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ABSTRACT
This thesis considers the Church of England as an International Actor operating in the
geographical area of Southern Africa during the period 1970 to 1980.
The central hypothesis, outlined in Section I, is that in a Transnational and Interdepen-
dency paradigm the Church of England is capable of operating as an International
Actor, that it does so and that environment, history, domestic and foreign social
involvement and theology all incline if to particular forms of involvement in particular
geographical areas.
Sections II and III, which form the main body of the work, test this hypothesis. They
are empirical in that they use archival evidence and, to a lesser extent, the testimony of
many of those concerned to examine the Church of England's attitudes -towards and
attempts to affect outcomes in RhodesialZimbabwe and South Africa during the
1970's.
In Section 1V it is demonstrated that the Church of England does operate as an Inter-
national Actor, though the form and extent of that action is determined and modified
by the factors outlined above. Moreover much of its effort in this respect is directed
towards what may loosely be termed 'Establishment'. It is further suggested that
though the very fact of its operation depends upon a Transnational paradigm the form
of that operation demonstrates the existence of a predominantly Realist view of Inter-
national Relations amongst those responsible for Church of England foreign policy
during the 1970's.
(ii)
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This thesis is an empirical study of the Church of England's attitudes towards and activities
with regard to Rhodesia/Zimbabwe and South Africa during the 1970s. It is based on the propo-
sition that the Church of England is at least capable of playing a role in world affairs outside the
confines of its originating society and state. It attempts to substantiate this thesis by empirical
research using the records and correspondence of those Church bodies concerned in the formula-
tion and implementation of 'foreign policy'.
It is acknowledged that the question of authority in the Church is an essentially contested
one. However it is suggested that discussion on this topic is usually conducted in normative
rather than observational terms and, further, that a central decision-making apparatus can be dis-
cerned. While this apparatus is incapable of attaching the hearts and minds of the faithful it does,
as a matter of fact, form policies and conduct the Church's day to day administration and relations
with other bodies. The debate over the location of authority is the reason for the use of inverted
commas hitherto around the word 'foreign policy'; the conviction that this debate is not as a
matter of fact realistic is the reason why the term is used consistently throughout this work.
In Section 1.1 the theoretical basis of the study is explained and a defence made of the logic
of including the Church of England as a capable actor under a lransnational world view. Incon-
sistencies between the Church's transnational status and its own view of the ordering of world
society are demonstrated.
Section 1.2 examines the Church of England's membership of the Anglican Communion, of
the World Council of Churches, WCC, and the British Council of Churches, BCC. These
affiliations are described as the Church's external environment and this environment, it is sug-
gested, strongly affects both the Church's imperative to act and the geographical and substantive
arena in which this activity takes place.
Section 1.3 is an examination of the development of the Church's history of social and polit-
ical involvement. Beginning with the involvement of discrete intra-Church groups or individuals
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in discrete areas of social concern the Church has been involved since the mid-nineteenth century
in both the amelioration of social hardship and the evolution of a theology of political and social
involvement. This, it is suggested, became a centralised activity with the creation of 'centralised
Church government' immediately after the First World War. It is further suggested that the First
World War and its aftermath also mark the beginning of Church involvement in issues of social,
moral and political concern outside England and the colonies.
In Section 1.4 the Church's own theoretical base is examined. It is suggested that, not only
its central doctrinal core and its accretional theology, but also its recent equation of theology and
human rights all push it into involvement in those domestic and foreign affairs where issues of
social or political morality are involved. No attempt is made however to look at fundamentally
theological issues.
Section 1.5 consists of a description and analysis of the Church of England's structure. Its
relationships with State, Government and its own Congregation are examined and also the
detailed central apparatus which, it is argued, made inevitable the concentration of foreign policy
making in a very few hands during the 1970s.
In Section 1.6 the role of the Archbishop of Canterbury is briefly considered and the compo-
sition and affiliations of the members and executive of the relevant committee are examined in
detail. It is suggested that the Church's constitutional affiliations to the State, its increasingly
centralised form and the personal histories and connections of those responsible for its foreign
policy affected the form that foreign policy took.
Thus Section I consists of a set of interlocking 'histories' all of which, it is claimed, coniri-
buted to the background against which the case studies which follow were worked out. Section I
is drawn for the most part from secondary sources but retrospective knowledge gained from
archive material is used where appropriate and the material in Section 1.6, on the workings of the
International Affairs Committee, LAC, of the Board of Social Responsibility, BSR, draws almost
completely on archive material.
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In Section II a detailed record and analysis of the Church's relations with
Rhodesia/Zimbabwe during the I 970s is undertaken. This has been done thematically for reasons
of clarity and as a result of the way in which the archive material presented itself. Events and atti-
tudes illustrative of the theses outlined above are highlighted in the text.
Section III takes a similar form to Section II but treats the Church's activities with regard to
Sputh Africa from 1970 to 1980. In this case the archive material has been treated chronologi-
cally because it was felt that historically there was a change of attitude and perspective towards
South Africa towards the end of the decade which would be obscured if themes were unravelled
and treated separately.
Section II and ifi draw on archive material, most of it previously unused and some of it
unsorted and uncatalogued, from the Church of England Archives, then situated in Church House
Westminster. Synod records were also studied and a number of those who appear as actors in the
following pages were interviewed.
In Section 1V the validity of the original theses is tested against the case studies and general
conclusions about the sources, strengths and limitations of the Church's policy are drawn.
TENTATiVE MODELS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHURCH
AND NON-CHURCH BODIES
There is nothing inherently difficult to grasp in the relationship between the Church of Eng-
land and other organisations but the following models are given to illustrate the flow of inter-









This model demonstrates the relationship between any major church and pluralist state
where government takes a democratic enough form to be responsive to inputs from society as
well as itself directive of that society.
Church and Congregation are separated, a device susceptible of theological and spiritual but
not of structural and empirical challenge; in all but a handful of churches, as opposed to sects, a
discrete decision-making body may be distinguished which determines major policy outlines.
The authority of this body may frequently be challenged, and this applies particularly in the case
of the Church of England which houses many shades of opinion; but it exists.
A similar model might be drawn for the Roman Catholic Church but it would be impossible
in this case to encapsulate it domestically. This is because a major policy determinant in the case
of the Roman Catholic Church in any domestic context is a set of broad policy guidelines laid
down by an authority outside the state. (The only case where this would not apply of course is
the Vatican State but this is hardly an illuminating exception.)
It is understood that the Congregation is a subset of Society. Accordingly input should be
indicated from Government to Congregation and vice versa. However it is suggested that a
Government seldom influences a Congregation in that capacity but in its members' capacity as
members also of Society. Attempts to influence in a reverse form may certainly be motivated by
Church or generally Christian considerations, but other members of Society also will be
influenced by sub-group or pressure group interests. It is also necessary to highlight by contrast
the distinct and important flow of information between Church and Society.
This is particularly important in the case of the Church of England because, despite its small
and decreasing regular congregations, the Church is important in the lives of many non- attenders
or infrequent attenders for its cultural and historical associations, for its, supposedly, unchanging
values, and for its validation of important rites of passage. Thus Church activities are watched,
commented upon, criticised and generally regarded as within their own legitimate sphere of
interest and activity by many non-Church members. Equally the Church concerns itself with the
lives, work, interests and general condition and health of Society in general and of individual
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members and groups within that Society. Its leaders claim both a right and a duty to speak on
such issues.
Figure 2
In Figure 2 a state of normal relations between two states and their respective national, or at
least major, Churches is depicted. No major contentious issue exists between them. Relations
which involve the respective Churches are largely inter-Church; there is little but ceremonial rea-
son for one Church to approach the Government and no reason for it to appeal to the Society of
the other State.
A particular exception must be made here - the legacy of Empire in the residual connection
between the Church of England and other societies, mainly in Africa, in terms of evangelisation
and education. However it should be remembered that mission on behalf of the Church of Eng-
land was undertaken largely by Missionary Societies who were not a part of the Church's central
decision-making organisation and so might be seen to function on a less specific and formal level
than that of central Church organisation to central Church organisation.
That most channels of interaction between Church in one country and State and Society in a
second remain inactivated under normal conditions is substantiated by research findings. These
demonstrate that the resources of those bodies within the Church's central organisation charged
with responsibility for 'foreign policy' were inadequate to do more than respond to crises as they
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arose. Too little in the way of staff or resources was available to initiate or maintain an active
foreign policy under normal, non-crisis, conditions. This will be demonstrated in Chapter Five
and in the later case studies.
Figure 3
Figure 3 demonstrates a situation where an issue of State policy or a Societal situation in
State II is of concern to State and Church I. Examples of such a situation might be perceived
attempts by the Government of Ethiopia to resist famine relief in rebel-held areas, the taking of
foreign nationals as hostages in situations of complex interethnic and/or inter-religious conflict or
the plight of child Aids victims in Rumania. It is suggested that both of the case studies in Sec-
tions II and ifi, the situation in post-UDI Rhodesia and the apartheid society of South Africa dur-
ing the 1970s, fall into this category.
It is recognised however that there are limitations on the usefulness of this model where
Church participation at least is concerned. There can only be communication of an even poten-
tially influential kind between Church and Church and Church I and State and Society II where
there is a basis of mutual spiritual, theological and cultural perception. This is not necessarily a
complete bar to such effective representation as that by Christian Church in one State to Muslim
State and religious leaders in another or vice versa. In such cases there exists a common ethical
bed-rock and a regard for things spiritual which may or may not prevail over the often antithetical
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historical circumstances in which each organisation is bound up.
The ability of spiritual leaders of the Church of England to understand and sympathise with
the outrage of British Muslims over Salman Rushclie's alleged treatment of the prophet
Mahommed in his book 'Satanic Verses' is an example of a case where the common experience
of spiritual values, whatever the difference between those values, has prevailed. By contrast the
affair of the kidnapping of the Archbishop of Canterbury's personal envoy, Terry Waite, demon-
strates an inability by state or religious leaders in a number of involved Middle Eastern countries
to understand the position and status of the Church of England and the limitations on its ability to
influence state policy; or at least it demonstrates the credible assumption of a useful inability to
understand.
Another method by which ostensible religious and cultural differences may be overcome is
a common recognition of a set of fundamental human rights. This showed some success in deal-
ings between the Church of England and other Christian churches and the erstwhile Communist
regimes of Eastern Europe. It has been less successful however in appeals both to perceived vio-
lators of individual human rights in South America and of individual and group rights in Muslim
countries. Moreover, even in relatively successful relationships of this type, there is a fundamen-
tal tension between the association of the Christian Church with the cultural legacy of Western
thought - individual rights - and a perception of the importance of community rights emphasised
by other cultural traditions.
Lines of communication are shown rimning in one direction in this model. It is recognised
that this might be misleading in that the initial stimulus to action by State I is the perceived crisis
in State or Society II. However initiative in activating channels of communication because the
crisis is perceived as having transuational or international implications of a security, a political,
an ethical or a religious variety lies with State, Society or Church I. Their initiative of course
meets with response whether in positive or negative form. But it has been thought useful to stress
above all that initiative's location.
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It is also recognised that there is no necessary coincidence of interest between State, Society
and Church. These may be completely at odds or in agreement to a greater or a lesser degree and
it is misleading in any event to represent these as unitary views. The proliferation of view on the
subject of apartheid in Society, in Government and in the Church is a good example of the
difficulty of isolating an 'official view' for the purpose of analysis. It is also a reinforcement of
the national pluralism which underpins the transnational paradigm on which this work is based.
It would also be possible to draw a fourth model which shows the response of two States,
two Societies, two Churches to a stimulus external to both. This has not been done because it is
not felt to apply in the case of the two studies which make up the empirical bulk of this work.
However many co-operative responses to major natural or ecological disasters would be analysed
under such a model.
The Church of England is awarded its full title throughout except where the text makes it permissible without confusion to
refer to it merely as 'the Church'.
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SECTION I
SECTION Li: THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
In terms of international relations theory this work has two elements and rests on two
hypotheses.
Firstly it is suggested that within a iransnational paradigm the Church of England is as capa-
ble of being a world actor as any other nationally-based but transnationally operating organisa-
tion, company or charity. It is therefore a study in transnationalism.
Secondly, and less straightforwardly, however it is suggested that the particular terms of
operation of the Church of England during the 1970s, despite the Church's iransnational status,
accepted rather than challenged both state primacy and a hierarchy of international issues chosen
within a firmly realist paradigm.
At the first and least complicated theoretical level this work is based on a simple and undif-
ferentiated form of transnationalism as encapsulated for example in the early work of R. Keohane
and J. Nye, before they and so many other interdependence theorists moved on to regime
analysis. It is concerned therefore with one of the transnational building blocks which enabled
the construction of the more comprehensively explanatory theories of interdependence and regime
analysis.
No particular claim to original theoretical insight is made for it but, given that transnational-
ism has been substantiated largely on a 'Look, here's another example!' basis, this work seeks to
do something similar but in a largely unresearched area. It is considered that too little attention
has yet been paid to the role of churches as organisations in International Relations as distinct
from Christianity or Islam as world-wide belief systems.
Only a brief outline of Transnationalism is necessary for few are unfamiliar with its major
elements. However the model is notoriously diffuse and has been criticised widely on the basis
of its imprecision and lack of clarity; some indeed might suggest that this makes it an ideal prism
through which to examine the Church of England which is frequently criticised on similar
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grounds.
Transnationalism and Interdependence are frequently written in the same phrase, uttered
consecutively and conceptually twinned. However the first is a vehicle for the second and more
fundamentally explanatory concept. Both reject the impermeability of states and their sole occu-
pancy of the actor role in world affairs. They refute too the validity of the Realist agenda of high
and low politics, of issues of national security and defence being axiomatically of determining
significance over commercial and economic issues generally. They postulate numbers, and his-
torically increasing numbers, of non-governmental linkages across state boundaries.
James Rosenau defines the transnationalism of world affairs as ... "the processes whereby
international relations conducted by governments have been supplemented by relations among
private individuals, groups and societies that can and do have important consequences for the
course of events."1
This is a definition that many of those who occupy the middle ground in the study of trans-
nationalism and interdependence would agree, although it must be born in mind that writers such
as John Burton2 would deny the prominence still given by such a definition to inter-governmental
relations and would see rather a web of interconnected and overlapping relationships; in this con-
struct states are merely an historical and geographical manifestation of the conjunction of a
number of important networks.
Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye 3 agree a Rosenau type of analysis and see transnational
relations and the interstate system as affecting one another and both as central to understanding
world politics. They define world politics as ... "all political interactions between significant
actors in the world system in which a significant actor is any reasonably autonomous individual
James Rosenau, 'The Study of Global Interdependence: Essays on the Transnationalism of World Affairs', Frances
Pinter (Publishers) Ltd., London, p. 1.
2 John Burton, 'The Study of World Society; a London Perspective', Pittsburg, International Studies Association, Pifts-
burgh, 1974; 'Systems, States, Diplomacy and Rules', Cambridge University Press, 1972; 'International Relations; a gen-
eral theory', Cambridge University Press, 1965; 'Deviance, Terrorism and War', Martin Robertson, Oxford, 1979; 'Dear
Survivors', Frances Pinter, London, 1982.
R. Keohane and J. Nyc, 'Power and Interdependence: world politics in transition', Little Brown, Boston, 1977; 'Trans-
national Relations and World Politics', Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1971; 'After Hegemony', Ptinceton Universi-
ty Press, Princeton, Guildford, 1984.
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or organisation that controls substantial resources and participates in political relationships with
other actors across state lines; an actor need not be a state."4
In the formulation of the theory of Interdependence, 'Complex Interdependence' in Keohane
and Nye's terminology, increased and increasing transnational links lead to increased mutual
dependencies and to multiple interdependence between states and societies.5
This sophisticated model formulated from the simpler insights of Transnationalism stresses
not only the existence of multiple contact channels between societies as detailed above but also
the absence of an immutable hierarchy of issues and the diminishing use and significance of mili-
tary force. Thus Complex Interdependence moves on from observation and quantification of mul-
tiple linkages to a postulation of their systemic effect. Moreover it postulates a system where, in
certain circumstances economic, non-state controlled linkages may be of greater defining impor-
tance in the allocation of value and power than states themselves.
The Interdependence paradigm may be seen from two major perspectives: either in terms of
specific interrelationships between two or more states or in terms of an over-arching structure
which conditions all integral relationships within an international political economy. 6 It is firmly
in the first of these perspectives that this work is anchored, given that the enumeration, elucida-
tion, and examination of iransnational linkages are the building bricks of specific interrelation-
ships.
If the thesis that much significant activity is transnational and not government initiated or
controlled holds good then the activities of a church, the Church of England, a church which is
part of a larger international organisation, the Anglican communion, must be quite as capable of
analysis in this light as the more usually quoted examples of transnational activity such as multi-
national business enterprises, trades unions, scientific and academic networks, air transport cartels
and revolutionary movements. Indeed, with regard to the last of these examples, the symbiosis of
R. Keohand and J. Nyc., 'Transnational Relations and World Politics', Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1971.
R. Keohane and 3. Nyc, 'Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition', Little Brown, Boston, 1977.
6 For a discussion of the possible interpretations of Interdependence see R. 3. Barry Jones and Peter Willetxs, 'Inter-
dependence on Trial: Studies in the Theory and Reality of Contemporary Interdependence', Frances Pinter, London, 1984.
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religion (though not the Christian religion) and revolution is one of the more significant transna-
tional elements in contemporary world politics.
One of the ways in which a church, any church, may qualify as a potentially capable
significant organisation in a lransnational scenario is that it is capable of rivalling a nation-state in
terms of winning its members' superior allegiance. Indeed, because its whole ideology is orien-
tated to an expectation of primary allegiance, it may be thought to be considerably more capable
of rivalling a nation-state in this respect than a transnational business enterprise whose theoretical
ethos is not so grounded. It is recognized however that in reality some such business enterprises
are all-demanding and one thinks of certain Japanese firms in this context.
It is recognized too that the comparison above is of limited utility and oversimplistic
because neither a church nor a transnational business enterprise exists without national
affiliations. Keohane and Nye point out7 that companies are seldom geocentric; they have a home
state and management is generally drawn from it. Thus company and national loyalty may
present no problems of conflicting demand. Equally the Church of England, while in theory
representing, indeed embodying, radically different principles from the state in which it operates,
identifies with the structure and social composition of that state by its own mirrored structure and
social composition, has historically supported that state in times of national crisis and by its esta-
blished status, and has been to an extent dependent on and intertwined with the state's govern-
mental structure.
The Church of England qualifies on three of the four parameters designated by Keohane and
Nye in Transnational Relations and World Politics 8 as typifying global interaction.
Where, their first category, communications and the movement of information, ideas and
beliefs are concerned its participation is very evident. It is part of world wide 'Christendom' and
thus shares a body of beliefs and preoccupations with Christians everywhere; there are certainly
areas of great difference between Christians but it is legitimate to maintain that contentious issues
' R. Keohand and I. Nyc, 'Transnational Relations and World Politics', Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1971.
8 Thid, p. 3.
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indicate common preoccupations.
Moreover the Church of England has tended during the twentieth century to see itself spiri-
tually and historically as part of the universal Catholic Church, thus identifying firmly with
universalist, rather than the particularist and sectional elements of Protestantism.
There are also many transnational issues such as human rights or aid and development in
which the major churches join to act as a transnational pressure group ongovernments, as spokes-
man for those they perceive as disadvantaged to international organisations such as the United
Nations, and as co-ordinator and go-between in efforts to relieve certain acute situations of hard-
ship.
Most significant perhaps is the Church of Englands' membership of the Anglican Commun-
ion, a world-wide network of Anglican churches whose distribution largely follows the shape of
the former British Empire The significance of this membership will be demonstrated in detail in
Section 1.2. but it is sufficient to say now that the world-wide network of information-gathering
and dissemination to which the Church of England has access is enormous and its access to
Church leaders in the Third World who often play a significant social, symbolic or governmental
role in their own societies, as well as a spiritual one, is assured.
Where Keohane and Nye's second parameter is concerned, finance and the movement of
money and instruments of credit, it should be noted that the Church of England is a significantly
wealthy organisation which invests in a wide range of industries, commodities and government
bonds. It is true that in this category Keohane and Nye were highly unlikely to have been con-
templating directly the activities of a church. However there is no reason why any organisation
whose investment portfolio is large enough or symbolically important enough to cause concern
over its placement or movement should not be seen as a significant transnational actor in a finan-
cial sense. By way of example Section III will demonstrate the efforts made by the South African
Embassy in London to convince the Church that complete disinvestment by them from the South
African economy or their recommendation that others should disinvest would be an undesirable
step. Moreover it was partly an awareness of the Church's own vulnerability to criticism over
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South African investment that prompted the campaign to effect economic change in South Africa
by means of economic pressure. Once more this is clearly demonstrated in Section III.
One might further suggest that the Keohane and Nye concepts of sensitivity and vulnerabil-
ity are demonstrated in this context, sensitivity being exposure to externally induced costs before
there has been time and opportunity to initiate remedial policies, and vulnerability being the con-
tinued exposure to such costs even after remedial policies have been undertaken. The South Afri-
can Government, in such a scenario, highly aware of the sensitivity of its economy and political
structure to external pressure, sought, in this case through its embassy in London, to limit the
extent of its vulnerability by persuading a significant and influential actor of the inappropriate
nature of disinvestment.
Where links through travel, Keohane and Nye's third category, is concerned the Church of
England's claim to transnational status is again clear. Its personnel, both lay and ordained, travel
widely and have numerous contacts abroad. Indeed many priests work abroad, particularly in the
Third World, for part of their ministry. This builds up a network of contacts which the Church
can use to gain information, to give it, to trade it sometimes for advantage. Moreover because of
the commonality of spiritual purpose among many, though not all, members of this network there
is usually an inherent goodwill which will ensure a level of co-operation and assistance in
difficulties and crises.
The only one of Keohane and Nye's categories of global interaction inappropriate in the
case of the Church of England is that designated 'transportation of physical objects, such as mer-
chandise, war materials, personal property'. 9 However the Church's interaction with other
churches on the parameters discussed above means that any threat which is perceived to be illegi-
timate to the property of a contact church is met with protest from the Church of England and
from other linked churches, Anglican and non-Anglican, across national boundaries. The case of
Alice Seminary in South Africa, described in Section ifi, is an example of this, as are protests
against the closure of churches by the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia and against threats to church
B.. Keohanc and J. Nyc, ibid, p.3.
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property by the former regimes in a number of Eastern European states.
This caveat on the Church's exclusion from the category of transportation however may be
regarded as a trivial one and it is willingly accepted that the basis of Church protest about pro-
perty dispossession is the spiritual significance and symbolic importance of open churches and
theological teaching establishments, not their monetary value or the material loss they represent
to the possessing church.
The Church of England's place within a transnational scenario is also supported by a taxon-
omy such as that of Mansbach, Ferguson, and Lampert. 10 The authors identify six types of global
actor:- interstate government actors, IGOs such as NATO or the UN; interstate non- governmental
actors, INGO's, such as the Red Cross or the World Muslim Congress; nation states; governmen-
tal non-central actors, such as personnel from regional, parochial or municipal governments
within a single state; intra-state non-governmental actors, such as political parties, the IRA,
Oxfam; individuals.
The Roman Catholic Church, the Anglican Communion and, indeed, world-wide Christen-
dom in so far as it is able to present a united position in discrete issue areas, may be seen as fal-
ling into the second category, that of interstate, non-governmental actors. The Church of England
itself may be subsumed under the fifth category, as an intra-state, non-governmental actor. The
Archbishop of Canterbury and a few other highly visible bishops, may be regarded as significant
individual actors; however their status and platform derive from the organisation to which they
belong, although some, such as the present Bishop of Durham, derive their platform largely from
their dissent from and maverick status within this body.
It is not necessary however to confine oneself to a transnational paradigm to justify this
study. The Church of England would merit detailed examination under a structuralist as well as a
transnational rationale. Galtung for example views transnational links as occurring in highly
specific patches in a world system characterised by South on North dependence within a
10 R. Mansbach, Y. Ferguson and D. Lampert, 'The Web of World Politics', Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1976.
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centre/periphery paradigm.11
Gaining's work admittedly concentrates on the pattern of contacts and reciprocal interests
between North-based owners and managers of multinational corporations and certain elite groups
in the South whose interests are linked with those of the Northern elite. There is no reason how-
ever why such a perspective should not encompass a network of churches, originating and still
centred in the North, and a Southern elite of prominent church leaders, many of whose intellectual
and spiritual perspectives are drawn from a culture which is alien to the indigenous peoples of
their country.
That this argument is empirically assailable is recognised and can be demonstrated by the
difference between the elites in Rhodesia and South Africa which will be described in Sections II
and ifi. In Rhodesia/Zimbabwe the Church leadership could justifiably be described in Galtung's
terms and its isolation from majority opinion was a source in turn of much misinformation and
misperception to the Church of England to whom its views were passed.
In South Africa however an indigenous leadership had emerged and its points of cultural
and spiritual reference were themselves increasingly indigenous; indeed the influence and exam-
ple of Southern African Christianity has been seen as increasingly important in terms of Angli-
canism world-wide during the 1970's and 1980's.
Even in terms of a dominantly realist paradigm analysis of the Church of England's position
internationally merits attention. The first paragraph of this chapter set out the research finding
that during the 1970s the Church operated, despite its transnational structure, in terms best
described as heavily state-centric and unquestioning of a hierarchy of international issues;
defence, security and the interests of the West emerged as important issues to those charged with
the Church's 'foreign policy'.
Jf one wished to labour discussion of this finding in terms of state-centricity itself one
would of course be presented with the problem that the Church would have no place as an inter-
' 1. Galtung, 'A Structural Theory of Imperialism', Journal of Peace Research, 8, 1966, pp. 81-117.
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national actor however preoccupied it might be with state primacy and however convinced it
might be of the importance of the maintenance and furthering of Western values. This cavil
might be circumvented by stressing the structural links between Church and State and the
Church's role as validator of state-bestowed value; but this would be to simplify structure and
parody a highly complex relationship.
Ultimately more interesting than an attempt to justify study of the Church of England under
every conceivable rubric is the Church's undoubted existence at a transnational actor, its
undoubted use of transnational links and levers juxtaposed with its close shadowing of govern-
ment policy, ideas, underlying assumptions and objectives in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe and South
Africa during the 1970s.
This, it will be suggested, was largely due to its structure which has, despite genuine and
well-founded intra-Church doubts about what and who is the Church and who may act on its
behalf, concentrated executive power in a small central organisation. This process, partly due, as
Section 1.5 will show, to a loss of confidence and direction amongst the clergy, began with the
restoration of the Church Assembly in 1919 but accelerated sharply from 1970 when the General
Synod was constituted and the structure became increasingly formalised.
Responsibility for the Church's 'foreign policy' was concentrated in the Board for Social
Responsibility whose Janus-quality encompassed both 'foreign policy' and the formulation and
pursuit of policy in the domestic, social and political sphere. Responsibility was further concen-
trated in the hands of a Committee of the Board of Social Responsibility - the International
Affairs Committee, whose members were responsible both for the Church's day to day response
to events on the international scene and for the formulation of policy options in this sphere.
Their recommendations were then submitted to the Board of Social Responsibility itself,
and, if approved, thence to Synod for discussion. Events requiring immediate executive action
were handled by the Committee itself under delegated authority; advice and policy recommenda-
tions were often given to the Archbishop of Canterbury or to his staff at Lambeth Palace and to
other leading bishops.
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It is suggested that the diffused and contested nature of spiritual power within the Church of
England led to a situation where a fairly new administrative structure concentrated much execu-
tive 'power' in relatively few hands. It is further suggested that the preoccupations and career
structures of the people concerned were a significant factor in determining the Church's overt
preoccupation with 'high politics', security issues and East/West relations in the context of South-
em Africa during the 1970s. This structure will be examined in detail in Section 1.5 and the
working out of the process outlined above will be demonstrated in Sections II and III, on
Rhodesia/Zimbabwe and South Africa respectively.
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SECTION L2: EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT
SECTION L2.i: INTRODUCTION
In this chapter the development of the Anglican Communion, a world-wide association of
linked Anglican churches, will be examined. It is suggested that this development occurred in
conjunction with the evolution of Commonwealth from Empire, is marked by a similar organisa-
tional and conceptual change from England as managing head office to equal participation of all
members and is equally important in influencing and restricting the policy options of the former
head office.
It is further suggested that one can only understand the Church of England in the latter part
of the twentieth century by reference to its status within the Anglican Communion, and its
membership of the World Council of Churches, WCC, and of the British Council of Churches,
BCC. It is not suggested that these order or decree the Church of England's activities, but rather,
that the Church is thereby made constantly aware of problems, influences and trends that originate
outside its own territorial base. In the light of this awareness it is forced to re-examine its own
practice and beliefs in theological, organisational and social terms and to recognise that these
aspects are closely interlinked.
This assertion, that environment helps to shape and externalise theology, is a contested one.
There is a strong Anglican tradition which has privatised theology and emphasised the importance
of the individual in his relationship with God. This view is challenged both by those who
emphasise the inevitability of political theology in the sense that theologians are unavoidably
conditioned by economic, social and political beliefs and environment, even a personal interpreta-
tion of the Gospels being made in a contemporary context, and by such notable figures in the
Church of England as F.D. Maurice, William Temple and Michael Ramsey who have stressed the
normative aspect of the Church's teaching on social involvement, their stance being that the qual-
ity of life and justice are and ought to be legitimate concerns of Christian people.
Thus the ideology of hope which entails the belief that eschatological forces are already
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operating in the world can be interpreted both in terms of personal salvation and (or) in collective
social and political terms, and those who maintain the inevitability or desirability of theology's
political aspect emphasise that it should be both.
In a British context Bishop David Sheppard of Liverpool is an example of one convinced of
the Church of England's obligation to display a bias to the poor; but a more fundamentally radical
emphasis on the breaking down of existing social and political structures is emphasised in Third
World Churches.
In Latin America the theology of hope has developed into a theology of liberation which
perceives that injustices in society are perpetuated by a structural violence which, it claims, the
European emphasis on an individual Christianity, leading to quietism in the face of manifest
injustice, has condoned. In Southern Africa too a different brand of liberation theology has
developed, one which stresses the Old Testament saga of a chosen people liberated by God, rather
than depending on a Marxist or neo-Marxist economic and social analysis as does the South
American model.
In terms of the externally directed activities of the Church of England such theology has
great practical influence. With little desire among its leaders to play a role as overtly political as
that of some churches and individual priests in the Third World, the Church of England is still
forced to a reinterpretation of its own behaviour in terms of the relative stress it lays on the indivi-
dual and the community, in terms of what a late twentieth century interpretation of the written
and traditional sources of Christianity ought to be (bearing in mind it is difficult to credit Christ
with a permanently relevant coherent social and economic message) 1 and in terms of whether the
post-Reformation emphasis on personal salvation can lead to an acceptance of a status quo which
is unjust in social and political terms.
1 Even if one accepts David Sheppard's analysis of the Gospels as revealing Christ's own bias to the underprivileged,
manifested, he claims, in Luke, Chapter 1, VV. 52-53 "... He (the Lord) hath put down the mighty from their seat and hath
exalted the humble and meek. He hath filled the hungry with good things: and the rich He hath sent empty away ...", this is
surely a sategic rather than tactical recommendation. David Sheppard, 'Bias to the Poor', Hodder and Stoughton, London,
1983.
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In a much more simplistic way the Church of England's early relations with Anglican
Churches overseas are important as the forerunners of its later foreign policy. Indeed, the Church
of England had no foreign policy to speak of before the First World War except its relations with
Churches in the British Empire.
Such claims of influence remain generalised contentions unless one examines the history
and structure of the Anglican Communion and the actual nature of its influence upon its member
Churches.
SECTION L2.ii: HISTORY OF THE ANGLICAN COMMUNION
In the beginning was the Church of England, established Church of a power which was
expanding from a small West European territorial base into the Americas, India and Africa from
the time of the Tudor establishment of a catholic, reformed Church. Those early. American colon-
ists who were not non-Conformist took English Church practice to the New World.
In later expansion missionaries followed, and sometimes preceded, colonisers and traders.
In the early years of colonial expansion new areas of Church activity were attached to the Church
of England; the American Colonies for example were part of the Diocese of London until the
Revolutionary War when, in 1789, they declared their autonomy and independence and drew up
their own constitution as the Episcopal Church in America: they maintained their relationship
with the Church of England voluntarily however. A similar developmental process, although not
initiated by revolution later took place in the older colonies of Canada (1862), India (1928), Aus-
tralia (1847) and New Zealand (1857).
In the nineteenth century Missionary Societies such as the Church Missionary Society, The
Society for the Propagation of the Gospel and Universities' Mission to Central Africa 2 attached to
the Church of England, and, to a much smaller extent, missionary societies attached to the
Episcopal Church of the USA, undertook extensive missionary work primarily in Africa, but also
2 The SPG and the UMCA later amalgamated unto the USPG.
- 22 -
in Asia and South America. This was an entirely different process from the spread of the Church
of England into areas which were heavily settled by Britons who often took their religion with
them as part of their baggage: this was the introduction of a religion of Judaeo/Greek origin medi-
ated by 1800 years of West European culture into communities which were founded on com-
pletely different religious, social and economic principles. 3 Much discussion within the Church of
England today about theological and social attitudes stems originally from this uprooting of a
Western theology and its replanting in a different cultural environment; the independent variable
of belief and custom has, by the operation of a new intervening variable, produced a dependent
variable of significant difference and its feedback into the Church of England challenges tradi-
tional theological and social teaching.
It was in the early 1850's that a desire was first expressed for the vague sense of kinship and
fellowship with Canterbury which undoubtedly existed amongst Anglicans to be hardened into
some more formal process of communication and Archbishop Longley of Canterbury convened
the first Lambeth Conference between the 24th and 27th September 1867.
Substantially this Conference produced little but the very fact of its taking place at all was
though significant enough for such meetings to have been repeated about every ten years ever
since. This decennial meeting was thus the first formal organisational manifestation of the Angli-
can Communion, even though common doctrinal and national origins had, despite differences in
developed practice, long bound its adherents in a tenuous brotherhood. Numbers of attending
bishops have grown from 76 in 1867 to 407 in 1978.
One could formerly suggest that the deliberations and recommendations of the Conference
as embodied in the Encyclical Letter and in the widely distributed full report of proceedings had
pervasive influence throughout the Anglican Communion, as the Encyclical Letter at least was
It should however be borne in mind that there has always been a strong indigenous Christian Church in North Africa.
The Ethiopian Orthodox Church dates its foundation to AD 332. Until its recent persecution by the Mengistu regime the
position of the Church of Ethiopia was still very strong, and in mid 1980 nearly 17 million of a population of 31.5 millions
were affiliated, not merely professing, Christians. The Coptic Orthodox Church of Egypt traditionally claims St. Mark as
founder of the Church in Alexandria, and, although modern Egypt is overwhelmingly Muslim in religious affiliation, there
were still 7.5 million Christians there in mid 1980, about one sixth of the population. The influence of these indigenous
African Churches has modifled Christian practice of Western origin in Southern Africa during the modern period.
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widely read out in Churches and discussed, though not necessarily implemented, by local priests
and laity.
However there has been no Encyclical Letter since 1958; in 1968 there was a Message to
the Clergy and Laity of the Anglican Communion, and in 1978 there was neither. This is prob-
ably suggestive of changing patterns of communication rather than a perception of Lambeth no
longer serving a useful purpose, although it is worth noting that sales of Conference reports have
declined by nearly 50% between 1958 and 1978 despite the large rise in attending bishops. It is
probably true to say that the Lambeth Conferences are no longer as central to Anglican unity as
they were in the days before ease of travel and communication led to swift and varied means of
disseminating ideas, and as they were in the days before the real centre of gravity shifted from
England and English associations.
During the latter half of the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth century many overseas
dioceses were created, usually in connection with the See of Canterbury. After the Second World
War this arrangement was increasingly seen to be reflective of a reality which was dying, for
Churches in the Third World which had begun as Western oriented and managed outposts were
now indigenous to the areas into which they had been introduced. Millions of new Anglicans
could have no meaningful sense of relationship with a white Archbishop of Canterbury thousands
of miles away; Anglicanism to them, if they divorced it at all from its immediate and local aspect,
was a world Church, not a British one.
Archbishop Fisher (1944-1961) recognised these pressures and on his initiative new Pro-
vinces were created out of dioceses in West Africa in 1951, Central Africa in 1955 and East
Africa in 196O. Once the principle was accepted that Churches belong to the place where they
are established and to the people who live there, many new Provinces were created.
One argument by which the Anglican Communion is divorced from the ramifications of Empire is that these Provinces
were created before political statehood was granted:- Nigeria in the Anglican Province of West Africa founded 1951 politi-
cally independent 1960, Sierra Leone in the Anglican Province of West Africa founded 1951 politically independent 1961,
Zambia in the Anglican Province of Central Africa founded 1955 politically independent 1964, Kenya in the Anglican Pro-
vince of East Africa founded 1960 politically independent 1963. Thus Archbishop Fisher did not merely follow a political
trend. This view however, while rightly separating the activities of Church and State, separates the process of development
of political and religious maturity and indigenous identity which were in fact closely intertwined.
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However the creation of new Provinces, the acceptance of the indigenous nature of all
member Churches of the Anglican Communion and their obvious wish to maintain a form of
unity in diversity increased the need for regular communication and enabling steps were taken.
The Lambeth Consultative Body had been formed at the beginning of the Twentieth Century with
the object of encouraging communication between Lambeth Conferences, but the logistic prob-
lems of travel were such that it was seldon able to meet. Attempts by the 1930 Lambeth Confer-
ence to inject some effective life into it proved abortive, but really effective changes were made at
the 1958 Conference; money was voted to finance the Consultative Body, its scope was widened
by specifying that its members should consist of the Primates of the 16 named Provinces and a
full-time secretary was appointed, which post later evolved into that of Executive Officer of the
Anglican Communion: to this post, on 1st January 1960, Bishop Stephen Bayne, Bishop of
Olympia, USA was appointed.5
Further manifestations of the unity of the Anglican Communion could be seen in the two
pan-Anglican Conferences of laity, priests and bishops which were held in 1954 in Minneapolis
and in Toronto in 1963. The changing basis of Anglicanism was emphasised by Bishop Walter
Gray at the Minneapolis Conference:-
"Today this Church is established on every continent and among people of every race
The pattern of expansion has been that the new sections of the Church, once fully
formed, have been national in their organisation and autonomous in their government.
There is no joint central executive or legislative body in the Anglican Communion.
No one archbishop or bishop is supreme, and no national Church has authority or jur-
isdiction over any other ...".
By the 1968 Lambeth Conference the complexities and variety of the Anglican Communion
and the enormous demands being made upon one man, the Executive Officer, were thought to call
for a consultative council of the whole Anglican world, and accordingly the Committee on
'Renewal in Unity' proposed that such a body be set up: its proposal was accepted and endorsed
by Resolution 69 of the Conference and the Anglican Consultative Council met for the first time
5 Subsequent holders have been Bishop John Howe who, in 1971, was appointed Secretary-General of the Anglican
Consultative Council. He was succeeded in 1982 by the Rev'd Canon Samuel Van Culin of the USA.
6 Report of the Minneapolis Conference pp. 1-2: quoted in Bishop I. Howe, 'Highways and Hedges', 1983, his unpub-
lished report on the Anglican Communion.
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in February, 1971 at Liinuru, Kenya.
SECTION L2.iii: STRUCTURE OF THE ANGLICAN COMMUNION
The Anglican Communion is commonly held to include those Churches which trace their
origin back to the Church of England in the sixth century and to the Celtic Church of the second
century; these churches accepted the Roman tradition until 1540 and thereafter a reformed Angli-
can tradition. The Anglican Communion is a family of regional Churches whose format is well-
expressed in the Encyclical Letter of the 1930 Lambeth Conference:
This Communion is a commonwealth of Churches without a central Constitution: it is
a federation without a federal government.7
Its claim is to be one, holy, catholic and apostolic, and while Anglicanism is in no sense
confessional, the irreducible minimum of Anglican belief is generally held to be embodied in the
four elements of the Chicago/Lambeth Quadrilateral, drawn up for ecumenical purposes between
1886 and 1888. Briefly these are that the Old and New Testaments are the "ultimate standard of
faith", that the Apostles' Creed and the Nicene Creed are a "sufficient statement of the Christian
Faith", that the sacraments of baptism and communion are essential elements of worship and that
the episcopate is an indispensable feature of Church organisation.
There are now 27 Provinces, more than 400 dioceses and 14,000 congregations within the
Anglican Communion, but no attempt is made to comprehensive world-territoriality, rather to a
reflection of the actual pattern of Anglican allegiance and the servicing of its spiritual require-
ment. The Provinces are self-governing and a variety of forms of government are found although
their lowest common denominator (or highest common factor) is the Provincial Synod which
alone can make canon law and alter Church Constitutions, and which in all cases consists of
bishops, clergy and laity. Synods are headed by a Primate such as the Archbishop of Canterbury
in the Church of England and the Archbishop of Capetown in South Africa, or by a Presithng
Bishop elected by his fellows, as in the Episcopal Church of the USA. There is thus no vertical
Quoted by Bishop John Howe in "Highways and Hedges', his unpublished report on the Anglican Communion, 1983.
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system of authority and adminisiration: contact is lateral, consultative and sometimes co-
ordinatory but no element or possibility of compulsion exists either in theology or adminisiranon,
and indeed great variety is found.
Within the Anglican Communion the Anglican Consultative Council is unique in that it is
the only inter-Anglican body with a Constitution and also its creation was unanimously ratified
by all member Churches. Its membership includes clergy and laity as well as bishops and derives
from all the Anglican Churches, each one choosing between one and three members according to
the size of the Church. It meets every two or three years in various parts of the world and its
Standing Committee meets annually. Funds are voted to it by member Churches and the Council
is thus answerable to them collectively; this too is a unique feature, as is the Council's possession
of a small permanent secretariat whose head, the Secretary-General of the Anglican Consultative
Council, has evolved out of the post of the Executive Officer.8
An even more recent feature of Anglican organisation has been the Primates' Meetings on-
ginating in the Primates' Committee which was set up to act in an advisory capacity at the Lam-
beth Conference in 1978. The Conference itself recommended that the Primates should continue
to meet and act in an informal advisory capacity to the Archbishop of Canterbury. With a
membership consisting of the principal Bishop of each Anglican Province the first Primates'
Meeting chaired by the Archbishop of Canterbury took place in November 1979.
Thus by 1979 the Anglican Communion had three distinguishable pan-Anglican organisa-
tions, the Lambeth Conference, the Anglican Consultative Council and the Primates' Meetings.
However only one of these, the Anglican Consultative Council, had continuous existence and a
funded secretariat - the other two were regular conferences. The usefulness of the Lainbeth
Conference is diminished to some extent by its size and infrequency of meeting. The Primates'
Meetings are still an unknown quantity because of their relatively recent foundation; their poten-
tial value however would appear to lie in their more manageable size, their informality and their
private character which enables Primates from areas of political tension and sensitivity to speak
See footnote 5, p. 24 to this chapter.
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freely without fear of possible reprisal to themselves or their congregations.
What, one may ask, is the organisational status, if any, of such a body with no central
authority,9 few central representative structures and great centrifugal tendencies in both practice
and belief? The answer must be that, however inadequately manifested in concrete terms, the
Anglican Communion feels itself to be exactly that - a Communion. This perception of a unity
which transcends the diversity of component churches and the strength that can derive from it was
illustrated by Bishop Tutu's sermon in Canterbury Cathedral in December, 1984, when he spoke
of thanking his brothers and sisters in the English part of the Anglican Communion for the sup-
port that their prayers and fellowship had given to the beleaguered Church in South Africa. This
unity which would appear both to derive from and transcend diversity itself derives from a variety
of factors.
While one of the Anglican Communion's many diversities is that between High and Low
Church practice it is true to say that a common perception of the catholicity of Anglicanism
makes a degree of unity not only a reflection but a desirable model of reality. One of the criti-
cisms of an inward-turning emphasis on personal salvation within the Church of England and
other Anglican Churches has been that thereby a sectarian and separate character may emerge
alien to the catholic nature of Christian teaching which does and should transcend national, cul-
tural, social and economic divisions.
David Sheppard, for example, deprecates the emergence of black churches in Britain, except
as a temporary phenomenon, because, while reflecting an understandable desire for social iden-
tity, status and security amongst people who have reason to see themselves as disadvantaged,
separate development is scripturally contra-indicated. 10 Anglicanism claims to uphold this
9 The question of authority within the Anglican Communion has been much discussed and John Howe (op. cit.) con-
tends that, although Anglicanism has no universal code or constitution there is authority in the common 'Anglican appeal to
Christ and the Gospel, and to faith and order in the apostolic and early Church". This would seem a refutable contention
because of generally recognised and permissable differences of interpretation, and it would certainly not constitute authority
in a recogniseable organisational form. The published report of the 1948 Lambeth Conference contains a detailed analysis
of authority in the Anglican Communion and in 1982 a booklet "Authority in the Anglican Communion" which contains
four papers put to the 1981 Meeting of Primates was published by the ACC and sent for comment to Anglican Churches
world-wide.
10 David Sheppard, "Bias to the Poor", Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1983.
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catholic tradition of continuity; at the 1954 Minneapolis Conference Archbishop Philip Can-ing-
ton of Quebec said:
It becomes clear then that the Anglican Communion refers ... to a historical standard
which is larger than itself. It falls back upon the Catholic tradition as a whole, espe-
cially in its most primitive phase in the period of the Apostles and their successors,
always referring in the last resort to the Holy Scriptures as received and used in the
Catholic Church.11
This clear and profound perception of catholicity is certainly not held by all Anglicans how-
ever and to judge the Anglican Communion or indeed any of its component Churches as unitary
actors is highly over-simplified despite the public pronouncements of prominent and influential
Anglicans. A fairly constant feature of all Anglican theology and practice is that Bishops have
led from the front. The Lanibeth Conferenc has displayed a constant perception of the unifying
elements in the Anglican Communion while, to many of the clergy and laity Anglicanism means
that form of worship and Church organisation with which they are most familiar. At this level an
impetus to unity has a tendency to appear in the form of a hope (even if unexpressed) that other
people will see the error of their ways and fall into line. In other words a clerical elite tends to
perceive unity in diversity while the rank and file tend to perceive diversity in unity. As Bishop
Howe points out such bodies as the General Convention of the Church in the USA or the Gen-
eral Synods of the Church of England or of Nigeria are very inward looking, and references to the
whole Anglican Communion and its view are fairly infrequent in their deliberations.
There is also a residual tradition in the Church of England which identifies catholicity in
historical and traditional terms, which bewails the rape of the liturgy, the use of new biblical
translations and the ordination of women to the diaconate as well as the priesthood. To those who
hold such views the catholic tradition is Euro-centric and time-bound.
In this context it is also necessary to consider how frequently, since individual nation-states
emerged from Christendom, religion in all its forms has been used to reinforce nationality and
with what regularity national allegiance has transcended pan-national affiliation. Established
' Report of the Minneapolis Conference, p.47, quoted in Bishop Howe, op. cit.
12 Bishop Howe, op. cit., p. 78.
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Churches, of which the Church of England is the only example in the Anglican Communion, are
particularly prone to identification with a set of fairly transient national objectives and attitudes:
that such identification can be overcome however is illustrated by the fact that discussion at the
1948 Lambeth Conference about the status of Japanese clergy and bishops who had joined the
Japanese government-sponsored amalgamated body of all Christian denominations in 1940 was
conducted wholly on theological, not nationalist, lines.
Consideration of the aftermath of the Second World War, when the majority of Anglicans
world-wide were identified to a greater or lesser degree with the Allied rather than the Axis cause,
leads naturally to a second element in explaining the persistence and burgeoning of the Anglican
Communion and one which reinforces a thet)logical sense of catholicity - common origins and
early identification with the same "Head Office".
The most common approach among Church leaders now is to stress that the Head
Office/Branch Office organisational format disappeared with the acceptance of synodical equality
and that the Archbishop of Canterbury's role is not that of Head of the Anglican Communion but
"would appear to rest on a long-continued historical tradition which has steadily increased in
dignity with the expansion of the Anglican Communion". 13 "The word Anglican ... no longer
means English but has come to be a term for the particular embodiment of the historic faith, order
and worship of the Catholic Church which is a heritage of this communion".14
In other words, the English derivation of Anglicanism is recognised but its present impor-
tance downplayed. In terms of contemporary perception of what function the Anglican Commun-
ion serves for member churches this is undoubtedly realistic but common origin is highly
significant still, both in terms of the network of informal relationship which have remained
between English Church organisations and individual English churches, and individuals and
Churches and individuals abroad, and in terms of its residual effect in strengthening a sense of
common identity.
13 1978 Lambeth Conference Preparatory Information, Clo, p. 78.
1978 Lambeth Conference Preparatory Information, CLO, p. 67.
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Personal ties between bishops, clergy and laity in different areas of the Anglican Commun-
ion have always been important, though, foreseeably, the diminisbingly expatriate nature of both
clergy and episcopate in the Third World may ultimately lessen this importance. Until the 1960s
the majority of bishops in Africa were white and expatriate: in the early Lambeth Conferences
there was a very real, as well as symbolic, sense in which most of them were "coming home".
Until the post-war period graduates of Church of England Theological Colleges were
encouraged to include a period of service overseas in their miuistry and thus, among older priests,
there remain links between those now in England and their former parishes, parishioners and col-
leagues abroad, and between those who chose to remain overseas and their fellow priests who
remained in England. Such links have traditionally been hardened into correspondence between
churches in England and the former colonies, and sometimes into visits between the clergy who
minister to them, and into financial support by English parishes of projects in their, generally
much poorer, contact parishes.
The English Missionary Societies too have maintained an active physical role especially in
Africa. Apart from the innumerable personal links which their work developed they act still as a
funnel whereby the English become involved in Africa. Their role is now very different from its
nineteenth-century one of simple, one-sided mission to spread Christian teaching. Help is now
more usually dispatched in the form of management, technical or organisational expertise whose
purpose is to enable indigenous Churches to develop skills for themselves.
Moreover mission has become reciprocal with the inception of the "Partners in Mission" mi-
tiative in 1973. This is based on the principle that mission can be as much about sharing and
receiving as about giving, in other words that the huge diversity of cultural differences and
insights in the Anglican Communion can be put to positive use in a complex process which
ignores traditional dependency roles. Each Province in which consultation takes place chooses
those other Provinces which shall participate, and analysis is attempted of problems which are of
concern to the host Province. The scheme is too new to attempt to assess its effect on the unity of
the Anglican Communion, but its intention and hope is that unity and genuine equality will be
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strengthened by overcoming the traditional relationships and constraints of dependency, and by
redefining status in terms of mutuality. The 1975 PIM Consultation on South Africa and the for-
mal and informal reports of those members of the Church of England who participated were an
important input to Church thinking on South Africa during the latter part of the 1970s.
In the abbreviated histoiy of Anglican growth which was given earlier in this chapter and in
references in the previous section to the role of Missionary Societies and priests in former
colonies is demonstrated the parallel development of Anglicanism and the British Empire. That
Anglican development took this form has had a considerable effect on the internal and external
faces of the Church of England and affects its attitude and activities in the contemporary world.
A letter to The Times in December 198415 referred to "that faintly ridiculous relic of
Empire: the Anglican Communion". Such an opinion is a product of the Euro-centric, catholic
view of the Church of England, and is simplistic and one-sided in ignoring the fact that the
Church of England's long involvement in a non-European environment has forced it to consider
itself in the context of a much wider view than Europe; not only this, but it commits the very real
folly of condemning by origin an organisation whose very existence has been a developmental
one. It would be possible, but equally unjust, to level such criticism at the Commonwealth, in
that both organisations must stand or fall by their present structure and purpose and are not con-
ceptually invalidated by their origin within a time-bound and now popularly discredited historical
form.
It is however undeniable that in the Anglican Communion, nearly all of whose 400 dioceses
are descended originally from the Church of England in an early or later phase of English
imperial expansion, the Church of England does enjoy a position of seniority. Not only were
most senior personnel in Third World Churches expatriate English until very recently, but many
constitutions of the 27 member Provinces have a recognisably English form. The short form of
definition of Anglicanism is that one is an Anglican who is in communion with a bishop who is in
communion with the See of Canterbury.
15 The Times, 16/12/84.
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While the legacy of Anglicanism's association with Englishness is hard to avoid, however
the Anglican Communion has in substance cast off its imperial origins. The number of non-white
Anglicans now exceeds that of whites, clergy are increasingly indigenous to their country of min-
istry as are bishops. The proportion of black bishops from Africa for example has increased
significantly since 1948 and over half the dioceses of the Anglican Communion though less than
half of its members, lie outside the British Commonwealth.
In many ways the real, as opposed to perceptual balance of power has shifted from England
and North America to the Third World generally and Africa in particular. Indeed the history of
Anglicanism in the twentieth century has largely been the history of its development from a Head
Office/Branch Offices format to that of the syiothcal equality of indigenous churches.
That it was not easy for the Church of England and individuals within it to make such
adjustment is undeniable and perceptual adaptation is undoubtedly still going on. Many of the
clergy who were trained and ordained when England was still the Head Office have great
difficulty in seeing mission and service in anything but one-sided terms, this often hand in hand
with what they were bred and educated to see as England's civilising mission overseas; there is
still a strong residual element of paternalism among both older clergy and laity which belies the
present structure of the Anglican Communion and which reflects the importance of cultural condi-
tioning and education.
However, while this in no way reflects the attitudes, activities and utterances of the leader-
ship of the Church of England, it is productive of a continued sense of involvement in and service
to Anglican Churches overseas: few English congregations, however paternalist their views on
Africa and Africans, would fail to collect conscientiously during Lent for the work of the USPG
or CMS. Thus commitment to the Church of England's externally oriented activities is rather
ironically sustained in the older generation by an attitude to the Anglican Communion which in
no way reflects present reality, the attitudes either of Church leaders or of the younger clergy and
laity.
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A very real influence on the Church of England is the duality of the Archbishop of
Canterbury's role as Primate of All England and Spiritual Head of the Anglican Communion.
That the Archbishop is constrained in relation to his role in the Anglican Communion to
take a world rather than national view is influential in determining the attitudes and preoccupa..
tions he brings to his domestic role, the appoiniments he makes and the causes he supports.
Within the Anglican Communion the Archbishop's role is very much that of primus inter
pares and he thereby acts as a focus and reference point for its numerous disparate elements, the
geographical and political scope of the Anglican Communion running from the USSR, via South
Africa and Australia to the Province of the Southern Cone in Latin America.
This illustrates the political ramifications of the Archbishop of Canterbury's role: as Spin-
tual Head of the Church of England his appointment is to a significant extent a political one and
he is thus uncomfortably close to, though certainly not aligned with, British Government policy.
He must also act as a focal point to Anglicans in Eastern Europe whose religion did not until very
recently include any article of faith on Western-style democracy, to Anglicans in South Africa
who range from tacit supporters of the status quo to advocates of its violent overthrow, to the
Anglicans of Argentina whose view on any degree of identification between the Archbishop of
Canterbury and the British Government's policy in the Faildands must be ambivalent at best. If
he is not called upon to be all things to all men the Archbishop must certainly be many different
things to many men, and if Anglicanism can be said to be identified with one man it is with him.
He is widely consulted by all member Churches and sometimes asked to form special investiga-
tory commissions or undertake special initiatives, but his position with regard to any Church but
the Church of England is advisory not authoritative; however the deference habitually and histori-
cally paid to Canterbury lends it the authority of tradition.
The experience and culture of the Anglican Communion especially in the Third World have
forced the Church of England to theological reappraisal. It is now exceedingly difficult for the
Church of England to stress only the relationship of the individual with God and to ignore the
problems of how much weight and emphasis should be accorded to human rights and social
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problems that are quite definitely of this and not the next world. This is by no means only a
legacy of Third World theological interpretation for the debate over how far the Church of Eng-
land should involve itself in domestic political issues has long been contentious; but the history of
the Anglican Communion and the circumstances of its spread, particularly in Africa, have given
immediacy to certain issues.
The experience of the Church of England for example in dealing with racial prejudice and
deprivation in England has been symbiotic with the intensification of this problem in Southern
Africa not only in forcing the Church of England and the rest of the Anglican Communion to
recognise and analyse the theology of apartheid and to reject it on the grounds of its inconsistency
with the New Testament, but also to emphasie the importance of equality in Christian teaching.
The experience of South Africa has also highlighted the difficulty of deciding which, if any,
contemporary political programme actually accords with a Biblical blueprint. Apart from those
few who condone apartheid South African Anglicans appear at various points on a continuum
which ranges from those who stress the inevitability and value of suffering and who maintain that
the conditions of one's life in this world are of little importance, through those who advocate gra-
dual reform by peaceful means and see religion as supporting them through their present
difficulties but not helping them to alter fundamentally the structure of the society in which they
live, to those who see the frequent Biblical motif of enslavement and freedom as of direct
relevance to the position of black people in South Africa. A case can be made for each of these
positions but the development of a coherent and unitary Anglican policy is practically impossible.
Less obvious, but equally fundamental, to a change of theological orientation in the Church
of England has been the deep African cultural experience and understanding of the family and
community. The importance of the community as against the individual is by no means new in
Christian thought: Tawney was of the opinion that the corporateness of Christendom itself was a
reality until the Reformation when the significance of the individual, his work, his economic posi-
tion, his personal worthiness for salvation became major preoccupations of Protestant thought.'6
16 R.H. Tawney, "Religion and the Rise of Capitalism: an Historical Study", MulTay, London, 1927.
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But a highly advanced sense of community continues to exist in Africa. There is a sense in
which individual existence is impossible outside a complex family structure which encompasses
past, present and future generations. Professor John Pobee, who is himself West African, has
written:
"I am related by blood therefore I exist, or I exist because I belong to a family".17
Not only does this perspective throw clearer light on aspects of family and community in
the Jewish tribes of the Old Testament, but it counterbalances the Western theological emphasis
on individual rather than collective values, and this forces political as well as theological reap-
praisal. Since, for much reiterated reasons of historical evolution, most Anglican theology has
been West European and most post-Reformation West European thought has been predicated on
the individual, time-bound interpretations of the social role and stance of Christians and of the
Anglican Communion have tended to be predicated on individual rights and needs. To accept the
importance of community however is to accept that there are residual communal rights. Hence,
through its connection with the wider cultural experience of the Anglican Communion, the
Church of England has been brought face to face with that interpretation of human rights more
usually associated in the contemporary world with the state socialist, tradition, where rights
accrue to the community as a community not merely as a collection of individuals.
The Anglican Communion's combination of informality and complexity defies simple
analysis and tempts discursive description and endless examination of its various constituent ele-
ments.
If one were attempting an analysis of the Anglican Communion as a transnational actor
however one would encounter great difficulty in elucidating an underlying objective or objectives;
common elements of belief hardly qualify under this categorisation. The word elucidation is used
advisedly as there is no authoritative statement of Anglican objectives. This is hardly surprising
given the evolution rather than foundation of the Anglican Communion. While Anglicans as
17 Profcssor John Pobec, "Towards an African Theology", 1979, p. 49.
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Christians can undoubtedly name a number of conventional and indisputable Christian objectives,
it is suggested that "objective" is a less useful concept than "significance" in this context, in that,
in anything but a totally moribund orgamsation, objectives must be pursued by purposeful
activity, while significance can be bestowed by the fact and form of existence; this is in fact the
Anglican Communion's claim, that its geographical spread and great diversity reflect both the
intntion and practice of the Early Church and thus also reflect Divine intent.
The parenthetic understanding of the Anglican Communion which can be given by compar-
ing it with the Roman Church has long been appreciated. A Committee of the 1930 Lambeth
Conference wrote:
There are two prevailing types of ecclesiastical organisation: that of centralised
government, and that of regional autonomy within one fellowship. Of the former, the
Church of Rome is the great historical example. The latter type, which we share with
the Orthodox Churches of the East and others, was that upon which the Church of the
first centuries was developing ... The Provinces and Patriarchates of the first four cen-
turies were bound together by no administrative bond: the real nexus was a common
life resthg upon a common faith, common Sacraments, and a common allegiance to
an Unseen Head.18
The structure, organisation, leadership and patterns of authority within the Anglican Com-
munion are respectively fluid, tenuous and authoritative rather than authoritarian. Moreover it is
suggested that, despite the existence of the Anglican Consultative Council with its secretariat, it is
impossible to define the Anglican Communion as an international organisation without great con-
tortion. That its member Churches see themselves as a community is significant only to them-
selves. The relevance of the Anglican Communion is internal to its members, not external to the
world although its individual churches may be.
Its importance to the Church of England is great however because it presents a constant
stream of information, problems, opinions originating in and enriched by different cultures.
These the Church of England must perforce consider.
Encyclical Letter of the 1930 Lambeth Conference, p. 153/3, quoted in Bishop John Howe, op. cit., p. 137.
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SECTION L2.iv: THE WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES
The Church of England's relationship with the WCC, a world wide affiliation of non-
Roman Catholic churches, is important because the WCC claims to speak on behalf of its member
churches on a wide range of social and political issues. The Church of England is thus identified
with a number of policies which its members and leadership might not, and sometimes do not,
approve. Church of England delegates sit on the WCC's General Council and on its committees
but they are on occasion overruled; and their personal perspective too is often very different from
that of their constituency 'at home'.
The WCC was born out of the ecumenical movement which had grown during the 1920's
and 1930's, some suggest as a mirror of the Ieague of Nations. The movement did not decline in
line with the League however and indeed seemed strengthened by the deteriorating political situa-
tion in Europe into formulating a theology of Church against the world in terms of witness
against the various prevalent secular evils.
At the Oxford Conference of Life and Work in 1937 it was resolved to set up a World
Council of Churches and in May, 1938 a meeting in Utrecht, chaired by William Temple,
Archbishop of York, produced a draft constitutional and doctrinal basis. Temple was elected
Chairman of its Provisional Committee and two General Secretaries in addition were appointed;
later in the same year the WCC moved to Geneva and there it remained.
While the impetus behind the WCC movement was largely British British influence dimin-
ished very quickly due to the death of William Temple in 1944 and to the separation of the Brit-
ish Secretary from the centre of activities in Geneva which was an inevitable result of the war.
Archbishop Fisher of Canterbury was Chairman of the WCC's opening conference in Amsterdam
in August 1948 and Bishop Bell of Chichester was Chairman of the Central Committee until
1954. However there were thereafter no Anglicans of similar stature to Temple or Bell who were
willing or interested enough in the WCC to play a leading role.
Enthusiasm for the WCC amongst members of the Church of England varied. The Church
Assembly in 1940 formally welcomed the establishment of the WCC, but after the death of
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Temple, an enthusiastic and evangelising ecumenic, and the end of the war enthusiasm waned.
However there was a revival of interest in ecumenicism during the 1960's, not just among
members of the Church of England but in all British Churches. These were the years of the
Second Vatican Council, of the establishment of new independent churches in new independent
states, of reunion projects; and the WCC was much involved in all of these.
The begiiming of the differences between the Church of England and the WCC which were
to be so obvious during the 1970's began in 1968 with the WCC Uppsala Conference whose out-
put might be said to embody the religious radicalism of the 1960's. The delegates, a majority of
whom were now from Third World churches, pledged commitment to world justice; their
enthusiasm was probably enhanced by the fact that Martin Luther King, who was to have been the
keynote preacher, was assassinated just before the Conference. There is no doubt that Uppsala
represented a real change of direction; the new Secretary-General was Carson Blake, a North
American who bad been heavily involved in the Civil Rights Movement, and he later claimed that
all the delegates were aware of a new era beginning, of the start of a new radicalism.
In 1969 the WCC Programme to Combat Racism was set up and, as a consequence, in 1970
the WCC announced that grants would be made to anti-racist liberation movements such as the
Patriotic Front in Rhodesia, Frelimo in Mozambique, SWAPO in Naniibia, the ANC and the
Pan-Africanist Congress in South Africa.
It was this radicalism which led not only to differences of opinion between the Church of
England and the WCC but to a frequent inability by each even to perceive the other's point of
view. The problem was not always as simple as a difference of policy but of different interpreta-
tions of professed shared objectives; each claimed a commitment to fight against racism for
example, but each was conditioned by constituent membership and custom to a different interpre-
tation of this objective. The working out of this mistrust in the arena of Southern Africa will be
seen in Sections II and Ill.
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SECTION 1.2.v: THE BRITISH COUNCIL OF CHURCHES
Disparity between the positions of the Church of England and of the BCC, an association of
British Protestant churches was never as great as between the Church and the WCC. However
there was some unease in their relationship especially in some areas of foreign policy.
The BCC had been set up as an ecumenical organisation of Protestant Churches in Britain in
1942 as a logical extension of the new WCC with Archbishop Temple as its first President. It
symbolised an end to many of the issues which had most divided the Protestant churches and the
1944 Education Act also helped to eradicate the hitherto numerous disputes between the Churches
over schools. There remained, and long-remained, however between the Church of England and
other members of the BCC the irreconcilable lifficulty of the Anglicans' non-recognition of non-
episcopal ordination; Anglican-Methodist reunion plans were rejected by the Church Assembly in
1969 partly on this ground.
Not very dynamic in its early years - Archbishop Fisher praised it for its reticence and
sobriety - the BCC began to gather momentum during the 1960's. The 1964 Faith and Order
Conference at Nottingham saw a significant increase in commitment to the BCC and from this
time area experiments in ecumenicism increased. A climate more favourable to ecumenicism
developed, throughout the WCC as well as in England, Christian Aid for example expanded enor-
mously, hospices were set up, Amnesty International was founded. Most of these organisations
were not solely Christian of course; one might suggest that a certain secular involvement in wel-
fare and human rights issues arose out of or at least developed in parallel with Christian interest
in these areas.
The 1960's and 1970's saw also the development of a radical theology which challenged
some of the central tenets of the Christian faith. It should not be seen however as radical in any
social sense, it had nothing to do with liberation theology or the consideration of the inherent jus-
tice or lack of it in political structures, which issues have already been seen to infonn the thinking
and work of the WCC at this time. And it was the legacy of liberation theology and the pro-
gramme of the WCC which was in fact more influential amongst BCC decision makers than the
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contemporary, home-grown re-evaluations of such theologions as Dennis Nineham, Maurice
Wiles, Donald Cupitt or John Hick.
The BCC's position was never as radical as that of the WCC. However its emphasis on the
social value of justice and its willingness to evaluate social structures against this criterion did
lead to tension between BCC and the Church of England particularly in the area of 'foreign pol-
icy'. Sections II and III will demonstrate both the grounds and the working out of this difference.
It will thus be seen that the Church of England's membership of organisations much larger
geographically and conceptually, much different culturally and experientially than itself led to an
awareness of issues beyond the domestic. Not only this but situations and the uncomfortable con-
temporary working out of perennial theological issues, which might otherwise have remained
comfortably outside the consciousness of Church leaders and members, were forced onto the
Church of England's agenda.
Section 1.3 will demonstrate how not only external influences but also the Church's own
internal history created an imperative to and an experience of involvement with secular social
issues. This, in conjunction with the developments detailed above, led to the need for a Church
view and Church policies in areas of perceived injustice and interest world-wide as well as
domestic.
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SECTION U: SOCIAL AND POLFICAL INVOLVEMENT
Not only does the Church of England's membership of the Anglican Communion, the WCC
and the BCC increase its awareness of the imperative to act in areas outside its own cultural
experience but its own history demonstrates a continuing tradition in this respect. This chapter
deals with the development of an mternally developed tradition of Church of England involve-
ment in social issues, both domestic and foreign.
It is suggested that since the early nineteenth century the Church has been involved continu-
ously in the furtherance of what is now designated human rights, through social and political
involvement, although the form that this involvement has taken has varied according to social and
political need and has often been domestic in orientation. It is further suggested that during the
latter part of the twentieth century this tradition has contributed to the creation of an imperative to
involvement in certain categories of foreign policy issues, those issues where a high content of
human rights or material deprivation are perceived.
Moreover the history of the Church of England in the last hundred years has been one of
development from fragmented and individual effort in social issues to a whole-Church tradition.
This latter was made possible by the evolution of a central organisation within the Church of Eng-
land and has resulted in a matching increase in the Church's ability to pursue whole-Church poli-
cies.
The same period of development saw movement from a domestic social orientation, where
all overseas activity was confined to missionary work undertaken by missionary societies, to a
church with a set of identifiable foreign policies and objectives. This was partly due to the growth
of an independent Anglican Communion paralleling the movement from colonial to independent
status of the former British Empire and the subsequent impossibility of confining relations with
newly independent states to Church and religious affairs alone.
It was also due to the nature of European politics during the 1920's and 1930's which
presented acute problems with a significant moral content from which the Church could not stand
aloof. The Second World War was treated in a very different fashion from the First with problems
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within the framework of a general approval of a war against evil treated on their own merits and
no longer justified on the ground that the overall Allied position could itself be justified. Post-war
developments continued this trend of involvement in foreign policy issues because of their moral
content, the issue of nuclear weapons being perhaps the most significant case in point. It is sug-
gested that the history of the Church of England's involvement in Rhodesia and South Africa is
firmly in this tradition.
While theological arguments for and against the Church's involvement in domestic and
international politics are examined in Section 1.4 it is appropriate to point out here that a princi-
pled base of ethical and theological considerations has only ever persuaded a minority at all levels
within the church during the last hundred years that such involvement is right. Throughout the
period the promise of a better life for all hereafter has been used by many Christians in the
Church of England to justify their acquiescence in a societal and world structure where many of
their fellow men suffer relative and often absolute want. The polarization within the Church
between Low and High churchmen, or Evangelicals and supporters of the Oxford Movement, was
much more important to most churchgoers from the mid-nineteenth century to the First World
War for example than was the evolution of a coherent Church position on social obligation and
involvement. 1 Before 1919 also there was constant preoccupation with the relationship between
Church and State and the Church's desire for a measure of self-government. The 1920's saw the
attempted revision of the prayer book. 2 The 1940's and 1950's the complete revision of canon
law and the creation of the Anglican Communion. Constant throughout the period too was the
concern for falling numbers of ordinands, confirmations and congregations, for the proper role of
bishops, for the disparate needs of town and country.3
The Evangelical Movement stressed the importance of the Calvinist elements in the Thirty Nine Articles and preferred
great simplicity of form in worship. The Oxford Movement stood for stress on the catholic heritage of the Church of Eng-
land, systematised devotions and a great preoccupation with improving the relationship and devotion of the individual to
God. Such a programme and the loss of one of the earliest and great leaders, Cardinal Newman, to the Roman Catholic
Church aroused latent fears of 'popery' amongst those to whom its reformed element was the most significant feature of the
Church of England, but the Anglo-Catholic movement, as it became known, was removed from the Roman position by its
willingness to absorb new Biblical scholarship and its rejection of claims of papal authority. For the purpose of this thesis
however the beliefs and work of this movemeits are highly significant in that their emphasis on the universality and catholi-
city of the Church brought them to a position where they had also to emphasise the Church's obligation to the social order.
2 The Revised Prayer Book was rejected by Parliament in 1928.
See Section 1.5.
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Thus it would be fallacious to paint a picture of an ever more united Church waking to its
social obligations as a result of more enlightened interpretation of its own scriptural sources and
tradition. But it is not inaccurate to detail the activities of small groups of theologians, of Chris-
tian political thinkers and activists, individual priests and laymen and societies who for a variety
of reasons recognised the validity of what the late twentieth century designates 'human rights'
and what they would have regarded as social justice. They tied this recognition inextricably to the
theology, teaching and work of the Church and influenced the Church to assume an activist role
in the field of human rights when, in the twentieth century, it developed a central organisation and
administration and a degree of autonomy in the government of its own affairs.
Probably the first important manifestations of social concern by members of the Church
were the campaigns of William Wilberforce against the slave trade and Lord Shaftesbuiy against
conditions in the mines and factories. Their work was intrinsically important and also important
to the Church as an example and demonstration of the possibility of exerting successful pressure
on the government to ameliorate an unacceptable social practice and unacceptable social condi-
tions.
They were followed by the short-lived Christian Socialist Movement which was important
because it was the first group of any note formed by Christians for the purpose of the amelioration
of social conditions and also because it was the first direct challenge to the Church's underlying
assumption, dating from the seventeenth century and perhaps specifically from the ideas of John
Locke, that there was no contradiction between the Christian way of life and a competitive form
of society. This assumption had been reinforced by the process of industrialisation and was later
also to be fuelled by Darwin's work on the origin and reasons for survival of species. This move-
ment lasted only ten years but was the inspiration of many later movements.
As the nineteenth century drew to a close an increasing awareness of the reality of social
conditions came about through the systematic research of such men as Charles Booth and Rown-
tree. This was reflected in the Church's increased involvement in practical ameliorative work and
the perceived impossibility of ignoring the widespread nature of social evil; and the inability of
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Churchmen to share the widespread secular faith in the essential improvability of the individual,
and hence of society, through education and the march of technology, was contributory to the
marked contrast between Christian pessimism and secular optimism in the years between the
beginning of the twentieth century and the beginning of the First World War. During the whole
of this period the Church's interpretation of what would now be called human rights was
reflective of the contemporary condition and needs of society, the right to a living wage, the right
to a decent education, the right to respectable living conditions.
The intimate relationship within the Church between theology and social thought and
activity was demonstrated by the fact that the group of men who formed the Social Christian
Union, SCU, in 1889 were also responsible for one of the most influential theological works of
the nineteenth century, Lux Mundi, which was also published in 1889. This took the form of a
symposium of articles edited by Charles Gore and many of these articles demonstrated the cen-
trality of Incarnation, of the immanence of God and the consequent importance of man and there-
fore of all men. This formed therefore a theological basis of social involvement, taken up in prac-
tical terms by the Christian Social Union whose object was to find out by group research what a
Christian social order in the twentieth century should be.
The SCU remained small but it was important in that many of its members were leading
churchmen and their input to the Lambeth Conferences was so influential that the Anglican Com-
munion as a whole did begin to demonstrate a greater awareness of social issues.
Thus it is not fanciful to suggest that, despite the reactionary image it often projected, the
Church of England was part of a movement which led to the founding of the Parliamentary
Labour Party in 1906. And at the same time the Church Socialist League, CSL, was formed by a
group of Anglo-Catholic clergy from the North of England with the aim of establishing ... "a
democratic commonwealth in which the community shall own the land and capital collectively
and use them co-operatively for the good of all".4
I. Oliver, The Church and the Social Order, A.R. Mowbray and Co. Ltd., 1968, p. 19.
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The preoccupation of the socially aware members of the Church with socialism was strong
during the early years of the twentieth century and this is well demonstrated by the 1908 Pan-
Anglican Congress' report 'The Church and Human Society' where the main question addressed
was whether Christianity pointed towards a socialist society and, if so, whether the Church of
England ought to be in alliance with the Labour Party. Most speakers replied affirmatively to both
questions and capitalism was agreed to be immoral. William Temple. 5 declared for nationalisa-
lion and said that ... "the Christian is called to assent to great steps in the direction of collectiv-
ism."6
However the diversity of opinion on social involvement in the Church, the strength of non-
conformist support for the newly emergent Labour Party, the preoccupation with internal disputes
and the struggle to wrest a measure of self-government from Parliament alt prevented the Church
from making a unified commitment to any political programme to attain socially desirable ends,
let alone one as radical as socialism was seen to be by most of the church's strongest supporters.
Both at this time and later, when social evils were diagnosed as largely located in industrial areas
and derived from an inequitable system of industrial production, the largely rural basis of the
Church should be remembered; the Church never managed to be adequately and effectively
represented in industrial cities.7 and amelioration of the acute problems of the few did not neces-
sarily seem of pressing concern to the many who made up the bulk of Anglican worshippers and
who were heavily divided in any case over whether the Church should enter the social and hence
the political sphere at all. Thus the group activity described above was very much minority
activity. That having been said however it did contribute both to the discovery and publicising of
social evils and in some measure to their amelioration.
William Temple, 1881-1944: Bishop of Manchester 1921-1929; Archbishop of York 1929-1942; Archbishop of
Canterbury 1942-1944; 1909 Chairman of Student Christian Movement Matlock Conference; 1924 Chairman of COPEC;
1929 Chairman of Central Council of BroadcastAdult Education; 1908-1924 President of WEi¼ 1932 give opening sermon
at Geneva Disarmament Conference; 1935 Chairman of BBC General Advisory Council; a prolific writer on theological
and Christian social issues e.g. his 1934 Gifford Lecwres, 'Nature, Man and God' and 'Christianity and the Social Order'
1942; and indefatigable social and educational reformer, member of the SCU and of the Labour Party from 1918- 1925; ar-
guably the most eminent and highly regarded church leader for the past centwy.
6 Report of the Pan-Anglican Congress, Vol. II, ClO, London, pp. 102-103.
See Section 1.5.
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While it would be too tidy to suggest that fragmentary effort ended in 1919 and that the
beginning of the Church Assembly saw also the beginning of a united voice and stance on social
questions, the social activity already documented historically ran parallel to agitation for an
increased measure of self-government in the church.
In 1919 the Church gained the apparatus for the formulation of centralised pronouncement
and activity in the form of the Church Assembly. This was needed if efforts in the area of identi-
fying and obtaining individual and collective rights were ever to be unified. The awareness of
Church leaders of the necessity for effort in this direction, due partly to the pioneering work of
the groups already described, was heavily reinforced by the social legacy of the First World War.
Indeed, from this time onwards the social movement became more and more a movement of
the whole Church and not merely of societies and individuals within it. However, the euphoric
and rather vague espousal of Socialism of so many eminent clerics in the pre-war years was gone.
The actuality of social reform, the emergence of the Labour Party as replacement for the Liberals
as the party of reform, the realities of the Socialist revolution in Russia, all these made many who
before the war had called themselves Socialist recant. Those who persisted in so regarding them-
selves were however much more committed than they had been before 1914.
District and national missions and conferences emphasised the wider input of personnel and
ideas. The first mission in this tradition was the nation-wide Mission of Repentance and Hope
held in 1916 in the middle of the First World War. Most English people were far too distracted by
the war to feel either repentance or hope at this juncture but the Mission produced five reports
and, of these, the Fifth 'Christianity and Industrial Problems', written by Tawney, is notable for
its recognition of the logic and obligation of the Church's involvement in industrial life. John
Oliver8 calls this report ... "one of the finest and most important expressions of Christian opinion
on social and industrial affairs ever produced by the Church of England."
The Report is mildly socialist in underlying ethos and deals with unemployment, the control
J. Oliver, 'The Church and Social Order', A.R. Mowbray & Co. Ltd., London, 1968, P.23.
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of industry, national education. It emphasised too the importance of a living wage. Building on
the basis it provided the Conference on Politics, Economics and Citizenship, COPEC, at Binning-
ham in 1924 and the Malvem Conference of 1941 collated and guided the Church's thinking on
the relationship between religion and social reality and provided input to the Lambeth Confer-
ences of these years and to debates in the Church Assembly. The role of William Temple in these
gatherings was seminal because he combined the two streams of Anglican reformist tradition,
Anglo-Catholicism combined with socialism and the more Protestant SCM, and he expressed
their consensus.
Church involvement in social and societal issues grew. In 1923 the Church Assembly set up
a permanent social and industrial committee; in 1925 the Bureau of Social Research for Tyneside
was set up as a result of COPEC; in 1928 a COPEC continuation committee arranged a Confer-
ence on the Welfare of Youth; in 1927 COPEC issued a report on Rural Life; in 1929 the Council
of Christian Churches in England for Social Questions was set up; the 1938 Pilgrim Trust Report,
'Men Without Work', produced by a team established by a Committee on Unemployment set up
by Temple and including Bishop Bell of Chichester, was regarded as a model of its kind, totally
professional in its methods and recommendations. Most interesting from the perspective of this
work a Council on Foreign Relations was also set up.
It is true that these meetings had little effect in terms of obvious input to government policy
but Adrian Hastings.9 suggests that they began an educative process whereby Church members at
every level, lay and ordained, moved from a largely High Tory attitude to an acceptance of the
Christian case for massive social reform and the development of the welfare state. Moreover the
meetings themselves, the reports which emanated from them, dissemination of the discussion
which took place there were undoubtedly part of the process whereby the ethic and practical
details of the Welfare State were formulated.
However John Oliver 10 points out that despite its organisational ability after 1919 to present
A. Hastings, 'A History of English Christianity 1920-1985', Collins, 1986.
10 John Oliver, op. Cit.
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a more united front the Church's contribution to Christian social thought was weaker than it
might have been because of the profound ignorance of many of those who wrote on social and
especially on economic theory, because a number of influential churchmen continued to oppose
the Church's social involvement on principle, because the continuing divisions within the Church
between High and Low churchmen, Socialists and anti-Socialists, weakened coherent and con-
cered activity and because during the 1930's the theological climate was hostile to the mildly
socialist Protestant outlook of the Fifth Report and COPEC
In this latter regard he suggests that only at the end of the 1930's was a more rigorous and
satisfactory basis evolved for the theology of Christian social thought under the external influence
of Niebuhr, Berdyaev and Maritain and by the work of the Jeunesses Ouvrières Chrdtiennes in
Belgium.
It is indeed true that under a variety of outside pressures the basis and scop of the theology
of social involvement in England became more aware of parallel movements in other churches
during these years, but such a view should not be allowed to underestimate the seminal role
played by the quintessentially English figure of William Temple in the years between the two
world wars. Temple was arguably the single most influential man in the evolution of a
specifically Anglican social theology because his methodology provided a specifically theological
approach to the problem of creating a servo-mechanism to link Christianity and politics which did
not involve direct application of biblical texts or Church doctrine to contemporary political issues
or the adoption of some secular analysis of society as the basis of Church policy.
Temple saw the need for professionalism and expertise, an approach which has marked the
Church's treatment of social problems ever since. Temple's axioms and the tradition he thereby
established for the Church of England were frequently cited in Synod and the Boards and Com-
mittees of Synod during the period covered by this present work and not only the Church of Eng-
land but the Second Vatican Council and the Ecumenical Movement have worked on the basis of
That Temple himself, particularly in his later years, was influenced by Niebuhr is undeniable. This is made clear in
Alan Suggate's article, 'William Temple and the challenge of Reinhold Niebuhr', Theology, November, 1981.
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elucidating a highly informed Christian opinion which is an input to a wider, not specifically
Christian, constituency. COPEC and the Malvem Conference were demonstrative of his approach
and much of the practical work in tackling social evils undertaken between the two wars was
based on his pivotal perception that the worth of the individual can be enhanced or diminished by
the social institutions and social conditions which, at least partly, determine his existence. 12
Nothing in the period between the wars illustrates better the influence of such ideas and the
more unified whole-Church approach to social questions than the Church's involvement in slum
clearance and the provision of new housing in the twenties and thirties.
The St. Pancras House Improvement Society was set up in 1925, a public utility society
which sold shares to buy up slum properties for reconditioning. Societies were set up too in Ful-
ham and in Bristol. In 1928 a survey was undertaken in Newcastle of the facts of social life in
Tyneside and a housing association was formed there too. Under the influence of the Rev'd
Charles Jenkinson, Vicar of St. John and St. Barnabas, Holbeck, Leeds and leader of the Leeds
City Council, a municipal housing scheme was undertaken there which changed Leeds between
1933 and 1939 from having some of the worst slums in England to being relatively slum-free.
The bishops formed an organised front in the House of Lords to press housing issues and
supported and publicised schemes in their dioceses and in the Church Assembly. Their activities
are generally held to have been instrumental in the passing of the Housing Act of 1930. More-
over the fact that as an elite within the Church they appreciated the fact that widespread social
problems could only be tackled effectively by the state and constantly emphasised this in the
House of Lords and Church Assembly was an input to the enormous changes which occurred in
British society after the Second World War.
The late twenties and thirties however are of seminal interest to this study because they
12 When assessing the Church's input to the formation of social thought and policy between the two wars, particularly to
the 1944 Education Act, Temple's lifelong and intimate friendship with Henry Tawney should also be noted: Henry Taw-
ney, Professor at the London School of Economics; writer of the Fifth Report; member of the 1919 Sankey Commission on
the Coal Industry which recommended nationalisation wrote 1921 'The Acquisitive Society', 1924 the Labour Manifesto
'Secondary Education for All', 1926 'Religion and the Rise of Capitalism', 1929 'Labour and the Nation', 1931 'Equality';
highly influential in the mid twentieth century move from individualism to a more socialistic society.13
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mark a real departure from the Church's habitual view of social responsibility as existing within a
domestic context. Europe and its problems now became centrally important to Churchmen and
Church thinking. Many leading Churchmen became aware of the needs and abrogation of rights
of individuals, often individual Christians, outside England and much effort began to be expended
in attempts to influence the British Government in this area.
It was really not until the advent of Communism in the Soviet Union and the rise of Nazi-
ism that the Church of England was intimately caught up in international politics outside the Brit-
ish Empire and Anglican Communion. The spiritual, ideological and political challenge of these
systems was too great for Church leaders to ignore and the Church of England was not the only
church seeking for some appropriate response to these phenomena. 14
Many works have demonstrated the importance of organised religion as enhancer and legi-
timiser of civil and state ritual. 15 That the Church of England as state church played such a role
through the First World War is undeniable, but with the peace its disagreement with much
government foreign policy became overt. Many bishops strongly criticised the provisions of the
Peace of Versailles, not merely because it stored up problems for the future, but on the grounds of
the individual suffering on a vast scale which would be caused by it. Before Huller' s rise to power
much was excused Germany because of the Versailles provisions, but after 1933 the leadership of
the Church increasingly remonstrated, directly and through the agency of the British Government,
about the treatment of the Church ii Germany and its forcible unification into one Reichskirche.
However it must be said that English Church reaction to the problems of the German Church con-
tinued to be complicated by guilt over Versailles and some churchmen were unwilling to pro-
nounce against the activities of the Reichskirche in case this began an anti-German crusade. Many
also compared Germany favourably throughout the 1930's with the USSR and this attitude was
reinforced by reports of atrocities there.
14 The position of German Lutheranism vis-a-vis the Nazi state and Pope Pius Xl's attempts to reach an accommodation
with the Dictators demonstrate not only how all European churches were drawn in but also how difficult was the evolution
of appropriate response.
For a modem treatment see Robert I. Bocock, 'Riuiah civic and religious'; British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 21,
1970.
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Sympathy for Germany amongst Anglicans as well as Roman Catholics developed largely
from a right-wing English Christian tradition. Its most unfortunate manifestation was the sym-
pathy of Bishop Headlam of Gloucester, Chairman of the Church of England Council on Foreign
Relations, for Naziism and the Nazi Protestant wing; he was apparently greatly impressed by
Ribbentrop' s assurance that Hitler was profoundly religious •16
A number of Church leaders however did not hesitate to protest about events in Germany.
George Bell, Bishop of Chichester, and Duncan-Jones, Dean of Chichester, were among those
who protested not only about the form and speed of unification but also about state attempts to
control the German church and, more generally, about the Aryan clauses. So vociferous indeed
was the protest in England, as well as in the USA and Scandinavia, that a message from the Ger-
man embassy in London in September, 1934, told Von Neurath, the German Foreign Minister,
that conflict with the Catholic Church and the creation of the Reichskirche was ... "the main bone
of contention in Germano-Bntish relations".17
Archbishop Lang of Canterbury too was involved; he protested to the German Ambassador
against coercion in 1934. Moreover the arrest, trial and sending of Martin Niemoller to concentra-
tion camp aroused such publicity and outcry in England, including numerous clerical letters of
protest to The Times and a condemnation by world Church leaders including the Archbishop of
Canterbury, that it was, Robbins claims, highly significant in interpreting Hitler's regime to
foreign observers.18
The effect of the Church of England on the Church in Germany too was noteworthy. The
attitude which the Church of England had developed to its role as an established church, that it
was part of the Establishment but not subject to it and was both free and obliged to criticise from
within, was influential in forming the thought and attitude of some of the German Protestants who
opposed Hitler such as Pastor Wilhelm Stahuin)9
16 The Guardian, 2/9/38, quoted by A. Hastings, op. cit., p.322.
17 DGFP, Series C, iii, pp. 425-26, quoted in Keith Robbins, 'Martin Niemoller, the German Church struggle and En-
glish opinion', Journal of Ecclesiastical History, Vol. XXI, No. 2, April, 1970.
15 mid.
19 J Bentley, 'British and German High Churchmen in the struggle against Hitler', Journal of Ecclesiastical History,




It has already been pointed out there was a second reason in addition to residual guilt over
the Versailles settlement for the less than unanimous condemnation of the German Government's
treatment of the Church there by leaders of the Church of England. This was reports of human
rights violations in the USSR and general antipathy to the form of government there. The two
regimes could be seen politically as antithetic and the undeniable failings of the Nazi regime
were, at least partly, excused by its opposition, until 1938, to the USSR.
Reports of possible religious persecution in the USSR began well before the Nazi takeover
in Germany: The Times published a series of reports beginning in June, 1929 about the possible
persecution of the Orthodox Church and there appeared also in The Times, Morning Post and
Daily Mail a series of reports on Soviet poliáy, designating it 'the anti-God society'. The issue
was immediately seized upon by the Conservative opposition as an effective way of undermining
the Labour Government's policy of cautious rapprochment with the USSR, but, while this had
nuisance value, the situation became serious for the Government when the Archbishops of York
and Canterbury issued a statement that 'no words can be strong enough to express the indignation
with which we have heard day by day news of the revival of persecution such as is incompatible
with the elementary principles of civiisation".2°
The Archbishop of Canterbury then pressed for a "full enquiry into the real facts of the
situation as regards persecution of every form of religion (in the USSR)"21 An official Foreign
Office enquiry was duly announced led by Ambassador Ovey in Moscow, but, as neither Soviet
Government nor private sources would provide information for Ovey's enquiry, this came to
nothing.
The situation between Church and State hierarchies was still extremely tense especially
when the Archbishop of Canterbury ordered prayers of intercession for Soviet Christians to be
said at Sunday parades in the armed services and this order was countermanded by the Prime
20 This was reported in the Daily Herald and read to Anglican meetings in diocesan cities. The statement itself was
probably at least partly prompted by the Pope's condemnation of Soviet religious persecution which had been reported in
the Daily Herald and The Times on 10th February, 1930.
21 House of Lords Debates, Vol.76, 1929-30, cots. 575-578.
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Minister, Ramsey MacDonald.22 However the crisis subsided when Ovey sent a report from Mos-
cow discounting the worst of the atrocity stories. Moreover the Archbishop of Canterbury demon-
strated an acute awareness of the problems of the Church's becoming involved in transitory polit-
ical issues, however important, when he wrote to MacDonald in February, 1930 "As to the whole
question of dealing with the situation in Russia itself, my difficulties are as great as yours. I can-
not,but feel the force of much of what you have said about the danger of only provoking the
Soviet Government. On the other hand, in a position as more or less a leader of religious opinion
in this country it had been, and still may be, impossible for me, to remain silent.23
It is undeniable in this case that the Church's intervention had no directing influence on
Government policy in the sense that no official representations were made to the Soviet Govern-
ment and diplomatic relations, so recently restored, were maintained; there was not even a full-
scale House of Commons debate. But it is equally undeniable that the Church's support of a mass
media campaign lent this campaign strength and moral validity and forced the Government to
treat seriously an issue which it might otherwise have regarded as yet another piece of opposition
trouble-stirring. Not only this, but the ambivalence over Naziism, and the possibility of its accom-
modation rather than eradication, which characterised British Government policy and much opin-
ion in society at large for so much of the 1930's was immeasurably fuelled by suspicion of atroci-
ties in the USSR which was seen by many as Germany's ideological antithesis. Edward
Crankshaw wrote in the 1960's ...."it was distrust of Russia and fear of Bolshevism on the part of
the appeasers which made them soft on the dictators, above all Hitler, who deliberately identified
himself with the struggle against Bolshevism."24
A totally different form of influence on the formation of foreign policy opinion was played
by the Rev. Dick Sheppard, a Canon of St. Paul's. In 1934 he founded the Peace Pledge Union,
PPU, whose members renounced war and to which, at its height, fifty thousand people belonged.
The tension was probably exacerbated by the Church's resentment at the Housc of Commons' rejection in 1928 of the
deposited Prayer Book Measure which had been approved by the Church Assembly.
PRO 30/69/1175: information in this section is taken exclusively from the doctoral thesis of Andrew Williams,
Geneva University 1985, 'Labour and the Soviet Union, Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Intemationales.
E. Crankshaw, 'When we wanted war', Observer, 23/8/64, quoted in D.N. Lammers, 'Explaining Munich', Hoover
Institution Studies 16, 1966.
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It served further to muddy the already murky waters of the 1930's by its encouragement of the
view that a renunciation of war on one side was bound to meet with a reciprocity; thus it could be
said to have encouraged appeasement generally and, while directed away from government and
towards public opinion at large, acted as validator of Nevile Chamberlain's position. Indeed
Archbishop Lang of Canterbury, in speeches both on the radio and in the House of Lords, seemed
unable to decide whether God or the Prime Minister was most to be thanked for the peace settle-
ment at Munich in 1938.25
Thus during the 1930's one sees a variety of Church responses to the developing situation in
Europe, concern for fellow churchmen and conversely for the spread of an ideology perceived to
be both politically and theologically dangerou; but what one fails to see is any concerted Church
action over the fate of the Jews in Germany. Until Kristallnacht, on 19th November, 1938, only
the Quakers as a group had joined with British Jewry in assisting Jewish refugees from Nazi Ger-
many. A few Churchmen such as Bishop Bell of Chichester and Viscount Cecil were involved but
it was by no means a Church preoccupation. Thus an area which in later years would have been
regarded as a natural sphere of Church involvement was ignored while the fate of Christians who
were certainly mistreated but only inter alia was a predominant issue.
In many ways the coming of the War clarified issues and co-ordinated erstwhile differences
about the ethics of the purpose, if not pursuit, of the war. This war also presented fewer
difficulties than had the First World War for a Church caught between nation and, supposedly
immutable, principle. It was possible credibly to represent the conflict as a battle between abso-
lute evil and at least relative good; and its Established status did not this time force the Church by
ceremonial association to the moral contortion of validating the actions of just one player in an
international war game.
This is not to suggest however that a unified Church approved automatically any step taken
by the allies to achieve victory over Fascism. How, as opposed to why, the war was being pur-
sued was an area of sometimes acrimonious debate. One man stood out in his examination of
Adrian Hastings, op. cii., p. 348.
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issues within war as moral of themselves; this was George Bell, Bishop of Chichester. He
objected to the trealment of enemy aliens in 1940. He campaigned fiercely against obliteration
bombing by either side and he particularly condemned the Allied bombing of Dresden.
In 1940 he published 'Christianity and World Order' in which he argued strongly for a
negotiated peace, a policy completely out of line with the stated policy of the Allies, uncondi-
tional surrender which in Bell's view did nothing to encourage anti-Nazi forces in Germany. He
did not only write on this subject however; in May 1942 he spent three weeks in Sweden and met
there the dissidents Hans Schönfeld and Dietrich Bonhoeffer. He brought back a message to the
British Government that certain highly placed Germans were planning a putsch with the aim of
overthrowing the Nazis and obtaining a just peace. They asked whether the British Government
would help them by indicating that Germany would be treated differently if they succeeded. Bell
had little success with the Government: although he saw Eden and Cripps and asked for such an
assurance in the House of Lords he did not obtain it.26
Temple too challenged Government policy when he spoke in the House of Lords on 23rd
March, 1943 urging that the Government give temporary asylum to all Jews escaping from Nazi
Europe. The Government rejected this idea as it did his other suggestions for saving numerous
lives by bombing the railway lines to Auschwitz or the gas chambers themselves or by admitting
large numbers of children into Palestine.
It would be totally inaccurate to portray the Church of England during the war years as
preoccupied solely or even predominantly with the War. That there were still very strong domes-
tic preoccupations was demonstrated by the appointment in 1943 of an Evangelistic Commission.
Its 1945 report 'Towards the Conversion of England' showed little sign of awareness of contem-
porary and developing issues and, by its sheer irrelevance, produced no significant policy recom-
mendations or innovations.
The same accusation could not be levelled however at the report 'The Church and the Atom'
It is likely that he sacrificed more by his outspokenness than anyone else as the general opinion has always been that
he was passed over as successor to William Temple as Archbishop of Canterbury in 1944 because of it.
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published some years after the War.27 This was one of the most significant reports ever produced
by the Church in that it laid the foundation for forty years of official Church pronouncement on
the nuclear question. The Commission which produced the report agreed unanimously that the
use of the atomic bomb was wrong, though some thought this was an absolute and others a rela-
tive wrong: "A majority of the members of this Commission is unconvinced by the plea that the
object of the use of atomic bombs against Hiroshima and Nagasaki was not destruction, but the
administration of a 'psychological shock' which would end - and in fact did end - the war
immediately. The minority is impressed by this plea, but is not prepared to defend the details of
what was done. "28
The centuries-old theory of the Just War was re-examined to determine its contemporary
relevance in mitigating the suffering of those innocently caught up in conflict which the existence
of sin in the world made an ever-constant possibility. As a consequence the report condemned the
blitzkrieg bombing by both sides in the recent war; also, and significantly for the subject of this
thesis, it rejected the validity of any claim to unlimited national sovereignty. "Christians cannot
admit unlimited rights of any kind, and must therefore resist all claims that a sovereign state is
entitled to do what it pleases."29 This is undoubtedly a foundation of what the Church sees as a
right and duty in the modern period to criticise social and political structures it perceives as
unjust.
The report however found moral the possession, as opposed to the use, of the atomic bomb
on the ground that it is a government's duty as much to prevent war as to resist aggression and the
existence of nuclear weapons can be a deterrent; thus was formed the basis for the official, though
far from united, Church view that atomic weapons may defend, rather than abrogate, the most
basic of individual rights , those to life and its continuation.
The view that nuclear weapon possession could be tolerated and might be regarded as pro-
ductive in certain circumstances and that possession and use of nuclear weapons should be
'The Church and the Atom', Press and Publications Board of the Church Assembly, London, 1948.
Roger Lloyd, 'The Church of England 1900-1965', SCM Press, London, 1966, P. 197.
Roger Lloyd, ibid., p. 198.
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considered under different criteria meant that Church and State views were basically in line with
one another. This is no reason for an automatic assumption that Church policy followed State pol-
icy because of structural linkage. It is quite clear that the Commission which produced 'The
Church and the Atom' reached its conclusions on fundamentally theological grounds. That theol-
ogy could support a different view is unarguable but there was at least perceived a lack of disso-
nane between the position recommended to the Church and theology and Church tradition.3°
In the years following 1945 the Church's involvement in social issues and in the interests of
the individual in the face of governmental or other institutional oppression continued. Indeed it
has already been pointed out that the Church's contribution to the very structure of post-war
society in terms of the Attlee reforms was significant.
The 1950's also saw the emergence of highly significant and influential Anglican activity of
a non-official kind. Christian Action was set up in 1945, initially to promote the restoration of
Germany; its leader was John Collins, from 1948 Canon of St. Paul's. In 1949, with Germany on
the road to economic and social recovery it took up the issue of apartheid in South Africa which it
tirelessly publicized for twenty years. It also set up the Defence and Aid Fund which financed the
defence of many of those arrested in South Africa for their opposition to the regime. Its activities
were not approved by the Church hierarchy, the Archbishop of Canterbury as well as the Cardinal
Archbishop of Westminster ceased to nominate representatives to its council, but it reflected a
non-institutional growth of social and political concern among British Christians as did the organ-
isation of Oxfam.
As with other periods of socially-orientated activity however this was not the Church's
major preoccupation. Geoffrey Fisher, Archbishop of Canterbury from 1945 to 1963, was preoc-
cupied as much with revision of the Church's canons as with the development of independent
30 Official tolerance of nuclear weapons possession and challenges to this position are themes which have run through
the Church's modem history, indeed that of all British churches. The Council on Christian approaches to Defence and Di-
sarmament spokesman, David Edwards, spoke in 1963 of his expectation that nuclear weapons would be in existence for
some years to come: in 1963 the BCC called for a "rapid progressive reduction" (not one notes 'abolition')"of nuclear
weapons even though these were an offence to God and a denial of His purpose for Man."Future of t& British Nuclear
Deterrent". BCC, 1979. p. iii: Both examples quoted in Nicholas A. Sims (ed.), 'Explorations in Ethics and International
Relations', London, Croom Helm, 1981 in an article by John Habgood, 'Theological Reflections on Compromise.'
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Anglican Churches in what had been the British Empire. 31 The 1960's and early 1970's moreover
saw debate on the epistemology and validity of Christian knowledge unparalleled since the work
of Schweitzer at the beginning of the century.
What had begun to exist however was a belief that whatever the Church's own internal
preoccupations it ought as an institution to comment on areas of social concern both domestically
and internationally.32
R.B. Dugliss 33 suggests that throughout this period there was a consensus within the
Church that there should be some sort of Christian comment in such areas as general legislation
and administration, defence and foreign policy, colonial affairs, domestic, wage and trade policy,
general welfare, criminal law. He suggests however that there was often lack of agreement about
the content of such comment. Consequently many topics have only presented themselves as
significant Church interests when some consensus has proved possible and has, been expressed
either through Convocations, the Church Assembly or the Bench of Bishops. (This was of course
the period before the setting up of the General Synod)
The activities of the Bishops in the House of Lords were particularly indicative of the
existence of a consensual opinion on human rights issues and social welfare during this period,
though judgement over the effectiveness of their representations must naturally depend on how
far one views as influential the House of Lords. This appearance of consensus is not surprising as
the speeches of bishops were, and still are, co-ordinated by the Church's central administration.
Professor, the Rev'd G.R. Dunstan, in an editorial review of Professor P.G. Richards book,
'Parliament and Conscience', 34 contrasts the significant part played in House of Lords debates by
See Section 3.2.
3 Section 1.5. will demonstrate the nalTowing of the traditional role of the clergy by the expansion of the Welfare State;
but many individual clergy still followed the older church tradition of individual crusades to right perceived wrongs. One of
the most striking examples of success here is the work of Father J0 Williamson, Rector of Stepney in the late 1950's and
early 1960's. He undertook a one-man campaign to urge the LCC and the national government to alleviate social conditions
in Stepney. The Bishop of London and the London Diocesan Conference supported him in petitioning the Ministry of
Housing and Local Government over slum removal, and Butler, then Home Secretary, gave as one of the reasons for his
acceding to the proposed revision of the Street Offences Act in 1958 his interview with Father Williamson. Debates of the
House of Commons, 1957-8, Vol 598, col. 1287: quoted in B.. Dugliss, 'The Church of England as a pressure group in re-
cent British politics, 1950-1960: the effectiveness of Establishment', Doctoral Dissertation, Duke University, 1963. The
community relations work in Leicester of Rev'd. EWC Carlile might also be mentioned in this respect.
R.B. Dugliss, ibid.
' Theology, L)CUV, No.613, July, 1971, No.613.
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the bishops and their support of reform there with the generally negative support for reform of the
discernibly Anglican vote in the House of Commons. He suggests that the bishops were closer to
the thinking of the Church than were the laymen in the House of Commons and further suggests
that their enlightened thinking owed much to the work of the Church of England Moral Welfare
Council which, after thirty years of growth, was at the peak of its influence in the 1950's and
early 1960's.
This organisation, which Dunstan so commended, became the Board for Social Responsibil-
ity in 1963 and its influential journal 'Moral Welfare' became 'The Crucible' with the same
emphasis on directing serious Christian attention to the major social and moral problems of the
day. This linking of episcopal activity in the House of Lords with the Church's principal organ of
social affairs information collection, organisation and dissemination emphasises that it was in the
area of consultation that the Church was then, and indeed remains, most effective. Distinguished
theologians, priests and laymen have been pressed into the Council's, and later the Board's, ser-
vice to prepare the sort of expert opinion on a range of social issues that William Temple had
advocated. Channels of communication between the Church's central agencies and dioceses,
deaneries and parishes were opened up for the collection and dissemination of information.35
Theological Colleges were kept up to date on social issues and much advisory correspondence
took place. All this led to the emergence of an elite well-informed enough on a variety of political
issues to contribute significantly to national debate.
During the 1970's the Board for Social Responsibility worked with the political parties
though it aligned itself with none, and had contacts in a research context with the Social Research
Board of the Labour Party and the Bow group of the Conservatives. It co-ordinated the Church's
social workers, had close links with the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Labour, the Home Office,
and, in the context of foreign affairs, with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The many per-
sonal contacts between Church, Civil Service and Government personnel were a valuable source
of data and ideas.
Section L5 however demonstrates the strains which continue between central and local agencies.
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The Council, and later the Board, enjoy(ed) a reputation for avant-garde social ideas. During
the 1950's the Council was influential in initiating Church Assembly Debates on such issues as
homosexuality and prostitution, and was responsible for a report on the Church in the Welfare
State, 'The National Church and the Social Order'. Dugliss 36 suggests that as, during the 1950's,
the Council's progressive general approach to social and moral questions was not repudiated by
the Church the habit of accepting first Council and later Board of Social Responsibility perspec-
tives as the official social policies of the Church became established. This theory would go far to
explain the hiatus which existed between the views of the average man in the pew and official
church pronouncements on such issues as race, NorthjSouth, inner cities. It also offers some ele-
ment of explanation for the semi-autonomy of the various committees of the Board of Social
Responsibility which will be referred to in greater detail in Section 1.5 and which will continually
be obvious in the detailed examination of the involvement of the Committee for International
Affairs in the affairs of Rhodesia and South Africa in Sections II and ifi.
As far as working with Parliament rather than forming Church opinion is concerned Church
activities in the 1950's and 1960's include the Council's evidence to the Younghusband Commit-
tee on Social Workers37 to royal commissions on Marriage and divorce and on Capital Punish-
ment, to the Feversham Committee on Human Artificial Insemination. Their recommendations
were often incorporated in committee rcommendations - the Moral Welfare Council's study
group for the Wolfenden Committee for example is widely credited with providing the basic
framework for that Committee's recommendations.
With the increasing proliferation of central and delegated legislation during the 1970's the
need for the Church to play a multi-faceted role increased. The Church had moved away com-
pletely from being an umbrella organisation under whose auspices individuals and small groups
involved themselves in social issues. By 1970, when the General Synod was established, the
Church was a centralised organisation which formulated and put into practice 'whole Church'
36 Dugliss, op. cit.
Departmental Working Paper on Social Workers, 1959, publication number 97679, London, HMSO.
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policies.
As for the legacy of a hundred years of social and political involvement, G.S. Ecclestone,
former Secretary of the Board for Social Responsibility, has suggested that the basis of the
Church's type of political involvement, which was laid down in the nineteenth century and exists
still, is freedom to warn, to advise, to recommend to civil authority, not to obey it blindly, close-
ness to the powers that be and a disturbed conscience. 38 This would appear to be a reasoned and
reasonable assessment of the situation.
It is suggested that this chapter which has traced the domestic roots of the Church's social
and political involvement bears out Ecciestone' s evaluation and that later chapters will variously
illustrate of the facets he identifies, particularly perhaps a 'closeness to the powers that be'.
Section 1.2. demonstrated the development of the Anglican Communion out of Empire and
the sense of residual loyalty and responsibility that were the legacy of an earlier, paternalist age.
This chapter has established the internal grounds and much of the impetus for Church involve-
ment in certain areas of foreign affairs. Both show how unlikely, even unthinkable, would have
been Church isolation from the affairs and future development of Rhodesia and South Africa dur-
ing the 1970's. This chapter has further demonstrated that preoccupation with the justice and con-
ditions of society began in a domestic, British context but spilled over increasingly from the time
of the First World War into a European and a world context.
Section 1.4 will take the analysis of the motivation for involvement further by examining the
theological grounding of the Church's involvement in foreign policy issues, the proximity of
human rights to theology and tradition and the interdependent importance of each to other, and
the gradual elision of Church and secular view.
G.S. Ecciestone, 'The Church of England and Politics', C1O Publishing, Lond°", 1981.
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SECTION L4: THEOLOGY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
SECTION L4j: INTRODUCTION
Previous sections have dealt with the Church of England's position as a system within the
environment of the Anglican Communion and with its histoiy of social and political involvement.
These, it has been suggested, help to form or to modify Church foreign policy.
However the theology by which the Church operates in this respect, that motivation which,
arguably, differentiates its activity from the merely political, remains to be examined. A brief
history will be undertaken in this Section and the concept of human rights in relation to the
Church of England, or more properly to Cbritianity generally, will also be examined. This is
because human rights in a wider context than the Church of England, or, indeed, of any church, is
also a major contributor to the 'ought' content of the Church's foreign policy.
SECTION L4.ii: THEOLOGY
There is no single and simple theological justification for involvement in welfare or rights
issues. Various groups in the fissiparious Church of England have stressed different Biblical and
theological arguments to explain their involvement, and to excuse it too in the face of the equally
long-standing argument that the Church and Churchmen should not be involved in politics.
The fact and circumstances of Creation are a major element. Creation feeds into the theol-
ogy of social involvement the idea that all men were created in the image of God and are equal in
His sight; thus radical disparity of treatment and estate is theologically indefensible.
Redemptive Incarnation is equally important and emphasises that God became man in the
person of Jesus Christ to offer a universal, not a selective, redemption; moreover, in this tradition,
the idea that in Christ God and humanity are unified emphasises the collective concept of 'mank-
md' rather than the disparity of individual men.
The importance of this element of Incarnation to a contemporary thinker is demonstrated by
the work of Kenneth Leech. 1 He argues that when the Word was made flesh man became the
KennethLccch, 'TheSocialGod', SheldonPress,London, 1981.
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centre of all things and, from that time onwards, whatever was done to the most underprivileged
was done to Christ. Therefore, as God became involved in human affairs, so also should the
Church. To Leech the separation of Church and God from political activity and the essential ordi-
nariness of everyday life is false, escapist, dangerous and untheological because of the Incarna-
tion.
The idea of the Kingdom of God is a particularly interesting element in political theology
because it can be, and is, used both to argue a complete separation of the secular and religious,
and equally to argue for committed political activism. The dualist position is that the Kingdom of
God is another and better world and that the duty of the individual Christian is to develop his own
relationship with God and thus to ensure his own access to God's Kingdom: this position was
demonstrated in the post-Reformation emphasis on personal salvation, and using the analytic
approach of Weber and Durkheim, is a characteristic of a sectarian religion rather than of a
universal Church.
The opposing view, that the Kingdom of God refers, at least in part, to the world of history,
can be seen in early Christian and in mediaeval thought and has been heavily emphasised in
Catholic thought since the nineteenth century. According to this argument the Kingdom of God
may, at least in some degree, be established and should be striven for in the physical world of the
present and it is the role of the Church, as the Body of Christ, to work towards this establish-
ment.
This emphasis on the attainability of God's Kingdom is intimately connected with a fourth
element - Scriptural authority. It is argued that the desirable characteristics of the earthly King-
dom of God are scripturally delineated; anyone reading Matthew 25 for example ... "The King
will answer, I tell you this: anything you did for one of my brothers here, however humble, you
did for me ... anything you did not do for one of these, however humble, you did not do for me."2
should be in no doubt that concerned involvement with society is mandatory upon Christians.
2 Authorised Version of the Bible, Gospel according to St. Matthew, chapter 25, v.40 and v.45.
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In addition to this, study of the Old Testament yields knowledge of a God involved with
and speaking to tribes, peoples and nations; the importance of community here is inescapable and
has yielded contemporary fruit in African theology and liberation thought there where it is very
much in accord with a cultural heritage where the identity of the individual is derived largely
from his membership of a tribe or people.
The idea of the Church as community and model for society is also an important element
because it has been used frequently as an illustrative and desirable antithesis to the fragmentation
and individualism of nineteenth and twentieth century capitalist society. The competition and
exploitation of men in the labour market, it has frequently been argued, are contrary to the exam-
ple of how men should live together which is demonstrated by the form of the Church.3
The importance of these various elements of theological justification for social and political
activity can be seen in the history of the Church of England's social involvement since the
nineteenth century.4 They are drawn together, some would say inadequately, in a form which
demonstrates the Church's perception of their contemporary relevance in the introduction to the
Archbishop's Committee Report on 'The Church and the Inner Cities'.5
The view that these apologia for Church involvement in the social and political arena seek
to rebut, that the Church has no place in politics, can also be broken down, this time into two
basis elements: that held by those who, not generally active members of the Church, resent what
they see as Church interference in lay affairs and condemn it as irrelevant and unwarranted, and
that of others, committed Christians, who believe that the Church has another and higher mission.
The first group were fairly heavily represented in Parliament and Government during the
1970's and some of the impatience with Church of England suggestions and political participa-
tion can be ascribed to this sentiment. The second view was clearly set out by Dr. Edward Nor-
man in his 1978 Reith Lecture6 where he summarised the arguments against political involvement
That this is a flawed argument in some respects is obvious because of the Church's own internal divisions, but it is ar-
gued that at least this has been recognised as a falling away from Divine intention.
' See Section 13.
Archbishop's Committee Report, 'The Church and the Inner Cities', CIO Publishing, December 1985.
6 This was later published as 'Christianity and the World Order', OIJP, Oxford, 1979.
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as follows: the Church is, and should be, a centre of purity untainted by a corrupt world; it is
essentially concerned with individual salvation and has nothing to say on the structure and organi-
sation of society; politics is a profession like others in which neither the Church nor the average
individual is, or should be, involved except at election times.7
The exposition above has the obvious and oft-cited flaw that it is not easy to derive what is
basically a political agenda from a set of biblically or traditionally based principles. This is true
and attempts to do so have led to some of the more outlandish sectarian deviations from main-line
Christianity.
Many modern theologians and churchmen of course would claim that direct biblical exhor-
tations to equal treatment of ones fellows are timeless; the Bishop of Liverpool, David Sheppard,
uses just this argument for example. 8 But for many some sort of linking and interpretative
mechanism is necessary, and in the Church of England for much of this century this has been sup-
plied by William Temple's concept of Middle Axioms.9
Theologically Temple was among those who took the Incarnation as his point of departure
and moved from this to a 'primary principle' which was the pre-eminent importance of inclividu-
als and of the structures through which they grew to full stature in the community. From primary
principle he moved to three derivative principles, freedom, social fellowship and service. Impor-
tantly he considered that these were likely to lead to an anti-status quo position because they were
eschatologically radical. This distances Temple, and with him a major thread in Church social
thought, from the conservatism, the strong emphasis on rules and law and order, traditionally
associated with Church of England social attitudes. These derivative principles, Temple con-
sidered, might provide a link between general attitudes and detailed policy choices by supplying a
set of 'middle axioms' based on their application to the analysis of significant issues and trends
Whatever one thinks of the earlier arguments, it is suggested that the last one is logically suspect, not merely conten-
tious: it is time-bound to modern western democracy, is predicated on a minimalist definition of democracy that many
would deny was sufficient to guarantee democracy at all, and begs the question of whether the voting behaviour of individu-
al Christians at elections is qualitatively different from that of non-Christians and could therefore be seen as constituting a
specifically Christian input into politics.
See David Sheppard, 'Bias to the Poor', Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1983.
9 For details of Temple's life and career see Section L3.
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and to the general direction in which society should move; thus Christian 'middle axioms' could
provide the basis of enquiry into and prescription for contemporary and seemingly empirical
situations.
Lest reference to an Archbishop who died before the end of the Second World War seem
irrelevant to the 1970's one should note the number of times during 1970's Synod debates that
Temple, and particularly his seminal work 'Christianity and the Social Order' were cited. 10 More-
over Adrian Hastings" writes of a common mind among English Christians on social and politi-
cal issues in the mid-1970's which he sees as the end of a line which can be traced back to Tem-
ple and to COPEC.'2
Hastings goes on to define this common mind as a commilment to a 'rather bureaucratic
form of social democracy with a human face'. 13 Trevor Beeson 14 pursues a similar theme when
he sees the Churches' line on social issues as the welfare state plus 'a good deal of state interven-
tion and a level of national planning not previously experienced in Britain.'
These arguments raise two interesting points. Firstly it may well be that the increasing dis-
junction between the activities of the International Affairs Committee, responsible for the Church
of England's foreign policy, and other members of the Board of Social Responsibility, with
overall responsibility for social issues both domestic and foreign, was due to the IAC's lack of
conformity with the general attitude described above. This issue is addressed in further detail in
Section 1.5. Secondly both Hastings' and Beeson's analyses are couched in secular, not theologi-
cal or ecclesiastical, form. This explains the considerable criticism which the Church of
England's policies attracted for exactly this reason and also strengthens the argument put forward
in the introduction to this section that both the concept and practice of human rights were
significantly influential in initiating and justifying foreign policy initiatives within the Church.
Indeed the numerous arguments against both fact and basis of the Church's social involvement
° For example General Synod Report of Proceedings, July 1979 Group of Sessions, Vol. 10, No. 2, p. 734.
Adrian Hastings, 'A Histoiy of English Christianity 1920-1985', Collins, London, 1986.
12 See Section 1.3.
13 op.ciL, p. 656.
Trevor Beeson, 'Britain Today and Tomorrow', Mowbray, London, 1978, p. 17.
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themselves bolster the argument that involvement rested at least partly on a justificatory basis not
theological.
Edward Norman, criticises this secularity of approach, and thus, to an extent, confirms its
existence. 15 He suggests that the theological ferment so marked in the Church during the 1960's
was an intellectual approximation by the academic and leadership elite in the Church to a pre-
valent secular humanism; not only was society becoming secular, but a very influential and prom-
inent minority in the Church were falling backwards to accommodate Christian theology to this
secularity. He suggested that most social issues were examined by the Church in the light of pre-
valent liberal humanism and, while the radicals did not always succeed in carrying the Church
Assembly and later Synod with them to the point of committing the Church to concomitantly rad-
ical decisions, many reports of many committees during this period reflected this process clearly
He went further, in 'Christianity and the World Order', 16 in claiming that the content of
what is generally termed human rights today is relative to time and circumstance and that its
enthusiastic espousal by Western Churches represents, not so much an expression of a carefully
worked out theological position, as a definition of Christianity in terms of contemporary secular
and political concerns. Indeed all current political involvement is criticised by Norman on the
basis that it is merely religious validation of personal preference.
"In the developed western nations the politicisation of Christianity is already very
advanced, it takes the form of identifying Christian teaching with the moral outlook
and political ideals of liberalism. Christian themselves, of course, only believe that
they are endorsing agreed moral truths - providing a religious foundation for the
higher principles which liberalism promotes. They see such concepts as democratic
pluralism, equality, individualist human rights, the freedom to choose values, and so
forth, as basic expressions of Christianity, the modern applications of the moral pre-
cepts of Christ. But to an external observer, or to non-liberals, their commitment to
these principles looks like ordinary political preference."17
One does not have to agree with Norman to agree the evidence of the Church's equation of
human rights with the timeless theological principles outlined at the beginning of this chapter.
And indeed it is argued here that increasingly from 1948 and the UN Declaration of Human
15 Edward Norman, 'Church and Society in England, 1770-1970', Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1976.
16 Edward Norman, 'Christianity and the World Order', 0131', Oxford, 1979.
1 Edward Norman, ibid. pp. 6-7.
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Rights the Church of England view of the theological and philosophical grounding of the equal
worth of human lives and the need to promote human dignity has to a large extent been elided
with this contemporary consensus.
SECTION L4.iii: HUMAN RIGHTS
In position papers on a wide variety of foreign policy issues during the 1970's the philoso-
phy behind the Church's position was as frequently expressed in terms of the need to fight for or
to defend human rights as in overtly theological terms; this would seem to have taken place
whether or not the writer or compiler was overtly concerned with human rights issues or involved
for example from 1988 with the BCC Human Rights Advisory Committee Thus, it is argued, the
language of human rights provided both a universally understandable rationale and language for
intervention in a wide variety of situations. Moreover, and most importantly, the term 'human
rights' was frequently used interchangeably with and as a shorthand for theologically grounded
arguments for equality of treatment and status.
Examples of interventions on overtly human rights grounds are numerous quite apart from
the case studies which follow: Lord Elton was heavily involved in attempting to ameliorate condi-
tions in refugee camps in Cambodia: numerous individuals within the Church as well as its cen-
tral organisation documented and protested over the abrogation of the individual freedoms of
Christians in Central and Eastern Europe: a highly active member of the IAC throughout this
period was the Rev. Paul Oestreicher, also for much of this time Chairman of Amnesty Interna-
tional: in the context of Southern Africa, in Uganda which has not fallen within the scope of this
work, intelligent and thorough efforts were made by the IAC to secure the freedoms of Christians
and other citizens from the arbitrary excesses of the Amin regime.
Where Norman's arguments are concerned it is also simplistic to designate human rights as
secular and to divide the concept completely from a discrete theological position. To do this is to
deny the origin and development of the concept of human rights from an essentially
Judaeo/Christian base and the similarity of some of the arguments for the foundation of human
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rights to unimpeachably theological arguments for equality of origin and treatment.
The Jefferson argument for self-evidence ... "that all humans are endowed by their Creator
with certain inalienable rights?? certainly falls into this category,' 8 as does the underpinning prin-
ciple of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen in 1789 ... "Les hommes naissent et
demeurent libres et egaux en droits." Equally Article One of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights of 1948 declares "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights". No
reconciling contortion is necessary here to match theological and humanist viewpoint; men may
obviously be born free and equal in a theological or an empirical sense.19
Many of the philosophical grounds of human rights have of course little to do with this
view. It is not easy for example to show the faintest shred of theological connection in Feinberg's
claim that to have an interest in a particular area is the basis of a justified right there, 20 or in Per-
dam and Frankena's suggestion that people should be treated similarly unless good reason can be
shown to treat them differently. 2 ' But the suggestion that human needs found human rights,22
that human rights are based on the presupposition of freedom, 23 or that rights are not primary but
are derived from duties which are24 all demonstrate certain points of contact with theological
arguments and a theological viewpoint.
A, perhaps the, major debate in the context of human rights is whether they are individually
or societally and collectively derived. The contemporary Church view emphasises the importance
of the individual and, in that sense, tends to elide with a Western orientated political view which
also emphasises the primacy of the individual. This will be shown in the case studies which fol-
low.
15 Preamble to the American Declaration of Independence.
19 For a full discussion of this grounding of human rights, including its theological aspects, see Jacques Maritain, 'The
Rights of Man and Natural Law', trans. D. Anson, Charles Scribner's 5ons, New York, 1951.
20 J• Feinberg, 'Rights, Justice and the Bounds of Liberty', Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1980.
21 Charles Perdam, 'The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument', Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1963 and
K. Frankena, 'Freedom and Morality' in the Lindley Lectures ed. J. Bricke, Lawrence, University of Kansas, 1976.
See for example John Burton, 'World Society', Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1972.
See for example, H.LA. Hart, 'Are there any Natural Rights?', Philosophical Review 64, 1955, no. 175, pp. 189-9 1.
See for example!. Rawis, 'A Theory of Justice', Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1971.
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According to this view the earliest demonstration of the existence of the rights of the indivi-
dual as opposed to the rights of the state is indeed a theological one; seventh century Hebrew
writing, and a much earlier verbal tradition, about the Creation, Adam created in the image of
God. The same source also validates opposition to a tyrannous state.
This theme was continued with the emergence of the concept of natural law as the basis of
natural rights, classical in origin but finding some of its greatest later exponents in mediaeval
churchmen such as Thomas Aquinas and William Occam. Important too were the religious and
political upheavals of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the confrontation of the concept of
divine right with that of contract between ruler and ruled, especially in the writings of John
Locke, and the changes, both revolutionary and evolutionary, in the mode of government in Eng-
land during the seventeenth century. Most important was the nexus of seventeenth century reli-
gious and political change, the relocation of authority both secular and religious, the philosophi-
cal exploration of the grounds of this authority in Europe as well as England; and it is here that
Church and polis share a common history. The near-effortless recent adoption of human rights by
the Church of England and by other churches is largely due to their share in the conceptual
development of ideals of personal and political freedom in an earlier period.
Moreover the pragmatic rather than theoretical grounding of individual human rights, the
fact that certain rights exist because they are secured and guaranteed under law, has been a major
English contribution to the observance of human rights. Magna Carta, the seventeenth century
Habeas Corpus Acts and Bill of Rights, the Act of Settlement are not only important in the estab-
lishment of English freedoms but in their antecedent status to the Preamble to the American
Declaration of Independence and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen; the
similarity of the freedoms which are secured is striking. When one looks forward to 1948 and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights one is again struck by lineal similarities. This com-
parison does not seek to establish a singular Euro-Christian source for the Universal Declaration
but to demonstrate that its pedigree establishes a logic of elision of objective for the Church of
England.
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The Church's outlook is less compatible theologically with the concept of human rights
founded in the collective and in society. However the European root of this view is generally
held to be a divinely ordained social order from which derive all duties, all status and all rights;
even the rights of Roman citizens were in fact privileges conferred by the state on a small and
highly selective group of people. Because a divinely ordained social order continued to be the
source of rights in European society until the Reformation there is a sense in which Church tradi-
tion and structure are at home with the concept of societally based human rights. Moreover the
utilitarian philosophers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, who denied the possibility of
holding rights against that society whose whole purpose is the pursuit of the greatest good of the
greatest number of its citizens, were profoundly English.
With the spread of Christianity into cultures predicated on essentially different principles
the importance of the societal basis of rights is reinforced for the Church. A strong case can be
made for an ordained social order in traditional non-European societies, the tribes for example of
Australia, Africa, North and South America, where the individual has no rights outside or against
the tribal structure, in Hindu societies where the caste system bestowed highly specific rights on
highly selective groups of people, and in Buddhist society because of its reverence for the ruler as
the embodiment of preordained order.
The contemporary pervasiveness of the idea that men hold rights because of their member-
ship of society, not against that society, is due to the writings of Hegel and of Marx and to the
working out of at least some aspect of Marx's thought in the structure and society of the USSR
and of a handful of other countries. Particularly during the 1970's and 1980's the influence of
those states whose political ethos was predicated on community, society or group, and whose
sense of group identity had often been reinforced by struggle to assert that identity, reinforced the
claims of, what the Universal Declaration of Human Rights designates, economic, social and cul-
tural rights. The iufiuence of Marxist thought on the theology of many practising priests, espe-
cially Roman Catholic and especially in South America, should not be underestimated but is not
specifically relevant to this study.
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Yet, in terms of the Church of England's appreciation, through its missionary outreach, of
issues of group identity and rights claims, knowledge of the importance in African societies of the
group or collectivity is more significant than Marxist thought. As Ifeanyi A. Menkiti 25 maintains
personhood in Africa is attained by one's belonging to, and fulfilling, one's role in the commun-
ity.26 This is undoubtedly an indigenous cultural input into attitudes towards post-colonial socie-
tal structure in Africa and is influential, not only in modifying Church consciousness, but in the
state, rather than individual, centricity of the OAU Human Rights Charter and undoubtedly in the
lamentable record of many African governments in the area of individual human rights enforce-
ment.
Moreover the internationalisation of human rights has often been less a matter of principled
pursuit of universally recognised freedoms than the spread of common humanitarian concerns.
These include the abolition of slavery and the slave trade, the treatment of wounded and prisoners
during wars and the protection of minorities; and all of these are areas of traditional Christian
concern.
It is not of course argued that humanitarian law can found human rights but rather that
habits of co-operation in the humanitarian field, recognising, as tacitly they do, that the domestic
politics of one state may be of legitimate concern to another state, have helped to create a climate
in which the international codification of human rights legislation can grow.
It is also suggested that, for the Church, a habitual involvement in essentially humanitarian
issues has spilt over into related areas of human rights. It is important too to remember that the
experiences of 1939 to 1945, which were a catalyst for the emergence of much subsequent human
rights legislation and a signpost to the functioning of the United Nations, were also of seminal
importance in the Church of England's own development. Section 1.3 has already shown how the
rationale and content of a Church foreign policy was shaped by the moral issues arising out the
inter-war years and the Second World War. It is further suggested that, as expression of human
LA. Menkiti, in R.A. Wright, ed. 'African Philosophy: an introduction', University Press of America, Washington
DC, 1979.
26 See also Section L2.
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rights aspirations in the developing world has so often been in terms of independence from colo-
nial rule and post-colonial economic control, the Church of England's extensive experience of
Britain's former colonial territories has inclined it to an active interest in contemporary human
rights issues there.
SECTION L4.iv: IMPLEMENTATION
It is in the area of human rights implementation, or rather the inadequacies of it, that one
sees an imperative to involvement beyond theology and Church tradition. This is an argument
that holds good for most churches, not merely for the Church of England. It is argued that there
has always been a considerable gap between the philosophical establishment of human rights and
their practical observance and that the major inadequacies of many regional and international
bodies in securing sometimes the most basic of rights is the reason for activity in this field by
many Non Governmental Organisations, NGO's, including Churches.
There is a large and multi-layered body of instruments which exist to secure human rights.
These range in status from multi-lateral treaties which create binding obligations on signatory
states and which include the UN Charter and its two Covenants, the European and American Con-
ventions on Human Rights and the Geneva Convention, through international declarations such as
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, various UN declarations and the Helsinki Accord, to
resolutions, decisions and investigations of national and regional bodies and the laws, courts,
regulatory bodies and policy decisions of individual states. In addition there are international and
governmental organisations which campaign, lobby, legislate and pronounce on human rights
issues.
All of this would seem to indicate a pervasiveness of human rights codification but it does
not indicate a matching level of implementation. The major division of view about the primacy
of individually based or societally based rights has led to a politicisation of these issues. 27 In
27 For a full discussion of this issue see T.J. Farer, 'Human Rights and Human Wrongs: is the liberal model sufficient',
in Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 2, May 1985, pp. 189-204 and Rhoda Howard 'The full belly thesis: should
economic rights take priority over civil and political rights? Evidence from sub-Saharan Africa', Human Rights Quarterly,
Vol.5, No.4, November 1983, pp. 467-490 and Jack Donnelly 'Recent Trends in UN Human Rights Activity' International
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addition to this most international human rights legislation is applicable to states not to individu-
als, and not all states automatically incorporate treaty obligations into their domestic law. Also
many treaties only come into force when a minimum number of signatories have signed. More-
over an individual will only be protected if his case is expressly and unambiguously covered by
the legislation, if his own state has ratified the relevant treaty and has not made a reservation in
cases such as his.
It is undeniable that a high international profile for human rights since the mid 1970's has
laid open to general opprobrium states who are guilty of grave violations such as genocide,
apartheid, racial discrimination, mass killings, widespread torture and imprisonment without trial;
it is agreed that they are not protected by articld 2(7) of the UN Charter which reserves domestic
jurisdiction, and indeed Sir Humphrey Waldock goes further in claiming that "the Universal
Declaration has now the character of customary international law."	 -
This has little to say however on the subject of implementation and indeed most observers
would agree that all types of human rights instrument are inadequately observed by most state
parties to them. Unless he/she lives in Europe and thereby has recourse to the European Court of
Human Rights an individual has great difficulty of access to the redress that international courts
might give him for abuse of rights within his/her own state; this is because that state's consent is
necessary to a recognition of an international court's jurisdiction. Most states are not signatories
to the optional protocol to the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which provides for
individual petitions or communications to the UN Human Rights Committee.
The ILO and UNESCO have developed some implementational machinery, although this is
more successful in the case of the ILO than UNESCO. The American Convention on Human
Rights has an individual complaint procedure but the OAU Human Rights Charter does not.
Indeed in the latter case it is worth noting that the major emphasis of the OAU Charter is on peo-
Organization 35, Autumn 8, pp. 33-55.
Humphrey Waldock, 'Human Rights in contemporary international law and the significance of the European Conven-
tion', ICLQ, Supplement no. 11(1965) p. 11, quoted in A.H. Robertson, 'Human Rights in the World', Manchester Univer-
sity Press, Manchester, 1972.
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pies', not individuals, rights and it is a Charter requirement that putative individual complaints be
subject to prior approval of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Governments.
The briefest overview of the international community's ability to guarantee human rights
demonstrates its inadequacy. The best chance that an individual's rights will be respected lies in
his domicile in a country where human rights validity and implementation are embedded in tradi-
tion, customary law and legislation; even this is no perfect guarantee. It is demonstrable therefore
that the situation internationally leaves great scope for the activities of NGO's; indeed over 700 of
them have accredited status with the UN as pressure groups.29
Pressure groups do not content themselves with representations to the UN but involve them-
selves in numbers of other activities. They issue reports, make public statements, attempt to
influence regionally based human rights organisations or the foreign policy of states in respect of
their relations with others, make behind the scenes representations, use their good offices or medi-
ate in areas where human rights violations are bound up with political issues.
Organisations which are active in this field include Amnesty International, the Red Cross
and the International Committee of Jurists. 30 But there are other organisations, not founded with
the specific object of defending and pursuing human rights, which devote some part of their time
and activity to the securing or defence of such rights. Churches and indeed the Church of Eng-
land fall into this category.
SECTION L4.v: CONCLUSION
The Church of England is an organisation nationally based but internationally and transna-
tionally operating by reason of the general internationalisation of Christianity and the Churches,
and of its membership of the Anglican Communion. These factors not only prompt but modify
'Non.Governmental Organizations in Consultative Status with the Economic and Social Council in 1978', UN Docu-
ment F11978/INFI7 (1978), quoted in Wessbrodt and McCarthy, 'Fact-Finding in INGO Human Rights Organizations', Vir-
ginia Journal of Jnternational Law, 22, Fall, 1981.
3° A typology of the activities of these organisations has been undertaken by Scoble and Wiseberg in 'Human Rights
and NGO's: notes towards comparative analysis', Human Rights Journal, Vol. 9, i, 1976, P. 611 in one of the only attempts
so far to deal systematically and comparatively with INCJO activity in the human rights field.
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involvement and help to shape an orientation in the general area of human rights which is itself
largely a product of authoritative Biblical and spiritual sources, of theology, of domestic experi-
ence and of a long iradition of community involvement. Structural considerations, dispositions of
authority, internal and unresolved tensions over role and resources, responsible personnel all in
their turn modify the form, the extent, the quality of the Church's involvement in what may be
designated human rights issues, whether domestic or foreign. It is these factors which will be
examined in the next section.
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SECTION L5: TilE STRUCTURE OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND AND THE
IMPLICATIONS FOR FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING.
(1) INTRODUCTION
Previous chapters have examined the Church of England's external environment and
influences, its own history and traditions and the sometimes overlapping, sometimes parallel trad-
ition of human rights, all of which, it is suggested made certain the Church's involvement in
foreign policy issues. This chapter will examine the Church's own structure which shaped the
form of that involvement and its parameters, and which ultimately concentrated responsibility in
the area of foreign policy formation and executive action on one, fairly small, committee and on
the chief members of that committee.
It is suggested that, while there was much resistance to centralisation in the Church, central-
isation is exactly what had happened. Moreover without adequate resources the central organisa-
tion was understaffed and gratefully dependent on the personal expertise of its staff, particularly
in situations where urgent decisions had to be made. This led, it is suggested, in the case of the
committee responsible for foreign affairs, to an autonomy of action in the expression and pursuit
of policy preferences.
Several conceptual and fundamental difficulties must be tackled before the structure of the
Church and its workings is further examined. Is the Church an organisation or a loose collection
of fairly diverse groups? Where does authority lie in the Church? Jn what sense can the Church be
said to 'do' political acts? Should the Church of England remain an established church?
Is the Church of England, as some suggest, a group of groups held together by a rather basic
lowest common denominator, endowed therefore with significance by its traditional forms and by
its historical and existential relevance as a branch of the Catholic, and therefore universal,
Church? Its diversity is undeniable and was commented on by a speaker in the 1979 Synod
debate on authority: "The Church of England ... contains both vegetarians and carnivores, both
soldiers and pacifists, both capitalists and socialists and refuses to unchurch or censure any of
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them".1
Or is it, on the other hand, an organisation with purpose and objectives? For the purpose of
this work, and to avoid lengthy exploration of Church history, the Church of England will be
treated here as a highly complex organisation., although neither its diversity nor its significance as
part of the universal Catholic Church are denied. This treatment is considered valid because the
Church does have objectives, even if its ultimate purpose is existential rather than tangible; it is
legally founded; it has both super and sub-structures; it is a large-scale employer; its opinions and
activities are modified by, and themselves modify, the attitudes and behaviour of other institu-
tions, individuals and a larger society; its members have invested in it moral capital of great per-
sonal significance and look to it for a considerable return in terms of belief affirmation and of
activity which is consistent with that personal belief.
The question of authority within the Church is a disputed one: in November 1979 the
Bishop of St. Albans told Synod that ... "There is always a problem of discovering where author-
ity lies in the Anglican Church." 2 The General Synod was established in November 1970 to
represent an equality of all within the Established Church, demonstrated, it was held, in the early
church but lost in the elaboration of pre-Reformation Roman form. The report 'Government by
Synod' 3 stated that "Theology justifies and history demonstrates that the ultimate authority and
right of collective action lie with the whole body, the Church, and that the co-operation of clergy
and laity in Church government and discipline belongs to the ideal of the Church."4 However
Paul Welsby5 disagrees and denies that the General Synod is intended to be democratic in the
usual Western sense of allowing majority opinion to prevail. He suggests that the Synod habitu-
ally seeks consensus and avoids over-ruling the view of any one House in favour of that of the
other two.
Report of Proceedings of the General Synod, Autumn 1979 Group of Sessions, Vol. 10, No. 3, p. 1043.
2 mid, p. 1007.
3 Government by Synod, ClO, London, 1968.
Jbid,p. 14.
Paul weisby, 'A History of the Church of England', 1945-1980, OUP, Oxford, 1984.
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On the other side of the location of authority debate are those who maintain the historical
claim of the episcopacy. It is the oldest form of government in the Church and, while bishops
often wield a modern influence by playing a prominent role in the deliberations of Synod, in com-
mittees and commissions, in the affairs of their own dioceses, claims to the primacy of episcopal
authority are made on the grounds of the doctrine of Apostolic Succession and Church tradition.
Thus an institutionalised charisma attaches to their office though their personal skills may well be
those of man or resource manager rather than spiritual giant or theologian. In quite another, a
sociological sense, they also form an elite by reason of their origins, education and connections
because the family background and education of bishops tend to be a-typical of the general popu-
lation and also of the rest of the clergy.6
However, whether in theoretical terms authority is seen to lie with Bishops or with Synod,
in practical terms it is undeniable that authority is diffused; indeed it is probably partly as a result
of the unresolved debate on the subject that a firm command structure within the Church's central
organisation was not set up during this period.
The question of the Church's ability as a Church to 'do' anything has been pin-pointed by
Peter Hinchliff. He suggests 7 four principal ways in which the word Church is used: - as a theo-
logical concept, as a congregation of Christian people, as a denomination with an institutional
structure and organisation, and as a clergy or ecclesiastical leadership. He suggests that in the first
three senses the Church can hardly be expected to 'do' anything political and in the fourth sense
the use of the word Church to describe the personnel and leadership of the organisation is strictly
improper.
It is suggested that this is inaccurate on observational grounds - the Church of England
manifestly 'does' political things and later chapters will demonstrate the extent of its activities
alongside and in co-ordination with other decision-making bodies, leaderships and elites. Peter
Hinchliff might legitimately ask, as do many others, 'Is and how is the Church of England
6 D.H.J. Morgan 'The Social and Educational Background of Anglican Bishops - continuities and changes', British
Journal of Sociology, 1969: Lesley Paul 'The deployment and payment of the clergy', ClO, 1964.
Peter Hinchliff, 'Can the Church do Politics?', Theology, September 1981, Vol. LXXXIV, No. 701.
- 80 -
authorised to 'do' anything political?', but there seems little purpose in enquiring whether the
Church can do what it manifestly does, unless one suggests that personnel and organisation are
disaggregated with the actions of the former unsanctioned by the latter.
However it is worth commenting on the imprecision of some of the Church's activities and
expressed views to which the recurrent debates on authority and political involvement undoubt-
edly contributed. This was well expressed by the Bishop of Truro, then Chairman of the Board of
Social Responsibility, 8 when he told Synod in 1978 that ... "the Church of England as such, what-
ever may be the opinion of individual members of it, has never officially adhered to the absolutist
view. That means in a sense that what we say is inevitably going to lack sharpness and precision
which some people would seek ... the Board is going to try adequately to represent what is the
mind of the Church of England while at the same time reflecting the fact that different views are
held within the Church of England.9
The continuation of the Church's established status has been under discussion for most of
this century but the teeth of those in favour of abolition on the grounds that Parliamentary
interference in Church affairs is inappropriate and undesirable have been drawn to some extent by
the passing of the Church of England (Worship and Doctrine) Measure and by the Appointment
of Bishops Measure in 1976 by which the de facto choice of new bishops passed to the Crown
Appointments Commission, even though the form of Prime Ministerial recommendation to the
sovereign was retained. Thus the Church is no longer confined within the parameters which the
House of Commons drew for it, a House of Commons most of whose members, if interested in
the Church at all, were more attached to the splendours of Church architecture, music, and liturgy
than to matching form and function with contemporary religious need.
There is a second and persistently relevant criticism of Establishment however, that it is
unrealistic and discriminatory to designate as the National Church and symbol of the nation's
Christian-orientated view-point a body which appears to attract the nominal allegiance of less
See p.92 of this chapter.
9 Report of Proceedings of the General Synod, November 1978 Group of Sessions, Vol. 9, No. 3, p. 968.
- 81 -
than 50% of the population. 1° An examination of actual, rather than nominal, membership makes
this criticism even more valid: the 1851 census of Great Britain showed nearly a quarter of the
population of 18,000,000 attended an Anglican church regularly: on Easter Sunday 1970
1,600,000 Anglicans received communion out of a population of 46,000,000 and on an average
Sunday at this time approximately 3.3% of the population was in an Anglican church. 12
Accordingly during the 1970's there was considerable evidential support for the view that
there was nothing but historical reason for the Church of England to be singled out for favourable
treatment, whether this took the form of increased access for its leaders and representatives to the
nation's decision-makers, its symbolic role on State occasions as legitimiser of the realities of
power or its representation by bishops in the House of Lords.
(ii) THE STRUCTURE OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND
The Church of England is 'by law established' and this law is statute law which, beginning
with the Submission of the Clergy Act, 1533, took control of Church government out of the hands
of popes and Church Councils. The monarch is supreme governor of the Church of England
although its spiritual head is the Archbishop of Canterbury, primus inter pares amongst the
bishops. There are two archbishops, forty three diocesan bishops and a number of suffragans
(assistants), a General Synod of three Houses, and synods too at diocesan and deanery levels.
The synodical system was set up in 1970.
For a large part of its history, 1533 to 1919, when the Church Assembly was established as
an ecclesiastical legislative chamber, the Church of England was governed by Parliament by sta-
tute law or by royal injunction. Until the Church of England (Worship and Doctrine Measure)
was passed in December, 1974 passing control to the General Synod, all measures passed by the
Church Assembly, 1919 to 1970 and the General Synod, post 1970, had to be submitted to Parlia-
10 TV Survey of popular attitudes to religion in Britain and Northern Ireland, 1970: quoted in PA. welsby, 'A History
of the Church of England 1945-1980', OUP, Oxford, 1984.
11 'Religious Worship in England and Wales', Routledge, 1854.
12 Church of England Year Book, ClO, 1973, Table 1, pp. 174-175.
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ment, thence to the Crown for approval.
Since 1974 however the Church has been the creator of its own legislation and arbiter of
Canons which, not altering the law of the land, do not need Parliamentary approval. Measures, on
the other hand, which do affect the law, must be approved by Parliament; since the Church of
England (Worship aiid Doctrine Measure) the Church can decide matters of doctrine for itself,
introduce a new prayer book to be used in parallel with the Book of Common Prayer (though not
dispense altogether with the Book of Common Prayer) and alter forms of worship without refer-
ence to Parliament.
In structure the General Synod consists of three Houses, Bishops, Clergy and Laity whose
most important meetings are together and three times a year, although votes are recorded
separately and the three Houses do also meet separately. Total membership of the three Houses of
Synod is 560. Its business is a mixture of Church administration, liturgical discussion and the
framing of measures to be put to Parliament, and debates on general issues.
Thus the General Synod is not only a law-making body but it also acts as a forum for the
airing of issues in the public domain as well as those of Church Government and theology. It
oversees also the Church of England's relationship with other churches in England and abroad
and with ecumenical bodies such as the BCC, the WCC and the Confederation of European
Churches.
It has a secretariat with fewer than ten senior staff and from 1972 its Secretary-General was
Derek Pattinson a former Treasury Civil Servant. His responsibilities were very wide: he was
Secretary to Synod during its sittings, advised its Chairman whom to call to speak, was Secretary
to the Business Sub-Committee of the Standing Committee and therefore drew up the first draft of
each Synod agenda; he was Chief Executive to the General Synod, ran Church House and met the
heads of all departments there on a weekly basis; he influenced important appointments and sat on
important committees as well as representing Synod in public and to other bodies such as the
BCC.
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The Church is variously administered at parochial, at deanery, at diocesan and at central lev-
els. Its central organisation, consisting of the Councils and Boards of the Synod, was at this time
situated geographically at Church House in Westminster except for the Church Commissioners
and the Central Board of Finance, who control the Church's investments, income, budgetting and
expenditure, who were at Milbank.
The Church's central organisation supervises the Church's corporate involvement in social
issues, its relationship with Churches overseas, its responses to foreign policy issues and the
selection and training of clergy. The Board of Education needs no explanation; the Board for
Mission and Unity, BMU, deals broadly with Churches overseas, relations with Missionary
Societies, the promotion of international ecumenical activities and the arrangement of the
itineraries of visiting clerics; the Advisory Council for the Church's Ministry, ACCM, with
clergy recruitment and training; and the Board for Social Responsibility, BSR, with domestic
social issues and foreign policy not connected to overseas churches.
Each of these Boards delegates areas of responsibility to subsidiary committees; thus the
BSR is largely responsible for foreign policy issues through its International Relations Commit-
tee, IRC, with whose work the following chapters are largely concerned.
(iii) PROBLEMS OF CHURCH ORGANISATION
In the brief outline above the structure of Church Government appears fairly straightforward
but closer examination and a study also of the Church of England in the wider context of British
society demonstrate serious problems. These, it is suggested, were important factors in a situation
which allowed the IAC for much of the 1970's to exercise a marked degree of autonomy and
idiosyncrasy.
The general debates over authority, political involvement, the Church's structural status and
Establishment have already been discussed. More specific to the period under examination was a
serious loss of Church membership and a related loss of clergy confidence, a constant debate over
the virtues of centralisation versus de-centralisation and criticism of the Church's central
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apparatus on the grounds of cost, efficiency and legitimacy and a related shortage of central
organisation resources.
Church membership had been in decline for many years before 1970; indeed it would be
true to say that the Church of England had become steadily more marginalised ever since the
Industrial Revolution. The editor of Crockfords Clerical Directory suggested in 1980 that there
was not merely a diminution but a serious rejection of Christian belief and behaviour in England,
and, due to urbanization and the media, English culture was now highly unified but in a way
remote from organised religion.'3
The position was fairly bleak for all churches but particularly so for the Church of England
which had never been adequately represented in the inner cities; the Paul report showed that half
the livings in the Church covered 10% of the population and 10% of livings covered a third of the
population, a structural inheritance at considerable variance with contemporary social reality.'4
Central too to the loss of social relevance has been the assumption by political parties,
Trades Unions and other pluralistic institutions of the role of arbiter and definer of moral, ethical
and social attitudes. Particularly relevant is the demonstration that, contrary to the traditional
Freud/WeberfNietzche/Marx analysis of religion as functioning to dull the suffering of the abso-
lutely or comparatively deprived, the working class in England appears to find radical politics a
more attractive outlet than religion for their status dissatisfaction. 15 One can make a caveat how-
ever that a combination of social radicalism and religion can be an extremely potent combination
as with the contribution of socially committed Christians to the legitimation of the Labour Move-
ment and of socialism generally into national life.16
13 Anonymous editor of the Preface to Crockfords Clerical Directory, CO, 1980-1982 edition.
1 Leslie Paul, 'The Deployment and Payment of the clergy', CO. January 1964.
15 See Rodney Stark, 'Class, Radicalism and Religious Involvement in Great Britain', American Sociological Review,
29, PP. 698-706 which is very much in line with H.R. Niebuhr, 'The Social Sources of Denominationalism', Henry Holt,
New York. 1929 which demonstrates that although major religious movements during the Christian era developed as solu-
tions to lower-class frustrations they did not meet such needs adequately and were very soon transformed into middle class
institutions; moreover, he argued, in Europe since the end of the eighteenth century working class dissatisfactions have
mainly been channelled into radical politics: also David J. Cheal, 'Political Radicalism and Religion: competition for com-
mitment', Social Compass, 1975, 22, 2, pp. 245-59.
16 See Chapter Three and also e.g. Robert Bocock, 'Anglo-Catholic Socialism: a study of a protest movement within a
Church', Social Compass, XX, 1973,1, pp. 31-48.
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Confidence in religion during the latter part of the twentieth century has also been eroded by
the advance of natural science and by coniroversies within the Church over how best to counter
scientific arguments. Attempts have been made to express Christianity in terms acceptable to a
scientifically-orientated society' 7 but these attempts at remedy have themselves presented a two-
fold problem. How far can belief and theology be adapted to appear acceptable to a contemporary
situation without involving the Church so closely in contemporary affairs that it is incapable of
mounting a critique of them from the standpoint of immutable values? 18 A second problem is that
much modem theological argument, while used ostensibly to refute attacks on Christianity
whether from a natural science, an atheistical, a humanist point of view, has seemed to many
whose faith is of a simple and uncomplicated variety to undermine the beliefs it claims to defend.
The spread of belief within the Church of England is traditionally wide but the Church has fre-
quently been forced to consider how 'radical' belief can be before it undermines the authority of
the position of the person holding that belief and calls into question his fitness to act on behalf of
those whose views are widely different from his own.
Associated with and derivative of the problems outlined above is a serious loss of
confidence and identity amongst parochial clergy; and it is suggested that during the period under
discussion this was a contributory factor to the increasing centralisation of Church affairs in
expert' hands and to a crisis of recruitment. The extent of the problem is demonstrated by the
fact that during the 1970's the number of full-time clergy fell by 2,000 and between 1974 and
1979 the number of annual ordinations fell from 348 to 303.
Loss of confidence was caused by a variety of factors. The change from rural to urban
society and the increasing inappropriateness of seeing the parish as the basic ecclesiastical unit of
analysis undermined the traditional social authority of the clergyman. Associated with this was
the fact that because in 1964 33.7% of the population was grouped in livings of 10,000 or more
See for example, J.A.T. Robinson 'Honest to God', SCM Press, London, 1963; H. Cox 'The Secular City', SCM
Press, London, 1965; Dr. Van Buren, 'The Secular Meaning of the Gospel', SCM Press, London, 1965; D. Cupitt 'Taking
Leave of God', SPCK, London, 1982.
For a full discussion of this issue see Robert J. Bocock 'The role of the Anglican clergyman", Social Compass, 1970,
17, 4, pp. 533-544.
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served by 16% of the available parochial clergy' 9 many of the urban clergy were suffering from
overwork combined with a low return on their effort.
The assumption both by the state and by trained professionals of many of the social func-
tions previously aggregated to the clergy also contributed to their loss of purpose and personal
certainty. One reason for the decrease of ordination candidates it has been suggested 20 was the
fact that men who, before the introduction of the Welfare State, would have become priests out of
a desire to serve the community, took up social or welfare work instead.
Many have suggested that the designation 'the Tory Party at prayer' which is frequently
used for the Church of England should with greater accuracy be used only to designate the House
of Clergy. They, it is thought, resist change so firmly because it affects what they perceive to be
an already threatened status. Towler and Coxon suggest that the clergy's imperfect assumption of
a 'professional' role in the nineteenth century and the anomaly of continuing without adaptation
so to regard themselves in the twentieth has led to a disparity between the clergyman as he would
like to see himself, an independent professional man, and public perception of marginality,
inflexibility, elitism and over-identification with the Establishment.21
This lack of confidence and a desire to man the barricades against change which might
erode status is important in the context of this work in that Synod is thereby less decisive, more
given to endless debates which end without decision, perforce leaving great leeway for the Coun-
cils and Committees of Synod to take necessary decisions.
Another debate which aggravated the problems of decision-making was that between advo-
cates and opponents of centralisation. There was a persistent body of opinion, frequently vocal in
Synod, which believed that the real work of the Church was done in the parishes, which resented
a central organisation speaking and acting on behalf of the Church, which resented also the
money necessary to maintain that central organisation and which sometimes went so far as to
19 The Paul Report, op. cit.
By the retired Archdeacon of Halifax in a personal interview.
21 A. Towler and AJ'M Coxon, 'The Fate of the Anglican Clergy: a sociological study, MacMillan, London, 1979: see
also A. Russell, 'The Clerical Profession', SPCK, London, 1980.
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advocate that all of the Church's functions be returned to diocesan or parish level.
Typical of this view was a Synod speech by the Bishop of Southall in 1978: "... I believe
that the Boards and Councils of the Church of England are incapable of running the Church of
England. That is done in the dioceses and parishes of our country. Boards and Councils can only
be bodies that service the work in the dioceses..." 22 It was also pointed out by the Bishop of Man-
chester that diocesan resentment of the Church's central machine was merely a mirror of the
resentful attitude of parishes to dioceses.23
One should remember moreover Synod's own sense of vulnerability to attack. The problems
of the House of Clergy have already been touched on but the House of Laity too was frequently
criticised as unrepresentative of Church opinion. In the 1970 Synod two thirds of its members
were at least forty years old and nearly a quarter of them over fifty; there were no members of the
skilled or un-skilled manual working class and very few women. 24 In the 1975 Synod there were
10% more women, even fewer younger members, again no members of the skilled or un-skilled
manual working class though rather fewer members educated at public school.25 Kathleen
Jones26 commented that the 1975 Synod was more like 'an ecclesiastical British Academy' than a
representative body and that there were few members who could 'provide more than a personal
anecdote' in debates on such issues as the immigrant population of Britain, trade unionism and
the poor and rootless.
Synod as a whole was vulnerable to criticism because of its division into factions. There
were (and remain) three coherent parties in Synod, the Evangelicals, the Anglo-Catholics and the
Radicals. Their individual views are less important in this context than their consistent tendency
to take specific lines on specific issues and thus make difficult the consideration of issues on their
own merits and in a particular temporal context.
General Synod Report of Proceedings, February 1978 Group of Sessions, Vol.9, No. I, p. 226.
23 General Synod Report of Proceedings, July 1979 Group of Sessions, Vol. 10, No. 2.
Kathleen Jones, The House of Laity in the General Synod', Crucible, July/August 1971.
Kathleen Jones, 'The House of Laity in the General Synod', Crucible, October/November, 1976. The lack of work-
ing class members is hardly surprising when one bears in mind that Synod meetings last for four days always during the
week because clergymen are otherwise occupied at weekends.
26 Ibid.
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By the end of the decade, and one must remember that this was the first and trial decade of
synodical government, the existence at least of strong feelings of resentment about the cost and
the very existence of the Church House apparatus was acknowledged. In 1979 Sir Ronald Harris,
Chairman of the Central Board of Finance, spoke in Synod of the urgent need to communicate
more effectively to the dioceses and Church members in the parishes the significance and value of
the work done at Church House and "to project its human face so that there might be a more wil-
ling understanding and acceptance of its necessarily increasing cost."27
Since the clergy and laity from dioceses and parishes were represented in Synod and thus
able to participate in Church government why, one must ask, was there so much resentment of the
Church's central, and Synod-based, apparatus particularly in social and foreign policy areas? The
answer is simply that Synod was responsible for much legislation in the area of liturgy, for a good
deal of debate and for the commissioning of many reports, some of them excellent, on contem-
porary issues; but, as it was not constructed for decisive decision-making on social issues, most
members of Synod did not see themselves as participating fully in Church government. Moreover
the Board of Social Responsibility frequently set up working parties using non-clerical expertise
which produced reports not commissioned by Synod and not, when they were presented, endorsed
by Synod. However they were frequently published and further muddied the water of authority
and responsibility in the Church.
Synod was certainly involved in the foreign policy issues with which this work is concerned
and there were debates on a number of major reports. These included 'Civil Strife' in 1971,
'Investment' in 1972, 'Force in the Modern World' in 1974, 'Religion in Eastern Europe' in
1974, 'Human Rights' in 1977, on the 'Christian Institute in South Africa' and the 'Alleviation of
Human Need' in 1977, on 'Defence and Disarmament' in 1979, on 'Political Change in South
Africa' and on the 'Church of England and Politics' in 1980, as well as a number of debates on
more discrete issues arising out of yearly reports of the IAC to Synod.
27 General Synod Report of Proceedings, July 1979 Group of Sessions, Vol. 10, No. 2, p. 754.
- 89 -
However, lest one consider that foreign affairs dominated Synod, one should bear in mind
the Queen's speech at the opening of the new General Synod in November 1975 which dwelt
overwhelmingly on domestic and liturgical issues and which suggested that the Worship and
Doctrine Measure had probably been the most important before the last Synod. 28 and her speech
at the opening of the 1980 Synod where she designated liturgical revision culminating in the
Alternative Service Book as Synod's most conspicuous achievement.29
In other words Synodical interests were overwhelmingly in-house. Domestic social issues
occupied more time and discussion than did foreign affairs. Moreover at least half the time which
Synod devoted to foreign affairs was in the area which could loosely be described as aid and
development - One World Week, Christian Aid, encouragement of the Government to accept the
Pearson Commission's proposal that 0.7% GNP be used in official government aid to Less
Developed Countries, LDC's. Bearing in mind too how small a minority of Synod debates
resulted in recommendations for action - in most cases members were asked to note the various
reports and their recommendations, to use them in fact as an information source and an aid to
position-forming rather than the basis for concrete decision-making - it is not surprising that the
IAC, with day to day responsibility for foreign affairs, should initiate policy and deal with crises
as they arose rather than depending on direction from Synod.
There was some resentment too, part of the general resentment of the centre by the pen-
phery, about the difficulty of getting Private Members Motions onto the Synod Agenda which
was set in advance by the Secretary to Synod and his Standing Committee. Thus a near monopoly
of agenda setting enabled the central organisation to reinforce their semi-autonomy which derived
from the nature of the structure and procedure of Synod. While the perceptions of the parties to
the conflict may provide unreliable evidence - and the professional staff of the Church's central
boards certainly saw things differently when they complained to the 1981 Partners in Mission
Consultation that in the last resort they were only advisory, with little initiatory power 30 - there is
General Synod Report of Proceedings, November 1975 Group of Sessions, Vol. 6, No. 3.
General Synod Report of Proceedings, November 1980 Group of Sessions, Vol. 11, No. 3.
° Anonymous author of the Preface to the 1980-82 Crockford's Clerical Directory.
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some suggestion that these fears were not without substance. In 1977 Mr. Bulmer Thomas
resigned from the CBF because decisions were taken by the Committee of the Board, not the
Board itself which only met twice a year to ratify decisions taken elsewhere; diocesan representa-
tives, he said, had no share in CBF decision-making. 3 ' Moreover the Rev'd. Paul Oestreicher's
criticisms of the 1AC 32 were essentially of a system which allowed a good deal of autonomy to
ceutral organisations but did not take adequate cognizance of opinions and input from below.
Semi-autonomous though the Synod's boards and councils might be of Synod, in some
respects they were handicapped throughout the 1970's by lack of money. Resentment in some
quarters at their very existence meant not only that the money they did receive was grudged to
them but that requests for more were received unsympathetically in Synod. This attitude was per-
vasive at influential levels as demonstrated by the comments in the Preface to Crockford's in
1980 where the author commented that the Church might still perhaps be seen at its best in parish
and diocese rather than national committees and that the £2,250,000 per annum which the General
Synod and its committees and services cost might be better spent at lower levels.33
In the Church Assembly in 1970 Sir Edmund Compton reported that 1971 estimates of
expenditure exceeded revenue estimates by £71,000, in 1972 by £140,000 and in 1973 by
£170,000. He saw already that this might curtail the structure and activities of the Church's cen-
tral organisation and in this he was proved right. In 1971 a 15% cutback in the operating costs of
Boards and Councils was announced: 35 in 1975 Sir Arnold France of the Central Board of
Finance reported that, because of the economic crisis, cuts in central organisation staff would be
necessary in 1976:36 in 1977 it was reported that since 1971 the number of posts at Church House
had been cut by nearly a third with no matching cut in the amount of work and the stress on staff
was now apparent. Sir Arnold France attacked the idea held by many members of Synod that a
31 General Synod Report of Proceedings, November 1977 Group of Sessions, Vol. 8. No. 3. p. 613.
32 See Section I.6.iii.
Crockford's Preface 1980-82 Edition, op. cit.
Church Assembly News, Summer 1970, Vol. IV, No. 2.
General synod Report of Proceedings, Spring 1971 Group of Sessions, Vol. 2, No. 1.
36 General Synod Report of Proceedings, Spring 1975 Group of Sessions, Vol. 6, No. 1.
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central organisation was unnecessary and things could be done cheaper in the dioceses. This
would, he pointed out, lead to expensive duplication whereas only 0.1% of the Church's income
was now spent at the centre.37
However his strictures did not quiet criticism which reappeared in a July, 1979 debate
where it was claimed that dioceses were forced to pay for expenditure incurred or sanctioned by
the Church's central organisation. 38 However it is fair to say that diocesan and parochial fears of
a huge central bureaucratic growth were not realized during this decade: in 1971 Church House
staff numbered 204 and in 1980 there were 165, of whom 14 were part-time. However this per-
manently over-stretched situation was undoubtedly contributory not only to the autonomy
enjoyed by the IAC but also to its essentially fire-fighting nature; the resources and manpower
simply were not there to do more than deal with emergencies as they arose and to concentrate on
a limited number of internally generated initiatives. This is clearly demonstrated in the IAC's
work in Rhodesia and South Africa where their major bursts of activity matched and appeared
responsive to crises or initiatives on the part of others and where their own initiatives were dis-
tinctly single-, rather than multi-, stranded.
(iv) THE BOARD FOR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
The constituted purpose of the BSR is to promote and co-ordinate the thought and action of
the Church in matters affecting man's life in society. This is an extremely broad remit and, as
Moore, Wilson and Stamp suggest, 39 it gives the Board a great deal of freedom by its vagueness.
They further suggest that because there is no clear policy over such a wide field the B SR produces
its own view rather than reflecting the state of opinion in the Church at large. This criticism
might be regarded as, as least partially, unjust however in the sense that this thesis has already
demonstrated the difficulty of identifying, let alone acting upon, a Church of England view.
General Synod Report of Proceedings, November 1977 Group of Sessions, Vol. 8, No. 3.
General Synod Report of Proceedings, July 1979 Group of Sessions, Vol. 10, No. 3.
C. Moore, A. Wilson, 0. Stamp, 'The Church in Crisis', Hodder and Stoughton, London 1986.
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The BSR's specific functions are to provide a service to Synod members in the production
of motions and reports on subjects which Synod wishes to debate and preparing briefs for bishops
who speak in the House of Lords on social and political topics. It also generates its own work. Its
use of working parties made up of non-clerical experts has already been mentioned and will be
demonsirated in the following chapters with regard to the work of the JAC. Moore, Wilson and
Stamp4° suggest very justly that there is often a certain amount of confusion about the status of
BSR reports because, though commissioned by the BSR and reported to them, their authors are
permitted to publish whether or not the report is accepted by the BSR This applies too in cases
where reports are rejected by Synod.
The question of authority arises in relation to the pronouncements of the BSR and its consti-
tuent committees because the basis on which its pronouncements are made is not clear. Is it
expressing the Church's view, a Christian view or an informed opinion? How much attention
should the Church pay to what it says? Moore, Wilson and Stamp indeed suggest that the whole
work of Synod and its related institutions can be questioned in this way.41
In international relations terms members of the B SR who played a significant role were the
Chairman, from the beginning of the decade until 1976 the Bishop of Leicester and for the rest of
the decade Graham Leonard, Bishop of Truro, and the Secretary, from 1972 to the end of the
relevant period, Giles Ecciestone. Of these the Bishop of Truro appears by and large to have been
in sympathy with the JAC's approach, and participated in some of their initiatives; it may well be
that the initial interest of the 1979 Conservative Government in the IAC' s disaster relief force
ideas was at least partly due to the Bishop of Truro's friendship with Margaret Thatcher. 42 Giles
Ecciestone however had serious reservations especially towards the end of the decade. Also at this
time Paul Brett, Chairman of the Industrial Relations Committee played some part in that area
usually seen as the prerogative of the IAC when he became involved in the question of disinvest-
ment in South Africa.
° Ibid
41 Ibid.
Interview with Giles Ecciestone, former Secretary to the BSR, Summer 1988.
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SECTION 1.6: THE LOCATION AND METHODOLOGY OF FOREIGN
POLICY DECISION MAKiNG
SECTION L6.i: INTRODUCTION
This Section will examine in greater detail the location of foreign policy decision making
during the 1970's. The not unreasonable expectation that successive Archbishops of Canterbury
were heavily involved will be examined and found to be only very partially fulfilled. The location
within the Board of Social Responsibility, the structure and the personnel of the International
Relations Committee will then be examined, and it is the contribution of certain members of this
Committee to foreign policy formation which is found to be defining. As an illustration of the
centrality of their position and the nature of their methods a study is then made of a project to set
up a Disaster Relief Force which was regarded as highly important by the Committee and which
ran for much of the decade under examination.
Much of the material in this Section is taken from files in the archives of the Church of Eng-
land or from personal interviews with the protagonists.
SECTION 1.6.ii: LAMBETH PALACE
As the Archbishop of Canterbury is Spiritual Head of the Church of England one would be
justified in expecting that he would exercise ultimate control and authority over foreign policies.
This is probably true in the sense that nothing he actually vetoed would be pursued as official pol-
icy, although the factionalism of the Church would allow it to continue to be pushed as an alterna-
tive to his preferred option. However it is not true that any of the three incumbent Archbishops
during the 1970's were involved in the choice of most of the IAC's policies or their day to day
implementation: their responsibilities were too wide and, by and large, their priorities too dif-
ferent for them to do this although, in the case of Ramsey and later of Runcie, their own attitudes
and activities were influential in laying down the broad parameters.
On the Archbishop's staff at Lambeth Palace were Councillors on Foreign Relations but
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they were largely involved in advising the Archbishop about relations with foreign churches,
although this sometimes had a political content. However most genuine foreign policy issues
were referred to the IAC for advice at least, and often for action, although it is Maurice
Chandler's memory that Archbishop Coggan, because of his great interest in people, sometimes
replied personally to individual approaches.' The IAC also provided briefs for the Archbishop
when he wished to speak on foreign policy issues to the House of Lords.
A Lambeth staff member attended IAC meetings from time to time but not on a regular
basis until the appointment of Terry Waite as the Archbishop's Special Advisor in 1980. There
were three Archbishops during the 1970's: Michael Ramsey until 1974, Donald Coggan from
1974 to 1980 and Robert Runcie from 1980 and for most of the period the main contact between
them and the IAC was the Archbishop's Lay Advisor, Hugh Whitworth. Much of the contact
between him and the Secretary to the JAC, for most of the decade Hugh Hanning, was the seeking
of information so that the Archbishop could decide between bodies or causes: should thç
Archbishop sponsor One World Week? Should he endorse UNA in his diocesan newsletter? - No:
"The thing has been a mess for years and cuts no ice with governments." 2 Could Hugh Hanning
provide information on napalm? How should the Archbishop's office reply to queries from indivi-
dual members of the Church on famine, unilateral disarmament, torture in Paraguay and Uganda,
the alleged forced marriage of a girl in Zanzibar?
However, despite his good relationship with Hugh Whitworth, Hugh Hanning, Secretary to
the IAC, did not succeed in developing close or even regular relations with either Archbishop
Ramsey or Archbishop Coggan. Ramsey was willing to accept advice and information on specific
issue areas but there was little in the way of personal contact or briefings. In May 1973 for exam-
pie Hugh Hanning wrote to Hugh Whitworth thanking him for arranging his visit to the
Archbishop to discuss the Archbishop's forthcoming visit to the Far East, which would indicate
that this was an unusual event. 3 And later in 1973 Hnning's suggestion to Whitworth that the
Interview with Maurice Chandler, sometime Chairman of the LAC, Spring 1988.
2 BSR/IAC/LAMJ3, letter of 18/4/78 from Hugh Hanning to Hugh Whitworth.
BSR/IAC/LAMII, letter of 1/5173 from Hugh Hanning to Hugh Whitworth.
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IAC should give regular briefings on important issues to the Archbishop met with the truly tactful
response that, though on principle this was a splendid idea, the Archbishop seldom made foreign
affairs speeches outside the House of Lords and when he was questioned on foreign affairs it was
difficult to tell what would come up. The Archbishop had certainly spoken recently in Cambridge
on violence ... "in a sense it was (a foreign affairs speech) but in the Archbishop's mind it was
theology, and on theology he would never accept lay briefing."4
An indication of Ramsey's view of the overlapping nature of theology and politics can be
seen in his stand, as President of the BCC, on Rhodesia in 1966 and his speeches against
apartheid in South Africa in 1970. This normally benevolent cleric, who allegedly had to practice
stern faces in a mirror so that he could match his demeanour to his delivery, made it quite clear
that his personal view was that Christians had an inescapable duty to regard and to treat all men
equally. His condemnation of the creation of Homelands also sprang from this essentially theo-
logical condemnation of apartheid, and theological too, was his refusal to endorse the WCC p01-
icy of grants to guerilla organisations, not a choice between justice and peace but a refusal to
accept violence if any hope remained of peaceful evolution; on a similar basis he condemned any
British supply of arms to the South African government. All of this was certainly theologically
based to him but seemed essentially political to Mr. Vorster who treated him with great hostility.5
Hanning's own memory also provides evidence of the distance between Lambeth and
Church House where advice over foreign affairs was concerned; he visited Ramsey when he was
first appointed Secretary to the JAC to brief him on the Committee's purpose and activities but
found him detached and with the appearance of not really knowing why Hanning had bothered to
visit him6
When Coggan became Archbishop Hugh Hanning and Lord Cowley again paid a visit to
Lambeth to brief him about the work of the IAC but regular contact was still through an
intermediary. However it seems fair to say that Coggan was more receptive to Hugh Hanning's
BSR/IAC/LAM/1, letter of 28/9173 from Whitworth to Hanning.
5 See Owen Chadwick, 'Michael Ramsey: a life', Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990.
6 Interview with Hugh Hanning, January 1988.
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general views and initiatives than his predecessor as well as less fundamentally innovative. He
chaired an all-day meeting on the Peaceful Uses of Military Forces, sponsored jointly by the JAC
and International Peace Academy, IPA, in 1976, several times advocated the Third Party Peace-
keeping Force in Rhodesia, for which Hugh Hanning spent so much of his time working, and
allowed Hanning to draft his March 1978 contribution to the Canterbury Diocesan Notes on 'UN
Peace-Keeping Force needed in the World,' which was basically publicity for the IPA and the
forthcoming Coventry Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Military Force. 7 Coggan also endorsed
in the House of Lords the IAC' s own, highly questionable, endorsement of the 1978 internal set-
tlement in Rhodesia.8
This is not to call into question however Coggan's strong comniilment to maintaining links
between Canterbury and Anglican Provinces in other parts of the world and his extensive foreign
tours to this end. It has been suggested moreover, though the author is not able to substantiate
this, that the murder of Archbishop Luwum of Uganda by President Aniin in February 1977 pro-
voked him to such personal grief and anger that he approached the Prime Minister of Australia,
which country he was visiting at the time, in an attempt to initiate some sort of Commonwealth
action against Amin.
Robert Runcie became Archbishop less than a year before the end of the decade. On coming
to office he immediately strengthened the team of foreign affairs advisers at Lambeth to create for
himself a much greater in-house expertise. The fact that in recent years much high-profile Church
activity has been identified with the Archbishop or his own staff is an indication of a real change
of approach with a new Archbishop and a newly-constituted set of synodical structures in the
1981 Synod.
SECTION 1.6.iii: THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE, IRC




migration. From the 1St January 1972 it incorporated the Council for Commonwealth Settlement,
although this role dwindled considerably during the 1970's and provided significanttly fewer
areas of activity. A functional specification of October 1971 described the IAC's role as follows:
it was the link between the BSR and the Churches Committee on International Affairs (under the
auspices of the WCC), the International Department of the BCC and the Conference of British
Missionary Societies, the BCC Community and Race Relations Unit, the Churches Committee on
Migrant Workers in Western Europe and Conferences on Christian Approaches to Defence and
Disarmament. (CCADD)
It consisted of a Chairman, the Bishop of Chichester until 1972 and Maurice Chandler
thereafter, ten members appointed by the Board on the recommendation of the outgoing Commit-
tee, five members from the Council for Commonwealth Settlement and a Panel of Parliamentary
and Ecumenical Consultants. 9 On both the 1970 and 1976 IAC there were four MP's two each
from the Conservative and Labour Parties, a representative from the Foreign Office, a representa-
tive of the BCC's International Department and a representative of CCADD. Some individual
members remained for the whole period including Maurice Chandler, a member of Synod with an
extensive interest in Commonwealth affairs, a member of the Conservative Commonwealth
Council and Chairman of a Conservative Working Party on the future of Dependent Colonial Ter-
ritories, who became Chairman in 1972; and the Rev. Paul Oestreicher, for part of this time
Chairman of Amnesty International and deeply involved in Eastern European Affairs.
The 1976 Committee included a representative of the Conference of Missionary Societies, a
member of the BMU, the Secretary of the Roman Catholic Commission for International Justice
and Peace, a retired Brigadier and a retired diplomat.
The IAC employed an Executive Secretary; until 1972 this was the Rev. Canon John Oates,
who remained a member of the Committee thereafter; from 1972 to 1979 it was Hugh Harming;
and from 1980 it was the Rev. Peter Haynes. There were also two Assistant Secretaries during the
decade; Lord Cowley, a former Conservative Junior Minister, expert on Latin American affairs
9 See appendix to this chapter for membership.
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and Conservative Front Bench spokesman on Foreign Affairs in the House of Lords, was
appointed in May 1975; Lord Elton was appointed in 1976 on Cowley's untimely death and
stayed until March 1979 when he was given office in the new Conservative Government. They
were appointed partly because of Hanning's work with the British Atlantic Association and partly
because, after the Bishop of Chichester' s retirement from the House of Lords, there was no regu-
lar ecclesiastical spokesman there for foreign affairs and a well-informed peer was seen as a good
substitute.10
Of these personnel Hugh Hanning was much the most significant and it was he who set the
tone of the IAC's work for most of the 1970's. In 1971 he was 46, educated at Winchester and
University College, Oxford. His working experience was largely in the media. He had been
Diplomatic Correspondent for the Westminster Press and Glasgow Herald, Defence and Foreign
Affairs Correspondent for the Statist, the Observer, The Guardian and the Times. He was also a
lecturer and chairman of meetings at Chatham House, a Director of the Intermediate Technology
Development Group, a member of CCADD and a long-time associate of General Rikhye, Direc-
tor of the International Peace Academy, the IPA. He was the author of 'The Peaceful Uses of Mu-
italy Forces'. 11 From the Summer of 1975 to December 1977 he ran the job of Secretary to the
IAC in tandem with that of part-time Director of the British Atlantic Committee.
He was appointed because of his experience. In 1979, when a Secretary to replace him was
being sought, he was asked what qualities he thought the new Secretary should have and replied:
"In 1972, it was considered a positive advantage that I brought with me certain ready-made
implements to the Committee, such as the Intermediate Technology Group, the IPA and access to
the columns of the Times. I think I would expect this to hold good in 1979.12 Maurice
Chandler's personal memory is also that this is hue, that Hugh Hanning seemed "to know every-
body" and that this was regarded on his appointment as a distinct asseLt3
10 Personal interview with Maurice Chandler, Spring 1988.
11 Hugh Hanning, 'The Peaceful Uses of Military Forces,' Praeger Special Studies in International Politics and Public
Affairs, Frederick A. Praeger, London, 1967.
12 BSRJIAC/SEC/l/2, 1979, but otherwise undated memo.
13 A personal interview in the Spring of 1988.
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Hanning's interests were catholic. The organisations to which he belonged give some indi-
cation of their range but a number of documents demonstrate just how far they extended. A
memorandum which he prepared for the first IAC Meeting where he acted as Secretary in June
1972 begins by defining the role of the IAC: this was as a forum for visiting experts, for the
briefing of speakers in the House of Lords, for the briefing of the General Synod, liaison with the
Archbishop of Canterbury, the issuing of occasional public statements and the generation of
ideas; this last he regarded as the most important and as penneating all other roles. The ideas
which he put forward for consideration to broaden the scope of the LAC's activities included
investigation of such areas as preventing an accidental war in the Middle East, hi-jacking, the
conventional arms trade, disaster relief, the military confrontation in Europe, winning the hearts
and minds of people of the developing world for the West, Ulster, Southern Africa, Scottish
nationalism. Appropriate Church activity in all of these areas, he felt, would come under the
heading of non-violent action and this would give a focus to IAC activities for the 1970's.
Methodologically he recommended the sort of techniques used at Chatham House, discus-
sions, lectures, seminars, the use of the extensive information sources available to the churches to
disseminate accurate information. This in turn might be done by using newspapers and the con-
sultants who were retained by the big television companies to seek out new ideas for pro-
grammes. He reported that he had already put the idea of an International Disaster Relief Force
and economic action to improve the conditions of black workers in South Africa to the
Archbishop of Canterbury who "responded enthusiastically."14
This sununary of possible activities for the IAC is a list also of Hugh Hanning's personal
interests and it did not change substantially during the years he remained at the JAC. Nor did his
method of disseminating ideas alter - a wide use of the media and the thorough working of all
possible personal and professional contacts. It is interesting too that he claimed already to have
sold certain ideas to the Archbishop of Canterbury before the IAC Meeting where these same
ideas were to be discussed and approved.
14 IAC Minutes, 14/6/1972, p. 6.
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In 1976 Hugh Hanning produced a five-year forecast for Giles Ecclestone on the work of the
IAC and this was little changed from his earlier, fuller, exposition. 15 He saw major themes as
violence and non-violence in such areas as international disaster relief, close co-operation with
the IPA, with BCC and with CCADD, East-West and Third World relations and specific issue
areas in, for example, Southern Africa, South America and Europe. Significant however is the
specific mention of human rights in relation to these issues. This is a reflection of the higher
profile enjoyed by human rights generally and of an increasing awareness in Church circles of
human rights in relation to domestic as well as overseas issues. The following chapters will show
however that with relation to Rhodesia and South Africa substantive action was little changed by
this awareness. Whatever there was of human rights in the policies evolved in 1972 was still, by
and large, unchanged at the end of the decade although the appointment of a very different Secre-
tary in Peter Haynes was certainly an indication of a perceived need for a different approach.
At the very end of the decade, in February 1980, Hanning drafted a report on the work of
the IAC for the forthcoming Partners in Mission Consultation. 16 The IAC, he claimed, aimed to
reconcile man to man on the international front; its functions included advising on questions of
war and peace particularly in areas such as help for refugees, international disaster relief, One
World Week and development, disarmament. Most of these activities, he said, had been newly
undertaken in the last ten years, although they did fit with the Committee's already existing pol-
icy of research and action in the cause of peacekeeping.
Hanning was right that before his arrival the JAC had broadly functioned in this way but it
had been fairly low-key and, by and large, responsive rather than initiatory. Not that the new
model IAC, after 1972, could be initiatory in more than a few specific areas for resources have
already been shown to be inadequate. Moreover its world-wide watching brief made it difficult
to do more than respond to crises as they arose, and this only in certain geographical areas; the
Middle East for example was left to the BCC who were acknowledged to have greater expertise
15 BSR/IAC/SEC/1/2, memo of 313/1976 from Hannirig to Ecciestone.
16 BSR/IAC/SEC/1/2, memo of 15/2/1980 by Hanning.
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there. However those persistent themes which did develop and which are outlined above largely
matched Hugh Hanning's own interests. His role was an executive one and he was not a voting
member of the IAC but the majority of the Committee continually supported his ideas. Indeed
Maurice Chandler, Chairman from 1972, and Hanning were very much in accord in approach,
interests and methodology and Chandler was often actively involved in Harming's executive
activity.
There were exceptions however to the general approval. Paul Oestreicher' s interest in issues
of justice and of peace was more fundamental to his thinking and work and more theologically
based than most active members of the IAC. He was not happy with either the substantive activi-
ties or the working of the Committee. In Jury 1971, in a debate on the newly set-up Boards and
Councils of the Synod Oestreicher demonstrated a sense of disquiet about an autonomous IAC;
could its organisation be examined and some way found to involve Synod and the Church of Eng-
land as a whole in the difficult moral relations of the world of international affairs? Could there be
BMU input because so much IAC information came from missionary sources?17
In 1976 in both Synod and the IAC he criticised the working of the Committee - it appeared
that his earlier fears had been substantiated. 18 He claimed that there was no clear definition of the
aims and purpose of the IAC, nor of the function and scope of the officers of the Committee; nor
were the principles underlying the choice of members clear. The Committee, he also said, hardly
ever discussed an issue in depth.
Maurice Chandler would appear to have acknowledged the justice of some of Oestreicher's
criticisms at least when he announced that the Committee would continue to meet six times a year
despite suggestions that budgetary cutbacks should reduce this frequency, and that at least one
all-day meeting in a year would be attempted. As far as providing further information for Synod
was concerned, another of Oeslreicher's suggestions, Chandler felt that its members did not like
too much paper and it was already being said at diocesan and synod level that foreign affairs
General Synod Report of Proceedings, July, Group of Sesaions, Vol. 2, No. 2, P. 672.
BSR/IAC/SEC/1/2, letter of 16/6/76 from Oestreicher to Chandler.
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dominated the agenda.19
However Oestreicher himself admitted that the situation did improve a little although he felt
that this was only cosmetic. 20 In 1979 he again initiated criticism of the IAC which was much
more serious and fundamental than his earlier complaints and in which he claimed many other
members of the Committee shared although they were notably reluctant to voice their views.
His criticisms first arose in the context of the Synod debate on the BSR paper, prepared by
an JAC working party, on 'Defence and Disarmament' which could hardly be termed an IAC
success. It attracted criticism from practically all quarters for its lack of an adequate theological or
ethical basis and its emphasis on military perspectives.21
In the Synod debate Paul Oestreicher, in attacking the paper, suggested that it was an almost
inevitable product of the Committee from which it emerged: "The Committee in all sorts of ways
has been insulted in the way it has been asked to do its work - this is part of a much longer record
of misconduct." 22 He went on to amplify his criticisms at the Bishop of Birmingham's request,
and these were sweeping. He criticised particularly the manipulative chairmanship of Maurice
Chandler and his tendency to ignore views which differed from his own. He commented on the
long and very general agenda for which prior documentation was seldom provided, on the infre-
quency of careful and detailed discussion, on the lack of political balance amongst members and
officers although "I believe both Hugh Harming and Lord Elton have always done their best to be
scrupulously fair".23 He praised Hugh Hanning's talents and personal probity but claimed that his
interests dictated the nature of the Committee's work to a certain extent. "Hugh did not operate
easily in the much wider framework of international concerns and ethical challenges. That does
him no discredit. It did however somewhat distort the Committee's work and even more its
image."24
19 IAC Minutes 1/10/76.
BSR/BCC/DIA - 'Board' - IAD/BCCAJDIA, letter of 22nd July, 1979 from Paul Oestreicber to the Bishop of Birm-
ingham.
21 General synod Report of Proceedings, July 1979 Group of Sessions, Vol. 10, No. 2.
Thid p. 738.
Letter of 22/7/79 from Oestreichcr to the Bishop of Birmingham, P. 1, op. cit.
24 Thid, p.1.
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His criticism of the work and composition of the Defence and Disarmament Working Party
is strong but substantiated. He was right in claiming that it was heavily weighted by the military
establishment, the final text was not produced or even seen by the Working Party and the inade-
quacy of the theological and ethical underpinning has already been commented upon. The dis-
tinguished Quaker, Sydney Bailey had been invited to join the Working Party by the Chairman of
the BSR, the Bishop of Truro, to take part in the review of "the whole Christian tradition regard-
ing peace and war"25 but resigned largely because of the heavy emphasis on military issues and
the reluctance of the defence experts there to hear discussion of Christian ethics; after one meet-
ing a Working Party member had told him that he had not joined in order "to be exposed to a
monthly theological seminar."26
Paul Oestreicher' s own views tended consistently to be more radical than those of the
majority of IAC members and he was usually in a minority at meetings.27 While it was agreed to
lengthen meetings and send out supporting documentation to Committee members, Oestreicher's
criticisms were, by and large, rebutted on the ground that he disagreed with the substance rather
than the methodology of IAC decision-making. But he was not alone in his disquiet. The Bishop
of Durham turned down an invitation to serve on the IAC ... "I am not entirely happy about the
way the IAC is structured, and would like to see a much closer relationship with its opposite
number in the BCC"28
In September 1979 Professor J.D. McClean, Professor of Law at the University of Sheffield,
wrote to the Bishop of Truro about future co-operation between the JAC and the DJA of the BCC
which he felt should be much closer. He reported a conversation with BCC Board members.
"They saw our Committee as relying overmuch on ecclesiastical and Whitehall sources, and as
failing to develop a sense of how issues have a variable mix of mission/witness content and polit-
ical context ... the message (veiy courteously and properly presented) was of encouragement to
BSR/BCC/DIA - Board - IAD/BCCA/DIA Enquiry, letter of 21 November 1979 from Sydney Bailey to Maurice
Chandler.
Thid,p. 1.
v Interview with Lord Elton, 14/7/88.
BSR/IAC/SEC/l/2, letter of 9/6/81 from Bishop of Durham to Chairman of BSR.
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press on with the review of our committee's working which we have aheady agreed to under-
take."29
This review resulted in a memorandum to the Board of the BSR by its Secretary, Giles
Ecciestone, in which he recommended that changes be made to the JAC when it was next recon-
stituted in 1980. It was a very large Committee, he said, and its members tended to have other
commitments which meant that there was little continuity of attendance from one meeting to
another and therefore difficulty in developing a corporate approach; it should be reduced in size
and members should be chosen for their ability to work on issues in depth not because they were
senior public figures; the representation of MP's and the FCO should be reconsidered.
His description of the qualities which a new Secretary should have were by implication cri-
ticisms of some of Hugh Ha.nning's methods of working; the new man must give IAC work prior-
ity over other commitments and contacts, if necessary reducing outside activities; he needed a
basic working knowledge of and interest in Christian social ethics and a willingness to modify his
judgements. He needed to be willing to spend time developing contact with the Church in the
dioceses. He concluded: "... the Committee needs to work harder at its contribution to an ecumen-
ical consensus in the development of justice and peace in international affairs; at present its per-
spectives are too much those of the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defence, the Commons and
the Institute of Strategic Studies."30
It is certainly true that the Rev. Peter Haynes who succeeded Hugh Hanning was chosen
because of his difference. He was interested in European politics and very knowledgeable about
world development as well as being a friend of the new Archbishop, Robert Runcie. Giles Eccle-
stone comments that he was much more the type of BSR staff member that Ecciestone expected.
One might of course be dealing here with problems of political, temperamental and perceptual
incompatibility but for the corroborative testimony, some of which is cited above, the more dis-
tinctively religious orientation of the BCC and the Catholic Institute of International Relations,
BSR/BCC/l)IA - "Board" - IAD/BCCA/DIA Enquiry, letter of 27/9/79 from Professor J.D. MeClean to the Bishop
of Truro.
3° BSR/BCC/DIA-Board-IAD/BCCJDIA Enquiry, memo from Giles Ecclestone 19/11/1979.
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CuR, and the general agreement on a change of direction in the handling of foreign affairs in
1980 both at Church House and at Lambeth.
SECTION 1.6.iv: THE CAMPAIGN TO SET UP A DISASTER RELIEF FUND: IDRF
In the light of foregoing comments and criticism about the working of the IAC it is reward-
ing to summarize a discrete issue which was central to their work and which Hugh Hanning
brought with him as an intense personal concern when he joined the Committee, The IAC cam-
paign to create an IDRF in NATO is a good illustration both of the type of issue area and the
methodology and tactics used by Hugh Hanning as Secretaiy to the IAC. It is interesting more-
over in the light of the main plank of JAC policy in Rhodesia - the scheme to set up a Third Party
Peacekeeping force. This is because both were viewed by Hanning as deriving from the same
concept - that military forces could and should be used for peaceful purposes.
The campaign began in 1972 after Hugh Hanning wrote a paper outlining the function such
a force might serve and what form it might take. Frank Judd was one of those who endorsed the
project because it would show ... "we were not just a body of philosophers". 31 There is no sugges-
tion that this idea came out of the blue however because there was a considerable degree of gen-
eral interest in such an project at the time. Dr. Michaelis for example had outlined something
similar in the Daily Telegraph on 10th October 1972.32 Here, as in so many other projects, the
IAC was not initiating but responding to an already present interest. That the initial introduction
of the idea into the IAC was Hugh Hanning's and a part of the collection of interests he brought
with him to the Church of England was also typical.
A Conference was held on the 17th November 1972 to which the Deputy Head of the UN
Disaster Relief Office, Mr. Rossborough, came, a report was published and a Continuation Com-
mittee set up. 33 This had a fairly heavy representation of retired military and political personnel
and Hugh Hanning's right hand on the Committee became Brigadier Michael Blackman. At the
' IAC Minutes, 17/7172.
32 BSR/IAC/SEq3/1, letter of 11/10/72 to the Bishop of Lcicester.
BSR/IAC/SEC/3/l.
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beginning of 1973 he wrote a paper for the Committee on the mechanics of an IDRF and future
steps to be taken.M He was hopeful of wide-ranging and government level support because the
Turkish, the Peruvian and the Belgian Governments were said to have endorsed the idea strongly
and the Canadians to be studying the papers with interest. It was decided to canvass the project
with thirty eight governments - a fairly eclectic collection including Iran, Eire, China, Italy and
Yugoslavia - with General Gowon of Nigeria, with the Economic and Social Committee of the
EEC, with the German Churches and with the Citoyens du Monde as well as with the three politi-
cal parties in the United Kingdom. Later chapters will show that there was always an assumption
of the acceptability of an IAC approach to the highest levels and this appears to have been a mix-
ture of the special moral position occupied by any Church, of the particular position of the
Church of England and of the personal contacts which Hugh Hanning brought with him to the
IAC.
Government reactions were largely at Embassy level but several were very interested and a
number asked for copies of Blackman's report on logistics. Great interest was reported in May
1973 in West Germany especially from Dr. Karl Mommer, Chairman of the Commission to res-
tructure the German Armed Forces 35 and later President of the Atlantic Treaty Association.36
Typical of Hanning's use of the media was the fact that he and Michael Blackman were
interviewed about the project on the BBC World Service 37 and that Hanning wrote an article in
the Guardian and gave a lecture to Chatham House about the need for an ]DRF.38
Political contacts were utilized in a meeting with Anthony Kershaw, Parliamentary Under-
Secretary at the FCO, and with George Thomson who advised that to get EEC action it was
necessary to work through one of the EEC members; Hanning could use Thomson's name in
approaching the new Irish Foreign Minister, Garrett Fitzgerald. This was done through Church
links in Ireland.
3' IAC Minutes, 23/1/73.





When, in September 1973, Hanning heard that there was to be "a fairly good shake-up" in
the Overseas Development Administration of the FCO and that the Minister of Defence had
issued an instruction on Disaster Relief within days of his Guardian article as well as announcing
that Gurkhas were to drive landrovers across the Sahara to help with the injection of cattle
stricken by the West African drought, he was convinced of Church influence. "I doubt", he said,
"if the BSR will ever get credit for any of this."39
With the drought in Africa as a spur to the IDRF campaign Hanning sent copies of
Blackman's staff study to NATO where the Secretary-General was reported to be interested
enough to pass on copies to the Chairman of the Military Committee and the Assistant Secretary-
General for Scientific Affairs.4°
Accordingly Hanning and Blackman visited NATO on 7th January, 1974 and met
Secretary-General Luns who was reported to have shown much sympathy with.the idea of using
defence forces internationally for disaster relief.41 He agreed to put the idea to a meeting of the
Permanent Representatives who would then sound out their respective governments.42 So hopeful
of positive outcome was the IAC when Luns asked }{anning "What can you do to help us?" 43 that
it was agreed that the Church would give maximum publicity to the work Luns did in this field,
put the LkC Continuation Committee at his disposal and arrange for Hanning and Blackman to be
available for consultation whenever necessary at NATO Headquarters. However their hopes
misfired on the political unacceptability of the idea.
The campaign however continued to make full use of Hanning's media and establishment
contacts as well as of traditional Church channels: a meeting with Jonathan Dimbleby who had
just done a programme on Ethiopia and the Sudan ... "we have got it absolutely right: the pressing
need is for international transport, now a matter of life and death" : letters to Judith Hart, who
9 BSR/IAC/SEC/3/1, letter of 21/9173 from Hugh Hanning to the Bishop of Leicester.
4° IAC Minutes, 26/9/73.
41 1AC Minutes, 15/1/74.
42 Thid.
Thid.
44 BSR/IAC/SEC/l/7, letter of 15/3/74 from Hugh Hanning to Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker.
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later set up a Disaster Relief Unit at the Ministry of Overseas Development, and William Rodgers
suggesting that British troops help with transport: an application for support to Frank Judd, a
member of the IAC and now Minister for the Navy: the lobbying of MP' s: a delegation to David
Ennals, Minister of State at the FCO:45 a motion in Synod in November 1974 recommending the
systematic use of armed forces in disaster relief: two Parliamentary questions on the subject by
Adam Butler, MP: 47 Douglas Dodds-Parker's visit to the Gulf and Middle East where he can-
vassed support from governments there: 48 the WCC Nairobi Conference's being persuaded to
include a request that member churches support proposals for the establishment of an IDRF in its
final statement:49 the dispatch of information to the Prince of Wales who had shown some
interest in the subject.50
Efforts such as these were thought to have paid off when, in the relief operation after the
Italian earthquake in 1976, all Western aid was channelled through NATO and NATO's commun-
ications system was used for an inventory of Allied contributions ... "we have scored a break-
through in disaster relief."51
It was felt that the impetus should be kept up and a second full-day Conference 'Disaster
Relief and the Military' was held in March 1977. The LAC also decided to apply further pressure
on NATO, where their earlier initiative had not born the hoped-for fruit, this time to consider the
most recent IDRF study by Brigadier Blackman at the level of the NATO Council of Ministers.
The British Government was approached to bring pressure to bear, the report of the March
Conference was sent to all NATO countries and the US Embassy sent copies to the State Depart-
ment, the Pentagon and the Federal Agency for Preparedness.52
Even larger in scale was the Coventry Conference on 'The Peaceful Uses of Military





5° IAC Minutes 30/3176.
' BSR/JAC/SEC/1/7, letter of 14/5116 from Hugh Hanning to Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker.
52 IAC Minutes 17/5/77.
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Forces' in April 1978 where papers were given on what Hugh Hanning considered the three-fold
uses:- Peacekeeping, on which General Rikhye of the International Peace Academy spoke, Disas-
ter Relief and Military Aid to the Civil Community. The Conference had a very high profile,
indeed seems to have been organised at least partly because Frank Judd, now Minister of State for
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, requested it; he certainly gave a key-note speech there.53
The 750 printed copies of the Conference Report were sent among others to all British Embassies
and to the UN Secretary-General as a contribution to the UN Special Session on Disarmament.
The extent of the JAC's network is demonstrated by the reported feedback on the clistribu-
don of the Conference Reports. 54 John Gilbert, MP, Minister of State at the Ministry of Defence,
was reported to have said that ... "it would be of great value to the Joint and Single Service Staff
Colleges."55 A member of the Office of the Chief of Defence Staff said that considerable interest
had been expressed in it and he would be interested to pursue the ideas further with Maurice
Chandler, Chairman of the IAC, in the near future. Others expressing approval were James
Weilbeloved, MP, Minister for the RAP, the Head of the US State Planning Department Staff,
Lord Goronwy-Roberts, the Rt. Hon. John Davies, Lord Carnngton, Sir Arthur Hockaday, Frank
Judd, as well as the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Rev. Brian Duckworth of the BCC.
However it is interesting to note that from the time of the Coventry Conference the
emphasis in JAC discussions shifted from Disaster Relief to Peacekeeping which was the major
thrust of IAC effort in Rhodesia. 56 Hugh Hanning's lecture to Chatham House in March 1979 for
example centred on British expertise for training a UN Peacekeeping Force. 57 He had also met
with the Secretary of State for Defence, where the holding of a joint MOD/IPA seminar on
'Profiteering from the lessons of Peacekeeping' was discussed, and visited the USA to attend a
meeting on peacekeeping equipment and to visit the Pentagon. He and Maurice Chandler visited
10 Downing Street to discuss the constructive use of UK armed forces with the new Conservative
From Hugh Hanning's own files and notes of the Conference; no formal reference.
IAC Minutes 19/7/78.
Ibid p.2.
56 See Section IL
LAC Minutes, 29/3/79.
-110-
Prime Minister. 58 Douglas Hurd, now Minister of State, wrote to say that he was considering set-
ting up a study of the proposals about peace-keeping and disaster relief which Chandler and Han-
ning had put to the Government twelve months before.59
This change of emphasis appears to have been due to serious reservations in Government
circles of a number of NATO members about the involvement of NATO in disaster relief and
about the bypassing of the UN Disaster Relief Organization, UNDRO, and duplication of its
work.
Reservations about NATO's involvement in such work centred on its unacceptability to
non-NATO countries, especially many in the Third World where disaster relief work was most
likely to be needed. It had functioned well during the Italian earthquake disaster because there bad
been no political problems of this sort but Richard Crawshaw, MP, summed up the problem when
he said that some governments would rather see people suffer and die than, accept help from
NATO.60
The problem of demarcation between NATO and UNDRO was perceived by the British
Labour Government and by NATO officials. In November 1976 Frank Judd said that Govern-
ment priority was being given to co-operation with UNDRO in current operations in Eastern Tur-
key and he hoped that an UNDRO representative would be invited to the forthcoming Coventry
Conference. 61 In May 1977 D.F. Hawley of the FCO confirmed this position by stressing that the
Government's view was that the effectiveness of UNDRO must be strengthened. In July of the
same year Hugh Hanning received a letter from the NATO Secretariat confirming that, while no
formalised disaster relief group would be set up in NATO at present, much closer relations were
being established between NATO and UNDRO.
This did not march at all with Hugh Harming's view that UNDRO, like many UN agencies,
was underfunded and inefficient. In 1974 he cited the Carnegie Endowment for International
IAC Minutes 14/11/79 and Hugh Hanning's own unreferenced files.
IAC Minutes 10/7/80.
LAC Minutes 17/5/77.
61 JAC Minutes 30/11/76.
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Peace's report on the UN's lacklusire handling of the drought in West Africa as a reason why an
alternative agency should be involved in disaster relief. 62 In 1977 he complained of UNDRO
inefficiency in the Van earthquake operation. 63 His earlier strictures met with a fairly sympathetic
response but by 1977 official opinion had moved towards a view that the UN was the most suit-
able responsible agency for such operations.
This issue area is typical of Hugh Hanning's personal interests, adjacent to the military and
with strong strategic overtones which benefitted the West as well as a (generally) unexpressed
humanitarian ethos. His contacts in media, academia, politics, the military in the UK and abroad
were used extensively, as well as, and more than, traditional Church contacts. It seems just to say
that, by his contacts, he gave Church sponsored plans a credibility in quarters where they might
normally have counted for little; conversely his status with the Church gave him official entree to
organisations where he would otherwise have had to skirmish around the outside seeking entry.
SECTION L6.v: CONCLUSION
This chapter and the previous one have sought to demonstrate the structure of the Church of
England in general and of its central apparatus, and the problems which arose in structural terms
from certain societal and internal factors. More specifically it has shown how both stucture and
problems led to a high degree of centralisation, even though this was resented and considered
inappropriate in many parochial and diocesan quarters.
This centralisation meant that, in terms of foreign policy, the choice of policies, within cer-
thin generally accepted parameters, and effective day to day decision-making was to be found in
the IAC, a Committee of the BSR. It is further suggested that the structure of the Committee
itself, its fairly infrequent meetings, the preferences of its chairman and the dynamics between its
members led to a concentration of effective power in the hands of the Secretary to the Committee,




sonal preferences amongst possible policies it is suggested that, for most of the 1970's, the Corn-
mittee was led to a certain preoccupation with strategic, East/West, military perspectives.
Whether this was a suitable set of preoccupations for the Church of England is a question
which will be asked in a variety of different contexts and different ways during the next two sec-
tions when the Church's attitudes and activities with regard to Rhodesia and South Africa are
examined.
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SECTION II: THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND AND RHODESIA 1970-1980
SECTION ILl: INFRODUCTION
The Church of England was involved in Rhodesia 1 during the 1970's for a variety of rea-
Sons all of them connected with or arising out of the factors which have already been discussed in
Section I.
It was an uncomfortable remnant of the British Empire and thus a necessaty arena of
involvement for two reasons. There was an Anglican Church and community there, part of the
Anglican Communion worldwide; moreover the uncomfortable cocktail of nostalgia, responsibil-
ity and guilt, which constituted the Churëh of England's attitude to former areas of Empire,
operated particularly strongly with regard to Rhodesia at this time partly because there were a
considerable number of white Anglicans there and partly because of its illegal status. This indi-
cates a further reason for Church involvement - Rhodesia was in crisis for the whole of the
decade and it has already been demonstrated that the Church of England's inadequate resources
enabled it to maintain a high level of involvement only in areas of crisis and acute need.
Indeed claims of inevitability are generally made only to be refuted but it is arguable that
the Church's preoccupation with the problems and future of Rhodesia falls as nearly into this
category as anything can. If one had found non-involvement in this area it would be so unex-
pected as to need detailed explanation.
The Anglican Church in Rhodesia was part of the diocese of Central Africa whose
Archbishop at this time was Donald Arden. It had two Archbishops of its own, Matabeleland and
Mashonaland who were both white. This was not inappropriate in terms of church allegiance even
if it appears so in terms of locale because a larger number of Anglican Church members in Rho-
desia were white than in other Christian churches there and the, generally reactionary, wishes of
the white community were dominant. Because of this and of its apparent closeness sequentially to
The present Zimbabwe will be designated by whatever was the name customarily used by the British Government;
hence it will be Rhodesia until 1978, Rhodesiiliinbabwe until 1980 and Zimbabwe thereafter.
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Ian Smith and then to the Interim Government of Bishop Muzorewa its clergy, its activities and
its pronouncements were often mistrusted amongst the black population. The position of the
Roman Catholic Church there was very different because it had far more black members, a char-
ismatic leader in Donal Lamont who supported black participation in government, and Robert
Mugabe, leader of the Zimbabwe African National Union, ZANU, had been raised as a Roman
Catholic and appears always to have retained an affection and respect for the Church of his upbr-
inging.
The section on South Africa which follows this will demonstrate a very different situation,
with an Anglican Church increasingly at the interface of Government/Society conflict and adopt-
ing an increasingly radical theological interpretation of the position of a church in society. By
contrast in Rhodesia there was a real sense in which the Anglican Church there was marginalized
by identifying first with an illegal and highly unpopular white regime and then with a coalition
government which was itself soon marginalized. Thus it was in many ways irrelevant to the final
solution.
There was no reason why this should automatically have marginalized the Church of Eng-
land also, although it would obviously have made it more difficult to establish its credibility with
the two guerilla groups in Rhodesia. Its ability to be active in the Rhodesian situation is amply
demonstrated in the following pages but it is suggested that there was a sense in which the
Church of England marginalized itself for the majority of Rhodesian people by its over-attentive
ear to the Anglican Church there, by its proximity to the fluctuating enthusiasms of the British
Government and by its preoccupation with inappropriate, externally devised remedies.
The concentration of planning and executive power over foreign affairs in the hands of the
IAC has already been discussed in Section 1.6; internal criticisms of this power concentration and
the methodology of its use have also been touched on. These, it is suggested, impinged directly
on the Church of England's policy towards Rhodesia.
The main plank of the IAC' s Rhodesia policy was the installation of a multi-national Peace-
keeping Force there and this was a policy which was imported onto the IAC agenda by Hugh
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Hanning at the time of his appointment in 1972. Its rationale was never fully explored and it is
suggested that not only was it an inadequate response but that also it was largely an unsuitable
one for much of the decade in question. The installation of such a force would have frozen the
situation in a form short of resolution or justice, put a high value on both the preservation of
peace and the preservation of Rhodesia from Communist influence and, for at least the last three
years of the decade, paid scant attention to the wishes of a majority of Rhodesians.
It is further suggested that the East/West power political orientation given to the JAC by
Hugh Hanning' s appointment was the major reason both for the failure to discriminate intelli-
gently among Rhodesian information sources and for giving disproportionate weight to the views
of those informants who personally favouied a middle way. This middle way appeared highly
desirable because it would have ensured the exclusion of communist influence from the Zim-
babwe which came into existence in 1980 but it is suggested that the structure and position of the
Anglican Church in Rhodesia were never sufficiently considered when information was sought
and received from its leading members.
This unbalanced use of information sources significantly affected the IAC's ability to form a
'Church view' for internal as well as external consumption, although it would be unjust to lay all
the blame here. Opinion in the body of the Church was much divided and the IAC's reluctance to
believe that a radical, black Marxist was really what the Rhodesian majority wanted echoed much
Church opinion and wishful thinking.
In terms of overall objective it is again profitable to compare the situation in Rhodesia with
that in South Africa at the same time. There is no doubt that the Church of England, and, as its
executive arm, the JAC supported the right of black Rhodesians to share in the government of
their country. In writing, speaking of and analyzing the problems of South Africa however there
was a recognition of apartheid as an evil and an affront to God and man which is lacking in dis-
cussion of the Rhodesian situation.
This is of course explicable by comparing the structural nature of apartheid's evils, of its
denial of the possibility of any form of equality, with the less monolithic denial of electoral and
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economic equality in Rhodesia. Graduated indignation in such circumstances is perhaps appropri-
ate but it is suggested that there was an excessive degree of pragmatism over rationale, over per-
missible means, over personnel and over time-scale.
Coupled with this and with the sometimes inappropriate coupling of home-grown pet
schemes and unripe situations was the failure to analyze many underlying issues in the theologi-
cal and philosophical terms which one might justifiably expect from a Church. Was a just solu-
tion or a peaceful one a primary aim? Could one be secured without sacrificing the other? If the
underlying value of the introduction of a Peacekeeping Force was the maintenance of peace what
degree of injustice might this perpetuate for those incapable of participating in the electoral pro-
cess and equally prevented from alternative action? Was dislike and fear of a Marxist solution a
religious or a power-political value?
It is suggested that the various spheres of activity which are described in the following
pages should have been analyzed in such terms and were not. It is this lack of thoughtful analysis
of the validity and appropriateness of policy and of the status of information sources which is
consistently striking and which will be demonstrated again and again.
- 117 -
SECTION 1L2: TilE SiTUATION IN RHODESIA DURING THE 1970's
To preserve white minority rule the Rhodesia Front government of Ian Smith issued an ille-
gal declaration of independence in November 1965. Various talks took place between the British
Government and the Smith regime in an attempt to resolve the situation, most notably the Tiger
and Fearless talks of 1965 and 1968. These foundered however on the Rhodesia Front's determi-
nation to maintain white supremacy. This aim was at odds with the Five Principles formulated by
the British Government as a necessary basis for settlement. 1 Briefly these principles were that:-
1. There should be unimpeded progress to majority rule.
2. There should be guarantees against retrogressive amendments to the constitution.
3. There should be immediate improvements in the political status of Africans.
4. There should be progress towards ending racial discrimination.
5. The British Government would have to be satisfied that any proposals would be acceptable
to the people of Rhodesia as a whole.
6. There should be no independence before majority rule.
Before UDI however the British Government, in what President Kaunda referred to as "one
of the greatest blunders any government could make"2 had already relieved Ian Smith's mind
considerably by making it clear that there was no thought of using British troops to put down the
rebellion.
Instead it adopted, though not without opposition from fifty Conservative MP's who defied
a leadership decision to abstain in the vote, a rather piecemeal set of sanctions which by
December, 1965 meant that 95% of Rhodesia's former exports to the United Kingdom were
embargoed. The Government also encouraged the UN to adopt a sanctions policy against Rho-
desia, and indeed first brought the issue to the Security Council on the day that UDI was declared,
11th November, 1965. A voluntary and selective sanctions policy had first been suggested but in
After the failure of the Tiger talks in December 1965 a Sixth Principle was added.
2 Quoted in Robert C. Good, "UDL International Politics and the Rhodesia Rebellion", Faber and Faber, London, 1973,
p.63.
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fact mandatory sanctions were imposed, though initially on a limited number of products. How-
ever in 1968 the Security Council passed Resolution 253 which made illegal any UN member's
trade and financial transactions with Rhodesia.
Only Portugal and South Africa openly refused to adopt a comprehensive sanctions policy
but covert non-compliance was much more widespread and this meant that sanctions could effec-
tively be circumvented. It was quite obvious by 1970 that sanctions were being broken, and this
continued extensively throughout the next decade. The most serious infringements were in the
area of oil where oil companies, including British ones, sent oil into Rhodesia through South
Africa and Mozambique thus largely frustrating the object of a ten year British naval blockade of
Beira.
The potential effectiveness of the sanctions policy was naturally vitiated both by evasions of
it and by the continued support of Rhodesia by the South African Government. However by the
end of 1972 it was generally accepted that, whatever the present state of affairs, the long-term
prospects for the Rhodesian economy were seriously damaged by the government's difficulties in
raising investment capital on the world market; road and rail systems were badly in need of
repair; aircraft were obsolete and spare parts of all types were impossible to obtain. The South
African Financial Mail of 20/10172 referred to a recent drain on Rhodesian foreign exchange
reserves and said "Without a settlement the foreign exchange position appears worse than it has
ever been."3
By 1975, when an intensive round of Government and NGO attempts began to resolve the
situation, sanctions had bitten deeper and the economy was also affected by the increasingly fre-
quent periods of national service, mandatory on all white men in certain age groups, which
resulted from the escalation of guerilla activity. Regional pressures too were mounting on Rho-
desia with the independence of Mozambique in 1974 and the collapse of resistance to the MPLA
in Angola in 1975. This facilitated the emergence of the group of 'Front Line' Presidents. 4 They,
From a Brief by Hugh Hanning for the Bishop of Winchester, 1/1 1f72: BSR/IAC/BRJEFS.
This group consisted of the Presidents of Tanzania, Botswana, Zambia and Mozambique.
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knowing how radically the internal situation in Rhodesia had worsened from the Rhodesian
Government's point of view, began an intensive period of diplomacy. This gathered momentum
only slowly with the release by the Smith regime of detainees, including Sithole 5 and Nkomo6 in
December 1974 and an ultimately unproductive conference at Victoria Falls in August 1975. This
was attended by Messrs Vorster, 7 Smith, Nkomo, Dr. Kaunda, 8 Bishop Muzorewa9 and the
Rev'd. Sithole. Vorster's presence was significant in its indication of a complete change of atti-
tude in the South African Government. They now favoured the emergence of a moderate black
regime in Salisbury if this might be effected, although divisions between and among the various
black Rhodesian organizations made such a hope a vain one.
In March 1976, after the failure of direct negotiations between Smith and Nkomo, the Bnt-
ish Government again called on the Smith regime to settle on the basis of the acceptance of the
principle of majority rule, elections for which should take place in eighteen months to two years,
agreement that there should be no independence before majority rule and that negotiations would
not be unreasonably long-drawn out. Smith rejected these proposals and the tripartite pressure on
Rhodesia - internal, regional and international built up still further.
Guerrilla activity increased. Indeed such was the activity of the two clearly delineated
groups operating within Rhodesia from bases outside the countly, ZANU and ZAPU, that reports
from Rhodesian Christians to the BCC indicated the general feeling that "Smith could not last
another rainy season." 10 Mozambique closed its land border with Rhodesia. American pressure on
the South African Government, transmitted through Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, who
viewed Southern Africa now in global terms because of the intervention of Cuban troops in
Angola, combined with South Africa's own internal problems had now changed Ian Smith's only
Original founder of the Zimbabwe African National Union, ZANTJ, itself a breakaway movement of the Zimbabwe
African Peoples Union, ZAPU; it was banned in 1964.
6 Leader of ZAPU which had been banned in 1962.
Prime Minister of South Africa
President of Zambia.
9 Leader of both the United Methodist Church of Rhodesia and of the ANC founded in 1971.
10 "Rhodesia, Namibia and the Transkei", a report of the Department of International Affairs, DIA, of the BCC and the
Conference of British Missionary Societies to the Fifth Assembly of the BCC, Autumn 1976, P.4.
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ally into an advocate of settlement.
Consequent on this combination of pressures was Ian Smith's broadcast to the Rhodesian
people on 26/9/76, generally known as his "surrender" speech. This bore testimony to the fact that
the Rhodesian Government had agreed a package of terms, worked out by Henry Kissinger, but
reinforced by South African threats to cut off logistical and sanctions-busting aid. Smith reported
that the Rhodesian Government had agreed to majority rule within two years and would meet
African leaders immediately to arrange for an interim government to function until the implemen-
tation of majority rule. Sanctions would be lifted and guerilla activity cease when the interim
government was in place, and an external trust fund would be set up to fund
Rhodesia/Zimbabwe's urgent economic neds.
The response of the African Presidents from Lusaka on the same day as Smith's broadcast,
indicated clearly that, future majority rule on one side, these arrangements met with little appro-
val from them and from the Zimbabwean freedom fighters who were regarded as having gained a
victory by their own exertions. They called for an African majority in the transitional government
which would rule until elections under a new constitution could be held. Ian Smith's plan was
castigated as "tantamount to legalizing colonialist and racist structures of power". 11 the British
Government was asked to call a conference outside Rhodesia to discuss the form and membership
of the interim government, to plan the convention of a constitutional conference and to establish
the basis on which peace and normality might be restored to Zimbabwe.
Nor had the guerilla leaders any intention of laying down their arms for a white dominated
interim government; indeed Nkomo and Mugabe buried their differencies sufficiently in October,
1976 to form the Patriotic Front. In the event the distance between the expectations and indeed
the perception of what had been decided between white and black leaders in Zimbabwe was to
vitiate this agreement and lead to three more years of bargaining and civil war.
The conference promised by the British began in Geneva in October, 1976 and was chaired
11 mId, p.3.
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by Ivor Richard, Britain's Ambassador to the UN. However it foundered on the differing expec-
tations of the participants. Smith insisted that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss imple-
mentation of the Kissinger proposals while the nationalist leaders refused to accept the Kissinger
terms as anything but a point of departure for discussion. An alternative plan formulated by Ivor
Richard, to accord more closely with nationalist aspirations and including a British Commissioner
to head the transitional government, was rejected by Smith before it could even be put to Nkomo
and Mugabe.
To fill this vacuum Smith attempted to create an internal settlement with Bishop Muzorewa.
Nothing came of this however nor, more significantly, of the Anglo-American initiative born of
the newly-appointed enthusiasms of President Carter of the USA and David Owen, the British
Foreign Secretary. Despite some intensive and initially promising shuttle diplomacy by David
Owen the new scheme, whereby Britain would take control in Rhodesia for a period of not more
than six months over the transition period to an election conducted on the basis of one-man one
vote, met with little enthusiasm from any of the protagonists.
Meanwhile the situation inside Rhodesia grew ever more serious. Guerrilla activity was no
longer confined to the borders but was sporadic throughout the country. The demands of army
service meant that industry was crippled and many one-man businesses failed, the costs of
defence rose dramatically 12 as did fuel costs and inflation. Chrome exports to the USA slumped
because one of President Carter's first acts had been to ensure the repeal of the Byrd Amendment
which had allowed the continued importation to the USA of Rhodes ian chrome.
While the situation in Rhodesia deteriorated more or less by the day David Owen continued
to work on his plan for British supervision of transition to majority rule. Lord Carver was chosen
as resident Commissioner and a UN force, it was now decided, would be responsible for supervis-
ing the ceasefire and would assist the police in keeping law and order.
These Owen/Young proposals 13 were once again greeted with little enthusiasm by all
12 Defence expenditure in 1977 rose by 44% to take up one quarter of the budget - Martin Meredith, "The Past is
Another Country", Andre Deutsch, London, 1979, p. 305.
13 Andrew Young was newly appointed by President Carter UN Ambassador.
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parties to the conflict. Indeed such was the Smith administration's dismay at the thought of the
virtual disappearance of the existing government security forces that they turned again to the idea
of an internal settlement. They even accepted the precondition of majority rule which was the
only basis on which Muzorewa, Sithole and Chirau would accept such a settlement. Thus, by the
beginning of March, 1978, the Salisbury Agreement was in place and heralded the setting up of a
transitional government. The declared objective of this government was to arrange a ceasefire, to
draft a new constitution, to remove racial discrimination and to conduct an election with the
object of handing over to a black government elected on the basis of one man/one vote on 31st
December, 1978.
Britain and the USA refused to recognise the transitional government without some
demonstration of its acceptability to the majority of the population. Nkomo and Mugabe
denounced the settlement and black Africans in rural areas, whose support was essential to its
success, refused to accept it. The transitional government's call for a ceasefire fell on deaf ears
and it became increasingly clear that Muzorewa and Sithole did not command enough support to
halt the guerilla war. Indeed Muzorewa's considerable popularity amongst the black population
was swiftly eroded by his perceived ineptitude and tendency to be outmanoevred by Smith.
As guerilla activity increased so the daily life of the country was increasingly disrupted with
the closure of numerous farms, of schools, of health and veterinary services; malnutrition and
disease increased and diseased cattle too died in great numbers. Brutal attempts at guerilla
suppression by the security forces further alienated the black population while guerilla atrocities
against both white and black populations were frequently reported.
Smith, increasingly desperate for a solution, attempted to give his settlement a greater
appearance of legitimacy by recruiting Nkomo but, since this failed, he succeeded only in under-
mining the position of Muzorewa and Sithole, neither of whom he had consulted about the nego-
tiations. Further negotiations with Nkomo were also ruled out by the wave of outrage which fol-
lowed the shooting down by guerilla forces of a Rhodesian airliner and their massacre of the sur-
vivors. And indeed for a short time it seemed that the position of the transitional government was
- 123 -
improving when Kaunda's economic plight forced him to reopen trade routes through Rhodesia
and so compromise his opposition to anything but a black victory in that country. Moreover in
October the security forces launched a series of raids on guerilla camps in Zambia and Mozam-
bique which killed over a thousand guerilas and destroyed large quantities of materiel.
This could be nothing but a temporary holding back of inexorable forces however and,
recognizing the long-term prognosis, Ian Smith allowed Sithole and Muzorewa to recruit what
were termed Auxiliary Forces but what amounted to private armies. Five armies were now effec-
tively fighting over Rhodesia and were set to become highly influential in the projected referen-
dum and general election. Almost inevitably these had been delayed and any residual black
confidence in the interim government was eroded by the failure to meet the December 31 deadline
for the beginning of black majority rule.
The new constitution was published at the beginning of January, 1979 and provided that
only legislative, not executive or judicial, power would be in black hands for many years to come.
Many of the whites were unwilling to concede even this limited degree of power but, seeing no
viable alternative, did vote overwhelmingly to accept it in a whites-only referendum at the end of
January, 1979. This was followed in April by a general election, intended by the Provisional
Government to demonstrate the extensive degree of internal support for the settlement. In this
Bishop Muzorewa's United African National Congress, UANC, gained 67% of the votes but there
was, and long remained, serious doubt about just how free and fair the election was. 14
This factor as well as the non-participation of ZANU and ZAPU and the fear of trade
reprisals from Black Africa caused President Carter to continue to withhold recognition from the
new Muzorewa Government. Meanwhile at the Commonwealth Conference in Lusaka Margaret
Thatcher, the new British Prime Minister, operating under similar constraints, took a similar line
but decided to make one more attempt to reconcile internal and guerilla nationalist movements.
14 The reports of Dr. Claire Palley and Lord Chilnis' British All-Party Parliamentary Group who alleged extensive in-
timidation and corruption should be compared with those of Lord Boyd's Group for the British Conservative Party and that
of Freedom House, a private New York based organization, who found the election substantially free and fair.
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A new constitution, from which blatant pro-white provisions were expunged, was drawn up
and presented to all the parties to the conflict in London at the end of 1979. At these Lancaster
House talks a great deal of pressure was brought to bear on the guerila leaders, with Lord Car-
rington, the new British Foreign Secretary, threatening to recognise Muzorewa if the Patriotic
Front did not accept; the Front Line Presidents too were exerting pressure. The situation in Rho-
desia, where the peace which Muzorewa had promised as his election platform seemed as far
away as ever, was enough to persuade a reluctant and resentful Muzorewa and Smith.
Lord Soames was sent to Salisbury as British Governor for a period of four months to
supervise preparations for a second general election. Ultimately elections, whose freedom and
fairness were almost as much debated as the previous ones, brought Robert Mugabe the victory
for which his ZANU guerillas had fought for so many years. The new state of Zimbabwe came
into being, not so much on Marxist as on tribal lines.
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SECTION fL3: MAJOR THEMES IN CHURCH OF ENGLAND INVOLVEMENT
An indication of the parameters of Church of England involvement has already been given
in 11.1. The values, overt and unexamined, which underlay action have been signposted and a en-
tique made, which later pages of this Section will substantiate.
For ease of analysis however involvement is treated thematically as it is considered that this
best demonstrates the different facets of activity and Church policy. There are major and minor
themes in this narrative. Minor themes include sanctions, which were overall of little interest to
Church policy makers after the first couple of years of the decade: this it is suggested reflects the
change of personnel within the IAC in 1972.
The mobilisation of Church resources on behalf of individuals perceived to be unjustly
treated by the regime in Rhodesia is also a fairly unprofitable study. Eastern Europe for example
is much more fruitful in this respect, lacking as it did governmentally recognised Church struc-
tures which might have been expected to safeguard its individual members. There are few
instances of significant Church of England pressure or activity in this respect in Rhodesia.
Major themes are the attempts to promote the setting up of a Third Party Peacekeeping
Force, facilitation of meetings between parties to the conflict, information gathering and the for-
mation of a 'Church view' for the benefit of Church members and leaders and for the formatIon
and pursuit of policy options, the divergence of Church policy and activity from those of the BCC
and WCC.
Central to the Church's involvement in Rhodesia in this period was the campaign to set up a
Third Party Peacekeeping Force there and efforts by various members of the IAC to act as facilI-
tators in the evolution of a peaceful settlement.
It is in the area of facilitation that some of the IAC's most interesting work was done and
the netwmk of contacts to which its members belonged by nature of the Church's and the Angli-
can Communion's structure was extensive. One should note however the fairly unbalanced
nature of contact patterns.
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Great importance too was accorded information gathering and the formation of a 'correct
opinion'. This would seem to be in the well established Temple tradition 1 as collecting as much
expert information and advice as possible to provide a sound basis for action. Later pages of this
chapter will demonstrate however that the information collected in this case was not always
sound.
Differences, initially of emphasis and later of policy, marked relations between the Church
of England and the BCC which became less cordial on the subject of Rhodesia as the decade wore
on. It is here that one sees perhaps a traditional closeness to Government amongst those in the
Church responsible for foreign policy and a distaste for a radicalism which they perceived
amongst BCC policy makers.
The Church's relations with the WCC and its attitudes to the WCC policy towards Rhodesia
are discussed in some detail. Even more than with the BCC differences were marked and disap-
proval of certain facets of WCC policy provoked not merely an 'in-house' irritation but public
disavowal.
All of these threads of position formation and activity, many of them ad hoc and few of
them integrated, led to a number of distinct attempts to influence the final settlement in Rhodesia.
These will be highlighted in the course of the narrative.
See Section L3.
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SECTION 1L4: THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND AND SANCTIONS
This may very briefly be dismissed as an area in which the Church of England was not
heavily involved. This would appear to be a reflection of intimate knowledge of the generally
ambivalent Government attitude to sanctions which itself encompassed knowledge of their
infringement. 1 There was a similar unwillingness to tackle South Africa's non-compliance with
sanctions which was the main factor in undermining their effectiveness. This was because South
Africa was a second minefield of Church of England involvement in Southern African.
The Church of England was only briefly involved in the notification of sanction-breaking to
the British Government and this was in the opening years of the decade. On 17/4/70 Frank Judd,
MP, a member of the IAC, wrote to Maurice Foley, Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign
Office, suggesting that BOAC could be contravening sanctions legislation by acting as broking
agents for South African Airways flights to and from Salisbury. Foley disagreed but Canon John
Oates, then Secretary of the IAC, wrote to Judd on 23/5/70 saying that he would have thought
that BOAC were aiding and abetting the breaking of the Security Council Resolution. Oates'
letter was forwarded to Foley who replied on 25/5/70 that although he had nothing to add to his
previous letter ... "in the light of recent developments we are at present reviewing the whole ques-
tion of BOAC's activities in relation to Southern Africa.2
This appears to be the sum of the Church's involvement in the area of sanctions and sanc-
tions breaking and it is significant that from 1972 the whole emphasis of church involvement
altered. This would appear to coincide with the appointment of Hugh Hanning as Secretary of the
IAC and his use of extensive personal contacts to make Church foreign policy co-operative rather
than confrontational with the Government's general approach.
The BCC was always more critical of sanctions busting than the Church of England and less
wary of pointing out to the Government its less than perfect record in this area. In 1977 the BCC
for example documented some of the infringements which had taken place and singled out certain
In 1968 for example the Government was informed that British oil companies were involved in sanctions-breaking but
no action was taken against them.
2 BSR/IAC/SEC/I/1.
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of them for particular mention. In 1972 Rhodesia had raised a loan of R$63.5 million to expand
steel production and this was largely done in Europe. The USA imported significant amounts of
chrome from Rhodesia between 1970 and 1972 and subsidiaries of Western oil companies were
known to have maintained Rhodesia's oil supplies.3
Until the 1979 settlement BCC reports continually siressed the importance of the non-
observance of sanctions as a factor in the maintenance of the Smith regime. However it was not
even a major element of BCC policy to strengthen sanctions; rather, as the decade progressed the
BCC increasingly came to concentrate on the externally based guerilla groups, ZANU and ZAPU,
as central to the future of Rhodesia.
Divergence of BCC and Church of England views on this issue was substantial but not very
high profile. The issue demonstrates however a tension between them on the developing situation
in Rhodesia which grew worse during the late 1970's and which will be explored in much greater
detail in Section 11.5.
'Ithodesia Now: the liberation of Zimbabwe', a report of the DIA of the BCC and the Conference of British Mission-
ary Societies, Page 10, October, 1977.
- 129 -
SECTION 11.5: DIVERGENCE BETWEEN CHURCH OF ENGLAND AND BCC POL-
ICY
Here one begins to see both the institutional constraint of the Church of England's proxim-
ity to the State and the influence of those particularly responsible for the formulation of Church
policy. In one case there was an inherent institutional distaste and in the other a personal distaste
for anything which might be designated a radical solution. The constraint of congregational and
Synodical sympathy for 'our kith and kin' is also evident although it is not always possible to
evaluate whether this was a real constraint or a useful reason for the IAC to advocate caution in
certain situations. In support of the latter possibility it should be pointed out that situations where
the staff of the BSR or IAC were firmly convinced of the desirability of a particular approach saw
little deference for Synod, rather plans to defuse its possible interference.
Whatever one's interpretation of such factors the fact remains that the official policy of the
Church towards Rhodesia was a clear condemnation of UDI and an intention of furthering the
rights of black Africans to share in government there; in other words an unimpeachable upholding
of the human rights of all Rhodesians, at least according to a Western and individual orientated
view of what constituted human rights.
However a wholehearted comniitment to the principle of one man/one vote as soon as it
might humanly be achieved was not nearly as obvious in the papers and correspondence of the
IAC as it was in those of the BCC which was also heavily involved in the Rhodesian situation..
Indeed as the decade progressed real divergence of views and perspective became apparenL
From 1965 the BCC's general line on Rhodesia had been clear, and, in so far as the Church
of England did not disassociate itself then from the BCC position, one must presume that at this
time their views were reasonably similar. At the BCC's Aberdeen Assembly in November of that
year it was resolved that the Council's concern was for ... "the mission of the Church of Jesus
Christ in the whole continent of Africa, then and in the future."' It was further resolved there that
'Rhodesia, Namibia and the Transkei', a DIA Report to the BCC's Fifth Aasembly, Autumn 1976. Page 1.
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"The Christian Faith demands that the 4,020,000 Africans as well as the 219,000 Europeans
should have the opportunity of sharing responsibility in the decisions concerning the government
of their country and ordering of their lives."2
The Assembly judged the British Government right to require the acceptance of the Six
Principles and suggested that the Fifth of these, on consent, was decisively important. Interest-
ingly they voted that UDI should be opposed, not merely by sanctions, but also by the UK's
resumption of responsibility for Rhodesian government, forcibly if necessary. The UK and other
members of the Commonwealth, they suggested, should try to guarantee human rights provisions
in any new constitution.
Archbishop Ramsey was President of the BCC and made a speech strongly supporting what
had been decided including the use of force if necessary. While one could not deny that
Archbishops have on occasion been thoughly out of step with the rest of their Church's hierarchy
and certainly with the body of Church membership, this speech would seem to indicate the
Church of England's position at that time.
The BCC maintained its consistency of approach with its comprehensive booklet 'Rhodesia
and our Responsibilities' which sought to give Christians enough information, on such esoteric
subjects as the 1969 Rhodesia constitution, the Land Tenure Act and the state of education in
Rhodesia, to allow informed decision.3
By contrast the Church of England's position had shifted and by 1972 real differences of
approach became discemable. 1971 was the year of the Salisbury Proposals, which embodied a
gradualist approach to African majority rule to be attained over a period of perhaps thirty years.
The Pearce Commission and Report4 which followed it in 1972 not surprisingly discovered, as a
result of an intensive enquiry into the acceptability of these proposals to Rhodesians, that the
whites overwhelmingly approved of them 5 and the blacks overwhelmingly rejected them6
2 Resolution of the BCC's Fifth Assembly in Aberdeen, October, 1965, cited in ibid, Page 1.
Rhodesia and our Responsibilities', published on behalf of the DIA of the BCC and the Conference of British Mis-
sionary Societies by the Church Army Press, Oxford, 1970.
Rhodesia: Report of the Commission on Rhodesian Opinion under the Chairmanship of the Rt. Hon. The Lord Pearce,
Cmmd. 4964.
byamajority of 14 to 1.
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The DIA of the BCC produced a statement on the Pearce Report in July 1972 which made it
clear that they had disliked the proposals from the beginning because they had been produced
without any consultation with the African majority in Rhodesia and neither measured up "to the
requirements of Justice TM nor were compatible with ... "the first four of the Five Principles and
were inappropriate for modern Africa as a whole." 7 Furthermore the statement still identified the
problem firmly as one of entrenched white privilege faced with now politicised black Africans set
on pursuing human rights at that time denied them. A peaceful and just solution might still be
hoped for, but any solution must be arrived at with the participation of the African leadership and
on the basis of the Five Principles. Sanctions, though not completely effective should be main-
tained and more effective implementation sought. "People in Britain must surely seek to avoid the
contradiction of trying to work for a peaceful solution in Central Africa and at the same time
opposing a stronger sanctions policy, which is the most suitable non-violent means available to
the international community."8
The BCC's view was based on something more than the internal evidence of the Pearce
Report because they had themselves undertaken a complicated survey to assess Christian opinion
in and on Rhodesia.9 This initiative had been welcomed at the time by the IAC, and as early as
their Committee Meeting on the 16th March 1972 they had notice of the investigation's findings
when it was reported that African opinion was solidly against the proposals and that the terms
were not acceptable to the majority of Rhodesians. 10 But by the time that the Pearce Report was
published the in-house JAC approach had become considerably more pragmatic.
An unsigned and confidential IAC memorandum in June 197211 assessed the post-Pearce
situation as 'exhibiting two major positions among the moderates an extension of sanctions or
6 by a majority of 36 to 1: R.C. Good, op. Cit., p. 317.
'Britain and Rhodesia Now', a statement on the Rhodesian situation following the publication of the Pearce Report,
published on behalf of the DIA of the BCC and the Conference of British Missionary Societies by the Church Aimy Press,
Oxford, l972,p. 1.
Thid, p. 3.
They had produced explanatory leaflets some to be distributed by the Churches in Rhodesia and some 9,000 by the
Missionary Societies and Churches in the UK; the Guardian published the pamphlet's main points in a leading article on
14/12171 and copies of the pamphlet were also sent to the religious press: Minutes of the IAC 15/12171.
° IAC Minutes 16/3/72.
Its style points toit being the work of Hugh flanning.
12 sic.
-132-
an adjustment of the Pearce Commission's terms to give more African seats more quickly which
might mean African rule in less than twenty years. This latter view and its elaborations was attri-
buted to Lord Harlech, a member of the Pearce Commission and generally regarded as a key link
between the Conservative Cabinet and the Commission. He apparently considered Ian Smith
likely to accept in order to rid the country of sanctions and to gain international recognition.
Talks, he thought, should begin in about nine months 'sub-rosa', leading then to genuine negotia-
tions. 13 Harlech was reportedly so convinced that Africans would not obtain a better deal that he
would have liked the Church of England to ask its missionaries to advise acceptance of such
terms.
On one level this memorandum is nothing but reportage but it is not unreasonable to corn-
ment on what it omits to include which is a critique of the Harlech position. There is no assess-
ment of whether or not these suggestions were in accord with the five Principles, which they man-
ifestly were not, nor is there criticism on the grounds of inadequate commitment to those princi-
ples of individual human rights which so obviously underpinned the Five Principles. Equally
there was no adverse comment on the lack of consultation with African leaders, to which princi-
ple the IAC, like the BCC, had hitherto appeared to be committed. Indeed, not merely was there
to be be no consultation but14
"He, (Lord Harlech) doubts whether any future referendum or Pearce-type commission
could ever induce a majority of Africans to vote for anything less than One man/One
vote Tomorrow. But he believes that his proposal could be negotiated between Ian
Smith and Her Majesty's Government, and would be the greatest benefit we could in
practice bestow on the African in this very difficult situation."
This position is perhaps not particularly surprising when one reflects not only on the
strongly patemalist tradition of the Church of England but also on the closeness of IAC members
to Establishment information sources and decision-making centres by 1972. Differences in the
relative positions of the Rhodesian Front Government and, sequentially, of Douglas-Home's Con-
servative and Wilson's Labour Administration were not as great as was often represented. Indeed
13 BSR/IAC/AFRJ2/1, 'Rhodesia after Pearce, a confidential IAC memorandum, June 1972.
14 Ibid, p. 2.
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at the time of UDI the British Government would have accepted a settlement which give no more
than an improvement in the political status of Africans and a repeal of discriminatory legislation
to protect the unenfranchised majority; immediate majority rule was not on the agenda.
Thus the IAC's willingness to contemplate the Salisbury Proposals was within a legitimate
tradition of political schemes to resolve the situation, even though the Church's position had
appeared hitherto considerably more radical and rights based. One might suggest that from this
time onwards one sees a partial elision of Church and Establishment position. A distinct theologi-
cal and even human rights based position within the Church of England is less thscernable.
Another pointer to a change of perspective at this time was a brief prepared for the Bishop
of Chichester on the 1St November, 1972.15 It would have to be described as power-political in its
approach to the pros and cons of sanctions and the present situation in Rhodesia. Ian Smith was
reported to be disquieted by the recent successes of Frelimo in Mozambique and by the growing
threat to Rhodesia's links with Beira and Umtali. He was therefore apparently ready to talk to the
Portuguese and South African defence leaders. The Rhodesian economy was reported as being
seriously, though not decisively, affected by sanctions. The case for sanctions was made however,
not so much on pragmatic success/failure grounds or upon grounds of principle, a tendency to
move the country towards a political situation where the rights of the majority might be secured,
but upon the effect on British interests in Africa if sanctions were to be removed. "General
Gowon's Nigeria takes sanctions extremely seriously, and we have a lot of investment at stake
there, not least in oil." 16 The abandonment of sanctions would also probably lead to the triumph
of the extremists, the Ugandan situation being cited as an example of the horrors which might tri-
umph if sanctions were lifted.
One can hardly quarrel with this on the grounds of analysis but one might legitimately ask
whether political repercussions in the rest of Africa were sufficient to ground a church's princi-
pled response?
' BSR/IAC/BRIEFS, 1/11/72. Again it was unsigned but again stylistically it would appear to be the work of Hugh
Harming.
16 Thid., p. 2.
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This question will inevitably lead to another, just as legitimate - what grounds should form
the foundation of a Church's response? The answer must be that, while the content of response
might vary considerably according to milieu, the parameters used to formulate response must be
the form and needs of a Christian society and of individual Christians within society. The theo-
logical and human rights input to Church of England policy choices has already been outlined17
and it is now suggested that such issues did not sufficiently inform foreign policy decision mak-
ing at a conscious level. That the personal views and long term objectives of those involved was
imbued unconsciously with such influences is not doubted, but there existed an agenda of ques-
tions which should have been used consistently to test possible policies and was not.
That differences between the BCC and the IAC were not completely clear-cut, and also that
they were firmly entangled in personal opinion and preference, however was demonstrated by
Elliott Kendall's, of the Church Missionary Society, comments at the IAC Meeting on the 5th
June 1972. In response to his contentions that Christians should now ... "select their initiatives in
an effort to renew dialogues between black and white," and that there were stronger grounds for
hope now than there were a year before, he was questioned on whether the BCC knew what Afri-
cans would agree to. His view was that the formal ANC position of one man/one vote might look
and sound intransigent and certainly caused some irritation in the FCO but he thought they (the
Africans) would settle for something much more flexible than this."18
In the main however the divergence of view remained, indeed it grew greater, to reach its
peak perhaps with the publication in June 1977 of the BCC document 'Rhodesia Now: the
Liberation of Zimbabwe', 19 This contained only one mention en passant of a pivot of IAC policy,
the Peace-keeping Force,20 and this only after "we insisted on at least a reference to a peacekeep-
ing presence".21 In its efforts to explain why guerilla forces had resorted to violence it was held
17 In Section 1.4.
JAC Minutes, 5/6/72, p.2.
19 'Rhodesia Now: the Liberation of Zimbabwe', DIA of the BCC and the Conference of British Missionary Societies,
Church Army Press, London, 1977.
20 See Section 11.8.
21 BSR/IAC/SEC/3/2, letter of 24/10177 from Hugh Hanning to the Bishop of Truro.
- 135 -
by many members of the IAC to be advocating violence itself, and one MP member commented
that it was unfortunate that so much attention was paid in the document to freedom fighters and so
little to security forces.22
This criticism was largely unjustified; indeed the document was an infinitely more sophisti-
cated attempt to understand the practical, historical and psychological parameters of the conflict
than anything the LAC had produced. Giles Ecciestone took this view when, at the IAC meeting
where the failings of the BCC's document were discussed, he suggested that the particular
emphasis of the document was an attempt to redress the balance which existed in British public
opinion in favour of 'kith and kin'23
Perhaps too 'Rhodesia Now' appeared to be preoccupied with the parameters of violence
because it attempted to get to grips with the dilemma which underlies so much theological think-
ing in the domestic and particularly in the international political sphere - can the use of violence
ever be justified? Can the demands of a temporal justice over-ride those of peace and the preser-
vation of human life?
"As to whether violence would be used at all, in a situation where all else fails, it must
be remembered that the right of armed struggle has been conceded in all the Christian
traditions save the pacifist one. And all Christians, including many pacifists, would
agree that the distinction between tactical and indiscriminate violence is not a specious
one. If it has to be either, let it be the former, despite the fact that the victims will be
oblivious of the distinction. But that said, it must also be remembered that for Chris-
tians as a body to express support for an armed struggle is a step involving serious
consequences ... The fact is that difficulties in the way of outright support for the
armed struggle also derive from knowledge of the dreadful toll that war takes, from
the example it gives to others who come later, and from the temptation it sets up for
those who come to power by force, to rule by force ... there is the fact, recognised by
the British Foreign Secretary in a number of speeches ... that many of the leaders of
the African political movements, if not of the guerillas themselves, are Christians -
"men of peace" in Dr. Owen's phrase. These now support the armed struggle as being
the only recourse which holds out any chance of success. Thus it cannot be denied that
if we are to keep fellowship with Christians involved in the realities of Rhodesia, we
must acknowledge that support for violence is at least compatible with some expres-
sions of Christian conscience."24
It is suggested that these are not the words of an organisation committed to a violent course,
IAC Mmutcs, 1417/77, page 3.
23 IAC Minutes, 2417177, page 3.
'Rhodesia Now', op. cii., p. 10.
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merely one "seeking to understand the use of violence by all those engaged in the anned struggle,
remembering that blacks also serve in the security forces of the illegal regime." 25 But it is true
that the publication did ignore the IAC's attempts to input bias towards Bishop Muzorewa and
sought instead to ask what and who the majority of blacks actually wanted ... "Not being deterred
by the fact that some uncongenial people also support them". 26 This rider being a good definition
of the IAC's view of the undesirability of Messrs. Nkomo and Mugabe by nature of their associa-
tions with Marxist ideas and Communist governments.27
From 1978 onwards a great deal of the work on Rhodesia and reaction to unfolding events
there was undertaken by a group set up under the auspices of the BCC - the Rhodesia Group.
This does not appear to have diminished to any significant extent the IAC's view that the BCC
was not sound on Rhodesia and, indeed, attendance of Church of England members of this group
was spasmodic in the extreme. To add further fuel to the generally uneasy relationship the IAC
favoured the interim government of Bishop Muzorewa while the BCC had deep reservations. But
from this time onwards events occurred so rapidly that to some extent they overtook considered
response and gave too little time for weighty consideration of divergent positions.
The contrast between the theological input to all discussion of the Rhodesia situation which
the BCC maintained throughout the 1970's and the pragmatic and increasing power political
approach demonstrated by the JAC of the Church of England is marked. It would seem to be a
feature both of the Church's closeness, institutionally and through its personnel, to government
and of the distinctly Non-conformist nature of much input to the BCC. Indeed for those members
of the Church of England who were committed to the ecumenical outlook of the BCC a turning
away from the special relationship between Church and State was necessary. It is noticeable that
those such as Paul Oestreicher who were highly committed to strengthening Church of England
participation in the BCC tended to be critical of the Church of England's 'Established' position.
Thi4,pagel2.
lbid,p. 12.
27 See Section 11.10.
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SECTION IL6: THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE WCC
There were distinct differences of approach between the Church of England and the BCC
over Rhodesia but the Church's relationship with the WCC was even less harmonious.
The major and continuing source of friction was a decision by the Executive Committee of
the WCC in September 1970 to make financial grants to a number of organizations in different
parts of the world which they saw as involved in the struggle against racism. 1 While financial
contributions to enable this to be done had been received from a number of sources part of the
balance had been taken from the WCC's General Reserve Fund. Since general approval had not
been sought for this many members of the Church of England had learnt of it from a highly
coloured media campaign which fuelled an instinctive disapproval of what they saw as tacit sup-
port for the activities of guerilla organizations.
A thoughtful Presidential address by Archbishop Ramsey of Canterbury at the Spring Ses-
sion of the 1971 Synod took a fairly moderate line. He pointed out the virtues of the gesture as a
symbolic act of solidarity with the oppressed but he did ask whether it was right to single out
white racism; all harshness of trealment on account of race by any government should be con-
demned. He refened to Archbishop Temple's distinction between the Church which lays down
general principles and points out what is wrong and the individual Christian who acts practically;
the Churches, he suggested, should not act in a military or political capacity, they should stand
above the battle ready to further the process of reconciliation. During his own recent visits to
South Africa and Uganda he had tried to protest against all forms of racism.2
However two motions at the same session of Synod were considerably less compromising
and, while they welcomed Christian stands against racism, they regretted the WCC grants to
groups openly committed to violence. They suggested that ways in which member churches
1 See Section 1.2: the Assembly of the WCC, meeting at Uppsala in 1968, had declared its implacable opposition to ra-
cism and had authorised the setting up of a Special Fund to which all churches were asked to contribute in order to combat
what was seen as a fundamental evil.
2 Report of Proceedings of the General Synod, Spring Group of Sessions 1971, Vol. 2, No. 1, ClO, London, 1971:
Ramsey had spoken Out strongly against the hardening of the principles and practice of apartheid during his South African
tour.
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might exercise greater control over controversial statements and activities of the WCC be
explored.3 These motions were not in fact debated through lack of time but they reappeared on
the July Agenda as adenda to other items, while an amendment to cut down the Church's coniri-
bution to the WCC was only withdrawn on the promise of a full debate on the WCC in the near
future. Moreover a report on relations between the Church and Ecumenical Organizations stressed
the cause for concern in the wide gap between the thinking of the international Christian leader-
ship and that of ordinary Churchmen amongst whom there had been widespread objection to the
use of WCC reserves for these grants even though they had been specified as being for non-
military purposes.
The Autumn Group of Sessions saw the controversy continue with a debate on a motion
deploring the WCC grants to groups committed to violence. This was ultimately defeated and a
more moderate motion carried welcoming the discussion the grants had provoked and recognising
the importance of the exploration of the use of power in pursuit of justice also provoked by the
grants.4 It was not an issue that would die however and it reappeared regularly and just as regu-
larly provoked heated debate which ran the gamut from condemnation of the WCC as "politically
lopsided"5 to fervent advocacy of the "need to recognise the implications of belonging to a demo-
cratically structured world fellowship which was that we should not always like the decisions that
were made but we must abide by them."6
Anti WCC feeling came to a head in the summer of 1974 when, after a debate on the worth
of both the BCC and WCC, where grass-roots attitudes were critical of both, the grant to the
WCC was reduced by £1,000 - a symbolic gesture of repudiation of the WCC's policy on grants
to guerilla groups. There was seldom thereafter a Synod meeting where the issue was not raised
and it was therefore not surprising that considerable controversy arose over the WCC' s decision
in August 1978 to make a grant of £43,000 for humanitarian purposes to the Patriotic Front in
General Synod Agenda for February, 1971 Session, G.S. 16, p. 10, motions 36 and 37, Wickham Press, Sidcup, 1971.
' Report of Proceedings of the General Synod, Autumn Group of Sessions, 1971, Vol.2, No. 3, ClO, 1971.
Report of Proceedings of the General Synod, Spring Group of Sessions, 1972, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 73, words spoken by
Mr. Gervase Duffield.
6 Thi4, p.74, words apoken by Mr. Paul Oestreicher.
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Rhodesia.
As far as the Church's central organization was concerned the is sue was first raised at the
IAC meeting in mid-September when the adverse reaction to this grant in some of the dioceses
was discussed and where considerable differences of opinion amongst Committee members was
apparent.7 In October Derek Pattinson, the Synod's General Secretary, wrote to the Bishops of
Matabeleland and Mashonaland on the instructions of the Synod's Standing Committee enclosing
the text of the Bishop of Bath and Wells' motion condemning the WCC grant in Rhodesia, and
asking for their comments.8
The telegram in reply from the Bishop of Matabeleland to Hugh Hanning was hardly res-
trained: "Judas Iscariot Patron Saint of WCC. British support for WCC motivated by British love
of bloodsports."9 Mashonaland' s reply was somewhat less picturesque but also deplored WCC
support for the Patriotic Front which he opposed on the grounds that it opposed free elections and
because its members were, he claimed, anti-Christian. He also made clear his support of the 1978
internal settlement. 10 The two bishops also wrote jointly to the Archbishop of Canterbury deplor-
ing the BCC's support of the grant to the Patriotic Front and asking the Archbishop to resign
from the BCC, whose president he was.'1
The opinion of the two bishops was undoubtedly influential, not least because it mirrored
the reactions of much grass-roots and a good deal of central Church opinion. Whether it was
reflective of more than a minority, and by and large a white minority, opinion in Rhodesia was
quite another matter. After their opinions had been circulated to Synod members prior to the
November 1978 Session a letter was received by Derek Pattinson from Donald Arden,
Archbishop of Central Africa.
The Province of Central Africa, of which he was head, had just become aware of a
correspondence between the JAC and two of its bishops; to complete the picture he wished also to
' JAC Minutes 14/9178, P. 3.
BSRJIAC/AFR/2/5, letter of 23/10178 from Derek Pattinson to Bishops of Matabeleland and Mashonaland.
Thid, telegram of 26/I 0/76 from Bishop of Matabeleland to Hugh Hanning.
10 Ibid. undated letter from Mashonaland to Pattinson.
Thid, copy of an undated letter from the two bishops to the Archbishop of Canterbury.
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say that the Church of the Province of Central Africa had always supported the WCC Programme
Against Racism. The British public and Rhodesian whites were totally ignorant of the acts of bru-
tality committed by forces of the interim government and the interim government now had little
support among 95% of the black population. To avoid civil war the British Government should
now abandon its divide and rule policy, he suggested, fly to keep the Patriotic Front together,
become fully involved in the situation and not recognise the interim settlement until it was
broadly supported by the black majority.'2
This view demonstrated how far from being representative of black Rhodesian opinion were
the Rhodesian bishops upon whose opinions now and in the past the IAC had chosen to rely. It
also demonstrated the reluctance of the Ciurch' s central decision makers to change an opinion
once formed; the Archbishop's letter was certainly discussed but it was not publicized to anything
like the same extent as that of his two Rhodesian diocesan bishops and no attempt was made in
the Synod debate which followed to inject a note of caution based on his attitudes and informa-
tion. A certain sense that over-reliance on the two Rhodesian bishops might prove dangerous did
surface at the IAC meeting in November however when it was suggested that, as a result of their
attitudes to the various political parties, the Rhodesian Churches might, after independence, be
written off as accomplices of former oppressors as had the Roman Catholic Church in Mozam-
bique.13
The BCC debate in October on the WCC grant, where it was decided that no new issue of
principle was involved merely because the locale was an area of significant British involve-
ment, 14 was in complete contrast to the highly emotional Synod debate in November. 15 Here the
motion finally carried noted the amount of disquiet about the grants in the Church of England,
considered that the Programme to Combat Racism had political and theological implications
which called for urgent debate and urged the Standing Committee to appoint a delegation to take
12 BSR/IAC/AFR/2/5, ktter from Archbishop of Central Africa to General Secretary of Synod, 8/1 1178.
13 IAC Minutes, 15/11/78.
14 BSR/IAC/BCC/1/'2, BCC background paper of October, 1978.
General Synod Report of Proceedings, Autumn Group of Sessions, 1978, Vol.9, No. 3.
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these matters up with the General Secretary of the WCC in Geneva.
It is easy to criticise the overwhelming distaste in the Church for these grants and for the
guerila activity they appeared to endorse; and it is undeniable that a large measure of reaction
was a shrinking from a radical, Marxist- orientated, home grown and black solution to the Rho-
desia problem. Also undeniable is the damage done to the formation of a realistic position by
over-reliance on the opinions of the two white and thoroughly biased Rhodesian bishops.
One must be fair to the Church of England here however; to designate the Church of
England's position vis-a vis that of the WCC as nothing but a vestige of imperialism is to ignore
the problem of the divergent, and indeed contrathctoiy, demands of justice and of peace which, if
often insufficiently considered by the IAC, were recognised and agonised over at length in Synod
debates by men who felt nothing but deep personal antipathy for white domination in Rhodesia.
Synod did contain reactionaries whose views were everything that the Wcç might justifiably
condemn but it contained also men of intellectual rigour and firm principle who refused to sim-
plify issues whose innate complexity they well understood.
Indeed it must be emphasized that in a serious discussion of Church objectives in the light
of the multi-stranded code of conduct enjoined on all Christians no perfect solution to this prob-
lem exists. It must also be right seriously to ask such questions as whether, even if justice is one's
preferred overall objective, it is right to single out particular guerilla groups as the most likely
means of obtaining justice. Would the support of such groups intensify and prolong civil war in
which many would lose their lives? What relative value had peace as an objective in the particu-
lar circumstances of Rhodesia? What value as a confidence building gesture on the other hand
would such a grant have in the context of black Africa as a whole? Preoccupation with such fun-
damental issues is apparent, along, it must be said, with residual imperialism, in the debates of
both Synod and the JAC.
The WCC however appears neither at this time nor since to have harboured doubts about
where choice should lie in the justice v. peace debate. Giles Ecclestone, Secretary of the BSR,
who went to Geneva as part of the delegation referred to above and who was consistently cautious
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in IAC and BSR discussions about many of the policies initiated and pursued by Hugh Hanning,
reported a complete inability on the part of members of the Executive there to comprehend, let
alone to understand, the disquiet felt by many Anglicans in England about the Rhodesian grant in
particular, and the grant awarding policy of the WCC in generaL16
There was certainly a visible and vocal residually racist element in Synod and there was
also a good deal of paternalism as a hangover from the days when this was an accurate representa-
tion of the Church of England's relationship with the Anglican Church abroad. But to dismiss all
theologically and intellectually sound doubt as manifestations of post-imperial racism, as the
WCC appears to have done, is to accept a one-dimensional analysis of the Church of England's
position. It is interesting too that many of those who did argue support for the WCC grants in
Synod did so on the basis of the need to demonstrate good faith and solidarity. In other words
inirinsic merit was less important than the refutation of a Third World perception of the Church of
England's position, even if that perception was ill-founded or, at least, simplistic.
16 In an personal interview in July, 1988.
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SECTION 1L7: INTERVENTION ON BEHALF OF INDIVIDUALS
This is an area where traditionally churches are much involved, sometimes on behalf of
Christians whose freedom to worship is denied them or who are discriminated against because of
their faith and sometimes on the wider basis that an individual's human rights are abrogated.
However the Church's intervention in this area in Rhodesia was minimal. Unlike Eastern Europe
where, increasingly during the 1970s, the Church monitored the plight of individuals whose
human rights were threatened or contravened, 1 Rhodesia was not an arena where the Church of
England operated through the championing of the problems of individuals.
This was largely because the Anglican Church in Rhodesia was independent and active and
interference by the Church of England would, by and large, have seemed inappropriate. Though
all questions of individual hardship were initially referred to the Church in Rhodesia it should be
noted that there was some real element of structural unfairness here as the Anglican Church in
Rhodesia was overwhelmingly white dominated.
The only significant instance of such intervention was the support given by the LAC in 1976
to the Roman Catholic Bishop Lamont who was sentenced in October to ten years imprisonment
for failing to report the presence of guerillas in his diocese. The message of support, sent on 1st
October, was copied to Ian Smith. A letter was also sent to Smith asking for the rescinding, or at
least the amelioration, of the sentence which would not, the JAC suggested, help the process of
achieving a lasting settlement in Rhodesia.2
The campaign on behalf of Lamont and his colleagues was pursued with some tenacity and
indeed Lamont was deported rather than imprisoned. However the role that protests like the
Church of England's played in the reevaluation of his sentence is difficult to evaluate as a number
of organizations were active in working on his behalf. Even before his sentence the BCC had sent
a telegram to the Archbishop of Salisbury thanking God for the stand made by the Roman
Catholic Church in Rhodesia where some Justice and Peace officials had recently been arrested,
See the work of Keston College for example.
2 IAC Minutes, 1/10/76 and BSR/IAC/AFRI2/1, telegrams and letter of 1/10176.
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and, in a letter at the beginning of October to the Secretary of the Commission for International
Justice and Peace in England, Hugh Hanning associated the JAC with this position.3
However this is the only noteworthy example of Church intervention on an individual's
behalf and it is not in this area that one must look for extensive Church involvement.
BSR/IAC/APRI2/1, telegram from the BCC to the Archbishop of Salisbury, 7/9/77 and letter from Hanning tothe
Secretary of the CUP 14/10/77.
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SECTION 11.8: THE CAMPAIGN TO SET UP A THIRD PARTY PEACEKEEPING
FORCE.
This campaign formed the main focus of IAC activity in the Rhodesia arena. It was
undoubtedly a bye-product of Hugh Hanning's personal interests which iravelled to the IAC with
him. 1 There were certain underlying values to this campaign which are significant in terms of the
theology or human rights values which underpin Church activity. On the one hand there was a
commitment to the value of peace itself, a desire to minimize the unnecessary loss of human life
and a belief in the value of mediation. On the other hand there was a failure to ask whether the
maintenance of peace might be at the expense of justice and where impartiality appeared in the
parameters of mediation. It is suggested that no analysis of these underlying values was under-
taken or even considered necessary by those attempting to implement this policy and that this
seriously undermined the Church of England's ability to judge the appropriateness and timing of
its attempted innovations.
This campaign gathered momentum at the beginning of 1975, although the matter was first
raised as a possible contribution to the Rhodesian situation as early as 1972. At the IAC Meeting
on 18th March 1975 Hugh Hanning reported that a seminar to consider the possibility and practi-
cability of setting up a Peacekeeping Force in Rhodesia 'pending the transitional period' was to
be held on 17th July, 1975.2 Apparently Sithole on a recent visit to London, had thought this was
a most creative idea.
This confidential seminar was set up under the joint auspices of the Centre for Human
Rights and Responsibilities and the International Peace Academy and various members of the
IAC attended it. Here one sees again the importance of Hugh Hanning' s personal contacts and
affiliations in the formation of policy.
The significance of this meeting is difficult to assess as detailed notes are not on file. How-
ever, in a brief to the Archbishop of Canterbury for a House of Lords debate on Southern Africa
See Sections 1.5 and 1.6.
2 JAC Minutes 18/3175, p. 2.
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on 14th April 1978 Hugh Hanning claimed that this concept ... "fourteen months before the Kiss-
inger initiative was eventually incorporated into the Owen/Vance proposals in the form of a UN
Peacekeeping Force." 3 Moreover, at an IAC Meeting in November 1977, Maurice Chandler
pointed out that the Church of England's specific contribution to the debate on the future of Rho-
desia, an International Peacekeeping Force, was now the policy of Her Majesty's Government.4
At a similar meeting in November 1979 it was noted that the cunent proposal of a Com-
monwealth Observer Team came very close to ideas put forward in 1975 by an IAC and IPA
Committee.5 IAC members obviously saw the meeting as the birthplace of a policy which was
later adopted by Government.
What is certainly true is that the idea of a Peacekeeping Force was widely disseminated by
the IAC. At a meeting on 30th March 1976 Hugh Hanning thanked Adam Butler, MP for circulat-
ing a report of a July, 1975 seminar which analyzed the utility of various types of Peacekeeping
Force in Rhodesia in his own, Conservative, party. 'There was general support for this concept,
particularly in the light of the gloomy prospect of starvation, of the resumption of violence, of a
new generation of Marxist field commanders who would repudiate Muzorewa and Nkomo, and of
a Marxist aligned belt right across Africa threatening the survival of Mr. Kaunda." 6 At this same
meeting Frank Judd was asked whether the Commonwealth Secretariat had undertaken any plan-
ning on this subject because, although the UN was unlikely to be of much help, several countries
like Canada, India, Botswana, Malawi and Zambia might well contribute to such a force.7
Once again one observes the mixture of humanitarian concern and power-political analysis,
a complicated cocktail where it would be impossible to know not only which concern predom-
inated but also whether one was observing a desirable or an undesirable phenomenom. Certainly a
power-political analysis alone, devoid of considerations of human rights and values, is an inade-




6 IAC Minutes 3013176, p.3.
Ibid. p. 3.
- 147 -
religious perspective can bring. Equally however it is unrealistic to ignore every political dimen -
sion and to dwell only on a theologically derived or essentially humanitarian analysis. Whatever
its virtues however this mixture of motivation and ambiguous response occurs again and again.
The importance within the IAC's programme of activities of the contacts which Hugh Han-
ning brought with him when he became Secretary was again demonstrated at the IAC Meeting on
16th June 1976. Maurice Chandler reported that at the IPA Meeting that week it had been noted
that it was constitutionally impossible for Ian Smith to approach the Secretary General of the UN
about a Peacekeeping Force while the British Government had not done so. However he could
approach the Secretary General of the Commonwealth, and it was agreed that Maurice Chandler
would write to the Secretary General on this subject.
This he did8 and on 16th September he wrote again to ask whether Ramphal would meet
General Rikhye of the IPA to discuss such plans on 28th or 29th September. 9 In his reply of 17th
September Ramphal said that he would be away then but the Assistant Secretary General would
meet Rikhye who was duly escorted to the Commonwealth Secretariat by Maurice Chandler,
Hugh Hanning and Rodney Elton to outline plans to examine the feasibility of a Third Party
Peacekeeping presence in Rhodesia. It was apparently agreed that this sort of contingency plan-
ning might be very sensitive done by an official body but might indeed be useful if undertaken by
an unofficial one such as the IPA. 10 It is tempting to read into this bland reaction and into
Ramphal's delegation of the meeting itself to his deputy a discounting of the IPA's or the IAC's
plans and/or their influence. This is perhaps unjust and there is not enough evidence to support a
well-substantiated analysis.
Hugh Hanning also took General Rikhye to visit Ted Rowlands, Minister of State at the
FCO, where it was agreed, in another splendidly anodyne phrase, that ... "the highly complex
situation in Rhodesia was susceptible of imaginative ideas". 11 The Third Party Peacekeeping mi-
BSR/IAC/APRI2/1, Inner dated 2617176.
9Thid.
° LAC Minutes 1/10/76.
IAC Minutes 1/10/76.
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tiative was further pursued in the latter months of 1976 by a letter printed in The Times, 12 by
Maurice Chandler, Hugh Hanning and Rodney Elton on the virtues of such a force, and by a
second letter on the 20th October on the same subject from Hugh Elliott, a member of the IAC,
written at Hugh Hanning's prompting.'3
At the turn of the year in 1976 the JAC was much concerned with the negotiations which
were going on, and apparently about to break down, in Geneva between Smith, Muzorewa,
Sithole, Nkomo and Mugabe. The meeting itself was the outcome of the talks in the summer of
1976 between Kissinger and Smith and the problems arose from their very different perceptions
of what had been agreed between them; Kissinger appeared to think that this was a transfer of
power while Smith insisted that only the sharing of power was on offer. At the IAC Meeting on
30th November. 14 Elliott Kendall reported that Garfield Todd seemed very depressed at the lack
of progress and possibility of failure; while the situation was unclear it certainly did not seem
hopeful. Hugh Hanning once more reported Rikhye' s view that probable disagreement over con-
trol of the security forces might be resolved by some form of Commonwealth presence, which
view had been passed on to the British delegation in Geneva. It was agreed that Hanning would
consult with the Quakers who had a delegation in Geneva as to the best way of informing the
various delegations about the researches of the IAC and IPA into the contribution which might be
made by the Commonwealth to the situation.
By the beginning of December hopes for a positive outcome of the Geneva negotiations had
faded even further as demonstrated by a memorandum from Rodney Elton to Lord Carrington.15
In this he reported a seminar he had attended with Garfield Todd who had said that the failure of
the Geneva negotiations was inevitable within the next few weeks unless an outside initiative was
received, preferably from the United Kingdom. Such a failure would almost certainly lead to a
period of up to two years of conflict in which the Cubans would be increasingly involved and the
12 BSR/IAC/AFRI2/5, letter dated 15/10176.
13 BSR/IACIAFRI2/1.
IAC Minutes, 30/11176, p. 1.
15 BSR/IAC/AFRJ1, memorandum dated 2/1 2176.
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possibility of a multiracial democracy would be replaced by the virtual certainty of a Marxist mil-
itary dictatorship. Garfield Todd was reported to favour the appointment of a British Minister
with sole responsibility for the Rhodesian problem and an offer of a British General as Chief of
Staff. The Minister should propose to the Geneva Meeting that a small but carefully chosen
group of men be appointed to serve on the interim government, and spell out to the reluctant
white delegation that the alternative would be the Cubans. Elton's own view was that the Foreign
Office appeared to have no strategy to avoid the breakdown of the Conference; "Their approach to
the situation seems, throughout, to have been Micawberish." 16 Here one sees the interwoven
quality of information gathering and dissemination with Elton plugged into both the Church of
England circuit and that of the Conservative Party; and Lord Carrington, it should be remem-
bered, became Foreign Secretary less than three years later.
There is a strong impression that the IAC initiative which followed was designed to remedy
the perceived hiatus in official Government policy. In addition the importance which the IPA and
the JAC, as the IPA's constant advocate and facilitator, attached to this putative Commonwealth
force was demonstrated by the round of visits made by General Rikhye when he was in London at
the beginning of 1977. He saw Ted Rowlands at the FCO, Ivor Richard at the Commonwealth
Secretariat twice, John Davies, the Conservative Foreign Affairs spokesman, and Jeremy Thorpe,
Leader of the Liberal Party. He also attended a meeting organized by the IAC with several dis-
tinguished members of Synod where the concept of a Commonwealth presence for Rhodesia dur-
ing the transition stage to majority rule was discussed in detail. One gains the impression of a
man with assured access to the second rank of political influence skirmishing around the inner cir-
cle constantly trying to gain access there. Hugh Hanning and the Church of England facilitated
this access and thus the idea of a Commonwealth Peacekeeping Force became even more firmly
fixed in the rubric of Church policy.
Indeed IAC staff produced a document outlining how such a presence might operate in the
areas of defence and policing and in monitoring a referendum. Their analysis of the fundamenla]I
16 Ibid. p.2.
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problem at Geneva was that an understandable lack of trust existed between black and white par-
ties to the negotiations and this was most acute in the areas of defence, internal security and law
and order. "In each of these areas confidence can be restored by ensuring that sensitive functions
are carried out under the control or supervision of a third party mutually agreed by both blacks
and whites."17
It was suggested that the Commonwealth presence be drawn from member countries,
amongst whom India, Nigeria, Ghana, Malaysia, New Zealand, Jamaica might be suitable. It
would not comprise a single preformed contingent, but a number of small parties or individuals.
In the area of defence they might perform such functions as acting with existing staffs, operating
training missions to retrain members of the nationalist movements at present under arms to serve
in the new national army or acting as field officers to monitor the deployment and role of forces in
the field. In the area of policing senior officers might supervise the use of the police forces and be
responsible to the Crown; District Officers might monitor local deployment of police forces and
ensure their impartiality in law enforcement; and a training role might also be undertaken either in
Zimbabwe itself or in Commonwealth training schools. A referendum was desirable because any
decision on the form of the interim government should be endorsed by the opinion of all Rhode-
sians, and the best way of ensuring the necessary impartiality was thought to be an independent
Commonwealth presence. This might also be used for the conduct of the first election if that was
requested.
The prerequisites of such a scheme were obviously an agreed and total cessation of hostili-
ties, which it would manifestly be extremely difficult to deliver, and the concession by Smith that
power would be transferred to, not merely shared with, the majority black population, a conces-
sion that he was not yet ready to make. Moreover at a meeting on 10th December Ted Rowlands
at the FCO had already spoken to Elton about the unacceptability of the idea of a Commonwealth
military force to Commonwealth countries if there were a prospect of their fighting the black
population. The TAC scheme was not for a fighting force as such but it would be impossible to
BSR/IAC/AFRJ1, undated copy of memorandum.
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guarantee that it might not be forced to adopt such a role given the unstable situation in Rhodesia.
Moreover Ted Rowlands in his response to the memorandum itself, 18 while recognising that there
were various ways in which Commonwealth countries might give assistance, pointed out that
there were a number of political and practical problems over such involvement.
However such Government reservations not withstanding, the JAC memorandum was sub-
sequently sent to the five Geneva Heads of Delegation, to the High Commissioners of Tanzania,
Botswana and Zambia, to the Bishops of Mashonaland, Matabeleland and Lebombo, to the Com-
monwealth Secretariat and to the FCO As replies were received they were forwarded to
Goronwy-Rees at the FCO, to Lord Carrington. to John Davies, MP, a Conservative spokesman
on Foreign Affairs, and to Frank Hooley, MI' Most of them could be classified as acknowledge-
merits but a letter from the Bishop of Mashonaland said that as he saw Ian Smith from time to
time he would have the Church of England's ideas in mind "if an opportunity presents itself."19
In itself this is an interesting comment on the Bishop's connections with the Smith regime but
one that evinced no recorded comment from the Executive or members of the IAC about his pos-
sible lack of impartiality. In his reply the Bishop of Lebombo reported that he had passed a copy
of the IAC memorandum and a note on the work of the BSR to the Secretary to the Minister of
the Interior in Mozambique.
There appears to have continued to be very muted enthusiasm for JAC ideas in official cir-
cles at this time. This was obvious both from the tenor of replies from Government departments
to the LAC's letters and from ithtation amongst IAC members about Government inaction.
Goronwy-Rees at the FCO appeared to harbour doubts about whether a Commonwealth presence
would be enough to reassure both sides during transition21 though Elton was reassuring on how
much work on viability had already been done and offered to facilitate contact between the FCO
and the 1PA22 Goronwy-Rees replied rather tepidly that he might well take up this offer at a later
BSR/IAC/AFR/1, letter dated 28/3/77.
19 BSR/LAC/APRI2/4, letter dated 24/3/77.
mid., letter dated 29/3/77.
21 BSR/IAC/AFR/2/5, letter of 2/5/77 from Goronwy-Recs to Elton.
B5R/IAc/AFRr2/5, letter of 6/5/77 from Elton to Goronwy-Recs.
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stage as he was aware of the 1PA's work; the priority now however was to find out how the par-
ties concerned viewed the problem. The Consultative Group announced by the Secretaiy of State
on 11th May would look, amongst other issues, into the feasibility of a Peacekeeping Force.
Despite this lack of official enthusiasm and perhaps to answer the substance of Government
doubts the IAC's media campaign was renewed in the summer of 1977 with a letter to The Times
on 26th June from Maurice Chandler, Hugh Hanning and Lord Elton stressing that the Peacekeep-
ing Force would be supervisory, not a combatant or an invasion force. 23 Their letter to the Guar-
dian on the 1st July followed an article on the subject of a Peacekeeping Force for Rhodesia in
that newspaper on 28th June, and stressed the need for an outside presence to guarantee the fair-
ness of elections. As Britain was still the sovereign power this would mean some form of British
contribution. They also congratulated the Foreign Secretary, David Owen, for seeing that the
machinery for transferring power needed to be agreed before the constitutional procedure and not
afterwards.24 In August Hugh Hanning wrote to Alistair Osborne, editor of The World Tonight
on BBC TV suggesting an interview with Maurice Chandler who would put the IAC's case for a
Peacekeeping Force in Rhodesia for a finite period; this did not in fact take place.25
September 1977 saw activity on a different front with a letter on 2nd from Hugh Hanning to
Lord Carver, newly appointed to organize the role of the forces in Rhodesia hand in hand with a
UN special representative, suggesting that General Rikhye, whose pedigree was enclosed, would
be willing to help. He had, Hanning pointed out, some useful contacts already having accom-
panied Hanning in talks with Ivor Richard and Ted Rowland at the FCO and with opposition
leaders.26 Rikhye was apparently unhappy with the plans for Rhodesian defense in the transitional
period as detailed in the Owen/Young proposals. The dilemma as he saw it was that the abolition
of the existing forces might leave a dangerous vacuum, but that they would be too widely dis-
trusted to be retained.27 Lord Carver's reply is not on record but Rikhye was not appointed.
BSB./IAC/AFRf2/5, letter printed in The Times on 26/6/77.
24jjj
BSRIIAC/AFRI2/4, letter of 1 1/8/77 from Hanning to Osborne.
BSR/IAC/AFRf2/1, letter of 2/9/77 from Hanning to Carver.
IAC Minutes, 15/9/77; an undated letter from General Rikhye to Maurice Chandler was read to the meeting.
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Despite lack of official encouragement the idea of a Peacekeeping Force was kept alive for
the rest of the decade, indeed until it was overtaken by events. It appeared under a different guise
in January 1979 when the threat of serious famine in Rhodesia prompted Maurice Chandler and
Hugh Hanning to submit to the DIA of the BCC a suggestion that a major disaster relief exercise
be mounted there. They considered the case for it to be unimpeachable because sovereignty still
resided in the United Kingdom, though tangentially they suggested that sovereignty issues be
ignored in crises of this sort; functionally NATO would be the best agency to undertake this
operation; though politically the EEC might be preferable, as an organization it lacked hardware
and executive ability; Zambia might provide a base for planes and the cost would be borne by five
or six of the richest Western governments.
There was also an interesting suggestion about how this might be used to gain political
advantage - if the various factions in Rhodesia did not agree to the recent Anglo-American initia-
tive they might be threatened with a cut-off in aid. This would appear to more of the bizarre mix-
ture of humanitarian impulse and Machiavellian scheming which, it has been noted already,
marked much IAC thinking. 28 However, and not surprisingly, at the meeting of the BCC's Rho-
desia Group in March there was little enthusiasm for this idea largely on the grounds of legi-
timacy, lack of neutrality and the general unsuitability of the situation.29
In a more familiar form the issue reappeared later that same year and from a source which
showed how the IAC's persistence with this issue had influenced others. On the 4th September
1979 the Chairman of the DIA of the BCC wrote to Lord Carrington, now Foreign Secretary in
the new Conservative Government, suggesting yet again that a British or Commonwealth Peace-
keeping Force be used during the period leading up to majority rule. 30 The idea certainly contin-
ued to be routinely endorsed as sound in IAC inner circles. In official vein a statement by the
IAC, put out over Maurice Chandler's signature on 16th March 1978 which welcomed the inter-
nal agreement as a first step to the establishment of a multi-racial Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, reaffirmed
3° BSR/IAC/AFR/2/2, document of 22/1/79.
3° BSR/LAC/BCC/1/4, Minutes dated 20/3/79.
3° BSR/IAC/AFR/2/5.
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support for both the introduction of specialist personnel from outside the countiy to assist in the
reorganization of the armed forces and police and for the creation of international machinery to
supervise and monitor the testing of Rhodesian public opinion. 3 ' A comment in a letter from the
Archbishop of Canterbury to Eldon Griffiths, MP, on 2nd March 1978, that a Peacekeeping Force
could play a useful role in Rhodesia, demonstrates how an idea which had begun within the
Church as the personal project of an executive member of the IAC had thoroughly penetrated the
hierarchy of the Church of England.32
It is impossible to judge how far pressure from the Church of England was contributory to
the decision in 1979 to send a Commonwealth Monitoring Force to Rhodesia to supervise the
elections. Members of the IAC Executive certainly felt that their ideas had been an early and for-
mative influence. And IAC contacts with Government and Opposition figures were significant
enough and the pressure exerted was persistent enough for the matter to be kept consistently in
the public and Government eye. This however is probably as far as one can go given that some
form of Peacekeeping or Monitoring Force was considered at one time or another by a variety of
different parties to the conflict and that the situation itself as it had developed by 1979 was the
determining factor in the choice of suitable handling device.
Moreover it should be considered how different a solution might have emerged if a Peace-
keeping Force had been introduced into Rhodesia in 1975. The situation would have been
artificially frozen and an even bloodier struggle might have ensued. The Peacekeeping Force
could not, as the IAC supposed, have been seen as a solution of itself but merely as an instrument
to the facilitation of a solution; the solution which eventually emerged was, as it had to be, a pol-





SECTION 1L9: THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND AS FACILITATOR.
While attempts to further the adoption as official Government policy of a Peacekeeping
Force were the IAC's most high-profile activity during these years their role as facilitator of meet-
ings between parties to the conflict was also significant.
Many politicians who passed through London during the 1970's made contact with the
,Church of England or the BCC. This probably indicated, not a specially assumed role in this
crisis, but over a century of custom and conditioning - making contact as it were with the home
base. Robert Mugabe and his party were the most notable exceptions here, partly as a result of the
Church of England's refusal to accept the strength of their power base in Rhodesia and the legi-
timacy of their platform and partly for the more simple reason that Mugabe had been brought up
as a Roman Catholic and remained considerably closer to the Catholic Church and its information
systems.1
It should also be noted that Church of England contact with Bishop Muzorewa and the ANC
was considerably greater than with other parties to the conflict, though the Lancaster House talks
in London demonstrated a web of mobilizable contacts across a wide spectrum of Rhodesian
opinion. Individual and structural inclination towards a non-extreme solution reinforced by one-
sided sources of information inclined the IAC to favour the compromise which Muzorewa
appeared to represent.
Thus the IAC' s attempts at facilitation were inherently flawed because they were based on a
preconceived preferred outcome which in turn was based on an inaccurate evaluation of the
strengths and levels of support of the various groups in Rhodesia and a failure also to recognise
that these changed over time. These misperceptions were fed by a bunkered view of what consti-
tuted legitimate sources of information and an inclination to listen most to information which
fitted already formed preferences and preconceptions.
This may well be the reason why the Catholic Institute of International Relations in London made consistently more
accurate predictions about likely outcomes in Rhodesia than did the IAC. One should remember too that the experience of
'backing the wrong horse' in Angola and Mozambique had definitely sensitized the Roman Catholic Church to the folly of
underestimating indigenous support for Marxist movements in Southern Africa.
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Facilitation too was closely bound up with the obtaining and evaluation of information. In
March 1976 Lord Elton met Mr. Chinamanu, Vice-President of the ANC, who was visiting Lon-
don. Elton harboured some legitimate doubts about his judgement because he claimed that there
was no animosity between the various groups fighting for freedom in Rhodesia and because he
considered him over-sanguine over both the likelihood of all groups accepting a settlement with
Smith's regime and over the willingness of guerillas to come in from the bush when a majority
rule state had been established.2
Just over a year later came a report of a meeting in London with leading members of the
ANC who said that they would welcome a referendum under supervision (British, Com-
monwealth, US or international) to decide which leader had majority support to lead the interim
government. The report could hardly be designated unbiased however because such a referendum
was very much Muzorewa's plan and was opposed by Mugabe and Nkomo, whose position
within Rhodesia was very much downplayed in this document. Moreover Mr. Kanoderaka, leader
of the delegation, was Treasurer to Muzorewa.3
In July 1977 Elton reported on a lunch he had given for Mr. Nyandoro, Treasurer to the
ANC, Mr. Mapondera, Permanent Representative of the ANC in London, David Harrison, Assis-
tant Chief Editor of Panorama, and his assistant. The Rhodesians had said that the guerillas could
not operate without the aid of the ANC and were therefore effectively its operating arm. Elton
observed, somewhat wryly, that they had now heard from each of the nationalist groups that they
had exclusive control of the guerilla forces. Elton suggested to them that, as the UK and the UN
had both rejected the idea of sending a Peacekeeping Force to Rhodesia, a force drawn from
acceptable members of the Commonwealth might be acceptable. This had apparently not been
rejected by the Rhodesians and Harrison of Panorama had also noted it. The object of the exercise
had obviously been to set up a Panorama programme to publicize the ANC 'S and Muzorewa 'S
views, and, of course, indirectly those of the LAC, and Harrison had said that although Panorama
2 BSRJIAC/SAF/5/1, confidential report of 12/3/76.
BSRJJAC/APR/2/l, report of 30/3/77.
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was now finishing for the summer, he would contact Nyandoro and Mapondera again because he
thought that a programme on Muzorewa actively promoting the political programme now being
prepared by the ANC would be interesting.4
More significant than this meeting however was John Mapondera's request to Elton to
arrange a meeting between Bishop Muzorewa, the Archbishop of Canterbury and Margaret
Thatcher, leader of the Conservative Party. 5 As this would be a major meeting Elton and Maurice
Chandler went with Hugh Whitworth, Assistant to the Archbishop of Canterbury, and Hugh Han-
ning on a preliminary visit to Muzorewa to find out what he wanted to talk to Thatcher and the
Archbishop about.6
This turned out to be a set of independent proposals to the Foreign Secretary which he
wished to publicize and also the desire to impress on the Foreign Secretary and the British public
the need for urgency. Muzorewa wished for all Zimbabweans (sic) to participate in an election but
claimed to know that they thd not want a constitution devised by the Front Line Presidents, but
rather a democratic constitution democratically approved.
Elton suggested that his proposals 7 were hardly innovative, but he was also deeply sceptical
about the time scale envisaged by Muzorewa. He met again with Muzorewa after the latter had
seen the Foreign Secretary on 15th August8 and strongly disagreed with Owen's assessment of
Muzorewa's hope that a Constitutional Council could report in three months as not over-
optimistic.
He, Elton, predicted9 that as the Patriotic Front could not hope to win a fair election, and a
fair constitution would therefore be a passport to limbo for them, they would resist the new con-
BSRJIAC/AFRI2/5, reportof 15/7/77.
BSR/IAC/AFRI2/4, letter of 9/8/77.
6 BSR/IAC/AFR[2/4, visit of 10/8/77.
A Constitutional Committee to be set up as soon as possible chaired by a constitutional lawyer appointed by the Brit-
ish Government to draft a constitution within two months, the passage by the British Government of legislation to imple-
ment the new constitution by January 1978, the formation by the British Government of a caretaker government to organize
and supervise a free general election of the first independence parliament, the provision of facilities for all Zimbabweans in-
cluding the guerillas to take part in the general election and the holding of this general election by March 1978.
BSR/IAC/APR/2/5.
Ibid. memo of 16/8/77.
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stitution at every stage of its drafting process and perhaps try to discredit it by boycotting elec-
tions or by using violence to stop elections taking place. The danger, as he saw it, was that the
British Government might be browbeaten into a constitution or franchise which put the Patriotic
Front at an unfair advantage or alternatively might 'funk' the consequencies of putting a fair con-
stitution into effect. This, to return to the IAC's favourite recipe, was why a Peacekeeping Force
for the interim period might prove so useful.
The analysis here of the likely activities of the Patriotic Front proved to be reasonably accu-
rate, but the reasons for their activities, that is the fear of extinction under a fair constitution and
franchise, were disproved by events. This miscalculation of the Patriotic Front's strength and the
concommitant analysis of Muzorewa' s support as considerable was, perhaps unconsciously, the
pivot of all IAC miscalculations over Rhodesia. More credance was given too to Muzorewa's
information about the situation generally than might sceptically have been sensible; Elton in this
same memorandum reports for example Muzorewa' s claim that rivalry within the Patriotic Front
meant that it did not exist as an entity - a statement with some element of truth in that ZANU and
ZAPU had deep and ultimately irreconcilable differences, largely of a tribal nature, but neglectful
of the fact that they were individually strong and might prove in the event capable of enough co-
ordinated activity to obtain a specified and mutually desired end - as they did.
About a month later Elton reported another meeting, this time with Alfred Mwanuka who
apparently knew Nkomo well but who also discounted influence attributed to the Patriotic
FronL 1° Once again one sees the reinforcing of misperception, of a position against which so
much counter-information existed that one begins to ask whether the IAC, and by extension the
Church as a whole, was using information in an unconsciously discriminatory manner to reinforce
the scenario and possible future that was most desirable to them.
Thus it is probably inappropriate to describe the Church of England as a facilitator here. It
was not neutral and because of its perceived bias stood no chance of being approached for its ser-
vices by all interested parties to the conflict. What the JAC was attempting to facilitate was its




SECTION IL1O: INFORMATION GATHERING AN]) THE FORMATION OF OPINION.
Earlier in this chapter the importance to the IAC of formulating and disseminating a 'correct
view' was mentioned, this being one of its major functions within the Church of England's cen-
tral organization. There was no shortage of information on which to base judgement on the
parameters of the situation and the relative merits of the various protagonists to the unfolding
conflict - some of the input has been discussed in the previous section. The Church's central
organization was in receipt of testimony and literature from eveiy conceivable shade of opinion in
Rhodesia itself and from those interested outsiders who visited or even who held strong opinions
about the situation. Mention too has already been made of the increasingly overt East/West
dimension in TAC thinking on Rhodesia nd on its pivotal position in Southern Africa. This was
contrasted with the BCC view which remained far more firmly fixed on the Christian parameters
of the situation and the obligation of British Christians to their Christian brothers in Rhodesia in
terms both of spiritual support and of work and prayer for the furtherance of their human rights.
One is forced therefore both to document the development of the IAC's in-house view and to ask
why it should so develop.
Early developments and divergence from BCC views have already been noted. From the
middle of the decade the strands of thought already present seemed to harden and this was largely
a function of the sort of information being fed into the IAC and of the IAC's discrimination
amongst this information.
In a letter to Hugh Hanning for example at the beginning of February, 1976 Hugh Elliott
reported a recent visit he had made to Rhodesia and his meetings with various political leaders
there including several Cabinet Ministers. Towards the end of March he wrote to the Times
emphasising the need for 'our kith and kin' to be persuaded to a peaceful transfer of power to the
Africans; otherwise the Marxist guerilas would take over.1
The same theme recurred in a letter to Maurice Chandler from Rodney Elton in July when
BSR/IAC/AFR/2/1, letter of 7/2/76 and letter of 22/3/76.
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he reported a lunch with Sir Cyril Hatty, a Rhodesian convinced of the need for moderate change
and fearful that the Marxist-backed guerillas might triumph if Britain did not reach a settlement
with Rhodesia. Hatty hoped for some outside initiative which might lend credibility to the
"significant group of thoughtful men, both black and white in Rhodesia" who might provide a
counterweight for Ian Smith against his intransigent right wing and help him to move more easily
to a just settlement. He had in mind a land purchase for Africans balanced with compensation for
white farmers. Elton reported that he had arranged for Sir Cyril to see Reginald Maudling2
As was so often the case there was both wisdom and blindness in this analysis; wisdom
because the unfairness of the Land Apportionment Act was indeed one of the major causes of
resentment among the black population; blindness because the position of ZANU particularly was
by this time becoming so hardened that the time had passed when a mere liberalization of the
Smith regime would satisfy the guerilla movement.
In October Hugh Elliott emphasized the main points of the analysis being formed by the
IAC when he wrote to Hanning that he had recently been collecting information on the ANC and
Muzorewa was more constructive than Nkomo and had a higher percentage of support. He
discounted the influence of Mugabe and the other guerilla leaders. 3 This was a month before
Elton's report on the seminar he had attended with Garfield Todd over the deadlocked Geneva
negotiations4 where once again the dangers of Marxist influence in Southern Africa were stressed
as well as the existence of moderate white opinion. This latter group was said by Todd to be
"open to persuasion" to the benefits of a multiracial policy despite Smith, but was apparently
difficult to contact because of government control of the media and large political meetings.5
It should be noted however that Elton was prescient enough to suggest that the British
Government should identify itself as the protagonist of the African people whose representatives
would inevitably come to power in the next few years; this would prevent the alienation of the
2 BSR/IAC/AFR/2/1, letter dated 19/7/76.
Ibid, letter of 20/10176.
see Section 11.8.
Thid, memo from Elton to Carrington, 2/12176.
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emergent Zimbabwe. It is perhaps unfortunate that the LkC did not consider the implications of
this suggestion more thoroughly in relation to its own policy.
An indication of how close were the IAC's information gathering sources to Government
and how overlapping were the various functions of its members was given in a memo from Rod-
ney Elton to Lord Carrington at the end of 1976. In this he passed on information he had gath-
ered on Rhodesia during a meeting with Ted Rowlands, Minister of State at the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office. This was the time of the deadlocked negotiations on the Kissinger propo-
sals in Geneva and Elton hoped for an initiative from the British Government as suggested by
Garfield Todd. 6 Elton suggested that this take the form of a Third Party Peacekeeping Force and
Rowlands raised certain reservations over this. However in addition Rowlands had told him that
11MG was holding out for a workable solution in Geneva even though this meant a bad press due
to public perception of an instant solution's being rejected. The whole viability of the plan rested
on Smith's willingness to co-operate because there was no question of a forcible solution. Voer-
ster, Rowlands suggested, was the key to Smith and after Soweto 7 Voerster might be willing to
ditch the white Rhodesians to ease his own internal problems, but Smith's commitment to these
negotiations was in doubt. Rowlands had given the impression that if the Geneva talks broke
down the package would be put to the Rhodesian people but he was very vague about how this
might be done. He was also apparently non-committal on the question of whether HMG was
aware that there was a growing body of white Rhodesian opinion favourable to a settlement in
spite of Ian Smith.
This interview is interesting in its mixture of acute analysis - the relationship between
Smith and Voerster - and a fairly obvious desire to be as little involved in the situation as possi-
ble - vague plans for putting the package to the Rhodesian people. It may be that the correct
interpretation of Rowlands' lack of reaction to the suggestion that a section of the white Rhode-
6 See Section 11.8.
On 16th June 1976 15,000 children from Soweto marching to object to Bantu education were shot at by the South
African police. Over the next few weeks over 600 people died, unrest in South Africa increased considerably and there was
considerable international protest.
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sian population was ready to negotiate was a realization that the moment had passed when varia-
tions on a theme of power sharing might be employed; but equally his obvious unwillingness to
commit himself might merely have been a political hesitation in the face of a man, Lord Elton,
who played dual roles in the Opposition and in the Church of England, both of which were
regarded with some reservation by the Government.
Elton's pivotal role as collector and purveyor of information was well illustrated by the last
paragraphs of this memorandum to Carrington when he passed on information from Harming:
"My colleague, Hugh Hanning, says that within the Foreign Office the following points are being
considered." 8 These points included the possibility that the position of Chief Minister might be
shared, that a Commission headed by a, Briton be appointed to control Law and Order, that
secondment of Commonwealth personnel into the police and armed services might be desirable
and that the use of Commonwealth units was not ruled out but this would have to be acceptable to
Rhodesia's neighbours. This episode demonstrated that the JAC's ability to elicit information and
therefore to be in a position to influence events would seem to have been at least partially depen-
dent on its ability to be itself a useful source of information; information could be traded for
further information and a listening ear. In view of the sources of information available to him
Elton's conclusions about the Rhodesian situation in a position paper written at the end of 1976,
and before the failure of the Geneva negotiations, are not surprising. 9 The time for settlement, he
concluded, was now short; at any moment the guerilla leaders might withdraw or use the negotia-
tions as a platform for a propaganda campaign in support of their military activities. However
their acceptance of any settlement was now critical and it was no longer the case, as it might have
been two years ago, that an agreement might be reached between the white administration in Rho-
desia and the British Government with the agreement of the Front Line Presidents. Smith was
heavily dependent on Voerster for support but the latter was now, in the aftermath of Soweto,
deeply concerned with his own internal situation and much less supportive of Smith. Within Rho-
BSR/IAC/AFRI2/1, 9/12176.
BSR/IAC/APRI2/1, draft of 13/12176.
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desia itself Smith was still largely seen as the indispensible representative of the white adininis-
tration but the Church's sources during the last six months had suggested a growing body of
informed white opinion, especially among businessmen, who were in favour of a settlement even
if this had to be made without Ian Smith. It should, he suggested, be a prime objective of the Brit-
ish Government to support such a movement and to encourage it to become organized and articu-
late. This however would mean banishing any lingering suspicion in Rhodesia that any influential
section of the British Establishment either in the City or Westminster would always put the
interests of white Rhodes ians before those of black Rhodesians.
If a settlement were not achieved, Elton concluded, the two fold result would be that much
blame would attach in African eyes to the Bxitish Government and that there would be competi-
tion between Moscow and Peking factions to control the guerilla movements. 10 He saw no hope
of a ceasefire before a settlement, and the introduction of any external force into Rhodesia without
the blessing of the guerilla leaders would be seen as support for Smith against their interests and
hence would not stop the war. The case therefore for external intervention would be strongest
after a settlement and, as the parties to the talks in Geneva were too paralyzed by fear of
compromising themselves to undertake contingency planning, he reported that this was well
under way at the IPA.
Contact had been established too between the WA, the British negotiators in Geneva and the
Commonwealth Secretariat. Because there was so much pressure on the British Government to
undertake some positive initiative in Geneva there seemed some movement towards a policy of
declaring the negotiations abandoned and appointing a Governor and Council. However this
scheme was subject to the strong objections that Britain did not have the military or political
strength to overcome even token resistance and that, however much the guerilla leaders might
seem to agree to such a plan in Geneva, there would probably be serious disagreement between
them if such appointments were made.
10 He reported an authoritative source as saying that there was a build-up of Cuban troops and armour in Mozambique
which could be "into Rhodesia by Christmas". Thid, p. 3.
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This is a clear and well-informed resume of the position in Rhodesia as it stood at the end of
1976. There is no indication of anything but a clear realization that Smith's position was not only
untenable in the long run but that it deserved no support in Britain. It is realistic about the South
African situation and about the potential for fission among the guerilla groups. It is however a
document which might just as easily have emanated from the Foreign Office, and indeed the
Foreign Office might appear to have been a more likely and a more suitable source. There is once
again no hint of a principled pre-position on the part of the Church of England, of a standard to
which the present situation might be matched, compared, perhaps found wanting. The underlying
theme is pragmatism, and, while it would go much too far to suggest that an agnosticism as to
outcome was apparent, there is no hint of what the parameters of a just society, which the Church
would consider indispensible to an acceptable outcome, would be. There is no use for example of
the Six Principles as a benchmark against which any settlement should be compared, equally no
presumption that natural justice, in terms of equality of right to participate in government, legisla-
tion and society, must be a minimum requirement. This criticism may itself be unjust in that
Elton was preparing a position paper not a major statement on the Church's position but in this
case, and many others, it seems reasonable to emphasize, not what was said, but what was not
said.
Information being received during 1977 did nothing to change the IAC's general position. A
letter from John Davies, MP, to Elton in January emphasized how crucial the attitude of the new
administration in Washington was perceived to be in the context of Rhodesia. 11 The two-way
traffic in information exchange continued between these correspondents with Elton later in Janu-
ary recounting a conversation he had had with Alan Savory, Chairman of the Combined Rhodesia
Opposition Parties. Savory had told him that white Rhodesians distrusted all British politicians
and, if the question of a suitable governor arose, they would prefer a man of action - someone
with a good record in the Malaysian insurgency would be ideal. 12 White Rhodesians were also,
BSR/IAC/AFRJ2/1, letter of 6/1/77.
12 Elton had previously suggested that Malcolm Macdonald might be approached, indeed had sounded out the ground
with MacDonald himself, but Savory reported that he would be no more acceptable than any other politician.
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he reported, still loyal to the Crown and the nearer the Governor or Commissioner were seen to
be to the Crown the more acceptable he would be; Elton commented that it was a pity that Lord
Mountbatten was not a few years younger.13
Another memo from Elton to the IAC during the same month correctly pointed out the
innate revahy between ZANU and ZAPU despite their temporary alliance, but significantly mis-
judged Mugabe who, Elton claimed, "danced to the tune of the guerilla commanders." 14 He also
suggested that while the Front Line Presidents supported the guerillas most of the blacks inside
Rhodesia preferred Muzorewa, a sustainable analysis at this particular time but one that should
have been re-examined in the light of future developments.
Importantly however, in the light of previous criticisms, Elton did pinpoint what humani-
tarian and Christian concern should be in Rhodesia - the establishment of a just society
throughout South Africa by just means. The significance of the juxtaposition of means and ends is
significant and has already been discussed. The modification and dilution of each by the other
would seem not only inevitable but also one of the major theological and theoretical problems
facing this, or any, church. If the desirability of the means employed is to be emphasised is the
commitment to ends less than wholehearted? If total commitment is made to such a desired end as
a just society can any means, however heavy in cost to human life and its quality, be tolerated? It
is arguable that much of the contortion and seeming irresolution in Church thinking and attempts
at policy formulation spring from this ultimately unresolvable problem.
Some of the fundamental problems involved were addressed more closely however at the
JAC meeting on 26th January, 1977 when Jim Wilkie, Africa Secretary of the BCC, analyzed the
post-Kissinger situation. His assessment of Ian Smith was that he had no real intention of hand-
ing over power and now probably intended to hang on from year to year, although he no longer
enjoyed the same degree of support among whites as formerly. In discussion on possible policy
options it was asked whether any purpose would be served in trying to draw attention to the
13 BSR/I.AC/AFP./2/1, letter of 13/1/77.
14 BSR/IAC/APRI2/5, memo to IAC of 12/1/77.
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reported plan to withdraw guerillas to the Front Line countries for retraining purposes prior to
independence - this to be tied in with the IPC's proposals for a Commonwealth peacekeeping
role. It was also suggested that an opportunity existed for an internal agreement between Smith
and Muzorewa on roughly Kissinger lines with guarantees of fair play over control of the police
and security forces; however this was thought likely to founder on Smith's insistence that such
control be retained in white hands. Further suggestions ranged over contacting the Front Line
Presidents with offers to assist in their attempts to maintain stability in the area, through a change
in attitude to the Smith regime, to a public recognition that Smith would never agree to a transfer
of power to black Africans and should no longer be negotiated with. While there was general
recognition that the key to Salisbury lay in Pretoria there was also the prescient comment that
"The churches must be careful to select the right emphases and make human rights, freedom and
independence their principal concerns," 15 It is unfortunate that this was not a truth more con-
stantly born in mind through the whole decade.
The IAC' s rather desperate search for a solution, or even a crack in the armour of intransi-
gence shown by the parties to the conflict, was reflective of the Government's situation as well as
their own; but, apart from the comment above, there was again no mention in this very full dis-
cussion of an irreducible Church of England minimum without which any settlement would lack
legitimacy. The situation was very much held over by the agreement that a memo on the Commit-
tee Meeting and the meeting on the same subject to be held during Synod week should be drawn
up by the Executive Officers and sent to the two Anglican bishops in Rhodesia. Once again a tried
and trusted source of information and advice was to be used, one which was predictable and
would recommend no unpleasantly radical solutions; one unfortunately which was also inherently
biased.
At their meeting in May the IAC had the opportunity to hear a different view of Mugabe,
the guerilla leader they most generally distrusted, from Bishop Donal Lamont, Roman Catholic
Bishop of Rhodesia, who had recently been deported from the country. In his opinion Mugabe,
IAC Minutes, 26/1177, p.3.
Lamont had come to represent Church opposition to the Smith regime whose inbansigence be o1jected to on the basis
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with whom he had held several conversations, was a sincere Christian and one who, Lamont felt,
would make way if a referendum gave power to a party other than the Patriotic Front. He brought
news too of atrocities committed by the security forces who burned and tortured in villages which
guerilas had visited without being denounced. His testimony was corroborated at the same meet-
ing by that of a young missionary in Bonda who had witnessed visits to villages from both free-
dom fighters and security forces. Interestingly she also reported that the freedom fighters regarded
the Protestant Churches "as hostile to the cause of liberation and their black clergy as either
irrelevant or disloyal."16
However this meeting, despite what one might have expected to be the uncomfortably desta-
bilizing evidence of two unimpeachable witnesses and at which so much time was spent on dis-
cussing the impasse in Rhodesia, still came to the conclusion that in the absence of any more con-
structive proposals from the British Government it would continue to advocate that panacea for
all ills, a Commonwealth peacekeeping presence.
However a new and unusual note amongst LkC members, and one more in sympathy with
Lamont's views, was sounded at this meeting by Giles Ecciestone who stressed that, although the
Marxist affiliations of the freedom fighters were much dwelt upon, nationalism was just as impor-
tant to them; and all lines of communication with them should be kept open. Moreover the Com-
mittee should look closely at the factors propping up Ian Smith, most important among them the
continued supply of fuel.
It is possible to isolate here, by the very infrequency of such urging to the Committee, one
of the factors which oversimplified the deliberations of the TAC The possibility that African
Marxism had heavy undertones of nationalism was scarcely considered, and consequently African
Marxism was judged in terms of the guiding ideology of the Eastern bloc whose interests were
seen as implacably opposed to those of the West on all fronts; not surprisingly it was found
that it would drive the black population towards the promise of Marxism. The Roman Catholic Church in Rhodesia was far
more heavily represented amongst the black population than were the Anglican or Methodist Churches. Lamont had been
sentenced to ten years imprisonment for failing to report the presence of guerillas on one of his mission stations. He caine to
the IAC on this occasion largely to express his thanks for their representations on his behalf to the Smith administration at
the time of his arrest and trial.
16 IAC Minutes, 17/5177, p.4.
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wanting in a scenario which identified good and evil, light and dark, religion and irreligion. That
Mugabe and Nkomo would accept help from any quarter whence it was offered was demonstrably
clear; that Mugabe indeed had an ideological preference for help from those states with a ruling
Marxist ideology was also clear; that either of them were prepared after years of exile and self-
sacrifice to head a Soviet or Chinese or Cuban dominated state was far from clear.
However such subtleties of interpretation were not apparent in the official briefing for
Robert Runcie, then Bishop of St. Albans, when he attended the Conference of World Religious
Workers for Peace, Disarmament and Just Relations between Nations in Moscow in June 1977.
Ha.nning's brief on the Soviet Union and the Developing World contained a special section on
Rhodesia:- "The biggest obstacle to a peaceful transfer of power today is the violent policy pur-
sued by Robert Mugabe, and now Joshua Nkomo, supported by Machel and egged on by Rus-
sia." 17 Given that the location of the conference might have persuaded Hanning that a firm and
unconcessionary line on Soviet intervention in Southern Africa was desirable, this was still a
highly contentious and one-dimensional summary of the situation.
The early months of 1978 saw negotiations over the internal settlement and finally the set-
ting up of the interim government of Smith, Muzorewa, Sithole and Chirau; and the first half of
the year for the IAC was taken up with preparing an official Church reaction. The JAC meeting on
13th March considered letters to the Committee from Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker and to the
Archbishop of Canterbury from Eldon Griffiths MP, calling on the Church to adopt a positive
attitude to the internal settlement. The Church, Eldon Griffiths suggested, should welcome the
"progress made in Salisbury" and appeal to Nkomo "to call off the armed struggle and join in the
new unilateral goveen" 18 The general tenor of his views can be ascertained from his further
statement that:- 'in my view it was always wrong for any part of the Anglican Communion to be
supporting directly or indirectly the so-called 'armed struggle' in Rhodesia." 19 Sir Douglas sug-
gested further that more and more people wondered why the Church remained silent and the
17 BSR/IAC/LAM/2, brief dated 27/5/77, p. 2.




There was a very obvious difference of opinion in the discussion which followed between
those Committee members who saw the internal settlement as a victory for the ballot box and
those who realised that a white dominated black government which excluded Nkomo and Mugabe
offered neither the hope of an equitable nor of a peaceful solution. It was finally agreed however
that Hugh Hanning as Secretary should draft a four-part statement. This would welcome the inter-
nal settlement as a first step, look forward to the speedy implementation of the principles of the
agreement, urge a widening of the area of agreement which would include the three other parties
- Nkomo, Mugabe and the white extremists - call for international supervision of the referendum
and subsequent elections, and, inevitably, propose the inclusion of an international element in the
security forces: this position paper would be put before the BCC Rhodesia Group and other
interested persons and parties. It was also inevitably agreed that the Secretary should write to the
bishops in Rhodesia to seek their opinion.20
An official statement by the IAC signed by Maurice Chandler was put out on 21st March as
a ClO press release. It welcomed the settlement as a first step to a multi-racial
Rhodesia/Zimbabwe and encouraged those who had stood apart from the agreement to partici-
pate.2 ' Generally approving comments on the statement were received from the Bishops of
Mashonaland and Matabeleland, the general tenor of whose views and connections has already
been indicated. Mashonaland, whose personal chaplain had administered the oath to Muzorewa,
Chirau and Sithole, particularly advocated support because ... "the internal settlement has ... the
major support of all races here beyond any possible doubt."22
Matabeleland saw three possible options for the British Government - to persuade the Patri-
otic Front to accept a fifth share in the interim government and then to take their chances at an
election (he claimed that they would be reluctant to do this), hand over Rhodesia to the Patriotic
Front now (in which case, in the Bishop's opinion, thbal war and Marxist rule were a possibility)
20 IAC Minutes 13/3/78, p.3.
21 BSR/IAC/AFR/2/1, official statement of 16/3/77.
BSR/IAC/AFR/2/5, letter of 22/3/78 from Bishop of Mashonaland to Hugh Hanning.
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or to recognise that complete satisfaction for all parties was impossible and accept the settlement
acceptable to most - the internal settlement. This was the option which the Bishop supported,
"And I should have thought it was the view most consistent with old-fashioned theology."23
Matabeleland followed up his first letter by another in April in which he told Hanning that most
of the black clergy in the dioceses of Mashona and Matabele favoured the internal settlement,
though some Ndebele priests might disapprove.24 One sees yet again the reinforcing of misper-
ception by the soliciting of information from what ought to have been perceived as biased
sources.
In April the Archbishop of Canterbury took part in a major House of Lords debate on Rho-
desia and spoke to a brief provided by Hanning. 25 In this brief Hanning made it clear that the IAC
supported the internal settlement in conformity with the advice of the Rhodesian bishops, 26 and
favoured the introduction of a third party peacekeeping presence in Rhodesia. The Archbishop,
using the words of the official statement of 21st March, supported the settlement as a first step to
establishing a multi-racial democratic Rhodesia.27
However the IAC statement and the manner of its issue were not received with universal
approvaL By the BCC they were regarded as highly contentious and some members of the IAC
itself were overtly critical of the content and manner of the issue of the press release. It has
already been noted that at the IAC meeting on 13th March it was suggested that no statement
should be issued before the meeting of the BCC's Rhodesia Group on the following Monday;
moreover no mention of a press release appears in the Minutes of the 13th March IAC Meeting.
When, at the next meeting on 16th May, Giles Ecciestone pointed out that the urgency of the
situation had not been such as to override the obligation to act ecumenically, Maurice Chandler
pointed out that the statement had not been issued until after the BCC Meeting. Two other
members of the Committee expressed similar surprise and were told that it had been important to
BSR/IAC/AFRT2I5, letter of 22/3178 from Bishop of Matabeleland to Hugh Hanning.
BSR/IAC/APR[2/5, letter of 16/4178 from the Bishop of Matabeleland to Hugh Hanning.
BSR/IAC/LAM/3, letter of 14/4/78 from Hugh Hanning to Hugh Whitworth, the Archbishop's Personal Assistant.
This was received incidentally after the statement had been made.
27 BSR/IAC/LAM/3, extract from, Yesterday in Parliament column in Daily Telegraph 17/4/78.
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produce a statement ... "not least to advise the Archbishop of Canterbury in his response to ques-
tions he had received on the matter." The tone of the minutes indicates that the discussion
developed into a debate on whether the IAC should have issued a statement as it did.
There is no doubt that the issue of a press release exceeded the agreement as laid down in
the Minutes of 13th March. Equally it is clear that, while the statement might not have been
issued before the Rhodesia Group Meeting, it had been prepared by 16th March and sent out to
the Rhodesian Bishops. One must see this as an example of executive action exceeding its
Committee-authorized brief. One should remember that there had already been complaint and
there would soon be more by Paul Oestreicher about the rubber-stamp quality of the full JAC on
the decisions of the Executive members and Chairman, and this would seem to be a good exam-
ple of the process of which he complained. One should also remember the less than happy state of
relations between the BCC's DIA and certain members of the IAC centring on the publication of
the 'Rhodesia Now' document in 1977. Maurice Chandler and Hugh Hanning did not regard the
BCC as 'sound' on Rhodesia and resented efforts of the more ecumenically minded members of
the JAC such as Giles Ecciestone to urge a more co-operative perspective. However their asser-
tion of the Church of England's right to independence was made on very shaky ground and in a
cause to which even the British Government, with its overwhelming desire to avoid more than a
minimal role in the post-UDI settlement, would not commit itself unless the guerilla leaders were
included.
By June the failings of the Interim Government and the poverty of Ian Smith's intentions
were becoming clear even to those who had hoped that this middle, comparatively non-radical,
way might succeed. After its miscalculation the IAC seems to have turned back to the British
Government as the only likely source of a solution and in June issued a joint statement on the
situation with the BCC and the Roman Catholic Commission for International Justice and Peace.
The tenor of this statement was provided by its title - 'Rhodesia - the deteriorating situation and
urgent need for talks' and it called on the British Government to redouble its efforts to bring all
LAC Minutcs 16/5178, p.3.
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parties to the conference table. 29 By the middle of July the IAC's disillusionment with the inter-
nal settlement seemed complete when, in a memo to Elton, Hugh Hanning commented that it had
been worth trying ... "but has achieved extraordinarily little."3°
In July an emergency meeting of the Rhodesia Group of the BCC took place, 3 ' and its
findings were reported to the July Meeting of the LkC. 32 Jim Wilkie, the BCC's Executive Secre-
ta-y for Africa, reported on his recent visit to Rhodesia, on the inexorable advance of the Patriotic
Front and the breakdown of services there; the morale of the whites was broken and an urgent
UK/IJSA/tJN initiative was necessary to devise the handover of the country to the Patriotic Front
in the shortest possible time. Inevitably the Committee went on to discuss possible outside inter-
vention which would, of course, have to originate in Britain even if it were international in com-
position; this, it was felt, would appear highly suspect in the eyes of the world even if the motive
were altruistic, and there could, in any case be no intervention without the agreement of the Patri-
otic Front No conclusion as to suitable action emerged from this meeting though it was rather
generally suspected that Ian Smith hoped for a Conservative election victory which might bring a
change of policy over Rhodesia. There also emerged a general consensus that Rhodesia should be
'taken out of politics', whatever that might mean, and this resulted in Maurice Chandler's
approach to the Foreign Secretary and to the Conservative Shadow Foreign Secretary.33
At the September IAC Meeting Chandler reported that from his discussions with the
Foreign Secretary and with John Davies of the Conservative Party he had been struck by the
closeness of their views; they differed, he suggested, in emphasis and detail only. It was felt that
this information might usefully be passed on to Ian Smith who was manifestly hoping that a Con-
servative Government might take a less intransigent view than a Labour Government on Rho-
desia; Chandler agreed to communicate with both the Foreign Secretary and John Davies along
these lines.M Accordingly he wrote to David Owen and to John Davies at the beginning of
BSR/IAC/BCC/1/4, statement of 26/6/78.
3° BSR/IAC/AFRI2/5, memo of 17/7/78 from Hanning to Elton.
BSR/IAC/APRf2/5, Minutes of 18/7/78.
32 LAC Minutes of 19/7/78.
mid.
' IAC Minutes, 14/9178.
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October saying that the IAC's view was that Rhodesia "should be taken out of politics".35
David Owen's reply was firm and without concession. He had, he said, never made party
political capital out of Rhodesia and he subscribed to the objectives supported by the IAC, that is
the establishment of a non-racial democratic state with its independence recognised by the inter-
national community. 36 Richard Luce of the Conservative Party took a rather different line in his
reply. There were, he said, fundamental differences between the parties, not in objectives but in
the means of obtaining these objectives. The Conservative Party felt that the Government should
have given more help and encouragement to Rhodesian leaders to move towards majority rule and
free and fair elections.37
This was hardly therefore a successful initiative even in its own terms. David Owen denied
that it was a party political issue and thus by extension that a concerted change of approach by
Government or Opposition was necessary. All of Richard Luce's comments on the other hand
confirmed its status for the Conservative Party as an issue out of which political capital might be
made. Yet the IAC's analysis that Smith was hoping that a Conservative victory in the next elec-
tion would by some unspecified and miraculous means let him off the hook was undeniably acute;
and a declaration of common purpose at that stage might have caused movement.
That the IAC had abandoned hope of an internal settlement featuring Muzorewa was
demonstrated by a position paper written at this time. 38 Here the British Government's policy
was stated to be to install Nkomo and then to confirm the appointment by referendum although it
was recognised that this would increase hostility between ZANU and ZAPU - Jim Wilkie's
suggestion that the country be handed over to the Patriotic Front in the shortest possible time
obviously still met with very little enthusiasm. The danger of civil war was discussed and an
assessment given of who backed whom among the Patriotic Front. 39 There was only a tangential
" BSR/IAC/SEC/1/5, letters from Maurice Chandler to David Owen and John Davies, 5/10178.
36 Thid, letter from David Owen to Maurice Chandler, 23/10178.
Thid, letter from Richard Luce to Maurice Chandler, 24/10178.
BSR/IAC/APR/2/4, undated.
Tiny Rowland was thought to be financing Sithole and Muzorewa to recruit their own armies as well as backing Nko-
mo.
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reference to Muzorewa and Sithole; and they were not mentioned in the context of who would
control the future of the country.
The early months of 1979 saw the appearance of disquieting reports from Rhodesia about
the increasing breakdown of the fabric of society and, most serious, the spread of famine. A
report by David Steel, MP, and Tim Sheehy of the Catholic Institute for International Relations
who visited the country early in the year detailed the general deterioration and inability of the
security forces to keep order, their excesses and those of the auxiliary forces and guerillas; Steel's
opinion was that Mugabe was in the ascendent although the government thought that they would
win the coming election and referendum. The IAC Meeting of 29th March brought a further
report by Elliott Kendall of the Church Misionaiy Society of famine and the breakdown of law
and order in some areas, of the access to slush funds in South Africa by the Transitional Govern-
ment; Maurice Chandler corroborated this from information provided by the Red Cross who
reported such serious shortcomings on both sides that they threatened to withdraw from the area.
This was the information which prompted Hanning and Chandler to suggest to the DIA of the
BCC that a Disaster Relief Force be sent to relieve the immediate plight of the Rhodesian peo-
ple.41
In April, 1979 elections took place. These were closely observed by a variety of groups and
three reports of major importance were produced all of which dealt with the fairness or otherwise
of the electoral process. Two of these reports, those of Claire Palley, Professor of Law at the
University of Kent,42 and Lord Chitnis, who headed the group of observers from the British Parli-
amentary Human Rights Group, concluded that the elections were categorically not free and fair;
in fact "The recent election in Rhodesia was nothing but a gigantic conñdence trick.. ."
The third report was dissenting and is more interesting in terms of the formulation of
4° BSR/IAC/AFRJ2/5, edited version of a confidential report to HMG, 16/1179.
41 BSR/IAC/AFR/2/1, 9/12176, see Section 11.8.
Report on the Rhodesian Election of April 1979 by Professor Qafre Palley, published by the Catholic Institute for
International Relations, London, April 1979.
'Free and Fair': the 1979 Rhodesian Election', a report by observers on behalf of the British Parliamentary Human
Rights Group, May 1979, publ. by the Parliamentary Human Rights Group, House of Commons, London, p. 52.
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Church of England opinion in that Rodney Elton was a member of this group who monitored the
election and prepared a report for the Prime Minister.0 The group concluded that the election
was ... "fairly conducted and above serious reproach". 45 Lord Colville reported in person to the
IAC June meeting46 and claimed that the group had been ... "harmonious, vigilant and cynical
ti;47 not only this but they had travelled widely in the country during the elections and spoken to
a wide cross section of participants. Lord Elton's more recent memory of the group's work
remains that it honestly reported opinions which were widely canvassed and freely given.48 and
his opinion of the validity of its findings at the time it was working is unchanged by subsequent
events.
It was hardly surprising then that th IAC proceeded to resolve to have ... "sensible and
rational discussions ..." with Muzorewa.49 The election results revived a hope that had never quite
died that Muzorewa's government might deliver an indigenous and non-radical solution. The
maintenance of that hope entailed the usual discounting of conflicting evidence.
And the conflicting evidence in this case was strong and highly reputable - the reports of
Lord Chitnis and Claire Palley; one might have expected that they would produce hesitation at
least in viewing the elections as a clear validation of Muzorewa' s regime. Other evidence too was
available. The IAC received a report from the Africa Secretary of the Methodist Church's Over-
seas Division who had seen extensive intimidation during the elections. 50 Hugh Hanning also
attended a meeting of the BCC's Rhodesia Group where a variety of speakers had been invited to
attempt to determine the truth of allegations of intimidation; in a memo to Chandler at the begin-
ning of May he said that he had found the speaker who claimed that there had been widespread
Interim Government intimidation "very unimpressive".51
" The group consisted of Viscount Boyd of Merton, Viscount Colville of Culross, Sir Charles Johnston, Miles Hudson
and Lord Eltorn 'A Report on the recent election in Rhodesia', pub. London April 1979.
4 Jbid, p. 2.
46	 C Minutes, 7/6/79, p.3.
Thid,p.4.
4s A personal interview in July 1988.
JAC Minutes, 7/6/79, p.5.
50 BSV1AC/AFRI2/5. undated.
51 35R/LkC/AFRI2/5, memo dated 1/5/79.
- 177 -
The extent to which the Colville Report was out of line, not only with the Chitnis and the
Palley reports, but with most Commonwealth thinking on Rhodesia/Zimbabwe might also have
given some pause for thought. The Colville group for example claimed that the election had had a
two-fold purpose one of which was the endorsement of the 1978 Constitution as a result of the
high turnout. The extent of the unacceptability of this view was demonstrated at the Lusaka
Conference of Commonwealth Heads of Government in August 1979 where a large majority of
them refused to consider the election valid because no referendum had been held among black
voters over the 1978 Constitution.
The weight of evidence was certainly enough to convince members of the DIA of the BCC.
A position paper drafted by them in June 1979 and put out as a press release at the end of July
called on the British Government to work towards an effective ceasefire, to find an interim author-
ity acceptable to all parties to the conflict and to draw up a constitution on the basis of the Six
Principles.52 There was no suggestion here that the Muzorewa Government's authority should be
endorsed.
In the event movement within Rhodesia itself and the ultimate success of international
efforts finally to resolve the conflict removed the need for either the IAC or BCC to take up ela-
borate positions or tentative negotiations with Muzorewa's Government. His position was soon
demonstrated to be unviable in the sense that, without the support of the guerillas, he could not
deliver peace, and without peace support for the ANC ebbed quickly away; he was therefore
dependent on those would never support him for the commodity without which he could not
maintain the support he had.
The Lusaka Conference in August was the turning point, with proposals for a new constitu-
tional conference and the remarkably rapid follow-up of the Lancaster House Conference in Sep-
tember. At the beginning of September a BCC statement welcomed the Lusaka proposals 53 and
an indication that their hopes for a definitive solution were shared by the JAC was given at the
52 BSR/IAC/APR/2/5, draft of 25/6(79 and press release of 2217(79.
BsRJIAqAFRI2/5, statement of 9/9/79.
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IAC Meeting on 10th September when it was decided to hold all further action and statement
until the outcome of the Conference was known.M
Most interesting at this time was a letter from Hugh Hanning to various friends about the
Lancaster House talks on which, as well as asking for their prayers, he reported from a highly
informed inside position on a shift in attitude of the Patriotic Front leaders towards accepting
elections with conditions.55 It shows the Church of England as a genuine facilitator and one
moreover who used an inside track unavailable to secular agencies.
There was a meeting at Caux prior to Lancaster House where nine black and seven white
Rhodesians had confronted one another and important shifts in attitude had taken place as well as
personal rapprochement. The participants had included Denis Walker and Andre Holland, from
Ian Smith's party, and George Nyandoro, Ben Mutasa and Louis Gumbo, envoys of Muzorewa.
Hanning commented particularly on the remarkable transformation in the relationship between
Andre Holland and Byron Hove, later a member of the Mugabe Government, which was effected
through their meeting at Caux:-
"Andre Holland changed his plans, accepting Hove's invitation and came to London
for a remarkable forty eight hours. The Foreign Office let him in (normally he would
have been banned): he and the Zambian High Commissioner spent an evening together
which neither will forget; he had an unhurried interview with the Head of the Rho-
desia Department in the FO ... ("I really believe I have met a British official I can
trust," he said) after three hours with Byron Hove in the Westminster Theatre, he came
out saying, "We are thinking of sending a cable to Salisbury: 'Conference unnecessary
- we have settled it all.' He told us, 'After all these years, for the first time I find I
want to pray for Britain, and I will."56
Obvious throughout the letter is the facilitating role that Hanning and his colleagues and
friends played during the Lancaster House talks; he set up many meetings and meeting opportuni-
ties. The following passage gives a sense of the atmosphere of expectation and excitement obvi-
ous throughout the letter: -
"During the Conference the delegates have been scattered in different hotels and
buried in endless meetings, so as to be almost inaccessible. But in extraordinary ways
IAC Minutes, 10/9/79.
BSR/IAC/AFRI2/5, letter of 29/9179.
56 Thid, p. 3.
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we have met many of them. Hugh was unexpectedly invited to the opening reception
at Lancaster House, where he met most of the ANC delegation and also Sir Antony
Duff and Derek Day. Henry bumped into Gary Magadzire who had arrived in London
representing the African Farmers' Union. Tom Glen came down from Scotland to
have an invaluable hour with his friend David Smith, Minister of Finance, who has
fought for personal reconciliation at the conference. Jim Trehane came from Bristol to
meet Kona, Chairman of Nkomo's party. Kedmon Hungwe and Sam Pono met one of
Mugabe's men whom our men had been seeing in detention in Rhodesia, and who we
did not know to be in London. Champion Chigwida (who has now returned to Rho-
desia) did great work behind the scenes, meeting many delegates privately. Each day
we have met as a team, with Conrad, Don Barnett and others, to seek fresh insights
and to pray together.
Gary Magadzire has proved to be a gift from God. His work during the night hours
(Often all night, seeing leaders on all sides) has been beyond price. He has presented
them with the facts and figures of the terrible suffering in the rural areas, the loss of
livestock, the collapse of farming and the imminence of famine - with the rains now
starting and people unable to plant. He has fearlessly penetrated the leaders' citadels,
often with harassment by the thugs guarding them, and challenged them to consider
how to end the suffering as the first priority - and has struck important unexpected
responses. His aim has been to get the Bisho2, Nkomo and Mugabe to meet together
in private (and we believe he has succeeded.)"7
This letter is an indication of how well a large and informal network of contacts like
Hanning's could work when brought to bear with intensity on a finite project. The Lancaster
House discussions were brought about by no agency of the IAC, indeed their stated and obvious
preference until the very last moment had been for Bishop Muzorewa and the ANC, but their
extensive contacts over time and place with many of the participants and their contacts in turn
enabled them to play a valuable facilitating role. Their fears of a Marxist dominated successor
government to Muzorewa were not removed:- "Tongogara, Mugabe' S top guerilla commander
has shown every sign of being a man who is far more realistic about the cost of the war and more
concerned to build an honourable peace than the 'political' leaders in that camp - notably
Eddison Zvogbu and Edgar Tekere, who are probably committed Marxists or used by them...";58
they were still obviously hoping that the encouragement of pragmatists in Mugabe's party might
vitiate a long-perceived Marxist ethos and Communist dominance. But an end to the conflict and
the sufferings and increasingly likely starvation of large numbers of rural Rhodesians was now an




members of the IAC, particularly Hugh Hanning, lavished on the Conference. Nothing, in the
opinion of this writer, became the IAC better during the whole decade than its work for this set-
tlement.
In December the Lancaster House Agreement was signed and was warmly welcomed by the
BCC, speaking on behalf of all its member churches and praying for ... "an end to bitterness and
vjolence, for a peaceful election campaign, for a just political future based on forgiveness and
human rights for ali." The Archbishop of Canterbury, on behalf of the Church of England,
wrote to Lord Soames congratulating him on his appointement as Governor.60
From now onwards JAC energies were concentrated on the problems which would be faced
and the reconstruction that would be necessary in the new Zimbabwe; not only this but the need
to educate Anglican opinion to the changes very obviously about to come was recognised. On the
practical front Bishop Skelton of Lichfield, who had been a diocesan bishop in Rhodesia, reported
to the January LkC Meeting that he had been asked to form part of a BCC team to visit the coun-
try and report on what post-Independence help would be needed; Michael Rose, Martin Box of
Christian Aid, and he, would advise on the political, relief and pastoral aspects of the problem.61
The Christian Aid view was that aid should be directed at a total reconstruction of Church life
throughout Rhodesia; general priorities were seen to be land reform and education. It was unfor-
tunate that when, later in 1980, the Churches launched a joint appeal for reconstruction in Zim-
babwe only £182,000 out of a hoped-for £1 million was raised because of the understandable
media attention on and appeals for the starving in the Horn of Africa.62
By this time no illusions appear to have remained about the post-Independence situation
facing the Anglican Church; indeed so clearsighted were the contemporary views of its failings
that one is forced to ask why a more realistic assessment of probabilities could not have been
made earlier. The main Christian influence in Zimbabwe was recognised as Roman Catholic,
BSR/IAc/BCC/3/2 and BSR/IAC/APR/2/5, press release of 19/12179.
Ibid, of the same date.
61 IAC Minutes, 10/1/80, p.2.
62 IAC Minutes, 1617/80, p.S.
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especially since they now had a black Archbishop. 63 The Anglican Communion was seen to be in
special difficulties because of the political stand taken by its two senior bishops who had given
consistent support to the Rhodesia Front and the ANC; leadership of the Church was in disarray if
not a complete anomaly; the Churches were generally weak and they did not know how to
respond to the new situation; there was a desperate need for strategic thinking which was why the
BCC had decided to encourage a steady stream of visitors to the country to try to input positive
planning.M
In terms of tactical understanding of the situation, Maurice Chandler reported to the January
IAC Meeting a situation of interim government intimidation and dependence on South Africa
which had never been admitted pre-Lancastr House. With new elections pending there was good
reason to believe that South African personnel were operating in the Rhodesian Airforce, in
armoured units and in Intelligence; Government auxiliaries had moved into areas vacated by free-
dom fighters and there was evidence that villages were being 'worked over' as during the 1979
election, which was not a view that had held out any appeal to the IAC while those elections were
going on - indeed Government intimidation had been denied; rumours were being spread that
people might lose their jobs or worse if Muzorewa did not win.65
This seems at last to represent a willingness to accept the situation as it was and not how the
LAC would like it to have been; the Bishop had backed the wrong side and could no longer be
viewed as the legitimate head of the nationalist movement; Mugabe's aims had seriously to be
considered. This is clearly demonstrated by Maurice Chandler's suggestion in January that an
effort might be made, perhaps by an article in the Church Times, to present the fact that there
were good reasons for believing that any government under Mugabe would be sympathetic to
Christians in the country. 66 At the May meeting it was suggested that Maurice Chandler or the
Chairman of the BSR should write to the Church Times commending Anglicans to support the
63 IAC Minutes, 10/1/80.
IAC Minutes, 22/5/80, p.4.
IAC Minutes, 10/1/80, p.3.
66 mid.
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new regime; in July Maurice Chandler reported that he was waiting for an opportunity to corn-
mend the new Zimbabwean regime to Christians in this country.67
In sum the IAC's stance, once the Lancaster House Agreement had been signed, was clear-
sighted acceptance and a desire to minimize the problems looming for the new state of Zim-
babwe. However much they had held to the hope of a different solution manned by different per-
sonnel they accepted likelihood and reality of Robert Mugabe's electoral success with magnanim-
ity. At the March IAC Meeting Maurice Chandler summed this up by saying that Mugabe had
received an overwhelming vote and should now be supported in his efforts to unify the country.
IAC Minutes, 22/5/80 and 16/7/80.
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SECTION IL11: CONCLUSION
The Church of England was througlily and 'inevitably' involved in the Rhodesian situation
and throughout the decade their central organization demonstrated an underlying strategic com-
mitment to equal political rights for all citizens of Rhodesia at some time in the future. But there
is much evidence to support the contention that decided preferences existed over the personnel,
iUeology, timing and methodology of majority rule. The official policy of the Church has also to
be seen against expressions of real antipathy to African aspirations which surfaced from time to
time in the General Synod and which represented both traditional British societal attitudes to race
and a reluctance, already discussed, to abandon 'kith and kin'. Such attitudes might not have
affected the good faith of the IAC's bottorti-line attitude to Rhodesia but they certainly diluted
public consciousness over exactly what the Church's attitude was and caused a general sense of
bewilderment amongst the public at large over the variety of clashing signals which emanated
from what was loosely designated 'The Church'.
It is also true to say that in terms of tactics and possible futures for the country political
rather than theological or spiritual bias was generally demonstrated. This was a reflection of the
interests and major figures in the IAC. Particularly noticeable was the use of a network of con-
tacts which resulted partly from the history and residual connections of the Church of England but
largely from the personal associations of IAC members, especially Hugh Hanning.
Worthy of comment are the correlations between activity and lull in the intensity of the
Church's attention to Rhodesia and activity and lull in the peace-making or conflict-resolution
activities of governments or other NGO's. This would seem to support the contention that the
Church had neither the capacity nor the resources to do more than respond to crises as they arose.
The beginning of the decade, the years 1971 to 1972, for example saw reaction to the Pearce
Report on the Salisbury Proposals. The Church, apart from fact-finding and accumulation of
information, then took no major initiatives and made no further major pronouncements until 1975
when Hugh Hanning began to see Rhodesia clearly as a suitable milieu for a Peacekeeping Force.
It is suggested that it is not coincidental that at about this same period the Victoria Falls Meeting
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began a new round of fairly high profile attempts to break the deadlock.
Assessment of the extent of Church influence on the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe situation is
extremely difficult to make as the Church was merely one amongst many other groups attempting
an influential role to some greater or lesser degree. Even a correlation between Church input and
British Government action is not enough to presume the Church's a determining influence.
It would be reasonable however to credit the sheer persistence of the campaign to install a
Third Party Peacekeeping Force if not with success at least with having kept the idea firmly in the
Government's view.
Interesting too in terms of the model of Church, State, International System interaction sug-
gested in the Introduction is that, although some attempts at direct influence were attempted, the
Church chose generally to act by pressure on and suggestion to the British Government. It is true
however that the situation in Rhodesia was a special one in terms of British residual responsibility
and greater attempts to exercise direct influence in South Africa will be seen.
Ultimately however it must be said that as far as 'backing a winner' to embody and achieve
the free Zimbabwe was concerned the Church's instinct to support the seemingly moderate and
non-Marxist Muzorewa was a mistake. To use the words of Hugh Hanning who more than anyone
was responsible for the content and direction of Church of England policy towards Rhodesia dur-
ing the 1970's :- "We got it wrong over Rhodesia".1
A personal interview in January 1988.
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SECTION ifi: THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND AND
SOUTH AFRICA 1970-1980
SECTION ffl.1: REASONS FOR CHURCH OF ENGLAND INVOLVEMENT
IN SOUTH AFRICA
The Church of England was involved in South Africa for much the same sort of reasons that
it was involved in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. These reasons were both pragmatic and theological.
Pragmatically it was impossible to avoid the implications of being there. As in
Rhodesia/Zimbabwe the Anglican Church had moved into the country hand in hand with British
economic, military and political colonization and though the British Empire had disappeared
Anglicanism remained. It was an independent Anglicanism however - the Province of South
Africa with its own Primate who was Archbishop of Capetown.
The division of the white races between Afrikaaner and British meant that Anglicanism was
never the religion of one single white minority ruling class as it tended to be in other parts of
Africa; the position of the Dutch Reformed Church amongst Afrikaaners was unassailable. How-
ever Anglicanism became significantly influential amongst blacks as well as white South Africans
of English extraction and the contacts between members and leaders of the Church in South
Africa and the "mother church" in England were constant.
As in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe the Church of England's association with a past colonial system
left a sense of continuing responsibility. The closeness of many Church leaders and executives to
government has already been detailed and this too tended to lead to an identification of matters of
national concern as matters also of Church concern, especially if, as in this case, there were many
indigenous reasons for involvement.
Where the theology of involvement was concerned this also has been examined and need
only briefly be restated. Men were created equal in the eyes of God and had been equally
redeemed by the death of Christ. Any government or state which treated a particular racial group
as constitutionally, politically, intellectually or economically inferior by reason of their member-
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ship of this racial group would and should be condemned.
It should be noted however that in the context of South Africa there were two complicating
factors. There was in fact a split between churches because the Dutch Reformed Church provided
its own 'theology' for apartheid and for the Biblical hallowing of separate development. This
was based on what most Christians would regard as a highly questionable interpretation of certain
Old Testament texts.
Moreover the South African Government ran a continuous and often successful public rela-
tions campaign to represent black aspirations and the organisations which represented them as
Communist inspired. Seen in this light the battle in South Africa was not between black majority
and white minority but between 'Christianity' and 'Civilization' on the one hand and Commun-
ism and the forces of darkness on the other.
Both of these elements muddied the water to a certain extent, the first perhaps minimally,
the second more seriously in that it fed into the already existing East/West perspective of those
members of the Church's central executive charged with the formulation of tactics.
These problems aside, two quotations sum up well the pragmatic and theological content of
the British churches' involvement in and opposition to the apartheid system in South Africa.
In its 1979 report on Britain's responsibilities to South Africa 1 the British Council of
Churches said "the notion that a segment of the population amounting to approximately 80% of
the whole should systematically be excluded from the rights, duties and privileges that go with
being a citizen in a modern state has made South Africa a major focus of international disappro-
val."2
The IAC report prepared for the BSR at the same time said that "the Churches in this coun-
try, committed to a belief in the fundamental equality of all men and women as created in the
image of God, cannot but be disturbed by the claim of the leaders of white South Africa to justify
'Political Change in South Africa: Britain's Responsibility', a Report of the Division of International
Affairs of the British Council of Churches, BCC, London, 1979.
2 Ibid, p. 1.
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apartheid (which denies that equality) as a Christian policy essential to the defence of Christian
civilization" .
The Church's opposition to the apartheid system in South Africa was thus defined in both
political and theological terms. The second was the underlying motivation for the first even
though a modem rubric of human, , of political, of economic rights was often used to convey credi-
bly sentiments about what were in fact a set of timeless beliefs.
Whatever the fundamental reason for involvement however it is manifestly inadequate to
discuss motivation in the sense of options preferred or policies adopted in terms of eternal yen-
ties. There are always numerous short-term tactical advantages which Church 'actors' see at van-
ous times as signposts or valuable gains tlong the road to universal recognition of Christian
beliefs and values and to the establishment of what they could regard as a just society. Their per-
sonal preoccupations and personalities incline them also to prefer certain tactical possibilities over
others. This has already been discussed.
In such terms a number of possibilities have been suggested to explain the particular stance
demonstrated by the Church over South Africa and the policies it pursued there. What values
weighed with decision-makers that they embraced a policy of constructive engagement and
rejected one of economic disengagement? Is one looking once again at peace as a predominant
value? Is one looking at Christian/humanitarian preoccupation with the well-being of the major-
ity black community, arguably those who would suffer worst if sanctions against South Africa
were imposed? Is one on the other hand looking at an organisation constitutionally averse to
overturning the status quo and reluctant to contemplate the complete displacement of South Afri-
can whites? Is one looking at a policy too uncritically cognizant of the predominant Western
power political analysis of the Southern African situation? Is one, in the most self-interested and
cynical assessment of the situation, contemplating an organisation which needs to protect its
investments and pander to the pro-white sympathies of many of its members? All of these claims
'Political Change in South Africa', a Report by the BSR to the General Synod, GS424, dO, London,
1979.
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have been made in respect of the Church's motivation and this chapter seeks to throw light on the
problem.
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SECTION ffl.2: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The reasons for involvement in South Africa were very similar to those for involvement in
Rhodesia/Zimbabwe but the problem was infinitely more intransigent. There was a sense in
which the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe crisis was finite, an ugly manifestation of a rear-guard action of
imperialism, with the economic and political factors which would ultimately bring down the UDI
regime present and growing from the beginning.
The situation in South Africa was quite different. The economic basis of apartheid had long
existed and, though dependent on Western investment and advanced technology, the State was
economically strong with its near monopoly of production of so many of the rare minerals neces-
sary to the West and a major importing and exporting role in world markets. Its economic posi-
tion was buttressed by an elaborate system of constitutional provisions for ensuring the separate
'development' of black, white and coloured peoples.
The essential features of apartheid, or separate development, are the control of black labour
through restrictive legislation and the movement of huge numbers of the black population into
areas designated as Homelands from areas designated as white. This is made possible by the
monopoly of political, economic and military power in white hands.
All of this has deep historical roots with Dutch settlement in South Africa dating from 1652
and British from 1805. The system of displacing and regarding as culturally inferior the indi-
genous peoples of the area began from the earliest years of settlement and was particularly appli-
cable to the Dutch Settlers, the Boers, who used black slave labour in the Transvaal to which they
'trecked' during the nineteenth century to escape from British control of Cape Province. More-
over the first Pass Laws were introduced by Royal Proclamation into the first British Cape Settle-
ments as early as 1797.
Disputes between the Boers and the British were resolved in favour of the British during the
Second Boer War of 1899 to 1902. The last uprising in Natal against colonial rule by the indi-
genous people of South Africa was put down in 1906.
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The long-existing economic foundation of apartheid, the control by the white population of
the most productive land areas, was reinforced by the creation of the Union of South Africa in
1910 with a franchise limited to the white population. In the mid-1920's the Afrikaaner electorate
voted to power the forerunner of the National Party and the colour bar began to be systematized
and institutionalized. Policies were aimed at separating black and white in living areas as well as
the work place and a differentiated education policy for black and white was instituted. This was
largely in response to 'poor white' feelings of threat and their consequent agitation to keep blacks
out of all but the lowest paid jobs.
The Nationalist Party Government came to power in 1948 committed to the complete insti-
tutionalization of separate development or apartheid. This was manifest in 'petty apartheid' -
separate transport, separate entrances to public places, different public and leisure facilities, and
in 'grand apartheid' - the provision of different educational systems, living areas, conditions of
work and pay. The system was buttressed further in 1958, when Mr. Verwoerd became Prime
Minister, by the creation of the Bantustans or native living areas outside which only those who
were designated as economically useful were allowed to live. Appendages, that is dependent
wives and children, had to remain in rural areas separated for most of every year from their men.
Resistance to the imposition of apartheid and the monopolization of political and economic
power by a white minority however dates back to the founding of the African National Congress,
ANC, in 1912. For nearly fifty years it led largely peaceful campaigns against the numerous res-
trictions on the lives of black South Africans, especially the Pass Laws, which restricted the
movement of Africans, and against the Land Act, which designated black and white living areas.
Philosophically its members resisted a racial or tribal analysis of South African society and
emphasized the racial equality of all citizens of South Africa. Thus its approach was liberal in a
racial sense but it was socialist in terms of economic analysis.
In the early 1940's its Youth League was formed and this indicated a degree of heightened
militancy and growing organisation. In 1949 its Programme of Action emphasized the right of the
people of South Africa to self-determination and the need for black people to play a leading role
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in the fight for liberation. During the 1950's the ANC played a leading role in organising mass
actions such as strikes, protests and demonstrations against the increasingly severe restrictions of
apartheid.
1955 was a turning point and an indication of the growing unity of purpose among black
South Africans when the ANC organised a Congress of People with over three thousand delegates
who came from all parts of South Africa. The Freedom Charter which resulted set out a pro-
gramme for a non-racial, unitary and democratic state. The South African Government declared
this to be treasonable and charged 156 ANC members with treason. After a mass irial which
lasted five years they were all acquitted.
In 1960 mass protests against the Pass Laws took place. In what became known as the
Sharpeville Massacre police shot and killed many peaceful demonstrators. This led to further
riots and protests and to the Declaration by the Government of a State of Emergency. Under this
about 20,000 people were detained and another 2,000 held without trial.
Also as a direct consequence of Sharpeville the ANC was banned which meant that it was
no longer allowed to hold meetings. Rather than submit to this the group went underground and
many of its leaders went into exile. Its policy of nearly fifty years, of advocating peaceful change,
now moved to an assessment of the necessity of armed struggle and to its advocacy. The
Government's attempt to stamp Out the ANC and its activities cu1minted in 1962 in the arrest of
its President, Nelson Mandela, his trial and conviction on a charge of treason. He was sentenced
to life imprisonment. Throughout the 1960's repression continued and all known liberation
movement leaders were imprisoned, banned or exiled by the end of the decade.
On the economic front however the South African economy enjoyed a boom until the mid-
dle of the 1970's. This led to an increased demand for black labour in urban industrial areas and
encouraged also increased migrancy from neighbouring states. This drift from country to town
led to higher rates of urban crime and to cramped and increasingly squalid living conditions in the
townships in which South Africa's urban black population was housed. Because the economic
dynamic was acting in many respects in opposition to apartheid ideology in encouraging
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migration from designated Homelands the Government saw it as necessary to impose ever
stronger restrictions and to uphold the morality of a society based on apartheid.
All this led to increasing black dissatisfaction and unrest which was infinitely exacerbated in
the mid-1970s by an economic recession. Black unemployment increased, with 25% of the black
work force out of work by 1980. The Government's answer to this was to accelerate the policy of
making the Homelands 'independent' so that the responsibility for a large unemployed black
labour pool fell on the 'independent' black politicians, state functionaries by any other name. The
'independent' Homelands of Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda were all created during the
1970's and recognized by no state apart from South Africa.
The years 1970 to 1980, the years when the Church of England's activities and attitudes
towards South Africa will be examined, saw both white affluence and black poverty increase.
Inflation ran at a minimum of 10% throughout the decade and had reached 14% by 1980. The
price of maize, the African staple food, rose by 60% from 1975 to 1980 and this badly affected
the living standards of those black Africans who were unwaged.' By contrast a small black mid-
dle class and elite group of workers emerged both in response to the need of multinationals for an
increasingly skilled work force and to the attempt by Government to impede the development of
black solidarity. By and large however black dissatisfaction increased in direct proportion to
black impoverishment.
The townships particularly became the scene of riots and uprisings. Boycotts and strikes
increased as did support for guerilla movements. Blacks flooded into the townships in the hope
of finding work in such numbers that administrators were unable to keep pace. There was great
resistance to the Homelands and 'Independent States' policy and to its basis which was the
Government's intention to further an ethnic analysis of black South African society. Increasingly
too blacks resented the Bantu education policy, seeing it as a weapon for creating in perpetuity a
culturally and educationally disadvantaged work force. As a consequence of all this the years
1 'South Africa in the 1980s', Catholic Institute of International Relations Position Paper, CUR, London,
undated.
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1969 to about 1977 saw the growth and development of the Black Consciousness Movement.
This differed from the ANC initially in that black identity was seen as the pivotal issue and
there was no room for radical white supporters who might possibly blunt the edge of the black
thrust for liberation. Black Consciousness was essentially a movement of young, politicized and
overwhelmingly urban blacks. Organizations which were set up under its general umbrella
included the South African Association of Students, SASO, and a number of trade unions in
defiance of the Government's anti-strike laws. In 1973 nationwide strikes took place, particularly
severe in Durban.
During these years the Anglican Church in South Africa was not immune from Government
harassment. As the scope of political trials and bannings increased Churchmen were drawn into
the net although, with certain outstanding exceptions such as Father Trevor Huddieston 2 and
Gonville ffrench-Beytagh,3 the Anglican Church had not previously been in the forefront of the
fight against apartheid. However the potential for the development of the Church as champion of
the Black underclass was always there by its very structure; it was intrinsically different from the
Anglican Church in Rhodesia by reason of its large numbers of black members and by the fact
that black priests were increasingly promoted to higher offices in the Church.
The real involvement of the South African Church in the political life of the country came
in late 1960 when the Cottesloe Consultation was convened by the WCC to discuss Christian
responsibility in race relations. Subsequently the WCC's eight South African member Churches
urged racial reform of a fairly moderate type in South Africa. Their position was completely
rejected however by the reactionary Nederduitse Hervormde Kerk, NHK, and, after government
pressure, by the Dutch Reformed Church, DRC.
Those churches who rejected a Biblical justification of apartheid came together in the Chris-
tian Institute led by Beyers Naudé.4 The aim of the Institute was a non-violent reclisthbution of
2 Member of the Society of the Resurrection, Priest of Sophiatown, Johannesburg, lifelong campaigner
against apartheid.
Dean of Johannesburg who spoke out so strongly against apartheid that he was tried for treason and
deported in 1972.
He was thereby forced to abandon his position within the DRC.
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power, the rediscovery of the Bible's original message and an identification with the poor. All of
these were seen as threatening by the Government, and the Institute and its members were con-
tinually harassed. The South African Council of Churches, set up in 1968 as successor to the
Christian Council of South Africa, was similarly treated.
Government disapproval deepened with the joint publication by the Christian Institute and
SACC of 'Message to the People of South Africa' in 1968 which declared apartheid to be con-
trary to the spirit of the Gospel. The correspondence which followed between Prime Minister
Vorster and Church leaders set out the difference of theological perception in its starkest terms:
Church leaders told the Prime Minister that ... "as long as attempts are made to justify the policy
of apartheid by appeal to God's word, we will persist in denying their validity," to which Vorster
replied that it was "with the utmost despisal (sic) ... that I reject the insolence you display in
attacking my Church as you do."5
In 1969 the Christian Institute and SACC set up the Study Project on Christianity in
Apartheid Society, SPRO-CAS, to help the Churches to move from a theological denunciation of
apartheid to significant involvement in its practical manifestations. It pressed for better wages and
social security for black workers, the development of black awareness and leadership capacity as
well as a change in white attitudes.
These activities were under even graver threat when the WCC, in 1970, announced its
grants to non-racist liberation movements. The SACC refused to leave the WCC, as the Govern-
ment demanded, but it did not support the controversial grants as it still saw the Churches as com-
mitted irrevocably to the principle of non-violennce.
Many issues led to confrontation between the Churches and the Government in the follow-
ing years - violence, and its validity, disinvestment, conscientious objection and the role of the
Christian in war. The influence and constituency of the SACC widened immeasurably in 1971
'Pseudo-Gospels in South Africa', Johannesburg, 1968, quoted in John de Gruchy 'The Church Struggle
in South Africa, itself quoted in Shirley du Boulay, 'Tutu: Voice of the Voiceless', Penguin, London, 1989,
p. 126.
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with the African Independent Churches Association's membership, and in 1975 when the Neder-
duitse Gereformeerde Kerk in Africa, NGA, the black 'daughter' Church of the DRC, was also
admitted. Under the leadership of John Rees 6 and Desmond Tutu7 the SACC came in a very real
sense to represent the aspirations of black Christians in South Africa.
In general, and not specifically Christian, terms, conflict between black citizens and the
Government came to a head in 1976 in a series of urban uprisings. In the Soweto uprising police
fired on and killed hundreds of blacks, including school children, who were protesting against the
Bantu Education Acts. This led to a two year wave of protest where hundreds of thousands of
workers were mobilized.
Soweto was a water-shed in a variety of ways and a number of lessons were learnt. The
black community saw the need to politicize young people who had enough maturity and leader-
ship quality to further their community's aims; they saw the need for some sort of co-ordinated
strategy for most of the riots and protests during this period were spontaneous and often not easy
to control; they observed the differencies which existed between students and workers which the
Government was able to exploit. Observers could see that 1976 was the beginning of a new
sophistication of approach in the analysis of exploitation, especially of its economic roots, and in
the strategies used to achieve political advancement.
Initiatives included the formation of the Soweto Students' Representative Council, SSRC,
and the Black People's Convention The former led a successful campaign against the Soweto
Urban Bantu Council which the Government bad installed to foster the appearance of increased
self-government by the black population. The SSRC prevented the Council from increasing rents
and, by constantly demonstrating its collaborationist features, caused it to collapse.
An increased perception developed among Black Consciousness organisations of the impor-
tance of the black worker in political change. This was caused by the dialogue which had begun
6 1970-1978, a white Methodist layman.
1978-1984, a black Anglican priest, previously Dean of Johannesburg and Bishop of Lesotho and subse-
quently Bishop of Johannesburg and Archbishop of Capetown.
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between politicized young blacks and members of the ANC, several of whose members were
released at this time from Robben Island where they had been imprisoned for twelve years after
the Rivonia Trial. 8 There was a new wave of recruitment to the ANC as a result of this dialogue
and its importance was reinforced when, in October 1977, the South African Government banned
all eighteen Black Consciousness organisations and two newspapers with a black readership.
This occurred because of the student boycotts and unrest which had followed the death of Steve
Biko, a SASO leader, in detention a month before. The bannings served to convince a new gen-
eration of blacks that non-violent, public and open methods of pursuing reform were hopeless.
The Church too was heavily involved in confrontation with the Government. A month after
the death of Steve Biko the Christian Institute of South Africa was one of the organisations
declared unlawful. Fifty black church leaders and several whites, including Dr. Beyers Naudi,
Director of the Institute, were detained or restricted for up to five years 9 He was refused permis-
sion to come to Britain to give a paper to Chatham House. In all fifty three leading churchmen in
Johannesburg, including the Bishop and the Dean, were arrested and the Prime Minister accused
the South African Council of Churches of using over £1 million to foment unrest. Bishop Des-
mond Tutu's passport was confiscated.
Attempts to set up a legitimate internal reform organisation were not completely abandoned
because the Azanian People's Organization, AZAPO, briefly emerged in May and June 1978. It
was an amalgamation of Black Consciousness Activists and members of the Pan African
Congress, a breakaway movement of the ANC. However its leadership too was soon banned. It
was reformed in September 1979 along with ASCO, the Azanian Students Organization, and
COSAS, the Congress of South African Students (schoolchildren). All suffered considerable pol-
ice harassment.
The authors of the CUR Position Paper, 'South Africa in the '80s' 1° suggest that in
8 So-called after the house in northern Johannesburg which was the headuaxters of the aimed wing of the
ANC, Umithonto we Sizwe whose leaders were arrested and sentenced to life-imprisonment for their policy
of violence to the installations and fabric of apartheid but not to its personneL
Restriction involves being forbidden to speak to more than one person, to write, publish or be quoted.
10 'South Africa in the 1980's', CUR, op. cit.
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AZAPO's analysis of the role of the black worker and of non-collaborationist tactics towards
government it could be seen as in transition from Black Consciousness ideology to an ANC
analysis of society. However a distinct difference of view was still distinguishable within
AZAPO between those who wanted to exclude all whites in the interests of black solidarity and
those who adhered to a rigorous non-racial analysis of society. Moreover its appeal was limited
and many workers and few unemployed or Homelands residents supported it.
There is no doubt however of the increased militancy of the majority of black people by the
end of the decade. Living conditions in the townships, the level of unemployment, the complete
impoverishment in every way of Homelands life continued. Those in work, despite considerable
restrictions, organised themselves into uniohs to press for better wages and working conditions. It
was their persistence which resulted in the two Government commissions of 1979. the Wiehabn
Commission, which recommended the setting up of official black unions under tight state control,
and the Riekert Commission, which recommended that the urban black elite be able to secure
tenured housing on long leases. The provisions of these Commissions were represented as con-
siderable concessions to black aspirations by the Government but the reverse side of their motiva-
tion was the desire to stifle black initiative in the formation and running of unions and much
stiffer sanctions against the employers of illegal migrants. The overall object was restriction of
surplus population to the Homelands and the creation of a stable, urban, elite black labour force.
There was one notable exception to the township and student orientated opposition to the
State and this was the organisation known as Inkatha which was founded by Chief Gatsha
Buthelezi in 1975. It was a cultural organisation of Zulu people based in the Zulu homeland of
Kwa Zulu whose life it dominated. Its support was overwhelmingly drawn from Kwa Zulu
although some Zulu speakers in Soweto also supported it. By 1980 it had about 300,000 card car-
rying members. After the banning of the Black Consciousness organisations it was the largest
legitimate black political organisation in South Africa but it was anathema to many of the newly
radicalised black young people of the townships because of its policy of dialogue and cooperation
with the South African Government. Buthelezi, whose personal charisma and political skills dom-
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mated the organisation, rejected the growing socialist analysis of the black condition and was wil-
ling to co-operate with capitalism by encouraging investment in Kwa Zulu. He had however
refused independent status for Kwa Zulu which increased his support amongst educated blacks by
favourable comparison with the 'quisling' leaders of other independent Homelands.
His activities in Kwa Zulu were sometimes criticised even within his own party however
because Inkatha and the Kwa Zulu government were more or less synonymous, a situation which
was abused. An atmosphere of veiled coercion was suggested by some observers. It was also sug-
gested that it was very helpful to hold an Inkatha party card in dealings with the government
authorities and that without such a card business life for blacks in Natal was difficult. For such
reasons the large nominal membership might not be a good indication of actual support for the
party. Buthelezi's autocratic control extended into all areas of Homeland life and Inkatha activi-
ties in schools and amongst young people attracted criticism and opposition Irom some of the
local churches. It was undeniable however that during the 1970s Buthelezi regularly attracted
10,000 to 20,000 people to his rallies in Soweto and reached a fairly large public with his news-
paper, the Nation.
It was felt by many however that his influence would wane in the wake of the school boy-
cotts in April to July 1980 when he used strong-arm men against students and called on vigilantes
to protect property, also condemning ANC agitators. This caused further alienation of black youth
in his own country and cut both his prestige abroad and his supply of funds from the same
sources. Moreover the ANC publically repudiated his activities. Assessment of him by the end of
the decade ranged from those who still saw him as a potential mediator to those who compared
him with Bishop Muzorewa.
Some reforms of petty apartheid were made in the last years of the decade. More money
was promised for black education and housing and the working practices of some of the multina-
tionals improved. However great unrest and a sense of thwarted expectation was caused in 1980
by the victory of Robert Mugabe in the second Rhodesian election and the creation of the new
republic of Zimbabwe.
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This victory won by guerilla tactics emphasised the activities of those South Africans who
had completely abandoned peaceful means of gaining reform and had themselves been using
guerila tactics against the South African state since the mid 1970's. The organisation most active
here was Umkhonto we Sizwe, the armed wing of the ANC, Its targets tended to be fairly small in
scope and symbolic of white state authority, such as police and police property. Until Soweto
their activities had been fairly spontaneous and disorganised, but afterwards they were both better
organised and more numerous. One of their most spectacular actions was an armed attack on a
police station in 1979 in retaliation for the execution of an ANC member, Solomaon Mhlangu,
who had been hanged.
Such activities led to the increasing militarization of the South African state and of white
South African society. The South African Defence forces grew enormously between 1975 and
1980 to about 480,000 and the State Security Council became the directing Cabinet Committee in
these years. In this prevailing ideology of national security, shared at that time by such states as
Paraguay, Argentina, Israel, South Korea and Taiwan, all human, civil and political rights were
subordinated to the national interest which was seen as the maintenance of the external integrity
and internal structure of the state against all perceived threat. The pivotal position and prestige of
the military was probably buttressed by the widely held belief that they had developed a nuclear
capacity. Uncertainty about its parameters undoubtedly made it a more effective psychological
factor than exact knowledge would have done.
This then was the turbulent state of South Africa during the 1970s. It was a decade when
each new crisis was seen by commentators as a turning point or as pivotal in the development of
the consciousness of one or another part of the population. This latter was undoubtedly true in
many instances but few of the perceived turning points proved to be turning points in fact. Few
would claim at the end of the decade that the fundamental position of the black population was
radically different from their position in 1970. Some 'petty apartheid' provisions had been
removed, an elite amongst them was better waged and housed; little more could be said in con-
crete terms, although the consciousness and analysis of their situation by the black population had
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hardened considerably as had the defense mentality of the whites. How adequate then was the
Church of England's response to these events?
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SECTION ffl.3: MAJOR THEMES IN THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND'S RELATION-
SHIP WITH SOUTH AFRICA
As in the case of Rhodesia/Zimbabwe certain major themes can be traced in IAC initiated
policy towards South Africa during the 1970s.
In a memo on future IAC policy written by Hugh Hanning to Maurice Chandler in April
1974 1 a list of priority areas is given. These were support for Intermediate Technology, support
for the Christian Institute and for Chief Buthelezi, the following up of the recommendations of
the Rogers Report on the conduct and work practice of British firms with South African subsidi-
aries and support for the organisation Christian Concern for South Africa (CCSA). For the rest of
the decade this was very much the programme that was adhered to.
There would seem however to have been an underlying unity to these activities and indeed
to all the initiatives of the Church of England in South Africa during these years which was lack-
ing in the Zimbabwean situation. This was the belief that pressure on economic institutions in
South Africa would lead to political change and the matching commitment to a policy which
would help to bring this about. In practical terms this meant the espousal of schemes to influence
British firms with subsidiaries in South Africa to improve not only the financial lot of their black
employees but to involve themselves in some of the problems faced by these employees because
of the constitutional and political differentiation from which they suffered.
Because of the underlying theme to so much of the Church's activity in South Africa its mi-
tiatives and reactions there have been examined chronologically rather than thematically. The
reader will see that not until the very end of the decade did some consciousness of the need for a
fundamental assessment of the rationale and theology of the Church's policies appear. Until then
there is a constancy of purpose and an assumption of essential rightness which can be traced from
year to year.
The parameters of what the IAC hoped to achieve however by recommending such a policy
1 BSRJIAC/SAF/4, memo of 24/4f74.
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were never totally clear. They were manifestly concerned to improve the living, educational and
working conditions of black citizens of South Africa but whether one can extrapolate from their
disapproval of apartheid and their pursuit of schemes of economic amelioration a belief that a rad-
ical political reorientation might be effected by economic means is not evident from the docu-
mentaiy evidence available. Indeed one has the distinct impression that the rationale of the policy
was never completely worked out.
What can and should clearly be stated at the outset is that there seems no doubt of the com-
mitment of the leaders and executives of the Church to the disappearance of apartheid. An extract
from a memorandum on the Church's investments in South Africa by Hugh Hanning is very typi-
cal of the tenor of condemnation found in the records.2
"Another aspect of the situation ... is the monstrous question of the Pass-Law regula-
tions. At present Africans are being herded through the Bantu Commissioners' Courts
at a rate of one every three seconds, often for the most trivial offences; There is no
pretence of justice ... These Pass- Law regulations could one day prove the last straw,
for they are a specific desecration of human self-respect."
A similar note was struck by Sir Ronald Harris, Chainiian of the Central Board of Finance,
who paid a private visit to South Africa in 1978. His recommendation was that a policy of
engagement should be maintained but his distaste for the apparatus of apartheid and concern at
the conditions to which so many black people had been reduced was very clear. 3 Amongst the
best indicators of the Church's official attitude were the speeches and demeanor of Archbishop
Ramsey on his visit to Southern Africa in 1970. He left no doubt of his firm condemnation of
apartheid and of its irreconcilability with the demands of Christianity whatever the Dutch
Reformed Church might claim.
However, even if there was no doubt about the commitment of the central organisation of
the Church to the ending of apartheid, this position was sometimes blurred to the perception of
those outside the Church by the undoubted sympathy of some individual and vocal chur-
chmembers for the white position in South Africa and also by the fact that the Church
2 BSRJIAC/SAF/1, internal memo by Hugh Hanning for the IAC, 13 February, 1973.
BSR/IAC/SAF/5/2.
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Commissioners retained holdings in companies which operated in South Africa. Most impor-
tantly the Church's policy over apartheid for most of this period, that it could be eaten away by
the amelioration of the economic position of the black population, was seen by many as an indi-
cation of a less than whole-hearted commitment to apartheid's abolition, especially since the
World Council of Churches was committed to a policy of disinvestment as the best lever for end-
ing white domination.
Indeed it must be noted here that a thread which ran through the whole decade was the
Church of England's increasing lack of agreement with the WCC and the BCC The W.C.C.
embraced the policy of disinvestment in South Africa. The BCC Assembly did not adopt it until
November 1979 but the previous years had seen much debate and a gradual moving towards this
position and the Church of England and the BCC were increasingly out of step with one another
on this issue.
- 204 -
SECTION 11L4: CHURCH OF ENGLAND POLICIES IN SOUTH AFRICA - 1970-1972
The first two years of the decade were not marked by a great deal of IAC activity over South
Africa. The Board of Social Responsibility and the IAC itself had only just been set up in their
present form and Canon Oates was still the Committee's secretary, Hugh Hanning at this time
being the African Consultant of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. At this stage
there was certainly no theme; this developed from 1973 onwards after Hugh Hannning became
Secretary to the Committee.
Much of the work of these early years appears to have been quite routine. It included the
answering of queries from Lambeth Palace about the status of various groups associated with
South Africa or its problems and from organisations who felt that the Church of England could
disburse some of its wealth to help their South Africa orientated activities. The collection of
information, some of it solicited and much of it unsolicited, also went on. 	 -
The first initiative of any note came in May 1970 when the Bishop of Chichester, then
Chairman of the BSR wrote to the Secretary of the MCC welcoming on behalf of the IAC the
Cricket Council's decision not to play against segregated teams during their tour of South Africa,
but suggesting that the tour itself should be cancelled.1
This issue was taken up again at the meeting of the Church Assembly in July of the same
year during one of the debates on the value of the BCC which punctuated Assembly and Synod
meetings. The Bishop of Peterborough, in denying that the BCC acted for his or for the country's
conscience, said that it was often misled by strong-minded leaders especially in its pronounce-
ments on South Africa. The BCC had recently decided to encourage demonstrations against the
cricket tour and had issued a report four years before 'The Future of South Africa' which had
infuriated South Africans. By contrast Canon Piachaud said that the BCC did act as the consci-
ence of the nation and would be in a good position to speak on the subject of arms for South
Africa which would soon arise. The groans from other Assembly members which greeted his
1 BSR/IAC/SAF/1, letter of 21/5/70.
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reference to this topic appalled him. One sees here already a certain polarity, not in terms of the
articulation of coherent opinion, but in terms of gut reaction, evinced by the subject of South
Africa.2
The change from Assembly to Synod did not affect the form and line up in debates on South
Africa, which was one of the most frequently and hotly debated topics in Synod's repertoire. In
the Synod held in the spring of 1971, in a report on the document 'Church and State', the Rev.
Paul Oestreicher raised the subject once again. In commenting on the state of England he sug-
gested that there was little genuine Christian witness in a nation which, among other things,
profited from British investment in a virtual slave economy. Should the Church of England, he
asked, be willing to use its wealth perhaps to compensate dockers who might be put out of work
if a real stand were taken against South Africa? He suggested too that it was hypocritical to ask
whether blacks had a right to use violence when the Church itself had condoned so much
violence.3
This was only one of many occasions when Paul Oestreicher urged radical action on a
largely conservative Synod. In the IAC too his stand was often out of step with his more cautious
colleagues, as on the occasion in October 1971 when he unsuccessfully urged that the question of
the Church's setting up a fund, to which individuals who supported the WCC fund for non-
miitaty assistance to freedom fighters could contribute, be discussed by Synod in the context of
the debate on Civil Strife. Synod too took a Cautious line on this issue which was in fact debated
in November 1971; despite expressed sympathy for those working for the overthrow of oppres-
sive regimes, it declined to set up such a fund.4
In January 1971 the Archbishop of Canterbury spoke to members of the IAC about his
recent visit to South Africa and Uganda. Those attending included Nicholas Scott, MP, J.S.
Gummer, MP and Sir John Lawrence. At the Archbishop's request no record was kept of this
2 Chuivh Assembly, Report of Pmceedings, Vol. 50, 1970, ClO London, p. 299.
General Synod Report of Sessions, Spring 1971, VoL 1, ClO London, pp. 64 to 65.
IAC Minutes of 8/10/71 andl8/11f71.
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meeting but he presumably detailed his shock at the unwavering and totally self-righteous stand
of the South African President, Mr. Vorster and his conviction of the fundamental evil of
apartheid which his visit and this meeting in particular had confirmed. The Archbishop's senti-
ments were expressed in a lecture he gave in Cambridge on 23rd February, 1972 where he said
"We cannot applaud Europeans who resisted the tyranny of a Hitler and then be
shocked when Africans want to resist a tyrannical regime today; we can discuss the
wisdom or the expediency, but we cannot indulge in facile moral censures. We too
easily form a habit of exculpating the violence in our own sphere of history and cen-
suring the violence of other races ... Then, we need to watch the ways in which we
can be involved in difficult situations not only by our actions but also by our inactions
In the matter of the World Council of Churches grants to combat racism I approved
generally the act of identifying with oppressed populations, but I did criticize the
grants in two or three instances where the organisation assisted was one with a violent
purpose. But if I or anyone else shrinks from that, one must not be tacitly helping to
uphold a regime which is using violence towards its population. This compels us to
ask ourselves questions about our practical relations with such regimes. I agree with
those who say that in a world filled with many varieties of evil and injustice it is
wrong for us to become obsessed with any one particular country. Yet South Africa is
bound to loom large in our consciousness because its regime claims to be a bastion of
Christian civilization on the African continent. Then we must realise that any attitude
on our part towards either violent or non-violent policies is going to be very costly for
us if we try to be Christian. if we say to Africans "do not act rashly, a violent revolu-
tion is likely only to bring to yourselves terrible suffering", we are saying in effect "go
on accepting your present suffering," and we can say that to any people only if we
somehow are ready to suffer with them. Again, we may urge that the best chance for
social change lies not through war or the ostracism of any regime, but through contact
with all the influence that may come through social and trade relationships. If so we
must remember that there are forms of contact which help the situation and forms of
contact which do not. It does not help when white immigrants go and fill the jobs
which should be filled by skilled Africans. It does not help to make investment, unless
investment is designed, as is sometimes possible with difficulty, to help African aid
advancement. It does not even help, as some of the churches in southern Africa have
found, to subsidise education, unless it is for an educational syllabus which aids
advancement, and not downgrading."5
This passage has been quoted at length to demonstrate both the pedigree of the policy of
engagement with industry which the JAC adopted from 1973 and the range of the Archbishop's
awareness of the complicated moral and theological parameters which governed the situation. It is
suggested that it was these parameters which were downplayed in the years which followed.
A firm conclusion of this work is that the uncertainties and lack of consensus of JAC and
BSR/IAC/SAF/1: Speech of Michael Ramsey, Archbishop of Canteibury, at Cambridge on 23rd Febru-
ary, 1972, for further details of Ramsey's visit to South Africa and his interview with Vorster see Owen
Chadwick 'Michael Ramsey: a life', Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990.
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hence of Church of England policy towards South Africa could have been diminished, if not com-
pletely eradicated, by a profound and wideranging analysis of the situation in terms of theological
and moral parameters as well as practical ones. It is perfectly possible that a similar policy might
still have been adopted, that the arguments both against the use of violence in anything but
extremes and against the suffering that a policy of disengagement would cause to the black com-
munity might still have prevailed. However the basis of this decision would have been more
sound and it would have appeared less the personal preference of a small group of men tempera-
mentally averse to rocking boats. Moreover an analysis of the best theological and political
minds would have clearly revealed the dual aspect of violence, direct and institutional and some
of the shortcomings of the middle way, in the form of Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, which the IAC
chose.
Another plank of the policy of engagement was the Board of Social Responsibility's report
on Civil Strife, debated by Synod in 1971. One of the axioms of the report was that racism was
intrinsically evil and that it was a Christian duty and privilege to help those in distress from this
as from other causes. Moreover there could be, in extreme circumstances, such a thing as a 'just
revolution'. In this appears the following passage, later quoted by the IAC in conjunction with
parts of the Archbishop's speech above to demonstrate the basis of their policy, a policy which in
December 1972 was declared to be ... "the active seeking of ways of improving the lot of the Afri-
can in South Africa without resort to violence." "In South Africa ... it is clear that, in the short
mn, the chances of successful rebellion, are minimal. Some other way, which might well include
non-violent action and much stronger external pressure, must be found; for any encouragement to
engage in armed rebellion, in these circumstances, would be highly irresponsible."6
Awareness of increasing unrest and a hardening of the South African Government's reaction
to it was reflected in the opening proceedings of the first day of the Autumn Synod in 1971 when
the Archbishop of Canterbury prayed for the Dean of Johannesburg, Gonville ifrench-Beytagh,
who had been sentenced to five years imprisonment under the Terrorism Act and who had just
6 BSR/IAC/SAF/1: 'Civil Strife', BSR Report 1971, quoted in an LbC memo of December 1972,
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appealed against his conviction. 7 Similarly in June 1972 a discussion took place between Hugh
Harming, now Secretary of the IAC, and Hugh Whitworth, Personal Assistant to the Archbishop
of Canterbury, about the Archbishop's reactions to the recent unrest in Capetown. He had felt it
right to make an initial public statement but he did not feel it right to interfere in the Archbishop
of Capetown's bailiwick to the extent of speaking on the subject on the World at One as he had
been invited to do.8
General Synod Report of Proceedings, Autumn 1971, Vol.2, No. 3.
BSR/IAC/LAM/1, memo of 7/6/72.
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SECTION ffl.5: CHURCH OF ENGLAND POLICIES IN SOUTH AFRICA - 1973
The LAC's main preoccupation during this year and for several years thereafter was the
development of a policy of bringing pressure to bear on British firms with interests in South
Africa, the genesis of which was detailed above. This was not an uncontentious issue and the bat-
tle lines were clearly drawn in the Spring 1973 Synod between those, always a minority in Synod,
who favoured disinvestment and those who favoured pressure through industry.
The debate brought statements from both the First Church Estates Commissioner and the
Chairman of the Central Board of Finance about the respective policies of their organisations with
regard to South Africa. Sir Ronald Harris for the Church Commissioners emphasised that the
Commissioners were aware of the complicated ethical questions raised by investment in South
Africa and the need to balance these with the proper growth of the Commissioners' income.
Because of the Commissioners' restraint over investment in South Africa "The overall yield on
Commissioners' assets is marginally less than it would otherwise be ... the Commissioners do not
pursue profit regardless of other considerations."1
Policy should be seen in the light of the fact that the Commissioners had never invested
substantially in South Africa they said because they regarded mining as too speculative, and until
three years before they had not invested in any company registered outside the United Kingdom.
When this latter provision was modified it was largely to facilitate investment in the USA. Their
policy with regard to South African investment was that the Commissioners did not invest in
companies operating wholly or mainly in South Africa. (This was difficult to interpret but after
considering capital, turnover, profits, potential profits and work on some sort of percentage for-
mula they might consider that 10% was reasonable while 49% emphatically was not).2
They were kept closely informed of the policies and practices of companies in which they
did hold shares and which had South African operations so that they could use their influence as
substantial shareholders to encourage and support enlightened and progressive policies.
1 General Synod Repoit of Proceedings, Spring Group of Sessions 1973, Vol. 4, No. 1, P. 81.
2 Ibid. p. 104.
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The policy of the Central Board of Finance as articulated by Edmund Compton, its Chair-
man, was somewhat different. Under the Church Funds Investment Measure of 1958 the Central
Board of Finance was not responsible to Synod for the management of its Investment Fund. The
law required that this be administered for the benefit of contributors, and financial considerations
alone controlled the buying and selling of shares. At the present time the Board did not involve
jtself in attempting to modify the policies of those South African companies in which it invested.3
Reaction to these statements demonstrated the range of opinion held by individual Synod
members over the investment issue. It included those who advocated the acquisition of far more
shares so that maximum pressure could be brought to bear on the South African Government,
those who claimed on first hand evidence that black citizens of South Africa did/did not want
disinvestment, those who advocated the Church of England's espousal of the WCC line on disin-
vestment, those who pointed out the particular horrors of companies such as Consolidated
Goldfields in which the Central Board of Finance had shares and which, it was claimed, used
labour in conditions of near slavery.4
Divisions were to remain fairly constant throughout the 1 970s with supporters of the WCC
line always in a minority in Synod but vociferous in condemnation of what they saw as complai-
sance in the face of oppression. A prescient delegate asked that the Chairman of the Central Board
of Finance convey the disquiet of Synod to the Investment Committee which might act in accor-
dance with statute but whose actions attracted publicity which reflected on Synod itself.5
Perhaps he foresaw that the image which the Church's central authorities sought to project
of real commitment to the eradication of apartheid albeit by peaceful means was constantly
blurred by the issue of Church investments. The niceties of the legal commitments of investing
authorities did not modify for some commentators the anomalous position of a church profiting





The debate which had begun in Synod was also adopted with vigour by the IAC. At its
January Committee meeting it was reported that two ecumenical groups and a Methodist group as
well as the CCSA and the BCC were looking at the investment issue . To co-ordinate the
Church's own activities Canon Gonville ffrench-Beytagh was "invited to undertake a study of
matters pertaining to investment and its consequences in South Africa". 6 Richard Hauser, the
sociologist, was to finance this work for three months on the basis that ffrench-Beytagh would
investigate ... "what should be done about the situation in South Africa which will be in the long
run constructive and hopeful and in the short run defensive and helpful." Hauser saw this project
"... as part of a structure on the League of Human Rights which we are trying to build up."7
ifrench-Beytagh worked quickly and by early March 1973 had produced articles on Legal
Aid for African Employees, the Trades Union Movement and South Africa and Industry and
Apartheid. His suggestions were integrated into the publication 'Investment in South Africa:
Challenge for the Church' which was published in the Spring of the same year.8
His ideas enshrined the notion of amelioration and were wide ranging. There were fairly
conventional suggestions such as pressure by shareholders in firms with South African enterprises
to improve the working conditions and the pay of their black employees, many of whom still
received wages below the Poverty Datum Line. He suggested also that employers could take
responsibility for providing aid, legal if necessary, for those of their employees who fell foul of
the Pass Laws. Firms should do whatever they could to train individual black employees in
labour representation techniques and genuinely representative workers' organisations, rather than
'appointed' works committees, should be set up. As well as improving wages welfare benefits to
black workers should be improved, with sick leave funds for workers' families. He suggested too
that the British Trade Union Movement could do more to make their members aware of the dam-
age to the employment chances of black South Africans done by British emigration to South
Africa. The steady flow of white labour was held to be one of the factors involved in the failure of
6 IAC Minutes 23/1/73.
' BSR/[AC/SAF/1, letter of 29/1/73 from Richard Hauser to Hugh Hanning.
8 'Investment in South Africa Challenge for the Church', BSR publicalion, 00, London, 1973.
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black South Africans to rise to more skilled and responsible posts.
ifrench-Beytagh's ideas were very much in line with Hugh Hanning's own views. In Febru-
ary 1973 Hanning wrote a short article for the May/June issue of the magazine Voyage. 9 What
had been requested was an article on the WCC's attitudes to investment but instead Hanning
wrote an apologia for what he called the 'Polaroid' approach. This he saw as one of three possible
options:- to "sell Out", the policy decided on by the WCC, the Oppenheimer approach, to
increase the level of investment in order to raise the standard of living in South Africa, and the
Polaroid approach, whereby investor pressure might be used to bring about change. His own
opposition to the WCC approach is demonstrated in the following paragraph;-
"The problem here (with disinvestment) is to see just how the Africans will benefit.
Are the purchasers of the stock sold by the WCC likely to be any more enlightened
than the WCC itself? Would a Japanese or a French investor be any more likely to
press for the reforms which the African requires?"1°
Hanning's personal contacts with the media were used to publicize the work that ifrench-
Beytagh was doing. On 7th March 1973 he wrote to Charles Douglas-Home, editor of the Times,
enclosing ffrench-Beytagh's study and asking for comments. Douglas-Home's reply of the 15th
was fairly non-committal, suggesting that it was difficult to see how British-owned companies in
South Africa could be made to act differently from South African-owned ones.11
Hanning also issued press releases to Baden Hickman, religious Correspondent of the Guar-
dian, and Clifford Longley of the Times pointing out how active was the Church of England in
formulating a programme of action which would "be put squarely to those in a position to act on
them, including Members of Parliament, in the coming weeks."12
By far his most fruitful contact was with Alistair Hetherington, Editor of the Guardian,
whose newspaper had run a revelatory article on black wages in South Africa on 12th March.13




12 Ibid. Press release of 20/3/73 by IAC.
13 JAC Minutes 13/3/73.
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On the 19th Hanning therefore approached Hetherington with copies of ffrench-Beytagh's articles
and the suggestion that because of the Guardian's interest in South Africa he might be interested
in ifrench-Beytagh's cooperating with one of his regular contributors, such as Adam Raphael. A
meeting the following week was suggested.'4
This obviously bore fruit because a full-page article by Adam Raphael and ffrench-Beytagh
on conditions of black employment in South Africa and the steps which might be pursued to
ameliorate the situation appeared in the Guardian during the first week in April. Hetherington was
obviously delighted with it, and told Hanning on the 12th April that any further ideas on South
Africa from either himself or ffrench-Beytagh would be very welcome. 15 On 16th Hanning sug-
gested that if Hetherington formed an ad hoc team on South Africa he would like very much to be
included and also recommended Gerry Mansell, at the BBC, Hugh Lewin of Christian Action and
"Charlie" Douglas-Home. 16 This suggestion came to nothing but the momentum was now consid-
erable and not only in the Church of England. The DIA of the BCC had produced an internal
document 'Investment in South Africa' whose approach was different from that of the IAC and
showed a readiness to follow the WCC line on disinvestment. On 8th May Hanning sent copies of
this to a number of bishops in South and Southern Africa asking for their comments. 17 On the
29th the Bishop of Malawi replied that he supported the work of Chief Gatsh.a Buthelezi and the
policy of putting pressure on firms investing in South Africa. Similarly on 30th May Robert Tay-
lor, the Archbishop of Capetown, replied that he was opposed to disinvestment which he thought
would bring economic chaos and would benefit no-one.18
Not that all comment took the ifrench-Beytagh/Hanning line. In June for example Bishop
Ambrose Reeves , President of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, wrote to the Rev. John Arnold,
General Secretary of the Board for Mission and Unity, asking for Church support for disinvest-







labour. Arnold replied that though this was a matter of great concern to the Church and a motion
calling for further study was before Synod at that very time the B.M.U. could not itself make
approaches to firms with South African links. Accordingly the letter was passed to Hanning who
attempted to convince Reeves of the virtues of ffrench-Beytagh's ideas, although with what suc-
cess is not recorded.19
Such was the general interest in this topic that the IAC decided to send copies of its pam-
phlet, "South Africa: a challenge for the Church", not only to members of Synod but to the Chair-
men of forty five large businesses with South African subsidiaries. The covering letter from Mau-
rice Chandler, Chairman of the IAC, stated correctly that the Church of England's attitude, in
contrast to that of the WCC, was not clear-cut. "While there are those who would associate them-
selves with the stand taken by the WCC, there are others who would take a strongly opposed
view." The views of the Archbishop of Capetown are reported to be that "economic growth will
produce social change and that pressure for reform, through invested capital seems to be one of
the few ways of exerting pressure to effect such change." Comments on ifrench-Beytagh' s propo-
sals, copies of which were also sent to Sir Geoffrey Howe, Minister of Trade, the two
Archbishops of South Africa, the BCC and Adam Butler, MP, were therefore invited.20
Twenty five firms replied and from twenty there was no response. The replies varied enor-
mously. There was anodyne approval, "many stimulating ideas",21
"We shall have to think hard about the Canon's recommendations and shall continue to watch
with great interest the lead given by the Church in this difficult area."22
There was firm defense of the operating practices of their own concerns:
"We have no male employee being paid at rates below the P.D.L. There are non-
contributory pensions for all staff with more than twenty years' service and scholar-
ships for the university are granted on merit for which the children of all staff are eli-
gible to apply. Scholarships for secondary education are available for the children of
non-white staff only. There has been a four-fold increase in numbers of our non-
19 BSR/IAC/SAF/1.
BSR/IAC/SAF/1, letter of 20/6173.
21 Digest of replies, BSR/IAC/SAF/1, extract from reply of Jim Slater, of Slater Walker Securities.
Ibid, extract from reply of las Chanman, EJ. Callaxd.
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European staff over the last five years "23
There were fears of widespread black unemployment if wages were improved. "... if the
wages are pushed up too quickly, it will mean that sackings will take place and less men will be
earning money. Is half a loaf better than no bread? We think it is" ... workers in India were ... "far
worse off than in South Africa".24
Several replies, not surprisingly, demonstrated total opposition to the WCC recommended
policy. Others were thoughtful and showed a pre-existing awareness of the problems of operating
in South Africa, even if not wholehearted approval of ifrench-Beytagh's recommendations,
although the reply from A. Cohen, cited above, did rather depressingly suggest that "Most UK
firms with South African interests would not have known the wages being paid to black or white
South Africans before the article about them appeared in the Guardian." One firm with small
industrial units in South Africa and only six hundred employees of all races there pointed out the
difficulties which these units would face which would be quite out of proportion to their strength
if they undertook the sort of programme envisaged in the paper. There was a limit, this respon-
dent suggested, to the ability and resources of even the largest companies to go very far in this
respect; ultimately only the resources of government could make much impact on this problem.
At the farthest end of the spectrum lay the reply which claimed that "Recruiting is carried out on
an entirely voluntary basis and Canon ifrench-Beytagh's suggestion of "forced labour" is thus
unfounded ... the migratory system is by no means unacceptable to the Africans ... on pass-laws,
we have reservations about some of the proposals ... it would appear that some of the measures
suggested could give rise to considerable administrative and personnel problems for large
employers of African labour."25
Presumably because Consolidated Goldfields's reply was not particularly sympathetic Hugh
Hanning visited the company on 24th July, 1973. His comments were revealing. "I had expected
Ibid, extract from reply of Chaiiman of the Natal Board of Barclays Bank.
Ibid, extract from the reply of Chairman of A. Cohen & Co.
Ibid, extract from the reply from a representative of Consolidated Goldñelds.
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in the Oppenheimer tradition that a very rich and powerful firm would have some liberal leanings.
I did not detect any at all ... On the other hand they are clearly very conscious of their image ..."
However, largely on the basis of a 25% wage increase for black workers in South African
Goldfields in April Hanning thought that there was detectable "movement" and did not personally
recommend disinvestment at that time.26
It is difficult to draw generalized conclusions from these replies because of their variety.
Over half of the companies approached felt the approach and its source to be legitimate enough to
warrant a reply at some length. Conversely almost half felt that they could safely ignore an initia-
tive from the Church of England. Many of them were able to comment on the analysis and
suggestions with understanding, although again many had reservations on the grounds of imprac-
ticability. There was not one approving response that also announced any intention of consequent
action. Only A. Cohen's representative voiced the sentiment "We would not continue in South
Africa with a smaller return than 12/15% on capital employed in the business", 27 a point of view
that they had also put to the Rogers Select Committee on Investment; but it may not be over-
cynical to suspect that considerations of just this sort lay behind some of the bland interest and
goodwill of some of the other replies.
If one seeks to ask what in concrete terms the Church gained from this exercise it is not easy
to say because there is no suggestion of direct behaviour modiñcation as a result. However it is
arguable that a heightened awareness was promoted of factors of which companies might have
been happy to remain unaware. Moreover the whole debate was made a national one and all input
helped to raise its profile. Hugh Hanning' s use of his media and political contacts in this context
shows a keen awareness of the possibilities of publicity.
In further pursuit of this policy of gaining a high profile for Church ideas Hugh Hanning
wrote on 14th June to R.B. Hornby, MP, asking whether, in view of ffrench-Beytagh's Guardian
article and his recent book on a similar theme, 'Encountering Darkness', Hornby would like him
26 BSRJIAC/SAF/3, memo of 24/7/73.
27 Digest of replies, op.ci:., p. 3.
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to appear before the House of Commons Trade and Industry Sub-Committee of the Expenditure
Committee which was conducting an enquiry into the working conditions and wage levels in
South African firms either owned by or otherwise controlled by companies registered in the U.K.
This was followed up on 16th July by a letter from Maurice Chandler to W.R. Rodgers, MP,
enclosing a copy of ffrench-Beytagh's memorandum and suggesting that it might be submitted in
,evidence to the Committee.
Ultimately both ifrench-Beytagh and Adam Raphael did give evidence to the Committee
which reported at the end of 1973 and the document 'South Africa: challenge for the Church' was
also submitted to the Committee. When the Committee reported the Guardian campaign to
highlight the pay and working conditions of black South Africans was singled out in its report as
an important factor in bringing these issues to public notice. One can hardly claim this as an
example of Church pressure alone leading to a change in government direction or public aware-
ness, but the IAC worked very effectively here by using a variety of pressure points to heighten
the effect of a campaign which it had not begun but with which it was in sympathy. Annotated
press cuttings from the Times and Guardian in April 1974 when the Rogers Report was published
show that the IAC itself certainly thought that their contribution had been influential. 29 ifrench-
Beytagh's own reaction was that the suggested code of practice read like a detailed version of the
BSR paper 'South Africa: challenge for the Church'.30
Interestingly all the work done until the end of 1973 was done in the name of investigation.
In a letter to the Times on 27th June Maurice Chandler sought to correct an impression given by
one of the correspondents that the Church of England was moving towards the WCC policy of
disinvestment. He did refer to ifrench-Beytagh's report but took pains to stress that the BSR had
commissioned this as a contribution to public debate; it had not formally been adopted as a
representation of its views.31
BSR/IAC/SAF/1, letters of 14/6/73 and 1617/73.
BSRJIAC/SAF/6.
Ibid, telephone conversation with Hugh Hanning of 29/4/74.
31 BSR/IAC/SAF/1.
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However Hugh Hanning took a less carefully diplomatic line in his reply to a worried inves-
tor seeking advice about the behaviour of South African firms when he wrote that Church House
thought that disinvestment should only be a final resort. 32 This is certainly true where he and
Maurice Chandler were concerned but the suggestion that this was a Church House view was not
strictly accurate because it implied a degree of unanimity nor was it technically accurate in that
Xhe BSR had not yet adopted the policy nor had Synod officially approved it although a a majority
of members certainly appeared to prefer an approach which did not involve disinvestment.
South Africa was again a major topic of discussion at Synod in the Summer group of ses-
sions, and although an effective deadlock on action was reached, with the BSR merely being
asked to investigate the subject further, the majority of speakers once more took the view that to
disinvest would be to opt out of a possible useful influential role; disinvestment should only come
if shareholder pressure failed. South African churchmen were quoted as being opposed to disin-
vestment, although this view appeared to depend largely upon the source of information con-
sulted.
Interestingly the Central Board of Finance took a more conciliatory line on this occasion,
probably as a result of the adverse comment which had followed Sir Edmund Compton's pro-
nouncement on policy at the previous Synod. This time he said that the CBF did attempt to recon-
cile ethical with sound investment considerations but that it was geared and staffed for investment
not for investigation of possible areas of positive social engineering.33
In the summer of 1973 Hugh Hanning had set up a working party on investments in South
Africa in response to the July Synod's call to the BSR to investigate the matter. This consisted of
Neville Vincent, Adam Raphael of the Guardian, Elliott Kendall of the Church Missionary
Society, Dr. Charles Elliott of the School of Development Studies at the University of East
Anglia, Gervase Duffield, a member of Synod, A.H. Carnwath of Baring Brothers, John Sackur,
an ex-member of the Foreign Office,Tiin Sheehy of Christian Concern for South Africa, Canon
32
General Synod report of Proceedings, Summer Group of Sessions 1973, VoL 4. No.2., P. 373.
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ifrench-Beytagh, Maurice Chandler, Paul Oestreicher, Giles Ecciestone, Secretary of the BSR,
and Hugh Hanning himself. Their remit was to prepare for the debate on South African invest-
ments which was scheduled for the November Synod.
The direction in which they would move was indicated by a preliminary letter which was
sent to members of the group before the first meeting on 24th September. With this letter was
included copies of letters from leading Anglicans in South Africa opposing disinvestment and a
digest of the replies received from the forty five firms approached earlier in the year.34 In his cov-
ering letter to the issue of papers for the first meeting Hanning said specifically that it was hoped
to take ffrench-Beytagh's work a step further and listed concerns which had already been raised
by working party members. 'What were the dangers, if any, of raising wages? To what end were
supporters of shareholder pressure working, a federal solution in South Africa for example? What
were the implications for British investment policy elsewhere?' 35	-
At the Working Party's first meeting on 24th September it was decided to prepare a follow
up document to 'South Africa: a challenge for the Church', 'Investment in South Africa: oppor-
tunities for the Church,' as an input to the debate at the November meeting of Synod. Afl.
Camwath of Baring Brothers, who was also Chairman of the Church of England Central Board of
Finance Investment Management Committee, could not attend this preliminary meeting but sent
letters pointing out the difficulties for investment managers of avoiding certain fields of invest-
ment on ethical grounds. Given that engagement was the only option which was seriously con-
sidered by the Comniittee this indicated an attempt to limit the sphere of effective operation yet
further.36
'Investment in South Africa: Opportunities for the Church' documented the Church's activi-
ties so far and suggested "There is evidence that the experience of the last nine months has greatly





dude that the World Council of Churches would do well to think again about their advocacy of
disinvestment. Although some African voices support a policy of disinvestment, the overwhelm-
ing opinion of those consulted, including the Archbishops of Capetown and Central Africa, is that
the WCC proposals would do more harm than good."37
The document's theme was that apartheid was anathema to Christians but that practical help
was needed for Africans and much could be done within the context of the South African
Government's declared policies. Economic and educational investment was needed in the Home-
lands. It was "... an urgent humanitarian need" 38 and should be made now that possibilities
existed for direct negotiation between firms and the Territorial authorities. The needs of Chief
Gatsha Buthelezi, "probably the most influential and respected of all African leaders ... an Angli-
can",39 were stressed - funds for payment of a full-time secretary, for the appointment of a secre-
tary for his Development Council and the establishment of a newspaper.40
The needs of the Homelands and the Republic of South Africa were listed under different
headings, although it is perhaps unjust to read into this an acceptance of a categorization invented
by the South African government and rejected by the overwhelming majority of black South Afri-
cans. The latter included vocational Iraining , increased wages, improved welfare benefits, help
for employees caught up in infringements of the pass laws. It was suggested that the Church of
England might initiate the setting up of a central educational fund, might give support to the
Christian Institute, might set aside money to help the victims of apartheid and might promote the
creation of a 'instrument' common to all churches which would centralize research and informa-
tion on the whole future of South Africa.
This document was interesting in a number of different ways. It signalled clearly, if signal
was still needed, that the Church of England was involved in and deeply concerned for the prob-




BSR/IAC/SAFI3: John Sackur visited South Africa in the autumn of 1973 and returned convinced of
the need to help Chief Buthelezi, whose needs he detailed to Hugh Hanning in a letter of 20/11/73.
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lems of South Africa. It encouraged the thoughtful participation of Christians who were share-
holders in an examination and improvement of the working practices of those companies in which
they had invested. It admitted that not all Africans were opposed to the WCC policy of disinvest-
ment. However it did this in the context of a document which did not seriously consider any
alternative for the Church of England except investor pressure. This may have been a hardheaded
evaluation of what the Church's financial institutions and the body of its membership would
stand, but if this was the case it would best have been demonstrated by producing a discussion
document which examined all options and sending it Synod to evaluate. Within the context of the
document's own terms of reference it is revealing to see, after a brief condemnation of the policy
of separate development exemplified in the Homelands, an endorsement of investment there and
of the policies and status of Chief Buthelezi without mention of alternative views and blueprints
of South African development and leadership.	 -
The document was issued to members of Synod preparatory to the Autumn meeting and was
sent when Synod was over to the same forty five firms who had been circularized earlier in the
year. The twenty two replies which had been received by December indicated a response very
similar to that which greeted the previous circularization. Those who replied were by and large
the same companies which had replied before. Moreover, as before there was a conspicuous lack
of promise of specific performance. 4 ' However one Chairman did say that he was sending the
legal proposals in the document to his South African branch with instructions that something be
done about them,42 and on 5th February, 1974 Shell International Petroleum Company asked for
six copies of the document, presumably for discussion and consultation purposes.43 As before
Government Ministers and MP' s as well as the quality newspapers were supplied with copies of
the document; Adam Butler MP, told Maurice Chandler that it was good to read ... "some sound




Ibid, letter of 3/11173.
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The long-term status of the document produced by the IAC working party on one side, it
was indeed impossible that South Africa could be far from the consciousness of concerned and
informed Christian opinion because the summer of 1973 saw the committal for trial of the Rev.
Beyers Naudd, head of the Christian Institute there. This multidenominational organisation of
individuals was committed to peace and non-violence but equally it identified with the poor and
sought a redistribution of power in South Africa. Naudé himself might well have become
Moderator of the Dutch Reformed Church, he was already acting Moderator, but when he insisted
on maintaining his role in the Christian Institute he was forced to resign from his position, leave
his congregation and the Broederbond to which he had belonged for twenty two years. He was
harassed, vilified in the media, sent to gaol and banned for seven years.
The Institute's present problems arose from its members' refusal to appear before the
Schlebusch Commission in 1972 to answer charges of subversive activity on the grounds that the
Commission met in secret. Because of this refusal summonses to appear in court had been
received by six members of the Institute's staff including Beyers Naudé. The original charges of
subversion were a result of the Institute's support for the Black Consciousness Movement and
Beyers Naudé's hope of setting up a Confessing Church in South Africa on the lines of that set up
in Germany during the 1930's, a comparison between Nazi Germany and South Africa not being
one that appealed deeply to the South African Government. Because of the Commission's
findings the Institute was declared an "affected organisation" which meant that it could not
receive funds from overseas thus depriving it of most of its financial support.
Accordingly at the November Synod the Archbishop of Canterbury praised the Rev. Beyers
Naudé as a Christian of great integrity and one who was devoted to peace and non-violent change.
He had both the regard and affection of those in Britain who knew him. Father Bishop of the
Community of the Resurrection, a personal friend of Dr. Naudé, reported that a defense fund for
those on trial had been opened and invited Synod members to contribute to it. 45 On 27th
November the Fund stood at £2739 against a target of £20000. Trusts and other bodies who
General Synod Report of Proceedings, Autumn 1973, VoL 4. No. 3.
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might give more considerable sums of money were approached and the Archbishop of Wales and
Professor Allott of the School of Oriental and African Studies were being sent to the trial as BCC
observers.46
This fund itself attracted a good deal of publicity, much of it due to Hanning's input into the
media. On 9th November he wrote to the Archbishop of Canterbury asking him to write to the
Times to publicize the Christian Institute's need for funds and to encourage British Christians to
contribute. This the Archbishop did. 47 On 13th November there was an article in the Guardian
about the Christian Institute Fund, although in a letter on the 8th Hanning took no credit for this
himself and suggested that it was due to Hugh Whitworth, the Archbishop of Canterbury's Per-
sonal Assistant.48 On 11th December Hanning approached the Archbishop of Canterbury to be
patron of the Christian Institute Trust which had been set up to administer the money which the
appeal was attracting. Trustees were Robert Birley, Hanning himself, Paul Oestreicher, the Rev.
Brian Duckworth, Father Hugh Bishop and the Rev. Elliott Kendall. 49 Thus both the Trust and
the issue itself were validated by the Church at the highest level.
On a practical level the case was not allowed to disappear from the public eye. A meeting
in March 1974 of the trustees of the Fund was told that good publicity had been obtained by an
article in the Times by Bernard Levin which ..." was the direct result of efforts by Mr. Hanning
who asked to be given any further information which Bernard Levin might use." 5° When his trial
and appeal were won Naudé himself expressed his appreciation for the support he had received in
a letter to Elliott Kendall. His case, he said, could not have been won without ... "such substantial
spiritual, moral and financial backing..."5'
The Institute's difficulties were thus a backdrop to the debate on investment for which the





° BSR/IAC/SAF/6, Minutes of Meeting of mistees of Christian Institute Fund, 22/3/74.
51 BSRAC/3AP/6.
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debate arose from a motion tabled by the Rev. Paul Oestreicher advising members of the Church
of England who were shareholders individually or corporately in firms with South African
interests to bring whatever pressure was possible to bear on them to work towards closing the gap
between their white and black employees. Moreover the motion went on to state that Synod
believed that, when the facts had been sufficiently established, no funds controlled by any part of
the Church of England would be invested in any firm which disregarded the social and economic
interests of any of its South African employees.
This motion received overwhelming support, and indeed the Synod's reaction to the topic as
a whole represents perhaps the highpoint of its emotional revulsion for apartheid and everything it
stood for. "For once the Synod was not afraid of its emotions. Led by the Archbishops of Canter-
bury and York, virtually every one of the 500 members at one point rose to their feet in loud and
prolonged applause as an expression of Christian solidarity with South African Christians suffer-
ing harassment by the authorities."52
However two other motions were also carried the first of which might be considered as
diluting the message of the main motion. It asked the WCC to reconsider its stated policy on
disinvestment and the Church Commissioners to reconsider their stated policy on investment in
Southern Africa. The other motion was unambiguous and called for a study of investment ethics
in general. The message which was received by the intelligent observer however seemed to be
that the Church of England was taking a stand against apartheid. It was summed up in a report on
the proceedings of Synod in the Guardian by Baden Hickman on 10th November. This was enti-
tled 'Anglicans deny funds to firms exploiting South African blacks and it stated that ... "The
Anglican leaders have rarely been more united or militant. Their denunciation of apartheid was
unequivocal ... but it was clear that they acted in sorrow and penitence rather than hatred."53
There was movement too in the financial institutions of the Church. Sir Arnold France,
Chairman of the Central Board of Finance, announced at Synod that ... "it would be right to have
52 Guardian report of 10/11/73 by Baden Hickman.
Extract from a Guardian report of 10/11/73 by Baden Hickman.
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a thoroughgoing review of policy in the light of that report 54 when it was received, and in the
light of what is said in this debate in the Synod today. This the Central Board will do."55
Sir Ronald Harris, First Church Estates Commissioner, outlined the policy of the Church
Commissioners which ... "allows investment in companies with subsidiaries involved in South
Africa, but it does preclude investment in companies operating wholly or mainly in this part of
the world." The policy also assumed ... "that where the Commissioners do hold shares in a com-
pany operating to some extent in South Africa they will make whatever use they properly can of
their position as a shareholder to try to influence the company's policies in relation to Southern
Africa and indeed on any other moral or ethical issue, as far as this is possible, but realising and
recognising that there are limits to the effectiveness of such action ... the Church Commissioners
will certainly carry out another of their regular reviews in the light of today's debate "56
Moreover towards the end of the year Sir Arnold France spoke again of the need for a
"thoroughgoing review of CBF practices in relation to investment." Central Church funds should
be used "consistent with the objects of the Church of England". Financing such as a visit to the
Homelands or staff for Buthelezi might be possible but it must not be political. If Synod wished
to contribute to the Christian Institute Fund there was a need to demonstrate that it was not politi-
cal. 57 None of this was radical but it did demonstrate an awareness of the Church's, and espe-
cially of Synod's sensitization to this issue and the effect of adverse publicity on the Church's
image.
Thus by the end of 1973 the JAC had received a positive endorsement of those policies to
which the majority of its members were personally inclined. Paul Oestreicher had certainly
pointed out in the debate that world opinion through the United Nations might well lead to the
point when investment and trade with South Africa became illegal but this was obviously not a
consideration which found much sympathy in Synod. This was clearly demonstrated by their call
'South Africa: challenge for the church'.
Report of Proceedings of General Synod, Autumn Group of Sessions 1973, VoL 4, No. 3, p. 672.
56 Ibid.
BSR)IAC/SAF/4, undated memo on a conversation between Neville Sabine and Sir Arnold France.
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for a WCC change of policy. However the profile of the subject and its serious treatment by
Synod had at least been lifted immeasurably from the beginning of the decade when, in a debate
in July 1970, groans from members had been the reaction to the raising of the subject of arms for
South Africa.58
58 Church Assembly, Report of Proceedings, Vol. 50, 1970, dO, London.
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SECTION 11L6: CHURCH OF ENGLAND POLICIES IN SOUTH AFRICA 1974
The early part of 1974 was a consolidation of the previous year's activity, and there was no
discussion of South African affairs in the February session of Synod. In a memo to Maurice
Chandler on South Africa in April Hugh Hanning stressed already familiar themes for the future:
support for the Christian Institute, support for Buthelezi, support for intermediate technology, the
'aftermath and following up of the Rogers Report.1
Intermediate technology and support for Chief Buthelezi were in a sense twin themes
because Buthelezi' s base was the homeland of Kwa Zulu and, in an area where Inkatha and the
government of Kwa Zulu were practically synonymous, he encouraged foreign investment. At
their March meeting the IAC received a visit from Mr. C.B. Pearce, Chairman of the Productivity
and Wage Association of South Africa and Mr. Sam Motsuenyane, National President of the Afri-
can Chamber of Commerce, both of them visiting the United Kingdom under the auspices of the
South African Trade Association. Their address to the Committee was not concerned with the
principles of Homelands investment but its practicalities. Motsuenyane spoke of the dangers of
unemployment in South Africa and the 70,000 new jobs which were needed in the Homelands
alone; there was an urgent need for better training but the South African Government was
thought to be beginning a new initiative in this area of which the creation of the Black Bank was
part.2 By and large, and despite warnings about unemployment, this was a remarkably optimistic
and non-radical feed-in. It reinforced pre-existing perceptions of the morality of Homelands
investment.
Of Hugh Hanning's own commitment to the introduction of intermediate technology into
suitable South African milieux there can be no doubt because of the amount of literature he per-
sonally received on the subject and the correspondence he engaged in in relation to it. Charles
Tett, for example, Director of Operation of Intermediate Technology, asked him at the beginning
of March to write an introduction for the JAC when they considered the subject and the literature
1 BSRJIAC/SAF/4, memo of 24/4/74.
2 IAC Minutes 12/3/74.
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which had been provided. 3 Moreover he had attended a seminar in Holland in December of the
previous year on Homelands investment.
In May, as part of the campaign to bring heightened awareness of the Church's position and
their own responsibilities to its members, Hugh Hanning prepared a paper 'South Africa and the
Church of England', a summary of the development of the Church's 'leverage' position as he now
termed it. This was circulated by the Board of Social Responsibility to 11,000 parishes. In it Han-
ning referred to the fact that in the Homelands where skills are short a special kind of aid was
required, Intermediate Technology.
"This enables communities to produce manufactures, and increase agricultural output
with fairly basic skills; and since much of the Homelands' more skilled labour
migrates to the white areas, there is general agreement that this is what the African
communities most urgently need. The problem is to attract the necessary capital
investment, for Intermediate Technology is small business rather than big business,
and could not begin to reproduce the dividends obtainable in, say, the mines. There is
a strong case for the bigger investors in South Africa, in the interests of a non-violent
outcome, to channel some of their resources into the development of the Homelands in
this way."4
In April 1974 the Rogers Report was published and the Church of England's agenda
received secular validation. Its major recommendations were that no British firm in South Africa
should pay adult male wages below the appropriate Poverty Datum Line, that all firms should aim
within a set timetable to pay minimum wages equal to the Minimum Earnings Level, which was
broadly equivalent to the Poverty Datum Line plus 50% Firms whose working practices were
held to fall short of the minimum required standard were named and the need for some sort of
continuous monitoring facility became very obvious.
The November 1973 Synod had in fact recommended that consideration be given to the set-
ting up of an ecumenical instrument to monitor progress in this respect and to provide the
member churches with a centralized information facility. This ultimately came to nothing largely
because of the resistance of the CBF, as usual fearful of the erosion of Church of England auton-
BSR/IAC/SAF/7.
BSR/IAC/SAF/4, report of seminar at Dr. Visser 'T Hooftcentre, Rotterdani, 6/12/73.
BSR/IAC/SAF/6, 'South Afiica and the Church of England', BSR paper, 1974, dO, London, p. 4.
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omy of action, to its being an executive body and not merely a reservoir and supplier of informa-
tion.
However it was increasingly considered at this time that an ecumenical pressure group,
Churches Concern for South Africa, CCSA, might take over much of the Church of England's
follow-up work to its approaches to British firms in conjunction with its own progranime of
'approaching those companies criticized in the Rogers Report to check whether inadequate wage
levels bad been adjusted. A leader at the beginning of May in the Guardian, which had in very
large measure begun the campaign for investigation and amelioration of black wages, promoted
the work of the CCSA and stressed the need for continued pressure. 5 Adam Raphael was still
very much involved in this work and sent an article he had written as a foreword to a CCSA book
on the Rogers Report to Hugh Hanning ... "to be boiled down for your Committee's consump-
tion." The article evaluated as highly significant the Rogers Report. It"... has now put the debate
on to a solid basis. The facts are no longer in dispute, and the guidelines on proper employment
practices are a benchmark against which one will be able to judge the future performance of Brit-
ish companies."6 On the Committee's recommendations he commented. "They ... are of major
importance. If they are put into practice, British companies will no longer be just like all the rest
but will be in the vanguard, not only of pay but also in training and African advancement." 7 The
conditional phrase at the beginning of this last sentence proved to be highly prophetic.
Raphael's endorsement of the CCSA by writing an introduction to their book indicated that
he saw them as playing an important role in the follow-up to the Rogers Report, the need for such
a function having been stressed in the Guardian leader cited above. On the South Africa Working
Party too such a need was perceived, John Sackur asking on 11th April, "Can the Church or the
BSR provide the continuing lobby and pressure group which is needed?" 8 Hugh Hanning's
response appears to have been that the Church could not undertake this role alone; he referred in
Guardian leader 2/5/74.
6 BSR/IAC/SAF/6, Draft of an article by Adam Raphael Apiil 1974, p.5.
7 1bi4 p. &
8 psp./1AcjsApi6.
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a letter at the beginning of May to the fact that the Church was now canalising its efforts through
the CCSA which was in touch with all the major firms mentioned in the Rogers Report. 9 In the
leaflet he drafted, 'South Africa and the Church' he again commended the CCSA, a body whose
purpose was ... "to clarify the role of the institutional and private investor in Southern Africa and
to sponsor research to this end." 10 He even made a plea for funds as the CCSA was in urgent need
'of money.
Indeed so short of money was the CCSA that on 17th June its chairman, Trevor Jepson,
wrote to Hugh Hanning asking whether an interim grant of funds might be made by the Church of
England because the BCC was taking so long to decide whether to make such a grant." It was
not long however before the matter of financial support appeared to have been solved by the Sum-
mer meeting of Synod which voted without opposition to make a grant of £3000 to the CCSA.
Despite the fact that this money had been voted, not merely discussed, by Synod it soon
became clear that the CBF was firmly opposed to paying it. Immediately Synod was over the
CBF enquired what priority the IAC and BSR attached to the grant, a discreet method of suggest-
ing that if this was prioritized other expenditure would be sacrificed. 12 The IAC was told at its
meeting on 17th July that Sir Arnold France had said that he would consider making this grant
but ... "this was a time of financial stringency and almost every new proposal for expenditure was
having to be rejected."' 3 It was agreed that the BSR could not find the money by economies and
Maurice Chandler undertook to convey to Sir Arnold the degree of importance it attached to the
grant, even if £3000 proved to be impossible at least a token sum was necessary, it was decided,
as an earnest of Church of England support.
At the beginning of October Trevor Jepson wrote to Sir Arnold France asking for the grant
which had been voted; the Methodists, who had also set up a unit to investigate investment in
BSR/1ACiAF/1.
10 'South Africa and the Church of England', op. cii. ,p. 5.
BSR/IAC/SAF/6.
12 BSRJIACAF/6, memo of 11/7/74.
13 IAC Minutes, 1717174.
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South Africa, had just voted £3500 towards the CCSA's work. 14 His suspicion that the grant
might not materialize was obviously shared because a Guardian article on 22nd October revealed
that the financiers were against it partly for economic and partly for procedural reasons. However,
if their advice was followed it would leave the Church of England as the only major denomina-
tion in England not supporting the CCSA, as the Roman Catholics, Methodists and Quakers were
on the verge of committing themselves financially.15
The Guardian's forecast proved correct when Sir Arnold France announced on the last day
of the November Synod meeting that both the CBF and the Standing Committee were against
paying this grant from central funds for a variety of reasons. Amongst these figured the difficulty
of singling out one good cause from many, the Church of England's shortage of money, oppres-
sion in many other parts of the world apart from South Africa and the impossibility of treating
this as a one off commitment. 16 Despite arguments that the Church of England was morally
obliged to make a commitment already accepted by most British churches, that it should give
teeth to the fine sentiments it had uttered in condemnation of South African policies in the previ-
ous November's debate and that the importance of doing something to tackle the issue of struc-
tural violence should be acknowledged, a motion endorsing the CBF's decision not to bring for-
ward a resolution to enable payment of the grant was carried.
Understandably this attracted a good deal of unfavourable attention - even the Church
Times was critical. 17 Sir Arnold France attempted to answer Critics in a letter to The Times on 6th
December when he suggested that although the grant could not be met out of budget general
funds a special case should perhaps be made with money being raised from Church members.18
On one level this can be seen as the operation of financial constraint on the expressed objec-
tives of Synod, and at the L&C Meeting on 26th November Maurice Chandler said that he had
14 BSRJIAC/SAF/6, memo of 11/10/74.
15 Guardian article by Baden Hickman, 22/10/74.
16 General Synod Report of Proceedings, Autumn Session 1974, VoL 5, No. 3.
17 Church Times, November 17th 1974 issue.
' BSR/IAC/SAF/6.
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seen the CBF figures which proved that money could not be found for the CCSA.' 9 Events are
suggestive too however that this was a structural constraint by a body whose aversion to any con-
nection with action it regarded as politically radical has already been demonstrated. At the IAC
Meeting on 12th March Giles Ecclestone reported on a meeting he had held with Sir Arnold
France where the latter made it clear that the CBF were interested in using any Church 'Instru-
'merit' on South Africa as an information source and not as a pressure body. Ecclestone con-
sidered that the CBF feared that they might be committeed to courses of action by a body of
which they did not approve.20 Moreover, Sir Arnold France had told Maurice Chandler that he
was convinced that the best course of action in the case of South Africa was discreet pressure on
companies operating there.21 The increasingly high profile activities of the CCSA, with their pub-
lications 'Corporate Responsibility and the Institutional Investor' and 'Corporate Responsibility
and Church Investment' and their campaign to publicize the activities of offenders against the
code of practice suggested by the Rogers Report, did not come under the heading of discreet.
All in all it was not an incident which reflected any credit on the CBF, which manifestly did
not regard itself as bound by the resolutions of Synod, on Synod which showed neither con-
sistency of approach nor any realization of the need to put teeth into its deliberations if it was to
maintain credibility and the semblance of independent thought, on the LAC who were easily lulled
by assurances of economic force majeure, indeed on the Church of England as a whole. It is easy
in this case to see why accusations of hypocrisy were levelled at a Church whose governing body
rose to its feet to express solidarity with the oppressed in South Africa and a year later failed to
make any grant towards a body whose work in this field it warmly approved and which was finan-
cially supported by churches much smaller and poorer than itself.
The pathetic post-script to the affair was a resolution at the August 1975 IAC Meeting that
the BSR should join the CCSA, which had instituted a new minimum membership fee to church
organisations of £50, and would also subscribe £100.22 At the November 1975 Meeting Maurice
19 IAC Minutes 29/11/74.
IAC Minutes 12/3/74.
21 IAC Minutes 26,f74.
LkC Minutes 6/8/75.
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Chandler reported that the BSR had endorsed membership of the CCSA but would only pay the
minimum subscription.23
Investment and the basis on which investment should be made was an issue which the
Church continued to pursue during the latter part of 1974. Their major initiative was a consulta-
tion on the Ethics of Investment which they held at St. George's House, Windsor on 22nd Sep-
temb'er. Thirty five representatives from the City, from academia, the Press and the Churches met
to hear four papers on 'Issues facing the corporate investor' by David Hopkins of M & G Invest-
ments, 'Theoretical Guidance and practical standards, past and present' by Canon Professor
Ronald Preston of the University of Manchester, 'Shareholder Responsibility' by Peregrine Fel-
lowes and 'Does the exercise of moral responsibility in individual and corporate development
require changes in the law?' by Murray Pickering. In addition those attending were provided with
a considerable amount of related literature before the Consultation. This demonstrated just how
widely the debate was ranging, with consideration of investment practice and corporate responsi-
bility in the USA,24 a paper by the C.B.I. on developments in the consciousness of public com-
panies of their own responsibilities,25 and a CCSA report on a similar theme. 26 From the point of
view of formulating an ethical base from which public companies should work the most interest-
ing preparatory paper was 'A Moralist in the City' by Professor G.R. Dunstan which suggested
that an investor's claims were contingent on others who have a claim on the company in which he
invests. Without profitability these responsibilities cannot be met, but until they are met profits
are not morally disposable.27
The unofficial verbatim account of the Consultation shows wide-ranging and thoughtful dis-
cussion but it does not demonstrate any concrete recommendation except that the BSR should mi-
IAC Minutes 4/11/75.
'Corporate Responsibility in the USA: the State of the Debate', Tim Sheehy 1974.
'A new look at the responsibilities of the British public company', an interim report for discussion by
the C.B.L, January 1973.
'Corporate Responsibility and the Institutional Investor', report of a seminar at the London Graduate
School of Business Studies by CCSA 1/11/73.
27 'A Moralist in the city', Professor. G.R. Dunstan, the 8th Sir George Earle Memorial Lecture on Indus-
try and Government, 28/3174.
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tiate an in-depth study of the subject, a process which it had arguably aheady set in motion by
holding the Consultation in the first place. The IAC Meeting subsequent to the consultation was
told of the publicity which the Consultation had attracted in The Times and the Investor's Chroni-
cle and of the favourable coimnents of many of the participants, but in the long run there appears
to have been little concrete gain. However, the intangible and unquantifiable return of helping to
give the issue a high public profile should not be discounted.28
[AC Minuses, 26/9174.
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SECTION ffl.7: CHURCH OF ENGLAND POLICIES IN SOUTH AFRICA - 1975
1975 saw an intensification of the IAC's preoccupation with employment and suitable tech-
nology transfers to the Homelands, a transfer of initiative in the matter of pressure on British
firms with South African subsidiaries to the CCSA and the Department of Trade and a diminution
of Synod time devoted to South African issues generally. The major exception to this latter trend
was a question by the Rev. Paul Oestreicher at the Summer meeting to both the Chairman of the
Church Commissioners and the Chairman of the Central Board of Finance about what they had
done to promote justice in South Africa and what further they intended to do. Would they publish
in detail their research and actions in this field? Their replies brought him no satisfactory answer,
being merely a restatement of their previous positions with the rider from the Church Commis-
sioners that it was not their policy to publish the results of enquiries about companies in which
they invested. 1 This was an answer which would tend to reinforce an interested observer's belief
in the cabal-like and unaccountable handling of affairs by those central organs of the Church
charged with managing its finances.
Activity over Homelands affairs and general questions of employment in South Africa
began at the January IAC Meeting with a report by Hugh Hanning that he had sent the Church
Commissioners a short list of what firms with interests in South Africa could do to help the situa-
tion there by setting up vocational training schemes and a detailed legal aid mechanism for their
employees, and by contributions to charities such as Intermediate Technology and Health and
Welfare in Zululand.2
This list had been produced by Lord Elton and was in many ways a reworking of previous
recommendations, with however heavy emphasis on the needs of Chief Buthelezi and of the Zulu-
land churches' Health and Welfare Association whose activities included a literacy programme,
the teaching of handcrafts, agricultural projects and construction training. British firms were also
recommended to invest 1% of their profits in the new African bank, and the activities of the Inter-
1 Report of Proceedings of General Synod, Summer 1975 Group of Sessions, Vol. 6, No. 2.
2 IAC Minutes 23/1/75.
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mediate Technology Group in Botswana and Zambia in setting up light industries and undertak-
ing water conservation projects was singled out as particularly relevant for the Homelands.
Investing firms were also urged to contribute more to all varieties of educational project for Afri-
cans - an African university was urgently needed as well as technical colleges and vocational
training.3
This list of possible initiatives was sent to the BSR of the Church of South Africa and to
Chief Buthelezi for comment. In a follow-up letter to Buthelezi in March Hugh Hanning asked
for the prompt return of his comments so that the list could be distributed to those forty five firms
with which the IAC had been in contact over the previous two years.4 At the March meeting of
the IAC Hanning reported that Mr. Xolo, Minister of Public Works in Kwa Zulu, had expressed
strong interest in the IAC's ideas. 5 That these ideas were beginning to be more widely discussed
was indicated by a request for further information from D.S. Lawn of Union Carbide Africa and
Middle East Inc., a UK subsidiary of a New York firm, which had become interested in helping
the Homelands as a result of an article about initiatives there, including those by the Church of
England, in the Johannesburg Sunday Times on 3rd March, 1975.6
While many reactions to the JAC's suggestions were approving the reactions of the BSR in
Capetown was interesting. Mr. Burton, Secretary of the BSR in Capetown, visited the BSR in
London and was provided with information and investment ideas for the Homelands especially
Transkei and Ciskei as well as for a Church and Industry Centre at Cape Town Cathedral. 7 At the
beginning of June David Russell, Acting Secretary to the BSR in Capetown, wrote to Maurice
Chandler saying how much they valued contact with the BSR in London.8
Russell's reply to Hugh Hanning's request for comments on possible Church of England
initiatives was illuminating in that it demonstrated the wide constituency of opinion to which the
BSR/IAC/SAF/5/1, undated memo.
BSR/IAC/SAF/6, letter of 12/3/75.
IAC Minutes 18/3/75.
6 BSR/IACIAF/6, letter of 10/4/75.
IAC Minutes 20/5/75.
8 BSR/IAC/SAFT1, letter of 10/6/75.
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Church had access. He had felt it inappropriate for the BSR in Cape Town to comment without
consultation and he had therefore passed the ideas on for comment to the Director of Inter Church
Aid at the South African Council of Churches, the Secretary of Black Community Programmes,
the Field Officer for the Border Council of Churches in Cape Province, the School of Economics
at the University of Cape Town and the Research Officer for the South African Labour and
Development Research Unit, also at the University of Capetown. 9 But despite the value he obvi-
ously placed on close links with the BSR in England David Russell was not in fact overwhelm-
ingly enthusiastic about the Church's suggestions, the only one he singled out as worthy of being
followed up being legal assistance for employees caught up in Pass Law infringements.
Much more interesting were the comments of Malusi Mthanjiswa Mpumlwana, Research
Officer of the Eastern Cape branch of Black Community Programmes Ltd., whose secretary was
Steve Biko. He agreed that technical expertise was lacking in African education and therefore
assistance in this field would be very welcome, but he suggested that none of the proposals had
anything to do with the black organisations which represented ... "the true aspiration of the people
your proposals are intended to help. On the contrary they seek to entrench the Bantustans which
have been created to tread upon the very dignity of the black man and his claim to human recog-
nition. I hope this is no indication of your attitude to the political situation in this country."10
Interesting too was criticism of the IAC' s schemes which arrived from quite another direc-
tion. On 16th April Hugh Hanning wrote to Sir Arthur Sneiling, a former British Ambassador to
South Africa, after his recent article in the Financial Times, asking for his comments on the
Church of England's recommendations. Snelling replied that British firms were at that time being
approached from many quarters for help with schemes ... "many of which are more convincing
and thought out in greater detail than this one." 11 He questioned for example why a secretary for
Chief Buthelezi had to be trained in London rather than Natal, said that there were already Afri-
can newspapers and questioned the desirability of asking firms rather than individuals to help the
BSR/IAC/SAF/7, letter of 12/8/75.
10 BSR/IAC/SAP/7, letter of 7/10175.
11 BSR/IAC/SAF/6, letter of 30/4/75.
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Christian Institute which often clashed with the South African Government.
Both of these criticisms are important. Mr. Mpumlwana voiced the view of many black,
and especially urban black, Africans that ameliorative schemes to improve living standards in the
Homelands did nothing to challenge the basis on which the Homelands concept was based. More-
over to choose to work through white and often foreign controlled industry was to choose to
ignore those black organisations through which black people saw the working out of their own
future, a future which would not be controlled by a white minority government or by multi-
national industry.
Sir Arthur Snelling' s comments demonstrate that even within their own terms of reference
the IAC was not succeeding. To be influential with industry a package of suggestions needed to
be well-worked out, well-researched and practical. Suggestions that would involve companies in
possible clashes with the South African Government obviously held little appeal; a sine qua non
of the operation of these companies in the South African Republic was their belief not only that
they could co-exist with the Government there but that it was in their interests to do so.
Despite having been told by critics of radically opposed view that their plans were exten-
sively flawed, there is no record of feedback by the executive even as far as the IAC itself, let
alone to a wider constituency. Plans once adopted and made operational by bureaucracies, even
comparatively small ones such as operated in the BSR, are notoriously difficult to change. More-
over a good deal of personal credibility as well as expression of personal values was involved in
the area of Homelands development and its wider hinterland of investment versus withdrawal.
The narrowness of appeal of their plans within the context of South African society did not cause
any change or even reassessment. One is therefore forced to conclude that the continued activities
of the IAC in this field were to a considerable extent internally generated to fit the needs of the
Church perceived through the narrow prism of those responsible for executive action and through
Synod, rather than externally generated to fit the situation.
A value which certainly did exercise the IAC Executive, although it is difficult to judge
whether this was a theological or secular value, an internally cohesive or an externally generated
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value, was that of the desirability and possibility of a peaceful solution in South Africa. In July
Clifford Longley wrote an article in The Times about the forthcoming World Council of Churches
Meeting saying that the WCC had been taken over by the condoners of violence. This stricture
was caused partly by certain grants made by the Programme to Combat Racism and partly by the
WCC's decision, taken in August 1972, to sell existing holdings in South Africa and to urge
member Churches, Christian agencies and individual Christians to do likewise. 12 Incidentally, the
pamphlet in which the background and reasoning behind this decision is explained, 'Time to
Withdraw', 13 in no way advocates violence.
The IAC's reaction was not to undertake a defence of the WCC and to point out how small
a proportion of its activity or funding was in connection with guerilla group/liberation move-
ments. Hugh Hanning drafted a brief for the Archbishop of Canterbury detailing the numerous
non-violent solutions to acute societal problems which the IAC had been exploring including
economic pressure on South Africa through 'leverage' and investment in the Homelands. This
was supplied to all the Anglican delegates to the WCC Meeting in Nairobi, 14 where the Church of
England's divergence from most other member churches of the WCC was once again demon-
strated by the reaffirmation there of the existing policy of the Programme to Combat Racism and
of disinvestment from South Africa.15
12 Resolution of the Central Committee of the WCC August 1972, documented in 'Time to Withdraw',
pub. by WCC, Geneva, January 1973.
' ibid
14 IAC Minutes, 6)f75.
15 IAC Minutes 13/1/76. report by Maurice Chandler of his visit to Nairobi.
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SECTION ffl.8: CHURCH OF ENGLANI) POLICIES IN SOUTH AFRICA - 1976
The latter months of 1976 saw further illustration of divergence between Church of England
and WCC policies when the Central Committee of the WCC in Geneva decided to urge member
churches to oppose the Bantustan policy.1
Thus the IAC's perception of its own and the Church of England's distance from the more
radical solutions sometimes advocated by the WCC was illustrated once again. It should be seen
in conjunction with the criticism of a black South African detailed above to demonstrate how far
from any identification with the Third World analysis of the black dilemma was the Church's
Executive. Some difference of perception on cultural and historical grounds was to be expected,
but in the area of foreign policy the Church's executive demonstrated a consistent inability to
comprehend that the parameters of violence included those imposed by the structure and laws of
the South African state as well as guerilla action to bring down that state.
This was not always true of Synod where some speakers in such debates as that on Force in
the Modern World and the world food crisis demonstrated a comprehension of the concept of
structural violence in a variety of milieux, not only South Africa, and a realization of the need for
Churches in the First World to understand the problems of those in the Third. In the debate after
the report of the Nairobi WCC Meeting at the February, 1976 Synod Canon Poulton for example
spoke of his conviction that English Christians should be more conscious of their need to change
in response to the demands of modern Christianity; the Church of England, he said, had no right
or reason to give advice to people fighting for freedom, considering their own history. He
identified a strong tradition of solidarity with the oppressed in the teaching of Temple, Gore,
Tawney, Scott-Holland and it was in this tradition he suggested that the WCC's grants to some
African freedom fighters should be judged - they were intended, not to finance revolution, but to
express solidarity. The whole issue had become so large because many members of the Church
of England did not want their comfortable lives disturbed - the tradition of Barchester.2
I BSR/IAC/SAF/5/1.
2 Report of Proceedings of General Synod, Spring 1976 Group of Sessions, VoL 7. No. 2, p. 482.
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By contrast with such sentiments a lack of comprehension of the true parameters of violence
and an easy equation of black South African needs with no danger to life, no hunger, improving
educational standards and better pay and living standards were a feature of Church thinking
amongst those charged with executive action in the foreign policy sphere. The 1976 BCC report
on the evolving policy of the CCSA posed a totally relevant question in this connection. "... while
material standards (in South Africa) have risen there had been no progress on the political or the
educational fronts. Can Christians rest content with a view of man which regards him as inñnitely
satiable by material acquisition?"3 By extension it is suggested that one is entitled to ask how and
why a policy directed more or less entirely at the material circumstances of the black citizens of
South Africa was adopted by an organisation whose overriding strategic objective was the suste-
nance of mens' spiritual, rather than, material needs.
It was to such preconceptions as those inherent in the IAC view that Philip Potter, General
Secretary of the WCC, addressed himself when he spoke to Synod in the summer of 1976. He
suggested that Britain and the whole of the Anglo-Saxon world had been selective over human
rights seeing them only in personal and political terms; the British needed to realize that there
were those in other parts of the world who viewed societal rights as more important. It was only
within the framework of a realization of the importance of both that Christians of North and
South, East and West could engage in genuine conversation. Moreover human rights had to be
viewed in terms of racism and sexism as well as of religious liberty and political dissent. In terms
of religious liberty it was important to realize that this meant not only freedom to worship but
freedom to witness to one's faith; this might well include the need to challenge the system under
which one lived.
In uncontroversial areas however the IAC on behalf of the Church maintained an impecca-
ble liberalism. Hugh Hanning and Elliott Kendall as co-sponsors of the Christian Institute Fund
had been instrumental in inviting Beyers Naudé to speak to the Royal Institute of International
BSR/IAC/SAF/12/1, report by Brian Duckworth 'Christian Concern for South Africa: an evolving poli-
cy', Febniary, 1976.
Report of Proceedings of General Synod, Summer 1976 Group of Sessions, VoL 7, No. 3.
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Affairs at Chatham House on 16th December. At the last moment Naudé was refused permission
to leave by the South African Government. His address was therefore read for him by Sir Robert
Birley and was later published by the Christian Institute Fund with, on the back page, a letter
from the Director of the Institute protesting at the refusal to give Naud a passport. The IAC
through Hugh Hanning, was instrumental in this.5
It was in issues such as that detailed above and in its attitude to the persecution of the Chris-
tian Institute that the IAC best demonstrated a sense of purpose and a determination to stand
against oppression. In late 1976 for example Hugh Hanning signed an ecumenical protest against
a recent raid on the Institute's headquarters and that of the South African Council of Churches.
The importance of pressure from outside South Africa to keep the Institute open was related by
one of its staff, Horst Kleinschmidt, who visited the JAC at the end of 1976 and was convinced
that it was only the international standing of the Christian Institute and the efforts of the interna-
tional community on its behalf which prevented its closure.6
In the matter too of the Alice Seminary the IAC's actions were unimpeachably liberal. Alice
Seminary was the multiracial Federal Theological Seminary of South Africa and, in December
1974, its land was confiscated with only one month's notice and title granted to neighbouring Fort
Hare University. Alice Seminary was forced to move to completely unsuitable premises at
Umtata in the Transkei.
A report of this was sent to Hugh Hanning and he orchestrated a campaign of protest by
writing to the Secretaries of the Young Conservatives, Young Liberals, National Union of Stu-
dents, Young Socialists, the Bow Group, the Federation of Conservative Students, the Union of
Liberal Students and the National Organization of Socialist Students. Moreover Bernard Levin,
who had written a previous article at Hugh Hanning's prompting, quoted in full a letter from
Umtata when he wrote about the move and the injustice of awarding this land to a University
which had ample room to expand in other directions than that of the Seminary.7
IAC Minutes 4/11175 and BSR1IAC/SAF/5/1.
6 IC Minutes 30/11/76.
BSR/IAC/sAF/11.
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An intervention by the Archbishop of Canterbury on behalf of two black South Africans,
who had been sentenced to death in connection with the killing of an Ovambo leader, was also in
a liberal, humanitarian tradition. He wrote to the President of South Africa on 17th May 1976 and
pleaded for clemency. The Prime Minister's initial response was less than helpful, "... it is noted
that you fail to express your abhorrence that the elected leader of the Ovambos was brutally mur-
'dered." 8 However the condemned men were in fact reprieved in October, an outcome which Rod-
ney Elton was convinced was at least partly due to the Archbishop's intervention.9
A similarly clear cut impression of resolution and commitment can be detected in the
Church of England's participation with other member Churches of the WCC in the matter of
loans by the Midland Bank Group to the South African Government. This was of course in line
with Church policy which frowned on further investment and also on open-ended political invest-
ment in the South African Government itself. At the beginning of February 1976 Philip Potter,
General Secretary of the WCC, notified Lord Armstrong at the Midland Bank that because the
Europe American B pnking Corporation, of which his bank was a member, had refused to halt
such loans, no further WCC funds would be deposited there and member Churches would be
encouraged to take similar action. 10
During March representations were made to the Midland Bank by the BCC, the Methodist
Church and the Church Commissioners but with no effect. Accordingly letters to the press publi-
cized the resolution to be put to the Midland Bank Annual General Meeting requiring an end to
such loans and an appeal was made for the hundred shareholders needed to sponsor this resolu-
tion. The resolution was supported by the Church Commissioners amongst a group of sponsoring
organisations and, although the shareholders rejected it by a majority of 47,400,000 to 2,950,000,
the target of in favour of ending the loans had been exceeded. In his report on the affair to
Philip Potter Hugh Hanning reported that the press had seen this as the first occasion when a reso-
lution of a moral and political nature had been formally requisitioned and discussed at the Annual
S BSR/IAC/SAF/5/1, letter of 14/7/76.
BSR/IAC/LAM/2, note of 18/4/77.
10 BSRJJAC/SAF/6, letter of 4/2/76.
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General Meeting of a British company."
Where Government initiatives were concerned however the Church's stance was much less
clearcut. This was perhaps not surprising in the light of what appeared to be a weakening commit-
ment on the part of the Government itself.
A White Paper (Command Paper 5845) had appeared in the wake of the Report of the Parli-
amentary Select Committee on the Wages and Conditions of African Workers employed by Brit-
ish Firms in South Africa. It had asked that all British firms holding more than 10% of the equity
of a South African Company publish information on the wages and working conditions of their
black African employees. At the end of December 1975 this requirement was modified in the
light of the South African Government's Second General Law Amendment Act of 1974 whereby
permission for the transmission of such information had to be sought of the South African
Government by such firms; this permission would only be granted for British holdings of 50% or
over; permission would be refused in respect of minority shareholdings. Consequently, and
seemingly recognizing this law as impossible to circumvent, the British Government amended its
own requirements, although Mr. Shore, Minister of Trade, assured the House of Commons that
"We shall continue to encourage British companies with a minority holding to publish whenever
possible similar information acquired in the course of their relationship with their South African
affiliate (or published locally by the affiliate) as well as more general information on matters such
as African advancement, collective bargaining, fringe benefits etc".'2
Thus by the end of their first year of operation Government requirements in this area had
been diluted. This would not have been too significant if the reporting requirement apparatus had
been working well in the first place but this was not so. At the beginning of May the Methodist
Recorder reported that Mr. Shore's letter to firms asking for progress reports had yielded little,
and very little progress had been made in improving black South African working conditions.
Job reservation under the legal restraints of the Industrial Conciliation Act remained; a few jobs
11 BSRJIAC/SAF/6, letter of 8/7176.
12 BSR/IAC/SAF/12/1, Press Notice from the Department of Trade, 1/12/75.
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previously only open to whites might now be available to Coloured workers but there had been no
relaxation in respect of Blacks. The attitude of white trades unions was not improved; wages had
risen but so had inflation which had diminished the effect of the increases; the gap between the
wages of black and white was just as great and the majority of black African workers were still
below the Poverty Datum Line. 13 In its less public moments the IAC inclined to the same view.
A memo in April 1976 commented that most of the members of the Rogers Committee were now
ministers and the ... "steam seems to have run out."14
One sees here therefore a campaign begun on the premise that industry could be influenced
to improve the pay and living conditions of is black workers in South Africa foundering on one
of the fundamental factors of investment there, and one which the Church had considered capable
of manipulation: firms with South African interests invested there because conditions yielded a
high rate of return which they had no intention of jeopardizing by antagonizing the South African
Government. Quite apart from constraints induced by this consideration there appeared little wil-
lingness to do what was possible, within the framework of what the system in South Africa per-
mitted, or at least to have activities scrutinized by the British Government.
The flawed working of the system of voluntary disclosure was demonstrated by the CCSA
which initiated its own enquiries both into the activities of the subsidiaries of British firms in
South Africa and into their record of reporting these activities. The CCSA's activities during
1976 and the later years of the decade led to its fall from favour with the IAC Executive who pre-
ferred discreet and unpublicized pressure rather than the public revelation of shortcomings.
Their reservations were demonstrated by the fact that the CCSA subscription had still not
been paid in January 197615 and by a memo in April which describes how wary were the Church
Commissioners of the CCSA despite the latter's desire to be useful to the Commissioners.16
Moreover Hugh Hanning, himself a member of the CCSA's Executive Committee, refused to
13 BSR/IAC/SAF/11, article in the Methodist Recorder, 1/5/75.
14 BSR/IAC/12/1, unattributed memo to Hugh Hanning.
15 IAC Minutes 13/1/76.
16 BSR/IAC/SAF/12/1, unattributed memo to Hugh Henning of 27/4/76.
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sign a document advocating a withdrawal of investment in ICI because of the labour practices of
their subsidiary in South Africa; Hanning saw this as contrary to Church of England policy,
although indeed this policy encompassed withdrawal as a last resort, and he queried also CCSA's
reservations over investment in the Homelands. 17 This reservation was moreover shared by some
of the English members of the Partners in Mission consultation in South Africa in July, 1976. In a
confidential report on the exercise to Giles Ecciestone, Christian Howard, a member of the
English delegation, wrote that "The Homelands issue is one of political dynamite. How can we
act so that we neither discriminate against Africans in the Homelands nor collude with South
African Government policy? I did not feel that the (brief) statement in the BSR Annual Report
sufficiently recognised this dilemma."18
Indeed in this latter respect by the end of 1976 the CCSA had come down in favour of non-
investment in the Homelands on the grounds that investment gave moral and psychological sup-
port to the present regime in South Africa. Patrick Stuart, Secretary of the organisation, favoured
instead direct relief with a political cutting edge to encourage self-organisation amongst those
who lived in Bantustans. Outsiders should also work through black-controlled organisations such
as the South African Council of Churches or the Black Community Programme.' 9 In his reply to
the statement of this position Lord Elton suggested that such a policy might perhaps be mistaken
because saving the lives of those who were starving in Bantustans was itself laudable. 20 This was
a fairly mild response to the CCSA's repudiation of Church of England policy but the divergence
between the two organisations grew more noticeable and, on the Church's side at least, more dee-
ply imbued with resentment as time went on.
It was not merely over the question of the Bantustans that they differed. The Church's
optimistic belief in the efficacy of behind the scenes pressure throughout the South African
Republic was also very much at odds with a new CCSA report 21 Not only did this single out the
17 BSR/LkC/SAF/12/1, undated memo by Hugh Hanning.
18 BSR/IAC/SAF/7, letter from Christian Howard to Giles Ecclestone, 13/9/76.
19 BSRJIAC/SAF/1, letter of 14/10/76 from Patrick Stuart to Rodney Elton.
° BSR/1ACjAF/1, letter of 19/10/76 from Elton to Patrick Stuart.
21 'Poverty Wages in South Africa - a Review of the Effectiveness of Self-Regulation and Voluntary Dis-
closure', CCSA, publ. London, 1976.
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activities of individual companies but it concluded that
"the majority of UK parent companies are reluctant to expose the affairs of their South
African affiliates to public scrutiny. Not only is this completely at odds with the spirit
of Government policy but it strongly suggests that they are failing to monitor in any
credible way the performance of their affiliates in the areas set out in the White
Paper."22
A deputation of churchmen from the CCSA, not including a Church of England representa-
tive however, visited the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Edmund Dell, at the beginning
of June to ask that the revelation of wages and conditions of work of the South African subsicli-
aries of British firms be made statutory.23
The visit was not successful in the sefise that no mandatory disclosure rule was introduced,
and some of the activities of Hugh Hanning and Rodney Elton throw light on the reason for this.
On 23rd September they visited the Foreign and Commonwealth Office for a meeting about South
Africa and the role the Church of England might play there. The Church's 'softly, softly'
approach was obviously very much in tune with Foreign Office thinking and they were told that
the Church had a most important role in the situation because the Government,
"though pressed by the T.U.C. and the National Executive Committee to take a more
active economic line ... was unwilling to allow itself to be presented as a "target" to
South Africa - i.e. for whatever reason, it is seeking to maintain a low profile. Clearly
one reason is the fact that the UK is South Africa's biggest export market, and South
Africa is the UK's ninth biggest."24
Results of requests for information under the provisions of the Rogers Committee report
were said to be very disappointing and it was suggested that the Church of England might assume
the higher profile which the Government was reluctant to do by another approach to those forty
five firms first contacted in 1972. As far as specific courses of action to be urged on these firms
were concerned the FCO saw the training of black employees in technical and engineering skills
as a priority.25 They even provided Hanning and Elton with a "shopping list" of training propo-
n BSR/IAC/SAF/12/1, summary of argument in 'Poverty Wages in South Africa' ibid prepared as a Press
release on 7/6/76, p. 3.
BSR/IAC/SAF/12/1, visit of 7/6/76.
BSRJIAC/SAP/7, minute of Hanning/Elton meeting at the FCO on 23/9/76, p. 1.
25
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sals to present to British firms, something which they were not at that time prepared to do them-
selves. "Any action will have to be on a strictly unattributable basis."26
The JAC' s conviction of the rightness of its own approach was reinforced by what its
members saw as Foreign Office endorsement of their investment policy over South Africa in gen-
eral and the Homelands in particular. At the IAC meeting on 1st October Hugh Hanning reported
that he had been told there that intermediate, labour intensive technology was exactly appropriate
to the Homelands and could do nothing but good.27 Moreover gathering prejudice against the
CCSA was reinforced by hearing at the FCO that City firms in particular had responded to CCSA
enquiries even less satisfactorily than to Government ones. From this was extrapolated or, at least
reinforced, the belief that the Church of England had a unique 'inside track' with many institu-
tions who were reassured by its Establishment image and connections. 	 -
Approaches were accordingly made to the Church's chosen forty five firms about the labour
practices, training facilities, attitude and practice over Trades Unions, welfare facilities of their
South African subsidiaries. At the end of November Maurice Chandler could report that he had
received acknowledgements from twenty two firms some with the requested information, some
with a promise of a full report in due course and others who said that they were pursuing the
matter with their South African subsidiaries?-
This sense of their own special relationship with Government did nothing to strengthen the
JAC's respect for the CCSA They increasingly disagreed with its approach which they saw as
ever more radical and divergent from Church of England interests despite its indefatigable collec-
tion of information and its high level and well-regarded seminars. Hugh Hanning went so far as
to state "There is undoubtedly a new, though small element in CCSA which introduces a new ele-
ment of risk into the situation."29
BSR/IAC/SAFJ7, letter of 29/9/76 to Hugh Hanning from P.W. Denison-Edson of the Central and
Southern African Department at the FCO.
IAC Minutes 1/10/76.
IAC Minutes, 30/11/76.
BSR/LkC/SAF/12/1, memo of 9/11/76, a reference to the recent change in the management team of the
CCSA.
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His increasing inability to agree as a member of its Executive Committee with the CCSA' s
activities and pronouncements, particularly the company profiles it proposed to circulate to share-
holders prior to Annual General Meetings, was presumably the reason for Hugh Hanning's
intense preoccupation in the Autumn of 1976 with the possibility that he and other members of
the Committee might be sued for libel. A voluminous correspondence built up, with the CCSA
'Executive and other members of the Committee not nearly as exercised over the matter as was
Hanning and, on his behalf, Maurice Chandler. They asked that a legal advisor to the CCSA be
appointed, which the Executive said that it could not afford; they asked that only unanimously
agreed documents be issued or, failing that, that the names of those who had endorsed a document
be given, other members thereby avoiding liability, a suggestion of very dubious legal value.
Legal advice was sought and the vulnerability of the Church of England to actions for damages in
respect of libel, because of a general perception of its wealth, was stressed. Hugh Hanning was
assured by the BSR that he would be personally indemnified for any action that might lie against
him as a member of the CCSA's Executive Committee. 30 It is difficult to explain the intensity of
Hanning's expressed fears by anything other than distaste for CCSA policy; 31 If the danger of
action for libel was great then other members of the Committee, even if they did not share his
policy preferences, would surely have shared his fears of personal liability.
3° BSR/IAC/SAF/12/1.
31 At the beginning of 1977 a summary by Hanning of the advantages and disadvantages of Chuith of
England membership of the CCSA heavily stressed the disadvantages. BSRJIAC/SAF/12/1, memo of 4/if77.
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SECTION ffl.9: CHURCH OF ENGLAND POLICIES IN SOUTH AFRICA - 1977.
IAC activity during 1977 continued very much along the same lines as in previous years.
Discreet attempts to ensure company accountability were still very much the major theme with
replies to the questionnaire on working conditions and pay in South African subsidiaries being
passed to the Church Commissioners and the Central Board of Finance.1
Rodney Elton asked a series of questions in the House of Lords about the failure by corn-
panies to disclose information about South African subsidiaries. In February his efforts resulted in
a written answer in Hansard on the number of companies complying to date with the request for
disclosure.2 In November the Department of Trade issued a digest of the reports of British com-
panies from 1st January 1975 to 28th February, 1977, a list sent to Rodney Elton by Lord Oram
and to the CCSA by Edmund Dell.3 The fact that of 189 reports only 43 provided all the informa-
tion requested demonstrated the limitations on the success of the exercise. Moreover a CCSA
report in July set out the divergent approaches of constructive engagement and disengagement
and commented that ... "it must be recognized that three years of constructive engagement have
produced little or no tangible evidence of substantial change."4
Highly significant too had been an earlier warning from a man whom the IAC regarded with
constant respect and approval. In August 1976 the Rev. Beyers Naud had given an address at
Rhodes University, Graliamstown, where he said that blacks regarded the question of foreign
investment as a political, not an economic, one, and they felt that they should be consulted over
the policy. Indications were that they were against it and prominent organisations such as the
Black Peoples' Convention and SASO seriously questioned whether investment could make any
significant change in South Africa. Naudd himself was not against investment but said that pres-
sure on investing companies had made a little, but not nearly enough, progress. Unless they did
1 IAC Minutes 26/1/77.
2 House of Lords Hansard, 15/2/77, p. 113.
A 'Brief Assessment of British Firms' Perfonnance' by the Department of Trade and Industry,
BSR/IAC/SAF/13.
BSR/IAC/SAF/BOX/2, CCSA report on Investment in South Africa, 18/7177.
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begin to observe certain minimum standards it would be difficult to avoid a black radical call for
complete disinvestment.5
The thrust of IAC policy however did not alter, indeed in some ways it hardened. At the
beginning of November 1977 the Rev. David Haslam, Secretary of 'End Loans to South Africa,
ELTSA, asked the Archbishop of Canterbury to sign a letter calling for increased pressure by
British churches to end such loans; the list of those who had already signed was long and drawn
from most of the main-stream churches. 6 Maurice Chandler, consulted about a suitable response
by Hugh Whitworth, the Archbishop's Personal Assistant, replied that they could not commit the
Church Commissioners because there were so many issues involved including the pay of the
clergy and Synod views; "Sir Ronald Harris takes the view that more good can be done behind
the scenes than by this method."7
The situation and problems of multinational companies in relation to the ethics of invest-
ment was a particular preoccupation during 1977 and one that reflected an internationally shar-
pened awareness. In 1976 for example the OECD Council adopted its own guidelines for TNC's
and in 1977 the new UN Commission on Transnational Corporations held its first substantive
meeting at Lima where it decided to draw up a TNC code of conduct. Also in 1977 a Commission
on Multi-national Enterprises was set up, chaired by an IBM executive and with the Chief Execu-
tives of Fiat, General Motors and Unilever as Vice-Chairmen.8
In this context Hanning wrote to Sir David Orr, Chairman of Unilever, on 21st May includ-
ing confidentially a copy of a BCC projected paper critical of the behaviour of multinationals and
requesting his comments. "It is a document with which some of us find ourselves in strong
disagreement ... as you know it is an axiom of Church of England investment policy that the most
productive procedure is private consultation with the leaders of the companies concerned."9
BSR/IAC/SAF/13.
6 BSR/IAC/SAF/13, letter of 4/11/77.
Ibid, undated memo from Maurice Chandler to Hugh Whitworth.
8 BSR/IAC/SAF/BOX/3.
BSR/IAC/SAF/BOX[3, letter of 21/5/77.
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In September the WCC held an international conference on multinational companies where
their position was described as translating a mandate for WCC action in the field of TNC's into a
programme of action/reflection by a combination of information gathering and analysis and the
prophetic action of the churches. Recommended guidelines in assessing the situation were
"... the demands of two-thirds of the earth's people, the food and ecological problems
that threaten present and future generations, the misuse of power and the struggle of
the powerless and the questioning of the growth-oriented affluent societies and the
consequences of this for the rest of mankind."10
The IAC's reaction to this was documented at the meeting on 15th September and in its
pragmatic and 'view from the boardroom approach' it could not have been in greater contrast to
the WCC document. It was reported that Geoffrey Chandler of Shell had spoken strongly against
the attitude of the WCC meeting. The Chairmen of the BSR and the JAC were to meet Sir David
On of Unilever during November and also hoped to establish contact with Tim Belben, Economic
Adviser to Unilever, who was a member of the General Synod. There was general approbation for
this approach of behind the scenes meetings between individual churchmen and industrialists and
it was specifically hoped that the coming BCC consultation on multinationals would enable the
churches "... to back away from the confrontational and emotional approach" shown by some
organisations and tackle the genuine problems.11
Hugh Hanning certainly felt that the record had been set straight to some extent by the BCC
conference held at the beginning of October where businessmen and churchmen met to exchange
and discuss views on the ethics of multinational activity. 12 The WCC, he said, had made
"broad, general and unsubstantiated accusations against the whole principle of TNC' s". Since the
BCC meeting however church representatives were much better informed. 13 He by no means
whitewashed activities of TNC's however and suggested that illegal behaviour, transfer pricing,
transfer of operations and emphasis on capital-intensive rather than labour-intensive investment
10 BSR/IAC/SAF/BOX/3, the WCC Study/Action Pmgramme on Transnational Coxporalions", Diego
A.N. de Gaspar, 1977.
1 L&C Minutes 15/9/77, p. 3.
12 BSR/IAC/SAF/BOX/3.
13 BSR/IAC/SAF/BOX/3, letter of 2/11/77 from Hugh Hanning to the Bishop of Truro, Chairman of the
BSR.
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were among their most frequent offences.14
The meeting between the Chairman of Unilever, Maurice Chandler, Hugh Hanning and the
Bishop of Truro resulted in a decision to propose that a paper on Transnational Corporations be
produced for the BSR. A wide range of transnational corporations based in the UK would be con-
sulted and either Hugh Hanning or an outside academic could write the report which would con-
centrate on TNC's worldwide and not only in South Africa.15
The IAC were undoubtedly confirmed in their approach by the decision in September of the
EEC Foreign Ministers to implement a tough code of conduct on all European companies with
South African subsidiaries. Each parent company was to receive a copy of the code of conduct
which would effectively end discrimination against black workers in South Africa and would be
asked to send a detailed report each year to its government on how the code was being applied.16
The Economist reported that the idea had first come from the British Foreign Secretary, David
Owen, and the IAC could congratulate itself on its involvement in the initial pressure to institute
some voluntary scheme of accountability in the UK' 7 The Times reported that one of the reasons
for British and Dutch pressure to adopt a Europe-wide code was that while they were the only
countries in Europe attempting to enforce some sort of accountability their companies had legiti-
mately objected that it put them at a disadvantage commercially against companies without com-
parable restraint.18
Pressure to reassess was building up however both through the changing perceptions of
other organisations, increasing feedback on policy success and events in South Africa itself.
In July the Roman Catholic Diocese of Westminster announced that it was selling its shares
in Consolidated Goldflelds Ltd. because it had explored all possible avenues of influencing the
Company and could do no more. They also sent a further contribution to the CCSA on whose
14 Ibid, p.2.
15 TAC Minutes, 15/11/77.
16 BSR/IAC/SAF/13.
17 The Economist, 24/9/77.
The Times, 21/9/77.
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work their decision had been based. 19 The contrast here is marked between the two churches' atti-
tudes to the CCSA and to investment in Consolidated Goldfields; this investment was maintained
by the Church of England despite an unsatisfactory attitude towards black South African employ-
ees manifested in the reply to the 1973 questionnaire and a later interview conducted by Hugh
Hanning.2°
A demonstration of the consensual view of many Western churches on this issue and the
Church of England's increasing isolation from this view was given in May. Rodney Elton
attended a conference for Western members of the WCC at Driebergen in the Netherlands on the
role of Western churches in bringing economic pressure to bear on South Africa to generate
change there. The consensual decision there was that complete economic disengagement was
necessary because it had begun to be regarded as the benchmark of goodwill by black Christians.
"if it was not adopted, the Black Christians would feel that brotherhood with any Whites, even
Christians, had ceased to exist and that the world was divided into two hostile species."21
JAC reaction was predictable. While Rodney Elton seems personally to have accepted the
force and logic of the argument outlined above it was the lack of official standing of the confer-
ence which was emphasised at the IAC Meeting on 15th September. The difficulty with reference
to the Church of England's large investment portfolio was stressed; it must, it was suggested,
include many holdings in companies active in or dependent on the South African economy.
Wholesale disinvestment would remove what little leverage the Church Commissioners had in
South Africa, so a policy of selective disinvestment would be wiser. Discussions between IAC
staff and the Commissioners were already taking place, though it was pointed out that the Com-
missioners were in no way responsible to the LkC, to the BSR or to Synod.22
One might suggest that there was a little movement here in view of the fact that selective
disinvestment was mentioned at all. There was certainly disquiet amongst the Commissioners.
19 BSR/IAC/SAF/512, press notice by the Diocese of Westminster, 14/7177.
20 See Section ffl.5.
21 BSR/IAC/SAF/14, report to the IAC by Lord Elton, 12/7/77.
LAC Minutes, 15/9177.
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Al. McDonald wrote to Rodney Elton about the Driebergen conclusions on 25th July and com-
mented then that attitudes to South Africa seemed to be hardening. In the light of this and of the
implications of the Driebergen line he asked for a meeting as soon as possible to learn the IAC's
views. Since Hanriing and Chandler also attended this meeting, and considering the tenor of the
Committee meeting where Driebergen was discussed, it is not surprising that no discernible
change was seen in the Commissioners investment policy.
However in August Paul Brett, a member of the BSR's staff concerned with Industrial Rela-
tions, was asked to convene a study group on the ethics of investment and also to represent Giles
Ecclestone on a Church Commissioners' group dealing with a similar subject. 23 Later in the year
he was asked to comment on the WCC Consultation on TNC's and on Geoffrey Chandler of
Shell's reaction to it.
His reaction and comments were significantly different from those of the IAC Executive. He
agreed that there were genuine opportunities for Third World development in the activities of the
TNC's, but suggested also that to attempt to deal with black accusations of Western exploitation
by denying them was inadequate. Moreover he considered that the effect of TNC's, as of all large
institutions, might be quite uncontrollable by the good intentions of their employees, and that the
concept of 'institutional sin' should be explored.
The remit of this study group was wider than the South African situation but the question of
ethics in relation to investment arose most often and most acutely in relation to South Africa.
Therefore the appointment of an 'outside' investigator was a challenge to the assumptions which
had long underpinned IAC policy. This was presumably a response to the movement towards
reevaluation of policy in this area which was going on in the BCC and many of its member
Churches, and to events in South Africa itself.
The situation in South Africa itself was not only increasing pressure for reappraisal of
overall policy but was forcing reaction to a set of acute crises rather than considered and long-
BSR/LkC/8AF/14, letter from Ecciestone to Elton, 10/8177.
BSR/IAC/SAF,BOX/3, memo from Paul Brett to Ecciestone and Hanning, 3/10/77.
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term initiatives from the Church. Recession and urban unemployment and the intensification of
the Homelands policy had exacerbated ever-present resentment. This came to a head in 1976 with
the Soweto uprising. In September 1977 Steve Biko, a SASO leader, died in police custody and
in October eighteen organisations, including the Christian Institute and SASO, and a number of
individuals, including Beyers Naudé, were banned.
No record exists on file of Church of England reaction to the deaths at Soweto although
there was a BCC statement deploring the circumstances. The BCC also issued a statement over
the death of Steve Biko pointing out that he was the twenty first political detainee to die in unex-
plained circumstances in a South African prison in less than a year.
The Church of England was individually involved in the issue of Biko's death and not
merely as a member of the BCC. Elton wrote on behalf of the Church of England to the Director
of Information at the South African Embassy pointing out discrepancies in the Government's
press release about Biko's death and asking to be informed of the actual sequence of events and of
what form of medical treatment Biko received. 26 The Director of Information acknowledged the
discrepancies and undertook to inform Elton of the details he had requested when they became
available.27
The Archbishop of Canterbury himself was involved in the Christian Institute affair. He sent
a telegram to the Prime Minister of South Africa deploring its closure and that of SASO as well
as the individual banning orders. In the Archbishop's own words the telegram in acknowledge-
ment from the President of South Africa ... "said exactly nothing. 28 However the Synod debate
on the issue produced a resolution of support for the Christian Institute and, such was the depth of
feeling on the issue, that W.D. Pattinson, Secretary General of Synod, sent the text of the resolu-
tion to the South African Ambassador in London who was known to be wary of Church opinion
and who regularly bombarded Church House with justificatory literature.29
BSRJIACJSAF/5j2 and BOX 5, press release of 1419/77.
BSRIIACISAF/BOXIS. lener of 2019177.
27 ibid letter of 26/9/77.
Rcpon of Proceedings of General Synod, Autumn 1977. VoL 8, No.3, p. 1043
BSRIIACISAF/512, letter of 16/11/77.
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He certainly replied in full. His ingenious justification for the banning orders was that the
human rights of the majority of citizens were defended by a government which did not allow
them to be subject to intimidation and subversion.30
BSR/IAC/SAPIBOXI5, letter of 29/11/77.
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SECTION IIL1O: CHURCH OF ENGLAND POLICIES IN SOUTH AFRICA— 1978.
This correspondence between the South African Ambassador and Synod's Secretary Gen-
eral continued well into 1978. The Ambassador's reply was held to be so unsatisfactory that Pat-
tinson published the correspondence and wrote to him again refuting his contentions one by one.
Stressing the excellent information-gathering system of the Anglican Church he questioned the
South African Government's version of Steve Biko's death, the recent banning orders, the real
causes of urban violence and the disparity between black and white wages.1
There is not the slightest sign in this correspondence of illusion as to the real situation of the
blacks in South Africa; the Church might have been wedded to a rather ill-defined policy of
reform through economic amelioration but disapproval and distaste as well as full and up-to-date
information were manifest in Pattinson's letters, the second, and most substantive of which was
drafted by the IAC2 Moreover the Church's capacity to needle the South African Government, or
at least its representatives, is demonstrated by the three subsequent letters sent by the Ambassador
as information became available to him with which to refute the points Pattinson made.3
The Church's access to information from numerous sources was well demonstrated in this
correspondence which dragged on into the summer of 1978 due to delay in replying by the South
African Ambassador who felt the matters raised were so serious they had to be referred to Pre-
toria.4 Numerous members of the BCC were consulted, as well as members of the now banned
Christian Institute, members of the Anglican Church in South Africa and a number of secular spe-
cialists, by the ad hoc group of the IAC set up to draft replies to the South African Ambassador's
letters. The correspondence was printed and circulated to members of the November 1978 Synod
and was used moreover by the Archbishop of Canterbury in the House of Lords Debate on South-
ern Africa which took place in April.5
BSR/IAC/SAF/BOX/4, letter of 1613178 from Pattinson to the South African Ambassador.
2 IAC Minutes, 13/3/78.
BSR/IAC/SAF/BOX/5, SAF/BOX/4, SAF/5f2 letters of of 9/6178,14/7178 and 18/7178.
IAC Minutes, 9/7178.
BSR/IAC/LAM/3, letter of 14/4/78 from Hugh Hanning to Hugh Whitworth.
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Matters such as this demonstrated the Church's firm views on the immorality of apartheid.
illustrative too of the same views were Sir Ronald Harris's report of his visit to South Africa in
January and February 1978, where his distaste for the structure of society there is manifest in
every line,6 and the JAC's involvement with the Crossroads Action Committee in the protest
against the forced removal of the Crossroads community.7
None of this however altered the fact that much Church thinking was moving away from
constructive engagement towards disinvestment as a suitable policy for Christian organisations,
and it was not taking the IAC along with it. Maurice Chandler and Hugh Hanning fought strongly
against this trend, particularly against the DIA of the BCC's decision to move towards embracing
an official policy of disengagement.
Disquiet was voiced by the Bishop of Guildford at the January meeting of the Synod's
Standing Committee about the inadequacy of the Church of England's policy still basically embo-
died in two documents drawn up in 1973 before Soweto. As the South African Council of
Churches itself seemed to be moving towards a belief in disinvestment ... "I hope very much that
there is a development in the BSR thinking about this matter and we shall emerge in step with
men like Beyers Naudé, whom we acclaim so much".8
A similar note was struck by Paul Oestreicher, Head of British Amnesty International as
well as a member of the IAC. In his Amnesty role he wrote an open letter to herald the publica-
tion of the Amnesty report on Political Imprisonment in South Africa. In this he suggested that
"the English-speaking churches have made many admirable statements rejecting the ideology of
apartheid. Yet it is widely recognized that they present no serious challenge to the continuance of
the tyrannous exercise of white power."9
The DIA began seriously to question BCC policy in 1978 and devoted a good deal of time
to the issue with a visit to South Africa by their Executive Secretary for Africa, a working party
6 BSR/IAC/SAF/512.
BSR/IAC/SAF/17.
BSR/IAC/SAF/BOX/5, letter from the Bishop of Guildlord to the Bishop of Truro, 4/1/78.
BSR/IAC/SAF/5/2, open letter by Paul Oestmicher, Feast of the Epiphany 1978.
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and a series of discussion documents. These included 'Economic Relations with South Africa',
and 'British Investment in South Africa', which advocated a graduated policy of sanctions.10
Maurice Chandler objected to this recommendation at the October Committee Meeting, saying
that it took no account of the change of premiership in South Africa. Mr. Botha who had recently
been appointed might be seen as more liberal because of his attitude to Coloureds and to Nami-
bia; sanctions would therefore not be appropriate."
At the next DIA Board Meeting it was obvious that Maurice Chandler's views had not pre-
vailed. The Board endorsed section five of the paper 'Economic Relations with South Africa'12
which called for Britain to support or at least not to oppose calls for sanctions against South
Africa in the Security Council of the UN and called on Churches to seek government measures to
prevent the flow of capital technology to South Africa. This recommendation would be put to the
Executive Committee, hopefully thereafter to Council, early in 1979 and form the basis of an
informed debate in the November 1979 BCC Assembly. 13 Maurice Chandler and Michael Lat-
ham, MP, a member of the IAC and a strong opponent of sanctions, were the only members who
voted against this decision. 14
Hugh Hanning attempted to modify the emerging BCC position by putting to a November
meeting of the DIA major points from his document on the case against sanctions in South
Africa. He was convinced that unilateral sanctions would do nothing but damage the British econ-
omy because others would step into the investment breach; if the UN wished to impose a sanc-
tions policy some military means of enforcement would be needed and would create major logis-
tic problems; moreover there had been insufficient time to examine the policies of the new South
African Government. He saw new possibilities for movement in a perceived greater super-power
interest in the area and in opportunities to influence UK firms in relation to their black South Afri-
10 'Economic Relations with South Africa', AF/78/60, published Sept. 1978, and 'British Investment in
South Africa', AF/78/28, published Oct. 1978, by BCC London.
11 BSR/JAC/BCC/1/4.
12 'Economic Relations with South Africa', op. cit.
13 BSR/IAC/BCC/1/4, meeting of 24 and 25/1 1/78.
14 IAC Minutes, 15/11178 and BSR/IAC/SAF/17.
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can employees. 15 After the meeting Hanning reported that his contribution had been taken seri-
ously and would be fed into the next consultation stage.' 6 He was disabused of this idea however
at the next DIA meeting where there were complaints that none of the opponents of sanctions had
produced any alternative policy, and he was obviously irritated that his suggestions did not
apparently come under this heading.'7
Efforts to fight against the prevailing tide did not stop here however. At the November IAC
meeting it was decided to ask the BCC and the CCSA, who were moving in the same direction, to
show the economic consequences of their proposals.' 8 This was presumably on the basis of
Hanning's belief that if the facts were known ... "the proposal would have the whole country
against it ... Seen by ordinary British people, it has the look of a campaign to make Lent compul-
sory."9 Hugh Hanning, in his quest for information to refute the case for sanctions, also visited
the South African Embassy. He was informed by Mr. Shoeman, the Information Attache there,
that the effect of imposing sanctions on South Africa would reverberate through the economies of
Zaire, Zambia, Mozambique, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, and Britain would be affected
too.20
1 BSR/IAC/SAF/17, a memo 'The BCC and Sanctions in South Africa', 16/11178, Hugh Hanning to
James Wilkie.
16 BSR/IAC/SAF/17, memo from Hanning to Chandler 9/11/78.
17 BSR/IAC/SAF/17, memo from Hanning to Chandler 11/12/78.
18 IAC Minutes 15/11/78.
19 BSR/[AC,AF/17, memo of 9/11178 Hanning to Chandler.
20 BSR/1AC1AF/17, letter to Hanning from Shoeman at the South African Embassy, 23/11178.
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SECTION ffl.11: CHURCH OF ENGLAND POLICIES IN SOUTH AFRICA - 1979
The year 1979 saw no change of attitude within the IAC over the question of sanctions but
it did see more movement in this direction by almost all British Churches. Accordingly there was
a certain polarisation of views with the IAC, the Church Commissioners and, probably, the
majority in Synod reluctant to accept the limitations of amelioration through pressure on British
firms which were now widely recognised in other church circles.
Most significantly, in terms of the Church of England itself, one sees the clearer emergence
of opposition in other parts of the BSR to the line so long pursued by the IAC. By the end of the
year this was clearly demonstrated by the fact that the BSR report on 'Political Change in South
Africa' 1 was written, after extensive consultations, by Giles Ecclestone, Secretary to the BSR All
previous position papers on the subject had been prepared by the IAC.
In January a BCC paper recommending disinvestment was published and accepted by the
BCC Executive Committee.2 At the March IAC Meeting where it was discussed 3 Sir Ronald
Harris, Chairman of the Central Board of Finance, was also invited to put the case against disin-
vestment and Maurice Chandler argued strongly against the BCC line, suggesting that sanctions
were a form of warfare and that, as the BCC document omitted most of the defence aspects, these
should be included in the IAC' s own report. Discussion was resumed in June 4 where real differ-
ences of opinion within the Committee itself were demonstrated; these were broadly between
those, such as Maurice Chandler, Hugh Hanning and Alastair McDonald of the Church Commis-
sioners, who abhorred everything the BCC document suggested and thought that recent changes
in South Africa were an indication of real and extensive improvement, and those, including Giles
Ecclestone and Richard Crawshaw, who felt that the Church should put forward a moral view
whatever the likelihood of its being adopted by the Government.
1 1979, CIO, London.




Thus Hugh Hanning produced a draft paper to be considered by the September JAC meeting
which challenged the need to impose sanctions in the light of what, he suggested, were rathcal
changes in employment law after the report of the Wiehahn and Riekert Commissions, of the
hardship it would produce inside and outside South Africa and the new willingness which he per-
ceived in the superpowers to involve themselves in South African affairs. He was assisted in this
by A.L McDonald of the Church Commissioners5
However on 24th September a BSR consultation on the BCC document was held, an event
which Maurice Chandler had attempted to block at the March IAC Meeting. 6 Not only were the
BCC document and Hugh Hanning's respqnse to it considered but also a report of the Industrial
Committee under the Chairmanship of Paul Brett.
The difference in tone between this and the IAC's position paper could not have been
greater. There was no mention of mineral resources or superpower interests, but instead a dispas-
sionate setting out of the issues with an emphasis upon the specific obligation and input of Chris-
tian thought. On the issue of human rights for example it stated. "Human rights issue from a
recognition of human worth. The denial of the right to move about freely, to live with one's fam-
ily, to associate with others of one's choice, to have a job, and, through the vote, to have a say in
the ordering of one's country, together with the enforcement of all this by a brutal police force
amounts to nothing short of tyranny. Against this the problems of economic breakdown and
increased unemployment may be seen in their place. They may turn out to be the lesser evils?7
There had already been other indicators too that the IAC was being outflanked by changing
opinion within South Africa itself. In January the Christian Institute of South Africa published
"The Outlook for South Africa", by the Rev. Dr. Theo Kotze of the Christian Institute Fund in
London.8 The main arguments of this book were also given as a speech to the Royal Institute of
'Sanctions in South Añica', Hugh Hanning, draft of August 1979.
6 IAC Minutes 29/3/79.
' 'British Interests in South Africa', Wo±ing Paper 8 of the Industrial Committee of the BSR SepIcinbei
1979.
8 "The Outlook for South Africa", Rev. Dr. Thou Kotze, Christian Institute Loodoii. 1979.
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International Affairs at Chatham House on the 7th November 1978. Kotze dismantled the case for
investment... "I believe that economic sanctions applied urgently and with sincerity provide the
last possible alternative to a ghastly war."9
A less unequivocal commitment, but a highly significant one, was that of Bishop Desmond
Tutu in August when he commented on the lack of real progress in South Africa and the
shortcomings of the Riekert and Wiehabn Commissions. 10 Most importantly in this context he
noted that the policies of present and past South African governments had been maintained by
overseas investment.11
The British Government never did move to a policy of recommending sanctions but in Sep-
tember it was reported that the Shadow Foreign Secretary, David Owen was looking at the possi-
bility of doing exactly that. The campaign by African and other Third World states was thought to
be tilting the balance of the economic argument against South Africa. 12 Moreover, when he gave
the Richard Feetham Memorial Lecture at the University of Witwatersrand in September, Owen
commented on this growing pressure and warned the South African Government of its likely
effects. He condemned them too for statements claiming that South Africa was a lone bastion
against communism in Southern Africa.13
Even Synod was unusually exercised on the subject of South Africa during 1979 with ques-
tons in the first session and the major debate in November. It was hardly surprising in view of
this cumulative reassessment that the Church of England's position should be seen as inadequate.
The tone of the September consultation set up to detennine the Church's approach also reinforced
the perception that events had moved on significantly and needed a reordering of response since
the days when ffrench-Beytagh's position papers had been drafted.
Ibid, P. 12.
10 Desmond Tutu, the most charismatic and foiteful Anglican Church leader in South Africa, and previ-
ously Bishop of Lesotho had been appointed General Secretary of the South African Council of Churches in
March, 1978. He has since become successively Bishop of Johannesburg and Archbishop of Capetown.
11 BSR/IAC/SAF2O, notes from a letter or conversation with Desmond Tutu, 27/8179.
12 Daily Telegraph report, 13/9179.
13 BSR/IAC/SAF/18.
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Those attending the Consultation were drawn from a wide constituency of Church,
academia, pressure group and industry. Unusual in Church of England deliberations there was a
group of black South Africans with a radical and, largely Black Consciousness, perspective.
These were Barney Pityana, formerly of SASO, Drake Koka, of the Black Allied Workers'
Union, and Martin Mabiletsa of the Black Consciousness Movement. They stated that black
organisations called for total disinvestment by foreign companies as foreign investment was part
of the capitalist system which was the parent of oppression in South Africa. Codes of conduct
were irrelevant because foreign companies were subject to South African law and codes of con-
duct could not breach that. Moreover foreign investment had little direct effect on the 84% of the
black population which was not employed in industry. Buthelezi, who favoured foreign invest-
ment, was seen as interested only in Kwa-Zulu; on the wider issue his views varied over time.14
Claims for recent improvement and for the effectiveness of pressure from industry were also
heard as well as assessments of the logistic difficulties involved in imposing effectively a system
of sanctions. However Paul Brett, of the BSR's Industrial Committee, produced a set of notes
and reflections on the Consultation. These sum up well the increasing unease with the conceptual
and theological basis of traditional Church of England policy. He suggested that the difference
between grand and petty apartheid should constantly be borne in mind with the fact that there was
no evidence that pressure from outside the country had altered the South African Government's
determination to pursue a grand apartheid policy of separate development. Therefore the policy of
constructive engagement was directed only at lessening the effects of petty apartheid. Black
members of the Consultation however had been adamant that they did not want the system eased,
they wanted it removed, and it was important to give full weight to their expressed need for black
self-determination.
In view of this very different input to the decision-making process it is hardly surprising
that the document 'Political Change in South Africa', drafted by Giles Eccles tone and edited by
14 BSRIIAC/SAFT2O, unauributed and undated report of the Consultation. BSR/IAC/SAF22, undated re-
port of the Consultation by Giles Ecciestone.
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the BSR, for discussion at the November meeting of Synod was veiy different from those form-
erly produced by the JAC. It did not advocate either constructive engagement or disengagement,
seeing it as over simplistic to classify potential action in such terms; the correspondence with the
South African Ambassador for example was seen as going far beyond the conventional parame-
ters of constructive engagement under which rubric the recent policy of the Church of England
was generally defined. Moreover he identified the basis of the apartheid system as political and
legal and incapable of radical alteration except by a combination of many forms of outside as well
as internal pressure. He documented the deep divisions of opinion on the significance of recent
developments in South Africa, on the interpretation of the effect of external pressure and on the
degree to which self-interest should modify policy options. He did recommend however that the
Church should encourage the British Government to express opposition to apartheid by pressure
of a variety of types, including the range of options set out in the BCC document under the gen-
eral heading of disengagement, diplomatic pressure and stricter implementation of the British and
European Codes of Conduct in relation to South Africa.15
Together with the BCC report, 'Political Change in South Africa: Britain's Responsibil-
ity,' 16 this report was presented to Synod in November. The polarised nature of the debate was
predictable, especially in the light of the fact that the opposition of one member of the BSR to the
Board's report was so vehement, that his dissenting view was published as an addendum to the
main body of the report.' 7 He went on, in the debate, to say that he would not have dissented if
the report put before Synod had been that prepared by the IAC. 18 The tenor of the debate differed
very little from its usual mixture with supporters of increased sporting and industrial links, of the
view that white South Africans were also one's Christian brothers, of the opinion that the contri-
bution made by South African soldiers during the war should never be forgotten, at one extreme
and supporters of the view that the Church should hear the expressed need of Black South Afri-
15 'Political Change in South Africa,' G.S. 424, ClO for the BSR, 1989.
16 op. cit.
17 Ibid, p. 20, dissenting opinion of Mr. G.E. Duffield.
18 Report of Proceedings of the General Synod, November 1979, VoL 10, No. 3, P . 1185.
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cans and support a policy which a majority wanted at the other extreme. More moderately were
expressed views and doubts which thoughtfully reflected the complexity of the problems
involved.
The original BSR motion, no doubt because it was considered that the diversity of views
made agreement impossible, was that Synod should merely take note of this report. However
some intensification of a sense that the Church ought to be seen to be doing more in South Africa
might be inferred from the fact that Synod also passed a motion put by the Bishop of Guildford
encouraging "widespread consideration of the proposals for economic disengagement in support
of efforts to secure a more just society in South Africa", drawing "attention to the EEC Code of
Conduct for Companies with Interests in South Africa", "in view of British involvement in the
South African economy", urging the Government "to press the implementation of the Code with
vigour" and the Department of Trade and Industry to hold a public hearing annually, after replies
were received from British companies with interests in South Africa, so that business, trade
unions, the churches and any other interested bodies might make representations about the imple-
mentation of the Code. 19 Moreover, on the recommendation of the BSR Chairman, the Bishop of
Truro, they rejected a motion whose general import was to welcome the changes recently intro-
duced by the South African Government, on the basis that it might look like an endorsement of
that Government's policies. 20 One is certainly seeing no radical change of policy here but rather a
slow widening of knowledge, an uneasy awareness of the implications of the radicalisation of
black South Africans and an attempt to come to terms with the complexity of the issues involved.
At the IAC Meeting on the fourteenth of November Maurice Chandler criticised the BSR
paper which had been put to Synod on the grounds that it had given insufficient emphasis to
recent changes in South Africa; but amongst the Churches at least opinion seemed to be moving
away from the views which he and Hugh Hanning had represented for most of the decade. On the




the economy of South Mrica and recommended that it should now be the basic approach for all
BCC member churches.21 The list of proposals published in an appendix to this resolution,
whereby disengagement might progressively be effected, were directly opposed to the
Hanning/Chandler approach.
21 BSR/IAC/SAF/512 and BSR/LkC/BCC/1/4, resolution ID/79/143(a) of the BCC.
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SECTION ffl.12.: CHURCH OF ENGLAND POLICIES IN SOUTH AFRICA - 1980
1980 was the year when Hugh Hanning ceased to be Secretaiy of the IAC and after his
departure a new fluidity of approach could be observed; his successor, Peter Haynes initiated
closer links for example with Quaker and other mediatory organisations in South Africa such as
the Centre for Inter Group Studies. However the main thrust of policy in this year, which also saw
the enthronement of Robert Runcie as the new Archbishop of Canterbury, remained the same
with the preparation of a document to inform the parishes on the various church positions over
South Africa, approaches to the Government who were refusing to disclose details of some of the
returns made under the EEC code and protests to the Government of South Africa over the
confiscation of Archbishop Desmond Tutu's passport.
The traditional JAC line was not abandoned without a fight. In January Hugh Hanning, still
acting as Secretary, sent a memo to the Rev. Michael Atkinson, who was drafting 'Britain's Rela-
tions with South Africa', to be circulated to Church members, arguing for the inclusion of the
IAC paper 'Sanctions in South Africa', which he had drafted in 1979 and which was .."viewed
favourably by the Church Commissioners. 1 He also suggested that Atkinson .."might crystallize
the difference between the GS and the BCC, which boils down to conjunctions. The BCC is now
considering how to promote disengagement, the GS is considering whether to do so." 2 He con-
sidered too that the BCC document was out of date because of the President of South Africa's
recent statements that apartheid as the Nationalist Party has always known it was now dead3
In January also Hanning was asked by Giles Ecciestone to reply to Dr. J.C. Polkinghocne of
Trinity College, Cambridge, who had asked for advice on how to bring pressure to bear on British
firms operating in South Africa. Despite the balanced approach implication of Ecciestone's
request that he mention the work of the CCSA and the BCC study, Hanning told Polkinghorne
that ..."the Church of England Synod still believes firmly in constructive engagement as do the




Church Commissioners and as does this Committee. Though agreeing with many of the BCC's
complaints I myself would point to extraordinary and quite unpredicted developments in the last
two years." As well as approaches to companies he recommended writing to MP' s or the Foreign
Office ... "which though one often gets a stereotyped reply attracts quite disproportionate notice
in Whitehall."4
At the beginning of February Hanning wrote to the Foreign Office because ... "it is sug-
gested hereabouts that United Nations resolutions about South Africa are usually opposed by Bri-
tain or else we abstain. I am contesting this statement"; 5 it was apparently the word 'usually' to
which he objected. The reply from M.C.S. Dickson, in the Southern Africa Department, was
related more or less verbatim to Michael Atkinson who was preparing 'Britain's Relations with
South Africa'. 6 It contained the fairly predictable information that though the Government was
against apartheid it was also against sanctions and therefore had to vote against resolutions sup-
porting sanctions; it usually voted for humanitarian resolutions however. In other words the origi-
nal contention which Hanning was seeking to refute was substantially correct.
However the leaflet, 'Britain's Relations with South Africa', was ftnally published at the
end of 1980 despite a number of criticisms of bias from members of the IAC. It did not advocate
either major view and concluded that the Church's concern was to explore ways in which the
conflict, defined as the imposition of the superiority of one race over another, could most peace-
fully be resolved. It reproduced the text of the BCC resolution as well as a brief history of
apartheid and the Church of England's response to it and asked whether the time was now right
for the Church of England to revise its traditional position.
At the November 1980 meeting of Synod it was also reported that during the previous year
BSR staff had been involved with Christian Aid, the Catholic Fund for Overseas Development,
CAFOD, and the Catholic Institute for International Relations, CIIR, in producing a study pack
' BSR/IAC/8AF/22, letter from Hugh Hanning to Dr. J.C. Polkinghorne, 24/1180.
BSR/IAC/SAF/22, letter from Hugh Hanning to the FCO, 12(2180.
6 BSR/IAC/SAF/22, letter from Dickson at the FCO to Hanning, 22/2/80, and memo from Hanning to At-
kinson 25/2/80.
-271-
on Southern Africa ... "to help adult Christians and others here in Britain to enter into the prob-
lems of Southern Africa with more knowledge and understanding." 7 By means of the leaflet and
the study pack ... "the Board believes the Church may be enabled to form in the near future its
corporate mind on the proper course to be adopted by the Government, and the Church itself,
towards South Africa."8
Pragmatically, and where present rather than future policy was concerned, the IAC func-
tioned much as usual during 1980. In May a Guardian leader commented on the Government's
refusal to publish the names of the thirty three British companies operating in South Africa who,
according to a Department of Trade analysis, were paying 2,000 African workers below sub-
sistence levels. This grew into an affair of some political controversy and a Commons debate on
the question of British companies' links with South Africa was held in July.9
This was a debate in which, under their own terms of reference, the IAC and the Church
Commissioners were bound to be involved. Accordingly at the beginning of June Maurice
Chandler informed the Minister of State at the Department of Trade, and Sir Donald Kaberry,
Chairman of the Parliamentary Select Committee on Trade and Industry, of the IAC's dissatisfac-
tion with the Government's refusal to publish.' 0 In the letter to Sir Donald Kaberry he asked that
Kaberry's Committee..." press for an early removal of the protection being thus afforded to those
firms which are violating the code."11
Criticisms from this quarter were seriously enough regarded to draw a reply from Cecil Par-
kinson, Minister for Trade himself. His reply, while reiterating the new Government's commit-
ment to the Code, contained the ambiguous statement that .."any such list must, by the nature of
the data, be based partly on subjective judgement and interpretation."2
'Southern Africa', a study pack for British Christians about South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe, and
our Christian response, November 1979, p. 1.
8 1979 Annual Report of the BSR to Autumn Group of Sessions of General Synod, Vol. 11, No. 3, p. 56.
BSR/IAC/SAF/21, Guardian leader, May 1980.
10 BSR/IAC/SAFI21, letter from Maurice Chandler to the Minister of State at the Department of Trade,
5/6/80, and to Sir Donald Kabeny, Chainnan of the Parliamentary Select Committee on Trade and Industry,
27/6/80.
11 Ibid.
12 BSR/IACjAP,21, letter from the Minister for Trade to Maurice Chandler, 27/6/80.
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The Church Commissioners were equally pressing. A report appeared in the Times at the
beginning of July of the Commissioners' challenge to five of the thirty three non-publishing
companies in which they had investments to clarify their positions on black African pay and
working conditions. The companies involved included British Petroleum and Shell, both of which
were among those accused by the Guardian of paying poverty wages to Black Africans in the
twelve months to June 1979. Sir Ronald Harris, the First Church Estates Commissioner, was
quoted as saying that the Commissioners were on the whole satisfied with the way the EEC Code
of Conduct was being implemented, but .."we are not happy with the signs that the Government
may be working in a certain way designed to ensure that companies do not observe the code."13
At the July LAC Meeting it was generally agreed that Cecil Parkinson's reply was unsatis-
factory and it was decided that the Bishop of Truro, Chairman of the BSR, should write to John
Nott, Secretary of State for Trade, calling for adequate disclosure. 14 His letter not only did this,
but also asked for an assurance that the Government was serious in intending to observe the
employment codes. 15 The Bishop could at least congratulate himself on the handwritten nature of
his personal reply from John Nott but upon very little else. Nott ascribed the furore, instigated
according to him by Raphael of the Observer and .."naturally taken up by the Guardian and par-
ticular members of the Labour Party" as merely intended to cause political embarrassment to the
Government. He regretted that .."the General Synod should have seen fit to question our pro-
cedures."16
This initiative demonstrates an area in which the Church, or rather its Executive, functioned
well. An issue was already in the public domain. No unique or distinctive Church position had to
be formulated before action could be initiated with consequent delays and appearance of ambi-
gully. Members of the LAC were part of a wide-ranging Establishment network and knew their
way around Parliament and, more importantly, around Whitehall. Their contribution was only a
13 BSR/IAC/SAF/22, cutting from the Times, July 1980.
14 LkC Minutes, 16f7/80.
15 BSR/IAC/SAFI21, letter from Bishop of Trum to John Nott, 27/8/80.
16 BSR/IAC/SAFI21, letter from John Nott to the Bishop of Truro, 11/9/80.
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part, but a useful part, of a wider campaign.
Promise of a new and less institutionally-based approach, an approach which characterized
much of the IAC's work after Peter Haynes replaced Hugh Hanning as Secretary, however was
foreshadowed at the IAC Meeting in November when the Bishop of Swansea and Brecon reported
on the working of the Sullivan Code in the USA which was far more effective, he claimed, than
the EEC code. The Rev. Leon Sullivan had a team of research officers who constantly sought and
evaluated information. The Rev. Sullivan would visit Britain at the beginning of 1981 to help
British Churches evolve a policy for making the EEC Code more effective and he would be asked
to a special LAC meeting.'7
Where the removal of Bishop Desmond Tutu's passport was concerned the IAC and the
Church generally were again on uncontroversial ground and reacted positively and with real
anger. It may well be that this was largely due to the sense of legitimacy bestowed by operating in
indisputably Church territory, although Tutu's undeniable political prominence, despite his own
constant denials of being a politician, also made it important that the Church of England was seen
to be unequivocably on his side.
There was no clear answer to the question of why Tutu's passport had been withdrawn, even
the South African Embassy did not seem entirely sure and were clearly embarrassed. 18 It was
likely however that his plan to travel to Europe had provoked fears of what he might say while
abroad as his pronouncements on the immorality of investing in South African industry while in
Denmark the previous year had not been at all well received by the South African Government.
The Archbishop of Canterbury asked the IAC for advice and it was decided that the most
effective action would be a personal approach from the Archbishop to the President of South
Africa. 19 The letter was a very firm one and, in asking for the restoration of Tutu's passport, sug-
gested that this should be done before the Archbishop's enthronememt on 25th March which Tutu
17 IAC Minutes, 25/11/80.
18 Report of a conversation with the Press Attaché there by Maurice Chandler, IAC Minutes 22/5/80.
19 IAC Minutes, 10/3/80.
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had been invited to attend. All the Primates of the Anglican Communion, the Archbishop
suggested,. ."will be in Canterbury and they could be counted on to express their feelings strongly
in the context of this public occasion." 20 A reply, which Maurice Chandler characterized as
"rather helpful",2 ' was indeed received the night before the Archbishop's enthronement. But Tutu
was still absent and his absence did indeed provoke a public statement from all the Primates
assembled in Canterbury deploring the South African Government's action.
The Archbishop's action on Tutu's behalf was a signal of a theme which was to be constant
through the next decade when, under Tutu's leadership and by his example, the Anglican Church
of South Africa participated more fully in the political life of the country than it had ever done
before. lii November 1982 for example Archbishop Runcie sent out a five man Anglican delega-
tion to demonstrate the concern of the Anglican Church world-wide at the Eloff Commission's
investigation of the South African Council of Churches. On other occasions he acted in a similar
way, an indication of his personal regard and his admiration for Tutu.
Runcie was much more personally involved in all foreign policy issues than his predecessor
had been. There were distinct signs in 1980 too that he could not be content to follow a foreign
policy largely and independently fomnilated by a BSR Committee. He appointed a number of
personal advisers to enable him to operate more independently of Church House and it was obvi-
ous from the beginning that his Primacy would be marked by a far more hands-on approach.
BSR/LkC/SAF/15, letter from the Archbishop of Canterbury to the President of South Africa, 4/3/80.
21 BSR/ISC/SAF/22, note of a phone message from Maurice Chandler, 25/3/80.
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SECTION ffl.13: CONCLUSION
The end of the 1970s found a very different attitude to South Africa and the resolution of its
problems amongst Church of England leaders than had been demonstrated during the earlier part
of the decade.
In the early 1970s Archbishop Ramsey had unequivocably condemned apartheid but this
had been translated without major debate about funcla.mental issues into a policy of gradualism; in
other words the political situation would be transformed if the economic circumstances of Black
workers were themselves transformed. This is not necessarily untrue, although a strong case can
be made for the predominant need for political change in a society whose political structure is so
bound up with its economic life, but it was not tested, questioned or assessed.
The middle years of the decade saw great changes and much violence of all kinds in South
Africa but none of this altered the policy of the IAC or introduced fundamental debate on the
nature and parameters of violence, on the legitimate response to structural violence, on the possi-
ble legitimate extension of the Christian concept of the Just War to the situation in South Africa.
There is no doubt of the genuine distaste for apartheid among IAC members but by and large they
were not willing to contemplate radical prescriptions for its removal. Thus much of the decade
saw a series of elaborations on the initial strategy of bringing influence to bear on British firms
with South African subsidiaries. It was perhaps only in such spontaneous issues as the Alice Sem-
inary affair and the treatment of the Christian Institute or of Bishop Tutu that genuine Christian
concern appeared unmediated through the constraints of preordained policy.
It was only at the end of the decade, with the cumulative effect of recent events in South
Africa, with a Church of England consistently out of step with most other British and World
Churches and with an imminent change of Committee Secretary, that doubts about previous cer-
tainties began to surface. One might say, in Giles Ecclestone's words, that the Church's 'troubled
conscience' reasserted itself.1
1 See Section 11.3.
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SECTION IV: CONCLUSION
The introduction to this works claims it as an empirical study of the Church of England's
activities and attitudes with regard to Rhodesia and South Africa during the 1970's. Section 1.1,
in which the theoretical foundations of the work are considered, suggests that it is based on two
hypotheses; the first of these is that, from the perspective of a Transnational paradigm, the Church
of England is capable of functioning as a world actor because, though nationally based, it is inter-
nationally operating; the second hypothesis is that despite the only true theoretical foundation of a
claim to status as a world actor resting on a Transnational view, the activities of those charged
with responsibility for the Church's foreign policy have inclined to the maintenance of a Realist
view of the state, power and policy priorities. Sections 1.2, 3 and 4 variously stress the condition-
ing by external environment, by tradition and by theological and philosophical underpinning
which would have made it a near impossibility for the Church not to involve itself in the prob-
lems of Southern Africa during the 1970's. Sections 1.5 and 6 examine the structure, present state
and increasing centralization of the Church of England as well as those personnel ultimately
responsible for its foreign policy. Sections II and ifi look in turn at Rhodesia and South Africa
and examine what those responsible for foreign policy said and did about the situation.
In drawing all these elements together in some final analyis it is necessaiy first of all to
observe that this work falls into two halves. This stems from the fact that the twin hypotheses
offered in Section 1.1 do not have the same status.
The first is drawn from the orthodox typology of possible International Relations paradigms
- during the past twenty five years Transnationalism has been extensively discussed in a theoreti-
cal sense and discrete corners of it have been intensively examined empirically. Thus in this
work, which can draw on the work of others, the hypothesis put forward, that the Church of Eng-
land is capable within a Transnational world view of being a significant international actor, has
deductive status.
The second hypothesis however, that the world view and mode of operation of those respon-
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sible for Church foreign policy was essentially Realist during the 1970's, is inductive in nature. It
is internal to this work and occurred to the author as a possible hypothesis only as the empirical
research progressed. Its validation is regarded as no less significant than that of the first
hypothesis, and it is in fact considerably more interesting, but its status explains the underlying
structure of this thesis.
This structure, a reflection of the research process itself, is based on the author's initial
expectation that the Church of England would be found to be an actor, of greater or lesser
significance, on the world stage; that certain historical, experiential and theological factors would
incline it to participation in issues which, in state terms, could be labelled foreign policy; that
these factors would operate particularly strongly in the case of countries which were part of the
old British Empire and which remained part of the Anglican Communion. Sections 1.2 to 4
demonstrate how far these initial expectations were borne out and can hold as little surprise for
the reader as did their research for the writer.
Section 1.5 however reflects the questions which began to occur early in the research process
about the nature of the Church's involvement and the values which underlay it, values which, it
came to be seen, were not simply those of a mediated Biblical or Church authority nor yet of
human rights as a commonly used shorthand for these. Both of the latter were present, both of
them were important, but they were themselves mediated through an Establishment, power-
orientated and balance of power perspective. Section L5 reveals the constraints of structure,
morale and economics which facilitated the emergence of a foreign policy programme which
reflected such views. It also reflects a change of expectation in the research process, a change
which should perhaps have been unnecessaiy given even a layman's knowledge about the close-
ness of the Church of England to State and Government. The author's initial expectation had been
however that the manifest antipathy of many Government Ministers for the Church's activities
and pronouncements in recent years was occasioned by a resolutely, if often privately expressed
and unpublicized, independent stance on most policy issues by the Church. As far as foreign pol-
icy was concerned during the 1970s this was not the case at all and this is demonstrated in Section
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1.6.
The structure of the IAC, its membership, its relatively infrequent meetings, the lack of con-
tinuity of attendance because of its members' other commitments made it near-inevitable that its
day to day rimning would be by its executive staff. Thus the interests and personal orientations of
these staff are thrown into prominence and particularly those of the IAC's Secretary, from 1972 to
1980 Hugh Hanning.
There is no doubt whatsoever about Hugh Hanning's personal integrity or devotion to the
Church of England. He was appointed because he was what he was; he had a particular sort of
experience, particular contacts, a ready-made set of interests. Therefore to attach any blame to
him for being and doing what he had always been and done is unjust.
It is not unjust however to ask whether the analysis that his particular interesis and expertise
were what the Church needed was accurate. It is suggested that it was not. This work certainly
rests on the designation of the Church of England as a transnational organization but such a desig-
nation is highly simplistic if it does not go on to ask what form this organization takes and what
type of contribution is made to the transnational community. It is suggested that there was an
essential disfunction between the type of distinctive contribution which a church ought to make,
because it is the only type of organization which can do so, and the type of contribution which the
Church of England was making. This contribution was in many cases not distinctively Christian
and made the Church vulnerable to criticism as a satellite of state policy.
Sections II and ifi examine the activities and pronouncements of the IAC in Rhodesia and
South Africa and it is suggested that they bear out and illustrate the contentions made above while
also demonstrating the importance of the factors of history, expeiience and theology examined in
earlier chapters.
Incidents which illustrate the Committee's methods of working have been highlighted. The
extent and type of contacts used to facilitate policy or to gain publicity for it have been demon-
strated. Assumptions which appear to have underpinned policy decisions have been examined as
have the preferences over both personnel and programmes which have frequently been
- 279 -
demonstrated.
Policies have sometimes been questioned. Most important here in the context of Rhodesia
was the refusal to recognize the support enjoyed by ZANTJ and ZAPU, the early preference for
influencing Ian Smith to accept internal change and the subsequent support for Bishop Muzorewa.
All of these, in conjunction with the reactionary position of the Anglican Church in Rhodesia,
contributed to the discrediting of the Church of England's own position there.
In the context of South Africa the pivot of LAC policy on behalf of the Church of England
was the assumption of the desirability of evolutionary rather than revolutionary change and, as a
vehicle for attaining this, the adoption of a policy of attempting to influence British firms in South
Africa to improve the pay, working and living conditions of their black African workers. This
policy was preferred to that of disinvestment which the WCC and, ultimately, the BCC supported.
The two situations differ because that in RhodesiajZimbabwe is now resolved, indeed was
resolved in the last year of the decade under examination. Hindsight can enable an analyst to be
unpleasantly seifrighteous but, while wishing to avoid this position, it is thought justifiable to
comment critically on certain aspects of the Church's policy and position formation over Rho-
desia.
Where Church of England divergence from the previously united BCC line, that any Rhode-
sian settlement had to encompass the Six Principles is concerned, it is reasonable to ask why and
how this divergence took place. The timing, 1972, the use of Establishment contacts and the quot-
ing of Government views all indicate that Hugh Hanning, appointed in that year Secretary of the
IAC, was responsible.
Nothing came of the Pearce Proposals or of the initiatives surrounding them and the
incident is therefore not important substantively. It is significant however in marking a departure
from a hitherto unified BCC line and a beginning of a much closer identification of the IAC, and
therefore in some circumstances the Church of England, with the views of Government and of
Establishment generally. These developments in turn prevented the presentation of a valid, united
British Church view, which would itself have been a useful weapon in foreign affairs issues; they
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also alienated the Church of England from much radical thought and opinion.
The Church of England's relationship with the WCC, problematical for some years, was
also affected adversely by the situation in Rhodesia. The WCC's decision to make grants to
groups involved in the struggle against racism in 1970 had offended many in the Church of Eng-
land and, such was the resentment, £1000 was deducted from Synod's grant to the WCC in 1974.
' It was inevitable therefore that the announcement of grants to guerila groups in Rhodesia in 1978
would cause considerable indignation on grounds of principle as well as of the belief that this was
meddling in Britain's affairs.
The arguments used to justify or vilify these grants have already been rehearsed and it is
unnecessary to repeat them, but it should be said that more was at issue here than the situation in
Rhodesia. As the brief resumé in Section 1.2 indicated, the WCC over the past thirty years has
moved away from domination by Western and European culture and belief patterns to domination
by members from, what may loosely be designated, The Third World.
The Established Church of England does not fit easily into the new system of priorities and
politico-religious attitudes; mutual incomprehension of opposing points of view is frequent. This
is demonstrated by the frequent difficulty which those who represented the Church of England at
the WCC found in conveying WCC views to Synod in acceptable terms. More specifically it was
demonstrated by the visit of Synod members to Geneva in 1978 where no understanding at all
was found of the difficulties which its own culture and history made for the Church of England in
accepting the apparent validation of violence.
In this situation fault attaches to both or to neither party, but it is fair to say that, as ex-
colonial status was a common denominator for many members of the WCC the Church of
England's closeness to State was a cause of mistrust and incomprehension. As has already been
indicated, the LAC at this lime was very much part of this Church/State nexus and undoubtedly
attracted criticism for its methods of working from those already suspicious of its structural con-
straints.
-281-
Without doubt the main plank of the Church's policy in Rhodesia was the proposal to set up
a Third Party Peacekeeping Force there. This was one of the issues which Hugh Hanning brought
with him as a ready-made policy option when he joined the IAC in 1972 and was part of his more
general interest in the peaceful uses of military forces. It was no worse for such an origin and
indeed the similarity of the arrangements which were made in Rhodesia to oversee the period of
interim government before the second election in 1980 to those consistently advocated by the
IAC might be seen in themselves as justification.
It is possible however to comment on how little reflection took place on the underlying
theological and philosophical implications of mobilizing such a force. It would be foolish to
advocate such a basis as the only one on which a church can act but it is reasonable to suggest
that any situational position should be mediated through that perspective which is particular and
perhaps unique to religious organizations.
The underlying conifict of interest under debate here is that between peace and justice,
which has already been discussed at some length in the substantive chapter on Rhodesia. It is sug-
gested that this debate underpinned, if not overtly, any decision over whether or not to employ a
Peacekeeping Force, particularly when this was suggested as appropriate at a stage in the conifict
when it would in fact have served the purpose of preserving the status quo. The decision that a
Peacekeeping Force would serve a useful purpose in Rhodesia was taken without any comprehen-
sive debate on the relative value to be laid on justice and peace, on the possibility that the two
were incompatible in the circumstances of Rhodesia, on the likelihood that one would have to
give way to the other and, if this were the case, which should yield.
It is perfectly possible that if such a debate had taken place a similar policy decision might
have been taken. For much of the decade it was not unreasonable to believe that a middle, yet an
African, way was possible in the form of Bishop Muzorewa. If he genuinely had been considered
the true representative of majority African opinion then a Peacekeeping force to protect his
government from unsanctioned violence was a reasonable policy option. Thus it is not the Out-
come but the lack of consultation and reflection in the decision-making process which should
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attract criticism.
It is reasonable also to criticise the IAC's information gathering process as discriminatory
according to preferred source. The status and attitudes of the Anglican Church in Rhodesia were
known, thus the views of the Bishops of Mashonaland and Matabeleland should have been treated
with caution as a partial and unrepresentative view. Instead they were accorded considerable
weight, and this was despite the counterview presented by their own Archbishop and despite the
alternative and reputable sources of alternative information which were consistently presented to
the IAC.
One is here forced to conclude that the IAC was listening to those views which best
accorded with its members preferences. A victory for a moderate group was desirable as avoiding
both bloodshed and the spread of communism, therefore WCC support for the guerrilla groups
was to be deplored as encouraging their victory both materially and psychologically. Hence total
condemnation of the WCC grants by figures as reputable as the two Rhodesian bishops was wel-
comed and not sufficiently questioned.
Much emphasis has been laid on the failure of the IAC and its executive to bring a
specifically Church orientated analyis to the situations with which they were faced in Rhodesia.
This criticism is thrown into particular relief when one considers the Lancaster House Conference
where the contribution of members of the JAC, using a network of well-disposed contacts, was
extensive, useful and clearly identifiable as Church originated.
Much of what the IAC had previously labelled mediation had in fact been contact-making
and maintenance among preferred politicians in Rhodesia but Lancaster House broke new ground.
There seems to have been a genuine agnosticism about outcome, or perhaps this was fatalism,
and a desire merely to promote as many cross-party contacts as possible. This was both to facili-
tate a settlement and to provide a basis for future co-operation in the new state of Zimbabwe. As
usual no analyis of underlying principles appears to have been undertaken but it may perhaps be
suggested that a theology of compromise as well as a setting aside of power-political considera-
tions might provide such principles.
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In conclusion on the subject of Rhodesia it would be totally unfair to give the impression
that the IAC was a bastion of reaction in a general climate of progressive Anglican thought. It is
true that some members of Synod, of the BSR and even of the IAC itself disapproved of the pre-
vailing line and methodology; it is true that the BCC was consistently more radical and more
thoughtful; it is true that the WCCs policy was radically opposed to that of the IAC. But it is also
true, and should be remembered when one considers how far distant from rank and file some
leadership groups become, that the JAC's views bore a marked similarity to those of many ordi-
nary Church members.
Section 1.5 has demonstrated the markedly unradical nature of the Church of England as a
whole, both in personnel and membership. Many Church members were, and are, atypical of the
population as a whole by both age and class, and among them were concentrated many who had
reminiscent views of Empire and its civilizing possibilities, sympathized to varying degrees with
'our kith and kin' and did not like communism. It would have been remarkably difficult for the
IAC to welcome the grants to guerrilla groups, even if its members had the slightest personal
desire to do so, because of the groundswell of opposition from the rank and file.
Thus it is to an extent difficult to criticize a servant committee of the Church for not being
more radical than the Church it served. This is to ignore however the radical nature of much of
the social research and recommendation that came from other member committees of the BSR
and to also to ignore the perhaps contentious stricture of Peter Haynes, Secretary of the IAC from
1980 (in a personal interview in January 1985) that the central organs of the Church exist not only
to serve but to educate.
Unlike the crisis in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe the situation in South Africa remains unresolved
and one is not therefore allowed the comfort of using an outcome as the basis of critical analysis.
However the recent rapprochement, assailable though it most definitely is, between the President
of the Republic of South Africa and the ANC since the freeing of Nelson Mandela might be said
to offer some degree of ex-post hoc justification to those, like the IAC, who always resisted
comprehensive sanctions as it has come about with a very partial use of sanctions. Others might
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well judge this view to be simplistic however in that those selective financial penalties, in terms
of denial of investment capital, which the unreformed economy in South Africa increasingly
incurred were seminal ones.
Moreover, if one is seeking to judge in terms of recent developments, the more recent out-
break of black on black violence in South Africa and the general position of Inkatha and Chief
Buthelezi with reference to this, one might suggest that the IAC's designation of Buthelezi as the
best way forward for South African blacks was also somewhat simplistic.
Both of the judgements above are themselves inadequate and may well be superceded but,
while it is not legitimate to condemn the Church of England's policy of resisting disinvestment, it
is reasonable to criticize it on the same basis as some of the Rhodesian policies. One can ask
therefore whether the way in which policy was formulated was consultative enough and represen-
tative enough of informed Church thinking. It is suggested that the answer here is no.
No profound analysis of what a distinctively Christian stance should be was undertaken
until the end of the decade and by comparison with BCC papers Church of England ones were
light on theology and heavy on logistics and power politics. It is not suggested that a different
policy should necessarily have been adopted. There is distinctive and long-recognized Christian
value in avoiding conflict and promoting peace and it may well be that a multi-facetted study of
the situation would still have preferred a policy of evolution and compromise. What is suggested
is that, without comprehensive study of possible options, the Church of England's policy was
open to criticism as an amalgamation of personal preference, unwillingness to rock the Govern-
ment boat and a preoccupation with the balance of power consequences of allowing too much
Eastern bloc influence to grow in Southern Africa. In other words the distinctive factors which
should have distinguished decision making in a church were once again lacking.
In the absence of a thorough, overt analysis of the basis of alternative policy options it is
necessary to explore the documentary evidence for signs of underlying belief and motivation.
Thus it is clear that not only a preference for a non-violent solution informed Church attitudes and
policies but also the conviction that thoroughgoing political and social change could be brought
-285-
about by economic means. This may perhaps be the case, though the efforts of the JAC might be
thought to have been directed more to the alieviation of the discomforts of petty apartheid than to
the removal of apartheid per se and to have ignored a fundamental fact of economic life, that
firms in South Africa had a vested interest in maintaining reasonable working relations with the
Government there.
One is forced to reiterate the argument that the Church should have been enabled to make an
honest choice of policy after thorough and informed debate. A Working Party on Investment in
South Africa was certainly set up in 1974 but it never considered disinvestment as an option and
even the working papers provided for its first meeting presupposed a consensus for influence
through investment rather than disinvestment. ifrench-Beytagh's ideas, his co-operation with
Adam Raphael in the Guardian exposé of South African wages, the evidence given to the Rogers
Committee were all in themselves laudable but the suppositions on which they were based had
never been examined. Despite claims that the TAC was merely information seeking on behalf of
the Church the Polaroid view, as Hanning himself called it, where existing investments were used
to gain leverage, became de facto Church policy. Moreover it was defended vigorously by Hugh
Hnning, Maurice Chandler, the Church Commissioners and members of the Central Board of
Finance who most definitely did not see it as an information gathering exercise.
The situation produced a number of unfortunate results. It called seriously into question the
genuineness of the Church of England's opposition to apartheid; ringing declarations followed by
behind the scenes manoeuvring with government departments presented an ambivalent face. This
combined in an unfortunate way with a barely hidden sympathy with the white South African
position amongst some members of the Church at large which was frequently demonstrated too in
Synod debates. If the position of the Church of England had deviated from that of the WCC
because exhaustive consultation and thought had produced a distinctive policy behind which the
Church could be seen to be united much less mistrust would have been generated. As it was the
situation was marked by behind the scenes contacts with government and business, by failure to
consider the increasingly numerous calls amongst South African black leaders for a policy of
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disinvestment to be considered and by support for the one black leader in South Africa who both
maintained a dialogue with the South African Government and encouraged investment.
Support for Chief Buthelezi was tied up with the investment question generally and with the
IAC's support for the use of Intermediate Technology in South Africa. This was seen to be partic-
ularly applicable to the Homelands and investment of this kind was supported by Buthelezi in
Kwa Zulu. A policy of encouraging Homelands investment was frequently defended on the basis
that it amounted to humanitarian aid and that no church could stand by while people starved.
However this begged the fundamental question of whether economic investment in the Home-
lands accepted a societal structure imposed by the white Government of South Africa. It ignored
the possible solution of alieviating hardship by channelling aid through South African Church
organizations, which would have avoided giving aid and comfort to artificial state structures
created to maintain and widen the effects of apartheid. Moreover the possibility that the structure
of the Homelands, as of the South African state as a whole, imposed a form of structural violence
on the black people of South Africa was never raised, let alone explored.
Once again criticism may perhaps be levelled more at the easy assimilation of this policy
into the IAC rubric than at the policy itself. Intermediate Technology was part of the package of
personal policies which travelled to the IAC with Hugh Hanning and it was placed before the
Committee as a valuable aid to development in South Africa, thence uncritically adopted. As a
result the Church was yet again vulnerable to criticism for the adoption of a policy whose impli-
cations remained unexplored, yet which appeared to some in the outside world to be part of a
package which ignored the legitimate aspirations of black people.
It was in its dealings with the Christian Institute of South Africa, in its protests over ban-
ning orders and confiscation of passports, in its pleas for the lives of those condemned to death
for politically motivated acts of violence that the Church of England was seen at its best. Its
activities were unexceptionable and uncriticised here, except of course by the South African
Government, because they met expectation of what a church's activities ought to be. Such actions
sprang not simply from a theologically based regard for human life and for freedom but from an
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instinctive reaction against the abrogation of human rights founded on the freedom of the indivi -
dual.
It is suggested that dichotomy in human rights thinking between those rights founded on the
individual and those founded on community is mirrored in microcosm in the work and thinking
of influential members of the IAC. They were instinctively at home in issues which involved the
abrogation of the former but uncomprehending of the complications involved in establishing the
rights of the latter. A plea that an individual should have freedom of speech and movement
restored to him presented no problems, its foundation was so culturally comprehensible as to need
not even articulation; the possibility however that the very structure of a state might itself violate
the rights of a community within it to an extent which might justify the use of violence against
that state and its representatives was culturally alien. This is well illusirated by attitudes to Home-
land development where the possibility that individuals might go hungry or individual children
lack education of the most rudimentary sort was thought unconscionable; the possibility that
long-term community good might entail the denial of these short-term individual benefits was not
even considered.
There are a number of factors which draw together the situations in Rhodesia and South
Africa. Most fundamentally they both attracted attention for the same reason - both were crises
and both were areas of traditional British responsibility.
Section 1.1 made clear how historical ties of empire and empire-wide Anglicanism have
been transformed into contemporary ties depending on the Anglican Communion. Moreover the
numerous personal contacts of clergy and laity, a sense of solidarity with 'kith and kin' and a
lingering sense of responsibility and guilt for empire variously maintain a sense of vested interest
in Rhodesia and South Africa.
Section 1.5 made clear how shortage of money and staff made the activities of the IAC
something of a fire-fighting operation; resources did not exist to make wide-ranging policy deci-
sions at leisure but, rather, crises were dealt with as they arose. It may well be that greater avail-
able resources would have enabled fuller and earlier planning and the development of a set of
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coherent policy responses which transcended individual situations.
Shortage of money was also a major factor in the development of a situation where a Com-
mittee like the IAC was able to function so independently of the Church as a whole and even of
its central organization. In appointing Hugh Haiming as Secretary they acquired in one man a set
of ready-made policies and the contact networks to go with them; this undoubtedly saved time,
money and personnel in the development and implementation of ideas, but it did lead, as this
thesis has shown, to an uncritical assumption of a set of unconnected and largely unexamined p01-
icies. Some of these were a good fit with Church orientations and a Christian viewpoint, some
were irrelevant, some were unsuitable.
Money was not the only factor here however because the Church of England's structural
and cultural proximity to State led both to the appoiniment of certain sorts of personnel and to the
acceptability of a state-orientated viewpoint which might be thought, on a philosophical or theo-
logical level, to have little connection with traditional Christian beliefs. In practical terms this
dichotomy is demonstrated well by comparison between the expressed views of Archbishop Ram-
sey and those consistently advocated by the IAC. In his speech at Cambridge in February 1972
the Archbishop said "... we must realize that any attitude on our part towards either violent or
non-violent policies is going to be very costly for us if we try to be Christian. If we say to Afri-
cans 'do not act rashly, a violent revolution is likely only to bring to yourselves terrible suffer-
ing', we are saying in effect 'go on accepting your present suffering', and we can say that to any
people only if we somehow are ready to suffer with them." There is little hint that such self-
questioning informed the deliberations of the IAC.
Thus one comes full circle and contemplates again an organization which, if analyzed in a
Transnational paradigm, is a world actor, of the supporting variety certainly but fitted to act in a
certain way and to articulate certain views effectively amongst other organizations and states.
This actor however, by its own structural, cultural and historical constraints, assumed for the most
part the role of chorus in a state-centric, status-quo scenario.
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APPENDIX TO SECTION 1.6: MEMBERSHIP OF THE IAC
The compositon of the IAC was as follows:-
Chainnan, appointed by the Chairman of the BSR.
10 members appointed by the Board on the recommendation of the
outgoing Committee.
5 members of a Migration Committee. This Committee met separately and reported when neces-
sary to the main Committee. Its work, assisting the resettlement of migrant Anglicans, gradually
contracted over the decade and it was eventually phased out.
A panel of Parliamentary and Ecumenical Consultants.
In 1972 membership of the LAC was as follows. Members of the Migration Committee are
excluded.
Maurice Chandler, Chairman
The Provost of Portsmouth
Rear Admiral Sir Anthony Buzzard




Rev. Canon John Oates
E.L. Mallalieu, QC, ME'
John Selwyn Gununer, ME'
Frank Judd, MP
Nicholas Scott, ME'
Rev. Hugh Wilcox, Secretary BCC International Department
Rev. Cyril Firth
Rev. Elliott Kendall, Community and Race Relations Unit, BCC
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Rt. Rev. Cecil John Patterson
The following list of members is at January 1975. Membership altered again from time to time -
the representative from the FCO for example moved abroad and was replaced by a colleague.
However this particular lineup gives a further indication of the typical professional and occupa-
tional composition of the Committee.
Maurice Chandler, Chainnan




Rev. Hugh Wilcox, BCC
Miss Ruth Anstey, Conference of British Missionary Societies
Rev. R. Elliott Kendall, Community and Race Relations Unit, BCC
Kenneth Johnstone
Rev. Canon John Oates, Previous Secretary to the Committee
Rev. Canon M.M. Haniond Moore, one of the Archbishop of Canterbury's
Counsellors on Foreign Relations
Sir Douglas Dodds Parker
Rt. Rev. B.N.Y. Vaughan
Giles Ecclestone, Secretary to the BSR
Hugh Hanning, Secretary to the IAC
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